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sec  /no, 712 

o 

Mead,  Charles 

Marsh, 

1836- 

1911. 

Supernatural 

revelation 

LECTURES 

ON    THE    L.    P.    STONE     FOUNDATION 


DELIVERED   AT 


PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY. 


SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION: 

CONCERNING  THE  BASIS  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN  FAITH. 


BY 

C.  M.  MEAD,  Ph.D.,  D.D., 

LATELY    PROFESSOR    IN    ANDOVER    THEOLOGICAL    SEMINARY. 


NEW  YORK: 
ANSON    D.    F.  RANDOLPH  AND    CO. 


Copyright,  1S89, 
By    C.    M.    Mead. 


University  Press: 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  CAMiiRiDGE. 


PREFACE. 


T  T  is  not  unfrequently  said  that  no  one  is  convinced  by  an 
-*-  apologetic  treatise,  that  infidels  will  remain  infidels  in 
spite  of  all  arguments,  and  that  therefore  such  works  as  the 
one  now  given  to  the  public  are  useless.  Christian  living  and 
experience,  it  is  said,  not  argumentation,  is  what  must  be 
depended  on  as  a  means  of  convincing  men  of  the  truth  and 
value  of  Christianity. 

But  it  is  obvious  to  reply  that  Christian  apologetics,  in  its 
general  scope,  includes  the  statement  of  what  is  involved  in 
Christian  experience.  If  one  cannot  give  a  reason  concerning 
the  hope  that  is  in  him,  it  is  not  unnatural  for  the  doubter  to 
conclude  that  there  is  no  good  reason  for  the  hope.  Even 
though  the  doubter  may  not  be  converted  by  the  Christian's 
reasons,  he  should  at  least  not  be  confirmed  by  the  Christian's 
silence. 

It  should  be  considered,  however,  that  there  are  large  num- 
bers of  persons  who,  in  their  attitude  towards  Christianity, 
cannot  be  reckoned  as  decidedly  on  the  one  side  or  on  the 
other.  Whether  through  ignorance  or  through  conflict  of  in- 
clinations, they  are  in  a  state  of  mind  which  craves  a  clear, 
simple,  and  candid  exposition  of  the  truth  as  it  appears  to  those 
who  are  more  positive  in  their  convictions.  No  one  mode  of 
presenting  Christian  truth  is  fitted  to  meet  all  the  manifold 
phases  of  skepticism.      New  statements,  adapted  to  the  new 


vi  PREFACE. 

and  ever-changing  forms  of  tlie  old  doubts  and  questionings, 
must  always  be  called  for  ;  and  every  such  statement  does  its 
part  in  the  contest  between  truth  and  error. 

In  the  following  treatise  I  have  endeavored  to  discuss,  in  a 
plain  and  intelligible  manner,  some  of  the  leading  questions 
towards  which  religious  thought  is  at  present  most  apt  to  turn, 
aiming  not  merely  to  parry  the  attacks  of  outright  enemies  of 
Christianity,  but  also  here  and  there  to  rectify  what  seem  to 
me  to  be  infelicitous  or  erroneous  statements  on  the  part  of 
professed  Christians.  In  so  doing  I  am  far  from  presuming  to 
be  infallible,  and  desire  the  arguments  and  expositions  to  rest 
on  their  merit,  as  tested  by  the  ultimate  judgment  of  enlight- 
ened Christians. 

In  referring  to  the  opinions  of  others,  whether  by  way  of 
approbation  or  of  criticism,  I  have  sought  to  be  fair  and  appre- 
ciative, and  to  aim  at  such  a  treatment  of  views  divergent  from 
my  own  as  to  promote  an  eventual  accord  rather  than  to 
intensify  the  disagreement.  It  is  not  necessary  to  justify  the 
choice  I  have  made  of  books  to  be  noticed  or  commented  on. 
I  will  only  say,  respecting  one  work  which  is  frequently 
referred  to  (my  friend  Professor  Ladd's  Doctrine  of  Sacred 
Scripture),  that,  although  I  have  felt  constrained  in  some  in- 
stances to  dissent  more  or  less  positively  from  his  conclusions, 
I  desire  for  tliat  very  reason  to  express  my  warm  admiration, 
not  only  of  the  scholarly  thoroughness,  ability,  and  candor, 
but  also  of  the  reverent  and  Christian  spirit,  which  characterize 
the  work.  Our  points  of  agreement  are  far  more  numerous  and 
important  than  those  of  difference. 

The  quotations  from  the  Bible  are  generally  worded  accord- 
ing to  the  Revised  Version. 

These  lectures  were  delivered  at  Princeton  in  February  and 
March,  1889.     For  the  sake  of  accuracy  it  should  be  stated 


PREFACE.  vii 

that  on  account  of  the  prescribed  limitations  of  time,  hardly  a 
half  of  the  contents  of  this  volume  could  be  given  in  the  six 
lectures  of  the  L.  P.  Stone  course. 

As  one  contribution  to  the  many  testimonies  in  favor  of 
Christian  truth,  it  is  hoped  that  this  volume  may  not  prove  to 
be  unserviceable. 

C.  M.  MEAD. 

September,  1889. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ORIGIISr    OF    THE    THEISTIC    BELIEF. 

Page 
Character  of  existing  skepticism.  Tendency  to  anti-supernaturalism  and 
atheism.  The  theistic  problem.  I.  Origin  of  theistic  belief  in  the  indi- 
vidual. The  belief  comes  from  tradition.  II.  Knowledge  in  general 
a  social  matter,  as  regards  (1)  historical  and  scientific  truths;  (2)  the 
objects  of  direct  perception;  (3)  the  training  of  the  faculties;  (4)  the 
advance  in  scientific  acquisitions ;  (5)  the  apprehension  of  intuitive 
truths;  (6)  the  adoption  of  theistic  notions.  III.  Yet  individual  cog- 
nition must  precede  the  ti-ansmission  of  knowledge.  1.  Testimony  of 
other  men  cannot  be  accepted  till  first  the  existence  of  other  men  is 
assumed.  2.  The  material  world  must  be  cognized  by  the  individual 
before  there  can  be  a  general  knowledge  of  its  existence.  3.  All  that  is 
truly  known  must  be  assumed  to  have  been  originally  an  object  of  direct 
perception.  4.  Intuitive  truths  cannot  be  accepted  merely  on  testimony. 
5.  Theism,  if  valid,  must  depend  on  something  more  than  testimony. 
IV.  Sure  knowledge  results  from  a  combination  of  individual  cogni- 
tions. Individual  cognition  is  the  prior  thing,  but  does  not  become  free 
from  the  suspicion  of  illusion  till  confirmed  by  others 1-19 


CHAPTER  II. 

GROUNDS    OF    THE   THEISTIC    BELIEF. 

"What  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  theism  ?  It  has  a  double  foundation. 
I.  Theism  springs  from  native  impulses  of  the  mind.  What  leads  to 
the  persistent  defense  of  theism  presumably  operative  in  producing  it. 
Hence,  1.  The  hjqw theses  which  derive  theism  from  dreams,  fear,  etc., 
groundless.  They  overlook  the  fact  requiring  explanation,  namely,  the 
persistent  tendency  to  believe  in  a  God.  So  the  Eitschl  theory  that 
theism  sprung  from  a  sense  of  weakness  and  want.  2.  TheLsm  not  a 
direct  intuition.  3.  The  presumption  is  in  favor  of  theism  as  over 
against  atheism.  4.  The  argument  for  theism  as  seen  in  the  light  of 
the  legitimate  consequences  of  adoi)ting  atheism.  On  the  atheistic  hy- 
pothesis  the  universe  is  aimless  and  meaningless.  Free  will  and  moral 
character  impossible.  Truth  and  error  equally  authoritative.  So  Her- 
bert Spencer's  doctrine.  Knowledge  being  held  to  be  only  relative,  all 
so-called  knowledge  becomes  merely  a  series  of  impressions.     The  fact  of 


CONTENTS. 

Page 
error  and  ignorance  suggests  the  existence  of  an  Intelligence  which  is 
without  error  or  ignorance.  The  origin  of  intelligence.  Relation  of 
morality  to  atheistic  conceptions.  Atheism  cannot  explain  the  moral 
sense  either  as  regards  its  origin,  its  present  working,  or  its  ultimate 
end.  Logical  issue  of  atheism  is  utter  indifference  to  the  general  welfare. 
Futility  of  the  notion  of  moral  order  on  atheistic  basis.  All  life  a  farce 
unless  there  is  a  God.  And  the  farce  must  be  infinitely  repeated.  The 
general  result  is  that  the  mind  of  man  demands  that  the  universe  shall 
have  an  end,  and  a  good  end.  The  teleological  and  the  moral  arguments 
not  the  source  of  a  belief  in  God,  but  rest  on  the  belief.  The  belief 
springs  fi'om  a  tendency  to  assume  a  personal  moral  Power  who  directs 
the  affairs  of  the  universe.  Agnostic  objections  futile.  II.  Revelation 
as  confirmatory  of  theistic  impulses.  Revelation  useless  without  a  the- 
istic  tendency.  Belief  in  a  God  involves  a  desire  for  a  revelation.  Reve- 
lation, when  it  is  received,  a  surer  ground  of  knowledge  than  the  theistic 
arguments.  Example  of  the  ordinary  Christian.  Theism  cannot  thrive 
without  faith  in  a  revelation.  The  objection  from  the  multiplicity  of 
alleged  revelations 20-64 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   QUESTION    OF   A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION. 

The  question  not  how  the  first  theistic  notion  arose.  Dr.  A.  M.  Fairbairn's 
argument  against  the  hypothesis  of  a  primeval  revelation.  Relation  of 
language  to  revelation.  Essential  uniiiueness  of  the  condition  of  pri- 
meval man.  Evolutionism  does  not  remove  the  uniqueness.  The  problem 
as  it  presents  itself  to  the  theist.  How  is  the  aboriginal  conscience  to  be 
conceived  ?  Present  analogies  favor  the  theory  of  a  supernatural  revela- 
tion. Dr.  Fairbairn's  notion  of  an  "atheism  of  consciousness."  Does 
God  desire  to  be  known  ?  Alleged  impossibility  of  a  primeval  revelation. 
Pfleiderer's  argument.  View  of  Theodore  Parker  and  F.  W.  Newman. 
Misconceptions  of  what  a  revelation  is  expected  to  do.  Pfleiderer  again. 
Alleged  gradualness      development  of  theistic  ideas 65-86 


CHAriER  IV. 

THE    CHRISTIAN    REVELATION.  —  GENERAL     FEATURES. — 
MIRACLES    DEFINED. 

The  argument  for  Chri-stianity  may  relate  to  contents  or  to  form.  Three 
points  ill  the  latter  case  :  I.  Revelation  limited  to  a  particular  time. 
J.  S.  Mill's  objection.  Reply.  Notion  of  an  absolute  religion.  Revela- 
tion no  more  universal  and  individual  than  the  communication  of  knowl- 
edge in  general.  Relation  of  .sin  to  revelation.  II.  Necessity  of  putting 
peculiar  confidence  in  individuals,  especially  in  Jesus  Christ.  Objection 
to  thi.s.  Rei)ly.  Men  naturally  crave  leaders.  III.  Revelation  involves 
the  as.sumption  of  a  supernatural  agency.  Miracles  defined.  1.  Over- 
statements. Miracles  not  violations  or  transgressions  of  natural  laws. 
Uume's  doctrine  considered.     "Supernatural  Religion."     Professed  the- 


CONTENTS.  xi 

Page 
ists' objections  to  miracles.  C.  H.  Weisse's.  Rothe's  reply.  Ancient  and 
present  conception  of  natural  forces.  2.  Under-statements.  Miracles 
explained  as  accelerations  of  natural  processes ;  or  as  analogous  to  mes- 
meric effects;  or  as  wrought  with  the  co-operation  of  natural  forces  (Pro- 
fessor Ladd ) ;  or  as  the  result  of  occult  natural  causes.  3.  The  distinc- 
tion between  absolute  and  relative  miracles.  Different  forms  of  it.  The 
distinction  untenable.     Special  providences.     Answers  to  prayer     .       87-123 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE    EVIDENTIAL    VALUE    OF    MIRACLES. 

Miracles  commonly  regarded  as  attestations  of  the  organs  of  revelation.  Re- 
actionary view.  Tendency  to  question  the  use  of  miracles.  I.  Is  faith 
in  miracles  a  matter  of  indifference  ?  Various  shades  of  view  here  in- 
cluded. The  objection  to  the  common  view  stated.  Reply  :  1.  The 
agnostic  view  conflicts  with  faitli  in  Christianity  as  a  special  revelation. 
Pfleiderer's  conception  of  Jesus'  inspiration  considered.  Abuse  of  the 
term  "revelation."  2.  The  skeptical  view  leads  to  confusion  and  self- 
contradiction  as  regards  the  uniqueness  and  authority  of  Jesus  Christ. 
No  explanation  of  the  uniqueness  on  naturalistic  grounds.  Jesus'  claim 
of  authority  not  explained  by  his  unique  excellence.  Ritschl's  view. 
Herrmann's  view  considered.  The  Ritschl  doctrine  of  miracles.  3. 
Skeptical  Christians,  in  attempting  to  ignore  the  miraculous,  virtually 
admit  the  greater  miracles  while  they  deny  the  lesser.  In  admitting  the 
fact  of  a  special  revelation,  or  of  the  sinlessness  of  Christ,  they  admit 
the  miraculous  in  the  spiritual  world.  4.  The  agnostic  attitude  towards 
miracles  leads  to  caprice  in  the  treatment  of  the  New  Testament  records. 
Matthew  Arnold's  attempt  to  show  that  Jesus  claimed  no  miraculous 
power.  Denial  of  the  supernatural  leads  to  unfounded  conjectures  con- 
cerning the  miraculous  stories.  Mr.  Arnold's  theory  of  the  origin  of  the 
stories  of  miracles.  What  the  Jews  expected  in  the  Messiah.  Mr.  Arnold 
on  the  resurrection  stories.  5.  Doubting  the  miracles  leads  to  an  un- 
tenable distinction  between  the  present  and  the  original  Christians  in 
their  relation  to  the  evidences  of  Christianity.  How  far  there  is  a  real 
difference.  The  difference  not  material.  6.  The  agnostic  attitude 
towards  miracles  leads  to  the  assumption  that  Christianity  rests  on  a 
fraud.  General  admission  that  the  original  founding  of  the  Church  de- 
pended on  a  belief  in  Christ's  resurrection 124-172 


CHAPTER  VL 

THE    EVIDENTIAL    VALUE    OF    MIRACLES    {Continued). 

Does  faith  in  Christianity  depend  on  antecedent  faith  in  the  alleged 
miracles  of  Chiist  ?  Difficulty  of  overcoming  the  presumption  against 
miracles.  Something  needed  besides  the  miiacles  themselves.  Dr.  W.  M. 
Taylor's  contention  against  Trench.  His  argument  presupposes  that  the 
fact  of  miracles  is  proved  before  any  faith  in  the  miracle-worker  exists. 
Mhacles,  as  distinct  from  feats  of  jugglery,  cannot  be  proved  without 


xii  CONTEXTS. 

Pagb 

confidence  in  the  professed  miracle-worker.  Trench  on  Deut.  xiii.  1-5. 
Dr.  Taylor's  reply.  111.  The  evidential  value  of  miracles  cannot  be  de- 
tached from  the  personal  character  and  teachings  of  the  miracle-worker. 
But  the  miracles  are  nevertheless  evidential.  Examination  of  the  view 
that  the  miracles  of  Christ  were  mere  effluxes  of  his  nature,  and  not  as 
such  evidential.  On  this  view  miracles  are  not  needed  as  manifestations 
of  Christ's  character,  and  become  not  only  not  evidential,  but  embar- 
rassing. Miracles  of  the  apostles.  Why  are  Christ's  miracles  credited  ? 
Their  use  in  proving  Christ's  uniqueness  and  sinlessness.  The  disciples' 
confidence  in  Jesus'  faultlessness  and  divinity  not  fixed  till  after  the 
resurrection.  According  to  the  New  Testament  the  miracles  did  serve 
an  evidential  purpose.  Professor  Bruce's  contention  against  Mozley. 
Conclusion  :  Miracles  have  an  indispensable  evidential  worth,  but  not 
independent  of  the  evidence  derived  from  the  personal  character  and  doc- 
trine of  the  miracle-worker.  Advantages  of  this  view.  Relation  of  this 
view  to  the  importance  of  the  experimental  evidence.  Christian  morality: 
its  distinctive  features.  The  power  of  Christianity  depends  on  the  as- 
sumption of  its  supernaturalness 173-195 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PROOF    OF    THE    CHRISTIAN    MIRACLES. 

Proof  of  Christ's  resurrection.  1.  The  apostles  believed  that  Christ  rose 
from  the  dead  on  the  third  daj'  after  the  crucifixion.  2.  The  Cliristian 
Church  spread  rapidly  immediately  after  the  crucifixion.  3.  These  phe- 
nomena satisfactorily  explained  only  by  the  assumption  that  the  resurrec- 
tion was  a  fact.  Opposing  theories  :  (1)  That  Jesus  did  not  die,  but  only 
swooned,  on  the  cross.  (2)  That  the  story  of  the  resurrection  was  a  fic- 
tion. (3)  That  the  disciples  mistakenly  thought  the  resurrection  to  be 
real.  The  latter  the  most  plausible,  but  purely  conjectural.  Attempt 
to  establish  it  by  Paul's  testimony.  Reply:  Paul  affirms  the  fact  of  a 
bodily  appearance  of  the  crucified.  The  allegation  that  Paul's  sight  of 
Christ  was  a  vision.  What  is  a  vision  ?  A  vision  may  have  an  objective 
cause.  View  of  Schenkel,  Keim,  etc.,  considered.  Paul's  testimony  as 
confirmed  by  that  of  the  Gospels.  The  alleged  discrepancies.  Apostolic 
testimony  besides  Paul's.  II.  Proof  of  the  miracles  wrought  by  Christ. 
The  miraculous  penetrates  all  the  Gospel  history,  and  cannot  be  removed. 
Christ's  extraordinary  claims.  Specimen  of  the  efforts  to  exjjlain  away 
the  miracles.  The  miracles  of  healing.  Why  they  are  more  readily  be- 
lieved than  others.  Untenableness  of  the  notion  that  Christ  healed  by 
a  sort  of  magnetic  power  naturally  growing  out  of  his  superior  spiritu- 
ality. III.  May  the  New  Testament  miracles  be  critically  examined? 
The  character  of  the  alleged  miracle  as  a  criterion  of  its  reality.  Par- 
ticular miracles  that  are  offensive  to  some.  Need  of  caution  in  applying 
any  criterion.  IV.  General  conclusion.  The  supernatural  an  integral 
part  and  proof  of  the  Christian  religion.  Distinction  between  Jew  and 
Gentile  with  regard  to  the  evidence  of  Jesus'  Messiahship  ....      196-228 


CONTENTS.  Xiii 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE   RELATION    OF    CHKISTIANITY    TO    JUDAISM. 

Page 
Was  Christianity  the  fuliilment  of  all  religious  prophecies  and  liopes,  or  only 
of  the  Jewisli  ?  Burnoufs  theory  of  the  Aryan  origin  of  Christianity. 
Jesus  himself  was  a  Jew,  and  asserted  his  i-eligion  to  be  the  completion  of 
the  Mosaic  revelation.  Paul  affirms  the  same.  The  conclusion  unavoid- 
able. Connected  questions  :  1.  How  far  was  Christ  prophesied  of  by 
Moses  and  the  prophets?  Distinction  between  direct  and  indirect  prophe- 
cies. Marsh  and  Stuart  on  the  typical  theory.  Their  view  criticised. 
2.  How  far  does  Old  Testament  prophecy  authenticate  the  divinity  of  the 
Mosaic  and  Christian  revelations  ?  The  argument  as  compared  with  that 
from  miracles.  Apparent  weakness  of  the  argument.  Keasons  why 
minute  exactness  in  prophecy  should  not  be  expected,  (a)  The  main 
work  of  the  prophet  was  preaching,  not  prediction.  Criterion  for  the  in- 
terpretation of  predictions,  (b)  Minute  particularity  in  prediction  would 
cause  doubts  of  the  genuineness  of  the  prophecy.  (c)  Minuteness  of 
prediction  would  interfere  with  the  free  and  natural  course  of  things. 
(d)  Prophetic  language  needed  to  be  intelligible  to  the  immediate  hearers. 
It  was  colored  by  tlie  circumstances  of  the  prophet's  time.  The  strength 
of  the  argument  from  prophecy  is  in  the  combination  of  them,  and  their 
convergence  towards  Christ.  3.  How  far  does  the  New  Testament  au- 
thenticate the  miracles  recorded  in  the  Old  ?  No  radical  distinction 
between  the  miracles  of  the  two  Testaments.  But  the  possibility  of  the 
admission  of  apocryphal  stories  may  be  admitted.  In  general  the  refer- 
ences to  Old  Testament  miracles  in  the  New  imjjlies  that  Christ  and  the 
others  who  refer  to  them  regarded  them  as  genuine.  4.  How  far  does 
the  New  Testament  authenticate  the  Old  Testament  history?  In  general 
Christ  and  the  apostles  treat  this  history  as  genuine.  The  narratives  in 
Gen.  i.-iii.  considered.  Efforts  to  treat  them  as  poetic  or  allegoric. 
Authentication  of  authorship.  Jewish  traditions  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment           229-278 


CHAPTER   IX. 

THE    RECORD    OF    REVELATION.  INSPIRATION. 

The  distinction  between  revelation  and  the  record  of  it.  1.  Kevelation  prior 
and  superior  to  the  record.  2.  Revelation  more  important  than  the  in- 
spiration of  the  Biblical  writers.  3.  The  fact  of  revelation  not  proved  by 
prior  assumption  of  Biblical  inspiration.  Yet  (4)  there  is  substantial 
gi-ound  for  holding  to  the  doctrine  of  the  special  inspiration  of  the  Bible. 
Preliminary  remarks  :  (a)  Not  the  Scriptures,  but  the  Scriptural  writers, 
can  be  called  inspired,  (b)  The  Biblical  writers  were  conscious  and  re- 
sponsible in  the  act  of  writing,  (c)  The  product  of  the  inspiration  was 
human  as  well  as  divine,  (d)  The  inspiration  of  the  writers  not  superior 
to  that  of  the  recipients  of  the  revelation,  (c)  The  recipients  of  the  reve- 
lation not  more  inspired  when  writing  than  wlien  speaking.  Was  tlie 
inspiration  specifically  ditfereut  from  that  of  believers  in  general  ?     Ob- 


V  CONTENTS. 

Page 
jections  against  the  doctrine  of  such  difference  answered.  Arguments 
for  tlie  doctrine,  i.  Antecedent  probability  that  the  authors  of  books 
which  were  to  serve  so  ini}>ortant  a  purpose  would  be  specially  aided. 
ii.  The  general  opinion  of  Christendom  that  the  Scriptures  were  pecu- 
liarly inspired,  iii.  Testimony  of  the  Bible  itself.  Christ's  authority 
ultimate.  The  force  of  2  Tim.  iii.  16.  Other  representations  kindred 
to  this.  Rothe's  attempt  to  distinguish  between  Christ's  testimony  and 
that  of  the  apostles.     Some  objections  considered         279-317 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   AUTHORITY    OF    THE    SCRIPTURES. 

The  search  after  Christian  assurance.  Biblical  testimony  as  a  ground  of  cer- 
titude. The  two  methods  of  arguing  Biblical  infalliljility,  the  subjective 
and  the  objective.  General  considerations  :  1.  Christianity  not  the  off- 
spring either  of  man's  natural  consciousness  or  of  the  Bible.  2.  Neither 
human  opinion  nor  the  Bible  has  authority  over  the  Christian  Church. 
8.  A  normal  Christian  experience  cannot  conflict  with  a  correct  under- 
standing of  the  Bible.  4.  As  between  the  Bible  and  Christian  opinion, 
the  Bible  is  the  regulative  authority.  6.  The  Christian's  religious  in- 
sight has  an  important  function, —that  of  interpreting  the  Scriptures; 
(a)  distinguishing  between  the  more  and  the  less  important ;  (b)  harmo- 
nizing the  different  parts  of  the  Bible.  6.  The  general  assumirtion  of 
the  infallibility  of  the  Bible  does  not  solve  all  questions  of  controversy. 
7.  No  theory  of  Biblical  infallibility  can  be  maintained  which  is  contra- 
dieted  by  the  Scrij)tures  themselves.  8.  The  Bible  is  perfect  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  perfectly  adapted  to  accomplish  its  end  when  used  by  one  who 
is  in  sympathy  with  that  end 318-354 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE    COXDITIONS    AND    LIMITS    OF    BIBLICAL    CRITICISM. 

Biblical  criticism  is  needful  and  useful.  But  it  has  its  limitations.  1.  Free- 
dom from  prepossessions  as  a  qualification  for  critical  research  is  neither 
attainable  nor  desirable.  2.  One's  critical  judgment  of  the  Scriptures 
must  be  modified  by  one's  antecedent  judgment  respecting  Christ  and 
Christianity.  3.  Neither  critical  research  nor  Christian  insight  will  ever 
effect  a  reconstruction  of  the  Biblical  Canon.  4.  Biblical  criticism  can 
never  persuade  the  Christian  Church  that  pious  fraud  has  played  an 
important  part  in  determining  the  substance  or  foim  of  the  Scrijitural 
Canon.  The  Tiibingen  theory.  The  Kuenen-Wellhausen  theory.  Rea- 
sons why  such  views  cannot  be  accepted 355-385 


CONTENTS. 


APPENDIX. 

Page 

Excursus  I.      Dr.  Maudsley  on  the  Validity  of  Consciousness  .     .     .  389-396 

Excursus  II.      The  Cosmic  Philosophy 397-411 

Excursus  III.     Personality  and  the  Absolute 412-422 

Excursus  IV.      Leland  and  Watson  on  the  Primeval  Revelation    .     .  423-425 

Excursus  V.     The  Certainties  of  the  Agnostic 426-428 

Excursus  VI.     Beyschlag  on  the  Miracle  of  the  Loaves 429-433 

Excursus  VII,     Ritschl  on  Miracles 434-435 

Excursus  VIII.     The  Book  of  Jonah 436-451 


Topical  Index 453 

Index  of  Authors  referred  to 461 

Biblical  Index 465 


SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 


CHAPTER    I. 

ORIGIN   OF   THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF. 

^  I  ^HE  skepticism  of  the  present  day,  though  in  general  less 
-*-  coarse  and  violent  than  that  of  the  last  century,  is  not 
less  radical  and  dogmatic.  It  exhibits,  as  at  all  times,  various 
phases,  now  diverging  only  a  little  from  the  current  Christian 
view,  now  departing  still  farther  and  abandoning  what  is  com- 
monly held  to  be  vital,  and  now  going  over  into  complete 
negation  or  agnosticism.  But  in  general  it  may  be  said  that 
the  tendency  of  doubt  at  the  present  time  is  not  so  much  to 
make  attacks  on  the  details  of  the  doctrines  of  revealed  religion 
as  it  is  to  attack  the  general  notion  of  revelation  itself.  Anti- 
supernaturalism,  stimulated  and  strengthened  by  the  discussions 
and  speculations  connected  with  Darwinianism,  is  a  potent  ele- 
ment in  the  thinking  of  large  circles  of  men.  There  is  indeed 
no  lack  of  assault  upon  the  details  of  the  Christian  belief;  but 
the  underlying  tone — that  which  gives  color  and  force  to  the 
assaults  —  is  a  disbelief  or  doubt  concerning  the  reality  or  pos- 
sibility of  a  supernatural  revelation.  The  critical  questions 
concerning  the  age,  authorship,  and  composition  of  the  biblical 
books  are  of  immense  importance ;  but  they  themselves  take 
their  shape  largely  from  antecedent  assumptions  respecting  the 
fact  and  character  of  a  divine  revelation.^ 

^  This  is  illustrated  by  tlie  anonymous  work,  Supernatural  Religion,  which 
begins  by  professing  to  prove  the  impossibility  of  a  supernatural  revelation, 
and  then  elaborately  argues  against  the  genuineness  and  credibility  of  the  New 
Testament  records  of  such  a  revelation.  If  the  first  general  proposition  is 
established,  the  second  follows  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  hardly  needs  so  much 

1 


2  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

The  problem  is  not  quite  the  same  as  it  was  in  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  when  the  principal  attack  on 
the  doctrine  of  revelation  came  from  English  deism.  It  is  now 
outright  atheism,  or  pantheism,  or  semi-pantheism,  which  wages 
the  battle  against  the  current  Christian  conception  of  revealed 
religion.  Christianity  can  indeed  regard  these  ever-varying 
attacks  with  composure.  Its  complete  overthrow  has  been  so 
often  heralded,  and  the  issue  has  so  uniformly  failed  to  come  up 
to  the  loud-sounding  phrase  of  the  manifesto,  that  no  one  need 
be  alarmed.  Yet  the  renewed  attack  must  be  met  with  renewed 
defense,  else  the  stronghold  will  be  regarded,  at  least  by  the 
doubtful  and  the  indifferent,  as  surrendered. 

The  essentially  atheistic  cast  of  modern  skepticism  creates  a 
special  need  of  reconsidering  and  restating  the  reasons  for  the 
belief  in  the  existence  of  a  personal  God.  This  belief  is  pre- 
supposed in  every  assumption  of  the  fact  of  a  supernatural  reve- 
lation, and  is  therefore  the  first  to  be  asserted  and  fortified. 

The  question,  Why  do  men  believe  in  a  God  ?  may  be  resolved 
into  two  distinct  questions  :  How  do  men  generally  first  come  to 
have  the  notion  that  there  is  a  God  ?  and.  Why  do  they  persist 
in  cherishing  the  notion  ?  This  distinction  is  often  overlooked, 
though  it  is  a  very  obvious  one.  The  origin  of  a  belief  is  quite 
distinct  from  the  ultimate  reason,  or  reasonableness,  of  it.  If 
we  consider  the  first  of  these  questions,  we  are  at  once  led  to 
the  observation  that, — 

I.  Men  in  general  get  the  notion  of  a  God  from  tradition. 
The  belief  is  a  communicated  belief.^     When  parents  have  any 

discussion.  If  we  are  sure  that  a  miracle  cannot  take  place,  or  cannot  be 
proved,  it  is  useless  to  examine  minutely  the  alleged  evidences  of  its  occur- 
rence ;  but  if  we  do  examine  them,  the  result  of  the  examination  is  of  course 
a  foregone  conclusion. 

1  •'  The  belief  that  there  is  one  God,  infinite  in  power,  wisdom,  and  good- 
ness, has  certainly  not  been  wrought  out  by  each  one  of  us  for  himself,  but  has 
been  passed  on  from  man  to  man,  from  parent  to  child."  —  R.  Flint,  Theism, 
5th  ed.,  p.  23.  "To  the  child's  mind  the  parent's  word  ought  to  be,  as  it  is, 
evidence  far  stronger  than  the  conclusions  of  his  unpractised  reason."  —  E.  R. 
Conder,  Basis  of  Faith,  2d  ed.,  p.  102.  Cf.  J.  L.  Diman,  The  Theistic  Argu- 
ment, p.  74. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  THEISTIC   BELIEF.  3 

religious  belief,  they  do  not  wait  for  the  children  to  develop 
their  own  religion.  The  theistic  notions  held  by  the  adults  are 
communicated  to  the  children  as  soon  as  they  are  able  to  grasp 
them.  No  man  can  probably  recall  having  a  distinct  concep- 
tion of  God,  antedating  all  mstruction  on  the  subject.  Even  if, 
in  case  of  neglected  religious  education,  the  child  should  raise 
queries  looking  towards  theism,  yet  he  does  not  reach  an  assured 
confidence  in  the  fact  of  a  God,  except  as  his  vague  conjectures 
are  confirmed  by  others.  In  point  of  fact  it  is  not  found  that  in 
communities  where  practical  or  theoretical  atheism  prevails,  the 
children  attain  to  any  essentially  higher  belief  than  their  elders. 
Whether  the  current  belief  is  monotheism,  polytheism,  fetich- 
ism,  or  atheism,  the  rule  is,  that  what  the  adults  are,  such  also 
the  children  become. 

As  a  matter  of  historic  fact  this  statement  can  hardly  be 
questioned  for  a  moment.  However  true  it  may  be  that  men 
are  naturally  mcZincf^  to  theism,  — that  they  have  innate  ten- 
dencies to  believe  in  a  God,  —  the  question,  how  each  individual 
first  received  the  definite  notion,  and  the  assured  conviction,  of 
the  existence  of  a  divine  being,  is  not  answered  by  any  demon- 
stration of  such  tendencies.  The  more  true  it  is  that  men  are 
naturally  theistic  in  their  tendencies,  the  more  pains  will  they 
take  to  inculcate  theistic  doctrines  in  young  children  ;  they  will 
try  to  preoccupy  their  minds  with  the  notion  of  a  God  as  soon  as 
they  become  capable  of  taking  the  notion  in.  In  most  cases 
this  traditional  belief  is  in  fact  the  only  belief  that  men  have  ; 
the  origin  of  their  belief  and  the  ground  of  it  are  identical. 
They  believe  because,  and  only  because,  they  have  been  told. 
They  never  undertake  either  to  question  or  to  substantiate  the 
belief  in  which  they  have  been  trained.^ 

1  Professoi  Calderwood  {PUlmophj  of  the  hfinitc,  p.  47)  says  :  "  The  great 
majority  of  men  are  believing  in  God  without  any  reference  to  the  arguments 
which  have  been  used  to  estabUsh  his  existence.  This  is  one  of  the  very  ob- 
vious facts  which  harmonize  only  with  the  admission  of  the  necessity  of  the 
conviction."  The  conclusion  is  hardly  to  be  inferred  so  necessarily  from  the 
premise  as  is  here  implied.  It  is  a  common  belief  among  young  German  chU- 
dren  that  new-born  babes  are  brought  by  storks;  but  it  would  be  hasty  to 
infer  that  there  is  any  necessity  in  this  conviction.  They  think  so  because 
they  have  been  told  so. 


4  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Now,  tins  is  no  exceptional  relation  of  things.  Eeligious  be- 
lief is  not  peculiar  in  being  a  matter  of  tradition.     For  — 

11.    Human  knowledge  in  general  is  transmitted  knowledge. 

The  faculty  to  understand  must  of  course  be  presupposed. 
But  the  actual  cognitions,  the  knowledges,  which  men  obtain, 
are,  as  a  whole,  dependent  on  the  testimony  of  others. 

1.  As  regards  the  larger  part  of  men's  knowledge,  the  propo- 
sition will  command  ready  assent.  The  most  of  what  every  one 
knows  respecting  history,  natural  science,  and  indeed  respecting 
the  world  in  general,  he  obtains  from  books  or  oral  instruction, 
and  not  from  direct  perception.  What  we  thus  learn  we  take  on 
trust.  We  assume  that  others  have  learned  the  facts,  and  that 
we  are  warranted  in  believing  them. 

2.  But,  more  than  this,  even  what  is  commonly  regarded  as 
an  object  of  direct  perception  becomes  in  the  full  sense  an  ob- 
ject of  knowledge  only  through  the  consentient  testimony  of 
men.^  Let  it  be  assumed  that  the  external  world  is  directly 
cognized  through  the  senses.  Still  there  arises  the  question, 
How  does  one  know  that  he  perceives  correctly  ?  He  seems  to 
see  the  outward  object  directly ;  but  how  is  he  sure  that  it  is 
not  merely  a  seeming  ?  Deception  is  possible,  as  all  admit ;  for 
in  some  cases  it  is  actual.  Optical  illusions  are  numerous.  In 
diseased  states  of  the  nervous  system  a  person  seems  to  see 
what  no  one  else  can  see.  In  dreams  unrealities  have  all  the 
seeming  of  realities.  Is  it  not  possible  that  all  our  apparent 
perceptions  are  equally  illusory  ?  How  do  we  decide  that  our 
seeming  perceptions  are  normal?  Our  only  means  of  deter- 
mining this  is  an  appeal  to  the  general  consensus  of  men.  If 
men  found  themselves  in  constant  disagreement  as  to  the  fact 
or  the  characteristics  of  the  material  things  around  them,  how 
would  it  be  possible  to  arrive  at  any  certainty  whatever  as  re- 
gards the  experience  of  the  senses  ?  No  matter  how  vivid  or 
how  permanent  might  be  the  impressions  of  some ;  if  others 
equally  numerous,  equally  sane,  failed  uniformly  under  like 
circumstances  to  experience  the  same  impressions,  there  would 
be  not  merely  an  insoluble  conflict  of  opinions,  but  there  would 

^  "  Our  natural  beliefs  do  not  belong  to  the  individual,  but  to  the  race."  — 
J.  J.  Murphy,  Scientific  Bases  of  Faith,  p.  101. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  5 

necessarily  be  doubt  on  both  sides  respecting  the  trustworthi- 
ness of  the  sensations.  Illusions  of  the  senses  being  possible 
and  often  actual,  how  is  one  to  be  assured  that  in  any  given 
case  his  sensations  are  not  illusions  ?  The  only  possible  source 
of  assurance  is  the  confirmation  which  his  experience  receives 
from  the  testimony  of  his  fellow-men.  We  trust  our  senses  be- 
cause they  agree  with  the  senses  of  men  in  general.  We  are  of 
course  naturally  inclined  to  trust  our  senses.  But  if  a  man 
found  himself  in  perpetual  and  universal  disagreement  with  the 
rest  of  the  world  respecting  the  objects  of  his  sense-perceptions, 
what  would  be  the  result?  If  he  were  in  general  of  sound 
mind,  he  would  himself  abandon  all  confidence  in  the  correct- 
ness of  his  experiences,  and  accept  the  testimony  of  others 
rather  than  his  own  apparently  direct  and  immediate  cogni- 
tions. In  the  case  of  those  whose  senses  are  abnormal  or  de- 
fective, this  trust  in  the  testimony  of  others  is  always  exercised. 
The  blind  and  the  deaf  credit  the  testimony  of  others  respecting 
vision  and  sound,  even  though  they  cannot  understand  it.  The 
color-blind  believe  that  others  see  real  distinctions  of  color 
which  yet  they  themselves  cannot  detect.  The  victim  of  de- 
lirium tremens  is  glad  to  be  assured  that  his  visions  have  been 
delusions,  however  real  they  seemed  when  the  delirium  was 
raging. 

Thus,  even  as  regards  the  general  question  of  objective  re- 
ality, the  individual  experience  depends  for  its  certainty  on 
the  confirmatory  experience  of  mankind  in  general.  But  more 
than  this :  — 

3.  The  infantile  faculties  of  perception  are  themselves  trained 
by  others.  The  fact  is  not  merely  that  children  first  perceive, 
and  afterwards  learn  that  others  perceive  the  same  things,  but 
also  that  others  first  teach  them  hov)  to  perceive.  The  child's 
first  sensations  are  vague  and  confused.  He  needs  to  be  taught 
to  distinguish  and  to  compare.  There  is  no  intelligent  perception 
till  there  is  discrimination.  Knowledge  in  the  higher  sense  de- 
pends on  the  power  of  abstraction  and  classification ;  and  this 
requires  language,  and  language  is  a  matter  of  communication. 
There  is  no  example  of  a  child's  growing  up  into  an  intelligent 
observation  of  the  world  without  his  powers  being  trained  by 


6  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

his  elders.  Without  such  education,  as  certain  sporadic  cases 
indicate,  a  child  would  hardly  equal  in  intelligence  the  brute 
creation.!     But  further:  — 

4.  This  law  of  dependence  on  one's  fellow-men  is  not  limited 
to  one's  incipient  years.  Even  what  seems  to  be  knowledge 
independently  acquired  by  an  adult  is  not  real  knowledge,  ex- 
cept as  it  is  connected  with  other  knowledge  for  which  he  has 
been  more  or  less  dependent  on  the  education  he  has  received 
from  his  fellow-men.  Thus,  for  example,  a  man  may  discover  a 
new  species  of  flower.  He  may  be  the  only  one  who  has  ever 
seen  it.  But  why  does  he  call  the  newly  discovered  object  a 
fiowcr?  How  does  he  know  that  it  is  a  flower?  Simply  because 
he  has  been  educated  to  classify  and  associate  the  objects  of  per- 
ception, and  to  distinguish  certain  groups  from  certain  other 
groups  according  to  characteristic  features.  The  very  word  by 
which  he  designates  his  discovery  is  one  that  has  no  meaning 
except  as  the  meaning  has  been  given  to  it  by  the  common  con- 
sent of  those  with  whom  he  has  lived.  What  he  reports  about 
the  new  flower  is  made  intelligible  to  others  and  to  himself 
only  as  it  involves  a  comparison  of  the  new  with  that  which 
is  already  a  familiar  and  common  knowledge  of  his  fellows. 
The  case  is  similar  when  what  one  has  learned  simply  from 
testimony  is  afterwards  supplemented  by  direct  observation. 
Thus,  one  reads  or  hears  about  Eome.  He  becomes  familiar 
with  its  history  and  its  physical  features.  But  his  knowledge 
is  wholly  a  communication  from  others.  He  knows  nothing 
about  Eome  except  as  he  trusts  the  veracity  of  those  who  have 
told  him  what  the  city  has  been  and  still  is.  Afterwards  he 
goes  to  Eome  himself.  He  sees  the  things  which  he  has  here- 
tofore only  known  about  through  testimony.  But  has  he  now 
become  independent  of  testimony  ?     By  no  means.     He  gets  a 

^  "  In  life  the  elilcf  clement  by  far  is  personal  intercourse.  This  is  the  true 
educator  of  man  Philosophers  and  preachers  are  alike  powerless  in  compari- 
son to  the  daily  teaching  of  personal  communion  between  man  and  man,  and 
still  more  between  child  and  man.  .  .  .  Habits  of  thought  and  tendencies  of 
affection  which  have  grown  through  our  earliest  experience,  and  been  inherited 
from  countless  ages  before,  assert  themselves  in  spite  of  all  adopted  opinions." 
—  R.  Travers  Smith,  Man's  Knowledge  of  Man  and  God,  p.  234 


ORIGIN  OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  7 

clearer  and  more  vivid  impression  of  the  place  through  direct 
perception  ;  but  as  to  the  history  and  meaning  of  what  he  sees 
he  is  as  dependent  as  ever.  Nay,  he  cannot  even  say  that  he 
now  knows  that  there  is  a  city  of  Eome  independently  of  ex- 
ternal testimony.  He  sees  a  city ;  but  how  does  he  know  that 
it  is  Eome  except  as  he  trusts  the  assurance  of  others  ?  He 
sees  the  Coliseum  and  St.  Peter's.  But  what  does  that  prove  ? 
He  does  not  know  that  this  pile  is  the  Coliseum,  and  that  that 
one  is  St.  Peter's,  except  as  he  implicitly  trusts  the  testimony 
previously  received  concerning  these  buildings.  There  can  be 
no  recognition  of  the  city  as  being  Rome  except  as  the  truthful- 
ness of  this  testimony  is  assumed. 

5.  Even  in  the  perception  of  the  truths  of  mathematics  and 
logic  there  is  no  absolute  exception  to  this  law  of  dependence 
on  the  testimony  of  others.  The  truths  are  called  self-evident ; 
but  this  does  not  mean  that  they  come  to  each  individual  spon- 
taneously. Even  the  simplest  mathematical  propositions  are 
first  introduced  into  the  mind  by  communication.  When  one 
is  mature  enough  to  study  mathematical  treatises,  one  comes 
to  see  the  intrinsic  truthfulness  of  the  propositions ;  the  testi- 
mony of  others  is  in  a  sense  replaced  by  a  direct  perception  of 
their  necessary  truth.  But  even  now  there  is  no  absolute  inde- 
pendence. When  one  has  attained  this  direct  assurance  of  the 
truths  in  question,  he  finds  that  other  minds  agree  with  his  own. 
This  agreement  is  a  confirmation  of  his  intuitions.  Suppose  he 
should  find  that  what  seems  axiomatic  to  him  is  called  ab- 
surd by  everybody  else,  what  would  he  have  to  conclude  ?  Just 
because  everybody  thinks  as  he  does  and  has  the  same  inward 
certainty  that  he  has,  he  becomes  doubly  sure  of  his  convic- 
tions. What  seems  to  be  a  law  of  his  mind  he  finds  to  be  a  law 
of  all  minds,  and  therefore  he  trusts  the  soundness  of  his  own 
mind. 

6.  Still  less  is  there  an  exception  to  this  law  of  dependence  on 
other  minds  in  the  matter  of  theistic  conceptions.  If  our  grasp 
even  of  the  principles  of  mathematics  and  logic  becomes  clear 
and  firm  only  as  it  is  aided  and  ratified  by  other  minds,  still 
more  must  this  be  the  case  as  regards  our  religious  notions. 
For  here  there  is  no  formula  which   so   sharply   defines   the 


8  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

conception  that  the  mind  has  at  once  the  sense  of  taking  it 
all  in.  The  definition  of  God  is  not  a  simple  thing,  like  the 
definition  of  a  circle.  The  conceptions  of  God  vary  greatly: 
some  are  meagre,  some  are  erroneous.  Consequently,  the  sev- 
eral conceptions  being  mutually  inconsistent,  theism  cannot 
claim  the  place  of  an  axiomatic  truth  which  compels  assent 
as  soon  as  stated.  Moreover,  in  mathematics  and  logic  that 
which  is  called  intuitive  or  self-evident  is  not  an  affirmation 
concerning  the  existence  or  qualities  of  an  objective  thing,  but 
concerning  certain  relations  of  things,  whether  existent  or  imagi- 
nary. And  the  self-evidence  extends  only  so  far  as  to  involve 
a  rejection  of  that  which  is  self-contradictory  or  absurd.  Thus, 
when  it  is  said  that  the  sum  of  two  and  two  cannot  be  five, 
that  is  virtually  only  saying  that  a  thing  cannot  be  greater 
than  itself ;  that  is,  that  it  cannot  be  itself  and  not  itself  at  once. 
"When  it  is  said  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space, 
the  statement  is  self-evident  only  in  so  far  as  this  proposition  is 
involved  in  the  definition  of  straight  lines.  If  two  lines  were 
found  to  enclose  a  space,  we  should  simply  say  that  they  are 
for  that  reason  not  straight.  But  an  alleged  intuition  of  God 
as  a  positively  existent  being,  possessed  of  superhuman  attri- 
butes, has  little  analogy  with  all  this.  If  the  alleged  intuition 
is  a  fact,  it  is  more  nearly  analogous  to  the  direct  perception 
which  we  have  of  the  material  world.  But  if  it  is  a  fact,  it 
must  be  a  universal  fact,  at  least  in  all  normal  minds ;  and  if 
so,  it  is  inexplicable  that  it  should  ever  have  been  questioned. 
Even  if  we  could  accept  the  assertion  of  those  ^  who  declare 
that  men  become  aware  of  God  as  soon  as  consciousness  begins, 
we  could  not  believe  that  each  individual  adult  traces  his  actual 
belief  in  God  to  any  such  infantile  intuition.  If  only  a  single 
person  had  such  an  immediate  consciousness  springing  up  in 
him  before  he  even  has  the  use  of  language  to  express  it,  and  if, 
when  he  has  acquired  the  power  of  communicating  with  others, 
he  should  find  that  he  were  the  only  one  who  had  the  notion  of 
a  God,  what  would  be  the  fate  of  that  poor  infantile  conception, 
negatived  at  once  by  the  parents  and  friends,  to  trust  whose 

1  For  example,  E.   Mulford,  Republic  of  God,    p.  1;    Professor  Calder- 
wood,  Philosophi/  of  the  Infinite,  p.  42. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  THEISTIC  BELIEF.  9 

word  is  as  strong  an  instinct  as  any  other  within  him  ?  No ; 
we  know  too  little  about  the  experiences  of  the  new-born  in- 
fant's mind  to  be  able  to  affirm  that,  before  it  can  speak,  it  yet 
knows  about  God ;  but  we  certainly  do  know  that,  before  the 
child  becomes  able  to  communicate  his  knowledge,  he  receives 
the  knowledge  communicated  from  others.  And  we  know  that 
if  he  did  not  receive  it,  if  he  grew  up  and  found  his  infantile 
intuitions  repudiated  by  all  his  elders,  he  would  probably  soon 
conclude  that  what  he  thought  before  he  knew  enough  to  talk 
was  not  of  much  account  over  against  the  accumulated  wisdom 
of  those  whom  he  instinctively  trusts  as  knowing  and  telling  the 
truth. 

Theism  is  often  treated  as  if  all  men  were  monotheists,  and 
as  if  they  all  immediately  after  birth  began  to  make  use  of  the 
Anselmic  or  the  Cartesian  argument,  or  were  struck  with  the 
wonderful  teleology  of  the  world  into  which  they  have  been 
introduced,  or  began  to  infer,  from  the  existence  of  a  moral 
sense  within  them,  the  existence  of  a  universal  Moral  Governor 
outside  of  them.  Or  at  least  they  are  supposed  to  have  a  pro- 
found feeling  of  dependence.  But  manifestly  there  can  never 
be  any  evidence  of  all  this.  What  the  speechless  child  is  think- 
ing or  feeling  in  the  theological  line  no  one  can  know,  unless  the 
child,  after  he  has  learned  to  talk,  is  able  to  make  a  report  con- 
cerning his  infantile  theologizings.  But  these  reports  have 
never  yet  been  made.  On  the  contrary,  what  we  do  know 
about  the  matter  is  that  from  the  very  beginning  of  life  the 
child's  mind  undergoes  an  educational  process  at  the  hands  of 
others,  and  that  from  these  others  his  religious  conceptions 
are  derived. 

But  if  it  should  now  be  inferred  that  theism  is  accounted  for 
simply  by  saying  that  it  is  a  traditional  belief,  we  should  be 
guilty  of  a  very  hasty  and  shallow  conclusion.  Testimony  is  a 
chain,  each  link  of  which  is  connected  with  another ;  but  what 
does  the  whole  chain  depend  on  ?  The  heginning  of  a  perception 
or  belief  cannot  come  from  testimony.  The  first  theist  cannot 
have  got  his  theism  from  his  ancestors ;  nor  does  ancestral  tes- 
timony constitute  of  itself  any  proof  of  the  correctness  of 
the  doctrine  handed  down.     We  are  led,  therefore,  to  a  line  of 


10  SUPEENATURAL  REVELATION. 

reflection  somewhat  antithetic  to  the  foregoing,  the  substance  of 
which  may  be  expressed  in  the  general  proposition  that  — 

III.  Individual  cognition  must  precede  the  transmission  of 
knowledge.  Though  one's  individual  sensations  need  to  be  con- 
firmed by  those  of  others,  yet  the  world  consists  of  individuals ; 
so  that  this  general  testimony  can  come  to  have  existence  only 
as  the  individuals  each  have  their  individual  experience  of  sen- 
sation and  perception.  The  primary  and  fundamental  fact,  then, 
must  be  the  individual  consciousness  ;  and  there  can  be  no  cer- 
tainty resulting  from  the  sum  of  the  consciousnesses  unless  there 
is  some  sort  of  validity  in  the  individual  one.  In  particular,  it 
is  to  be  considered  that  — 

1.  Before  the  testimony  of  other  men  can  be  taken  in,  there 
must  be  an  apprehension  of  the  fact  that  there  are  other  men.  I 
cannot  believe  another  man's  statement  until  I  first  believe  that 
that  other  man  exists.  How  do  I  come  to  know  or  to  believe 
that  there  are  other  persons  than  myself  ?  This  cannot  come 
from  testimony;  for  the  acceptance  of  testimony  presupposes 
such  belief.  There  is,  therefore,  an  original  act  of  perception  by 
which  one  person  becomes  aware  of  the  existence  of  another. 
Manifestly,  this  is  a  fact  of  prime  importance ;  in  reference  to 
the  general  question  of  cognition  it  is  fundamental.  Whatever 
may  be  the  infant's  first  act  of  consciousness,  whether  a  percep- 
tion of  the  material  world  or  not,  it  is  certain  that  one  of  the 
first  cognitions  of  the  child  is  the  cognition  of  other  'persons. 
Even  though  we  concede  that  this  cognition  comes  through  the 
cognition  of  the  material  world,  yet  it  is  a  distinct  and  vitally 
important  thing.  The  whole  subsequent  development  of  the  child 
depends  on  his  being  able  to  come  to  this  consciousness  of  fellow- 
men,  and  therefore  to  receive  instruction  from  them.  And,  be  it 
observed,  this  cognition  is  a  cognition  of  mind  by  the  mind.  The 
child  by  means  of  his  eye  and  touch  can  directly  perceive  nothing 
but  the  form  and  color  and  motion  of  other  men.  By  his  ear 
he  becomes  aware  of  sounds,  which  somehow  he  comes  to  asso- 
ciate with  these  persons.  But  he  also  gets  an  impression  of 
form,  color,  and  sound  in  connection  with  other  external  objects 
which  never  appear  to  him  in  the  character  of  persons.  What 
is  it  in  the  movements  and  in  the  voice  of  other  men  that 


ORIGIN  OF   THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  11 

awakens  these  peculiar  experiences  of  recognizing  them  as  kin- 
dred beings  ?  How  is  it  that  there  can  come  to  be  a  mental  com- 
munication between  the  child  and  the  other  human  beings  with 
whom  he  comes  into  contact  ?  Particularly  how  is  it  that  words 
—  arbitrary  sounds,  having  no  intrinsic  meaning  —  come  to  have 
a  definite  meaning,  and  constitute  the  means  by  which  the  mind 
of  the  child  enters  into  communication  with  his  fellow-beings  ? 
How  can  there  be  an  interchange  of  thought  and  feeling  by 
means  of  language  ?  Whatever  theory  of  knowledge  men  may 
adopt,  here  is  a  fact  which  challenges  attention  and  demands 
recognition.  And  true  as  it  is  that  our  perceptive  experience 
is,  and  needs  to  be,  confirmed  by  that  of  other  men,  it  is  equally 
true  that  there  must  be  an  anterior  assurance  of  the  fact  that 
there  are  other  perceptive  beings  than  ourselves.^ 

More  primitive  and  truly  natural  than  speech  are  gestures  and 
facial  expressions  as  indices  of  mental  states.  The  infant  can 
cry  and  scowl  before  it  comes  to  distinct  consciousness ;  and  its 
cries  and  grimaces  are  expressions  of  its  emotions.  But  how 
does  the  child  know  that  a  mother's  smile  has  any  meaning  ? 
He  cannot  come  to  this  knowledge  through  having  discovered 
that  his  own  pleasure  is  expressed  by  a  smile,  for  he  has  never 
examined  himself  in  a  mirror.  The  recognition  of  a  smile  as 
the  expression  of  maternal  love  and  pleasure  presupposes  the 
recognition  of  personality  in  the  mother.  However  indispen- 
sable the  body  may  be  thought  to  be  as  the  medium  of  com- 
munication between  minds,  it  cannot  serve  as  such  a  medium 
except  as  the  mind  which  animates  it  and  uses  it  is  recognized 
by  the  other  mind  which  receives  the  communication.  This  is 
an  ultimate  fact.  How  early  this  recognition  takes  place,  and 
of  what  sort  it  is  at  first,  no  one  can  tell.  But  before  one  can 
receive  instruction  from  another,  before  one's  infant  impressions 
can  be  consciously  confirmed  by  the  representations  of  other 
persons,  those  others  must  be  known  to  he  persons.  Unless, 
therefore,  we  are  prepared  to  fall  into  the  arms  of  hopeless 
Pyrrhonism,  we  must  assume  that  it  is  the  prerogative  of  the 
individual  mind  to  know  intuitively  that  there  are  other  minds 
kindred  with  itself. 

^  See  Excursus  I.  ia  tlie  Appeudix. 


12  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

But  this  cognition  of  other  persons  is  not  a  purely  spiritual 
one,  independent  of  a  material  medium.  The  child  becomes 
aware  of  an  external  personality  only  through  the  perception  of 
an  external  hody.  The  perception  of  a  material  world  must, 
therefore,  be  prior  to  the  recognition  of  personal  beings  in  it. 
Consequently,  if  the  confirmatory  testimony  of  our  fellow-men 
can  really  come  to  us  only  on  condition  that  we  first  know  that 
there  are  such  personal  beings,  it  is  still  more  obvious  that  — 

2.  There  must  be  a  direct  and  immediate  cognition  of  the  ma- 
terial world,  anterior  to  the  knowledge  derived  from  testimony. 
However  important  that  testimony  may  be  as  a  confirmation  of 
individual  impressions,  and  however  true  it  may  be  that  the 
total  absence  of  such  confirmation  might  properly  lead  one  to 
doubt  the  validity  of  his  own  impressions,  still  there  must  first 
be  the  impressions,  and  they  must  precede  the  confirmation  of 
them.  Moreover,  trust  in  the  affirmations  of  others  implies  that 
they  also  have  somehow  obtained  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
the  external  world ;  otherwise  the  source  of  our  knowledge 
would  be  an  endless  chain  of  testimony,  —  each  link  depending 
on  a  preceding  one,  but  the  whole  supported  by  nothing. 

It  is  very  clear,  then,  what  reply  to  make  to  one  who  tells  us 
how  fallacious  the  testimony  of  our  senses  is.  It  is  no  doubt 
easy  to  prove  that  we  are  often  deceived  by  them.  It  may  even 
be  shown  that  in  some  respects  all  men  are  deceived  by  the 
natural  and  untutored  operation  of  the  senses.  It  may  be  af- 
firmed that  all  knowledge  of  distance  comes  from  the  correction 
of  the  original  impressions  made  on  the  eyes.  It  may  be  shown 
that  all  men  are  deceived  in  imagining  that  color  is  something 
inhering  in  material  objects,  whereas  science  has  proved  that  it 
is  nothing  but  a  subjective  affection  caused  by  peculiar  undula- 
tions. All  manner  of  individual  delusions  may  be  proved  to 
have  existed.  And  so  the  physical  senses  may  be  convicted  of 
general  incapacity  to  tell  the  truth,  and  of  being  under  the 
necessity  of  dutifully  receiving  instruction  from  the  learned. 
But  to  all  this  there  is  one  short  answer.  Imperfect  or  erro- 
neous cognition  cannot  be  corrected  unless  there  is  somewhere 
reed  hnoiuledge.  If  it  is  affirmed  that  all  knowledge  is  only  of 
the  phenomenal  or  relative,  —  that  we  know  only  what  appears 


ORIGIN  OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  13 

to  be,  and  cannot  get  at  the  "  thing  in  itself,"  —  the  question  must 
be  asked,  How  do  we  come  to  know  that  knowledge  is  thus  im- 
perfect or  misleading  ?  If  the  senses  of  touch  and  of  sight  in 
various  ways  supplement  and  correct  one  another ;  if  certain 
phenomena,  at  first  supposed  to  be  objectively  real,  are  after- 
wards proved  by  observation  or  by  testimony  to  be  subjective 
impressions  merely ;  if  physiologists  and  naturalists  and  chem- 
ists prove  that  the  whole  material  world  is  in  motion,  even 
where  it  seems  to  be  most  profoundly  at  rest,  —  that  heat  and 
light,  popularly  supposed  to  be  distinct  entities,  are  nothing  but 
subjective  sensations  caused  by  invisible  motions  of  particles,  — 
that,  in  short,  things  in  general  "  are  not  what  they  seem,"  — 
what  then  ?  The  obvious  inference  is,  either  that  these  scien- 
tists themselves  are  trying  to  delude  us,  or  else  that  they  really 
do  knoio  some  things  positively  and  immediately.  If  all  sup- 
posed knowledge  is  only  phenomenal  and  therefore  deceptive, 
then  there  is  an  end  to  all  possibility  of  correcting  the  decep- 
tions.^ If  the  scientist  knows  that  heat  is  a  mode  of  motion,  it 
is  because  he  is  sure  that  in  his  investigations  he  has  discovered 
facts,  and  discovered  them  by  direct  perception ;  in  other  words, 
he  must  be  sure  that  he  has  obtained  a  direct  and  infallible  cog- 
nition of  the  external  world.  Consequently,  if  the  importance 
of  testimony  is  insisted  on,  if  it  is  urged  that  no  one  can  im- 
plicitly trust  his  individual  impressions,  we  may  admit  all  that 
is  proved ;  but  in  admitting  it  we  must  assume  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  a  direct  and  trustworthy  knowledge  of  the 
material  world,  otherwise  neither  we  ourselves  nor  any  one  else 
would  ever  be  able  to  correct  our  mistakes.  No  number  of  con- 
firming witnesses  can  make  anything  sure,  if  the  testimony  of 
each  one  depends  for  its  value  simply  on  the  testimony  of  some 
one  else.  The  direct  cognition  which  the  individual  has  of  the 
external  world  must,  therefore,  be  the  prime  factor  in  the 
knowledge  one  acquires.  One  must  trust  his  senses  ;  if  he  can- 
not trust  them  as  regards  the  perception  of  the  material  world, 

^  Cf.  Professor  Bowne,  Studies  i?i  Theism,  chap.  i. ;  Prof.  S.  Harris,  Philo- 
sophical Basis  of  Theism,  §  5.  "If  agnosticism  were  proved  true,  at  tlie  same 
moment  it  would  be  proved  false,  for  it  would  be  proved  that  we  know  the 
truth  of  agnosticism." 


14  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

then  lie  must  distrust  them  also  when  through  them  he  sees 
and  hears  the  witnesses  who  profess  to  rectify  his  cognitions. 

3.  Equally  clear  is  it  that  what  one  learns  solely  by  way  of 
communication  must  be  assumed  to  have  been  originally  learned 
by  some  one  —  if  true  —  through  direct  individual  cognition. 
The  most  of  our  knowledge  is  derived  from  others  ;  and  it  is 
indispensable  as  well  as  instinctive  that  we  should  put  con- 
fidence in  what  others  affirm.  But  when  we  thus  trust  them, 
we  must  assume  that  the  knowledge  was  originally  obtained 
otherwise  than  by  testimony.  False  notions  may  be,  and  have 
been,  propagated  from  one  generation  to  another  for  ages. 
These  notions  sometimes  become  corrected  through  more  care- 
ful observation  of  facts.  But  whether  true  or  false,  our  no- 
tions cannot  be  tested  by  mere  testimony.  All  real  knowledge 
must  be  originally  direct  knowledge ;  and  when  communicated 
knowledge  is  afterwards  confirmed  by  direct  observation,  this 
direct  cognition,  while  it  confirms,  also  in  a  sense  supplants, 
the  testimony  which  first  communicated  the  knowledge. 

4.  Again,  our  more  abstract  and  spiritual  conceptions  are 
subject  to  the  same  law.  What  are  called  innate  intuitions 
are  in  point  of  fact,  as  a  rule,  first  communicated.  There  are 
many  who  from  lack  of  instruction  never  come  to  a  conscious 
recognition  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  mathematics  or 
of  logic  or  of  ethics  ;  and  those  who  have  come  to  a  clear  rec- 
ognition of  them  have  generally  first  come  to  it  through  a 
communication  from  others.  The  truths  called  axiomatic  or 
innate  are  presented  in  their  formulated  shape  to  the  child. 
He  then  reflects  on  them.  He  may  be  too  young  or  too  feeble- 
minded to  understand  the  statements  at  first,  and  he  may 
accept  them  blindly  ;  or  he  may  understand  the  statements,  and 
accept  them,  without  seeing  their  intrinsic  and  necessary  truth, 
—  the  apprehension  of  this  intrinsic  necessity  may  come  to  him 
afterwards.  The  explanations  which  come  to  him  from  books 
or  teachers  quicken  and  aid  his  apprehensions.  A  short  study  of 
a  work  on  geometry  will  introduce  one  to  an  assured  conviction 
of  the  absolute  and  incontrovertible  truth  of  certain  geometric 
principles,  whereas  without  that  instruction  the  principles 
might   never   have   taken   definite  shape  in   the  mind   at  all. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF  15 

What  is  true  of  the  most  fundamental  mathematical  truths 
holds  also  of  moral  principles.  Let  them  be  ever  so  elementary 
and  necessary,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  infant  mind  unaided 
picks  them  up  and  recognizes  them  as  infallible  truths.  The 
recognition  of  the  necessity  and  intrinsic  excellence  of  the 
truths  must  indeed  come ;  it  must  come  through  the  exercise  of 
the  faculties  of  moral  perception,  which  are  inborn.  Yet  his- 
torically the  general  principles  come  as  communications,  in 
the  first  instance.  And  in  all  cases  this  instruction  has  a  large 
influence  in  shaping  the  form  which  the  principles  assume  in 
the  juvenile  mind. 

But  the  point  now  to  be  emphasized  is  that  here  too  —  and 
here  more  almost  than  anywhere  else  —  there  can  be  no  depen- 
dence placed  on  mere  testimony  as  the  ultimate  ground  of  belief. 
There  may  be,  and  is,  much  blind  adoption  even  of  what  are 
commonly  called  intuitive  principles.  But  no  one  who  reflects 
can  regard  mere  testimony  in  these  matters  as  an  ultimate 
ground  of  belief.  The  truths  must  be  self-evidencing ;  they 
must  be  seen  to  have  an  intrinsic  validity  compelling  men  to 
accept  them.  Ultimately  the  testimony  is  replaced  by  a  direct 
perception ;  and  this  direct  perception  of  the  truth  is  assumed 
to  be  the  original  ground  on  which  it  came  to  be  recognized, 
and  to  be  that  alone  which  gives  the  testimony  itself  its 
worth. 

5.  In  like  manner,  testimony  concerning  a  Divine  Being  can- 
not be  taken  as  an  ultimate  and  adequate  proof  of  the  fact  that 
there  is  such  a  Being.  The  faith  in  God  may  be,  and  is,  a  com- 
municated faith ;  but  we  cannot  reasonably  rest  our  faith  on 
testimony  alone.  There  must  be  some  more  original  and  con- 
clusive evidence  of  the  divine  existence  than  is  found  in  the 
mere  prevalence  of  the  belief.  If  theism  is  founded  in  fact, 
then  somewhere  —  either  now  and  always,  or  at  certain  special 
times  —  there  must  have  been  a  direct  knowledge,  an  evidence, 
concerning  the  Deity,  which  serves  as  the  foundation  of  the  tes- 
timony and  gives  it  its  value.  Whether  that  knowledge  comes 
from  some  direct  intuition  which  every  one  may  have,  or  comes 
only  to  a  comparatively  few,  is  a  question  on  which  men  may 
differ.     The  point  here  emphasized  is  that  the  transmitted  no- 


16  SUPERNATURAI.   REVELATION. 

tion  must,  if  valid,  have  some  other  basis  than  the  mere  fact  of 
the  transmission.  There  must  be  or  must  have  been  something 
like  an  immediate  cognition  of  God  somewhere,  or  else  the 
theistic  belief  must  take  its  place  alongside  of  other  fancies 
which,  after  being  for  generations  handed  down  and  believed, 
have  at  length  been  exploded,  because  found  to  be  without 
evidence  or  contrary  to  evidence. 

What,  then,  is  to  be  our  conclusion  ?  "What  has  now  been 
laid  down  may  seem  to  nullify  the  force  of  what  was  said  be- 
fore about  the  importance  or  necessity  of  common  consent  as 
the  conclusive  evidence  of  the  truth  of  things.  Direct  in- 
dividual perception  appears,  after  all,  to  be  the  true  source  and 
ground  of  all  knowledge.  What  is  the  correct  statement  of 
the  relation  of  individual  to  general  experience,  with  regard  to 
the  question  of  the  validity  of  men's  beliefs  and  cognitions  ? 

IV.  The  answer  to  the  question  is  this :  Sure  knowledge  is 
the  product  of  the  combination  and  comparison  of  individual 
cognitions.  A  common  belief  is  made  up  of  individual  beliefs, 
and  therefore  the  individual  belief  must  be  the  prior  thing. 
But  the  individual  impression,  so  long  as  it  is  merely  a  single 
one,  is  more  or  less  vague  and  uncertain.  The  impressions  of 
one  individual  need  to  be  explained,  corrected,  or  confirmed  by 
those  of  other  individuals.  The  general  experience  is  nothing 
but  the  sum  of  individual  experiences.  There  is  no  generic 
man  whose  verdict  can  be  got  at,  apart  from  the  testimony  of 
the  several  individuals  who  make  up  the  community.  All  that 
is  known  must  originally  have  been  cognized  by  individuals  by 
some  direct  process.  But  the  experience  of  two  individuals  is 
of  more  value  than  that  of  one ;  and  the  experience  of  a  thou- 
sand, if  it  is  all  in  one  direction,  is  of  more  value  than  that  of 
two.  The  impression  of  one  is  more  likely  to  be  correct,  if  all 
others  under  the  same  circumstances  have  tlie  same  impression, 
than  if  they  do  not.  For  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  im- 
pulse to  trust  the  word  of  others  is  as  original  and  innate  as 
the  impulse  to  trust  the  validity  of  one's  own  cognitions ;  but 
the  cognitions  of  all  those  others  must  be,  for  each  one,  an 
original  cognition,  if  it  is  to  have  any  intrinsic  value  as  a 
confirmation  of  the  cognition  of  the  one. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  17 

With  regard,  for  example,  to  the  reality  of  an  outward  world, 
every  one  seems  to  have  a  direct  perception  of  it.  But  this  im- 
pression may  be  a  mistaken  one.  One  may  be  deluded  by  a  purely 
subjective  affection  of  his  own  nerves.  If,  however,  he  finds  that 
everybody  else  has  a  similar  impression,  he  sees  that  his  expe- 
rience is  not  to  be  explained  as  a  delusion.  He  is  confirmed 
in  the  conviction  that  what  seemed  to  be  a  direct  cognition 
of  something  external  was  reallT/  such.  But  the  force  of  this 
confirmation  comes  from  the  assumption  that  in  each  individual 
case  there  was  a  direct  and  independent  perception.  Each  one 
perceives  for  himself;  but  each  one  is  made  confident  of  the 
accuracy  and  reality  of  his  perception  by  learning  that  others 
have  the  same  experience. 

All  knowledge  is  thus  seen  to  be  a  composite  thing.  It  is 
made  up  of  two  elements :  (1)  the  direct,  immediate  perception 
or  impression  which  the  individual  has ;  and  (2)  the  ratification 
and  education  of  that  impression  by  the  general  community  of 
individuals.  Until  this  confirmation  comes,  the  individual  cog- 
nition remains  a  mere  impression,  a  possible  illusion.  It 
seems  to  be  a  valid  cognition ;  but  it  may  be,  and  often  proves 
to  be,  a  mere  impression,  answering  to  no  objective  fact. 

In  this  respect  man  is  evidently  to  be  sharply  distinguished 
from  the  brute  creation.  The  human  faculties  are  from  the 
first  subjected  to  an  educational  process,  to  which  there  is  no 
analogy  among  the  brutes.^  Whatever  may  be  our  theory  of 
instinct,  nothing  can  be  more  obvious  than  that  there  is  a  wide 
difference  between  the  human  and  the  bestial  being,  as  regards 
the  manner  in  which  they  severally  attain  knowledge.  Just 
in  proportion  as  the  human  knowledge  is  of  a  higher  sort  than 
that  of  which  the  brute  is  capable,  in  just  that  proportion  is  the 
human  being  dependent  for  the  attainment  of  his  knowledge 

^  There  is,  no  doubt,  au  educational  process  involved  in  the  mere  accumu- 
lation of  experience.  It  is  a  familiar  truth  to  all  observers,  that  the  first 
cognitions  of  the  infant  seem  to  be  almost  wholly  experiences  of  bodily  sensa- 
tions, accompanied  by  a  very  vague  and  inaccurate  impression  of  the  outward 
cause.  Dr.  McCosh  (^Intuitions  of  the  Mind,  part  ii.  book  i.  chap,  i.) 
depicts  this  well,  but  does  not  give  sufficient  weight  to  the  educating  in- 
fluence of  others  in  developing  and  shapuig  the  deliverances  of  the  cognitive 
faculties. 

2 


18  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

on  his  elders  who  have  accumulated  a  store  of  it  before  him. 
Human  knowledge  is,  in  an  emphatic  sense,  a  common  posses- 
sion. It  is  a  possession  in  which  no  one  is  wholly  independent 
of  others.  Not  only  the  great  mass  of  information  which  comes 
purely  as  a  matter  of  testimony  and  is  accepted  purely  on  trust, 
but  also  the  knowledge  which  comes  from  direct  observation, 
depends  for  its  full  validity  on  the  confirmatory  evidence  of  one's 
fellow-men.  Knowledge,  especially  knowledge  of  the  higher 
sort,  is  not  genuine  knowledge  till  it  can  be  expressed  in  lan- 
guage ;  and  language  is  essentially  the  means  whereby  thought 
is  communicated.  Language  is  the  property  of  a  community. 
Whatever  may  be  the  true  theory  of  the  origin  of  it,  and  how- 
ever important  or  even  indispensable  it  may  be  to  the  indi- 
vidual in  his  private  reflections,  still  we  know  of  no  language 
which  is  not  a  social  thing.  No  one  invents  a  language  of  his 
own ;  he  receives  it,  ready  made,  from  others.  He  never  begins 
independent  meditations  in  the  use  of  language  till  he  has  a 
language;  and  he  gets  a  language  only  as  a  communication 
from  others.  Though  he  may  afterwards  use  language  in 
elaborating  his  own  ideas,  though  he  may  even  contribute  some- 
thing to  the  modification  or  enrichment  of  language,  still  the 
mental  culture  which  now  enables  him  to  pursue  his  in- 
dependent studies  was  originally  dependent  on  the  language  of 
others. 

The  social  element  is,  therefore,  a  much  more  vital  thing  in 
man's  nature  than  in  the  brute's.  A  brute  can  live  and  grow 
and  attain  the  perfections  of  a  brute  almost  entirely  without 
any  connection  with  other  brutes.  A  human  being,  on  the  con- 
trary, left  in  infancy  without  the  help  and  stimulus  of  human 
companions,  would,  even  if  able  to  survive,  yet  never  manifest 
distinctively  human  traits.  Nothing  of  that  which  is  highest 
and  most  characteristic  in  man  comes  to  him  apart  from  in- 
struction. Eeason  is,  in  a  true  sense,  a  collective  possession  of 
the  race,  —  not  distinct  and  independent  in  each  individual. 
Germinally,  it  must  exist  in  each  one  ;  it  cannot  be  a  collective 
thing  without  being  first  an  individual  thing.  But  it  nowhere 
becomes  its  true  self  except  as  it  is  developed  under  the  shaping 
influence  of  what  other  minds  contribute.     As  faintly  burning 


ORIGIN  OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  19 

coals  lying  separate  only  tend  to  die  out,  but  when  laid  to- 
gether kindle  one  another  into  a  glowing  flame ;  so  the  spark 
of  human  reason  left  in  any  one  wholly  without  the  kindling 
influence  of  companion  minds  would  grow  dull  and  feeble,  while 
contact  with  others  quickens  and  brightens  it  into  a  burning 
light. 

All  knowledge,  accordingly,  is  essentially  the  property  of  a 
human  community.  Even  the  first  acquisition  of  it  by  the 
individual  depends  on  the  education  previously  received  from 
others.  The  great  mass  of  knowledge  possessed  by  the  world 
is  purely  a  matter  of  communication ;  and  the  assurance  of  the 
correctness  of  it  comes  from  the  confidence  that  is  felt  in  the 
trustworthiness  of  testimony.  This  holds  true  of  the  concep- 
tions which  men  cherish  concerning  God,  as  well  as  of  every- 
thing else. 

Nevertheless,  there  must  be  some  means  of  verifying  men's 
theistic  notions  ;  there  must  be  an  ultimate  ground  for  the  be- 
liefs underlying  the  traditional  communication  of  them,  or  else 
they  are  all  superstitions  blindly  cherished  and  blindly  accepted. 
We  come,  then,  to  the  second  general  question.  What  is  the 
ultimate  foundation  and  justification  of  the  common  belief  in  a 
Supreme  Being  ? 


20  SUPEENATUKAL  EEVELATION. 


CHAPTER     11. 

GROUNDS   OF   THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF. 

"  I  "^0  explain  the  original  ground  of  theism,  we  should  need  to 
-^  go  back  to  the  first  man  or  men  who  were  led  to  embrace 
it,  and  learn  why  they  embraced  it.  But  this  it  is  impossible 
to  do ;  our  means  of  investigation  are  not  adequate  to  the 
task.  But  though  we  cannot  recur  with  certainty  to  the  actual 
origin  of  theistic  belief,  we  can  do  what  is  closely  akin  to  it,  — 
we  can  question  the  consciousness  and  experience  of  those  who 
have  lived  and  still  live  in  historic  times.  We  can  learn  not 
merely  what  the  traditional  notion  is,  but  we  can  learn  also 
what  it  is  that  sustains  the  belief  after  it  has  been  assailed.  It 
may  be  presumed  that  what  now  serves  to  keep  it  alive  and  in- 
fluential, even  in  the  face  of  doubts  and  open  opposition,  must 
have  operated  also  to  produce  it  originally. 

Now,  when  we  inquire  what  it  is  that  feeds  and  perpetuates 
the  belief  in  a  Divine  Being,  we  find  the  answer  already  sug- 
gested by  the  foregoing.  The  belief  rests  on  a  double  founda- 
tion. There  are,  in  the  first  place,  primary  and  direct  impulses, 
tendencies,  or  intuitions  of  the  individual  mind  leading  to  the 
conception  and  belief.  There  is,  in  the  second  place,  the  as- 
surance of  the  correctness  of  the  belief  wliich  comes  from  cor- 
roborative testimony. 

I.  First,  then,  theism  may  be  considered  as  a  belief  springing 
from  the  direct  operation  of  the  individual  mind.  In  point  of 
fact,  what  is  commonly  called  natural  theology  does  not  de- 
scribe the  process  by  which  the  theist  comes  to  his  belief ;  it  is 
rather  the  defense  which  is  made  against  real  or  imaginary 
attacks  on  the  belief  which  has  been  inherited  or  communi- 
cated. Education  has  so  far  superseded  the  action  of  the  spon- 
taneous impulses  of  the  soul  that  it  is  impossible  to  determine 
how  such  impulses  would  work ;  indeed,  it  is  certain  that  they 


GROUNDS  OF  THE  THEISTIC  BELIEF.  21 

would  never  develop  any  clearly  conscious  belief  without  the 
help  of  others  who  have  already  a  positive  belief.  It  being  im- 
possible to  ascertain  the  genesis  of  the  original  conception  of 
God,  and  equally  impossible  for  any  one  now  to  come  to  such  a 
conception  independently,  all  that  natural  theology  can  do  is  to 
justify  theism  against  assault.  In  this  self-defense  the  theist, 
though  he  does  not  present  the  historical  process  of  his  own  or 
other  minds,  may  yet  be  presumed  to  indicate  substantially 
what  the  instinctive  tendencies  are  which  have  led  to  so  gen- 
eral an  adoption  of  theistic  beliefs.  That  which  persistently 
defends  these  beliefs  must  most  probably  be  the  same  as  that 
which  created  them. 

1.  This  test  disposes  at  once  of  those  hypotheses  which  derive 
the  notion  of  a  God  from  dreams,^  or  animism,^  or  personifica- 
tion,^  or  self-deification,*  or  fear,^  or  deliberate  deception.  At 
the  best,  such  hypotheses  are  merely  hypotheses,  resting  on  no 
basis  of  ascertained  fact.     The  chief  plausibility  belonging  to 

^  Sir  John  Lubbock,  Orir/in  of  Civilization,  3d  ed.,  p.  207;  Darwin,  Be- 
scent  of  Man,  vol.  i.  p.  66;  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology,  chap.  xi. 
He  makes  tlie  impressions  of  dreams,  swoons,  etc.,  lead  to  the  belief  in  ghosts, 
and  this  to  ancestor-worship  (chap,  xx.),  and  this  again  to  idol-worship,  fetich- 
worship,  etc.  These  various  explanations  may  more  or  less  run  into  one 
another. 

2  E.  B.  Tvlor,  Primitive  Culture,  chaps.  xi.-x\'ii. 

2  Hume,  Natural  History  of  Religion,  p.  317  (ed.  Greene  and  Grose)  ; 
John  Fiske,  Idea  of  God,  p.  65. 

*  Feuerbach,  Wesen  des  Christenthums,  §  2. 

5  Lucretius,  Be  Natura  Rerum,  vers.  1161-1240;  Lange,  Geschichte  des 
Materialismits,  p.  17'^  (4th  ed.,  1882).  An  interesting  instance  of  the  dogmatic 
confidence  with  which  some  men  can  discourse  about  the  origin  of  theism 
is  found  in  M.  J.  Savage's  Religion  of  Evolution  (Boston,  1876),  where  the 
genesis  of  the  notion  of  divine  beings  is  stated  to  have  been  fear.  Whatever 
moved,  he  says,  was  imagined  to  be  alive ;  and  since  men  were  hurt  and  killed 
by  wild  beasts,  inanimate  things,  such  as  water,  lightning,  the  sun,  moon,  etc., 
came  to  be  feared  also.  "  Thus  they  turned  all  these  things  into  gods.  .  .  . 
Tuis  was  the  original  polytheism,  or,  in  its  lowest  manifestation,  fetichism" 
(p.  53).  Five  years  later  the  same  author,  in  his  Belief  in  God  (Boston, 
1881),  propounds  another  view  ;  he  rehashes  Herbert  Spencer's  dream-theory, 
shows  how  naturally  ancestor-worship  grew  up,  and  adds,  "  Out  of  this  belief 
in  ancestor- worship  sprung,  first,  fetichism  "  !  (p.  19).  In  both  cases  the  au- 
thor discourses  as  if  he  had  been  present  and  seen  the  process. 


22  SUPERNATUR.VL  REVELATION. 

these  theories  comes  from  the  characteristics  of  the  religion  of 
certain  degraded  races.  In  fact,  there  lies  at  the  foundation  of 
all  such  theories  the  tacit  or  avowed  assumption  that  theism 
is  a  grand  illusion. 

It  is  a  sufficient  refutation  of  them  to  say,  not  merely  that 
they  are  destitute  of  proof,  but  that  they  utterly  overlook  the 
main  fact  that  needs  to  be  explained.  That  dreams  or  inten- 
tional efforts  to  deceive  should  ever  succeed  in  producing  so 
persistent  a  notion  as  that  of  the  existence  and  agency  of  su- 
perhuman beings,  implies  a  pre-existent  tendency  to  entertain 
such  a  notion.  That  any  one  should  associate  the  conception  of 
deity  with  certain  special  objects  or  activities  of  Nature  pre- 
supposes a  theistic  sense,  —  a  tendency  to  believe  in  super- 
natural agents.  Without  such  a  sense,  that  is,  without  theism 
already  at  least  germinally  existent  in  the  mind,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  account  for  the  arbitrary  act  of  associating  nat- 
ural phenomena  with  supernatural  agencies.  These  theories, 
therefore,  are  as  shallow,  psychologically  considered,  as  they  are 
destitute  of  basis,  historically  considered. 

Aside  from  all  this,  however,  it  is  a  conclusive  refutation  of 
these  hypotheses  that,  if  there  were  any  truth  in  them,  theism 
would  fall  before  the  first  assault  from  enlightened  reflection 
and  science.  That  this  is  not  the  case  is  a  sufficient  evidence 
that  the  theistic  sense  is  a  deeper  thing  than  the  theories  in 
question  recognize. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  another  hypothesis  —  a  modi- 
fication of  Schleiermacher's  theory  of  the  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence  —  which  has  considerable  vogue,  especially  in  Ger- 
many.    It  is  thus  stated  by  one  of  its  advocates  :  ^  "  Eeligion 

1  Kaftan,  Wesen  der  christlichen  Religion,  p.  96.  Similarly,  Bender  {Wesen 
der  Religion,  p.  38)  :  "  Religion  on  its  practical  side  is  the  exercise  of  the  im- 
pulse of  self-preservation  in  man,  by  means  of  which  man  seeks  to  maintain  the 
essential  ends  of  life,  amidst  the  obstacles  found  in  the  world  and  at  the  limit 
of  his  power,  by  voluntarily  rising  up  to  the  power  that  orders  and  controls 
the  world."  To  the  same  effect  is  the  definition  given  by  Ritschl  {Rechtfer- 
tigung  und  Versohmtng,  p.  17,  2d  ed.,  1883):  "All  religion  is  an  interpreta- 
tion of  the  course  of  the  world,  to  whatever  extent  it  may  be  apprehended,  in 
this  sense :  that  the  lofty  spiritual  Powers  (or  the  spiritual  Power)  which  hold 
sway  in  it  or  over  it  maintain  or  secure  to  the  personal  spirit  its  claims  or  its 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  23 

takes  its  rise  when  and  because  man,  with  his  claim  to  life 
[Anspruch  auf  Zehen]  and  with  his  effort  to  satisfy  it,  comes 
to  the  limit  of  his  power."  This  inability  of  himself  to  satisfy 
the  cravings  which  the  inborn  love  of  life  involves,  leads  man, 
we  are  told,  to  seek  help  from  higher  powers ;  or,  in  the  case 
of  more  degraded  races,  the  religious  impulse  takes  mostly  the 
form  of  an  attempt  to  propitiate  the  evil  spirits  that  are  con- 
ceived to  obstruct  men  in  their  search  of  the  comforts  and  en- 
joyments of  life.  This  experience  of  limitation,  it  is  said,  is  that 
which  leads  men  to  religion,  "  in  that  it  becomes  the  occasion  of 
seeking  fro7n  the  deity  help  for  the  want  which  has  been  experi- 
enced." 1  This  is  conceived  to  be  an  explanation  of  the  origin 
of  theistic  notions  which  answers  to  all  the  varied  forms  of  re- 
ligion. Prayer  for  help,  sacrifices  to  propitiate,  worship  in  all 
its  forms,  —  these  are  regarded  as  evoked  by  the  impulse  to 
seek  from  superhuman  sources  the  help  which  one  needs  in 
order  to  attain  the  good  which  he  desires. 

No  doubt  a  large  part  of  the  religion  especially  of  the  less 
cultivated  races  does  consist  in  a  purely  selfish  appeal  for  help 
to  the  invisible  world.  No  doubt,  also,  this  is  an  element  which 
is  found  in  all  religions.  Prayer  implies  dependence  ;  and  prayer 
is  a  characteristic  of  all  religions.  But  it  does  not  therefore 
follow  that  the  notion  of  a  divine  being  first  grew  out  of  the 
sense  of  impotence  and  the  desire  for  help.^     Given  the  belief  in 

independence  against  the  obstructions  which  come  from  Nature  or  the  natu- 
ral workings  of  human  society."  Teichmiiller  {Relujionsphilomphie,  p.  24), 
acutely  observes  concerning  it :  "  Ritschl's  definition  of  all  religion,  which, 
carefully  guarded  by  many  precautionary  clauses  and  well  equipped  with  inter- 
calations and  divisions,  strides  along  like  a  camel  loaded  with  a  month's  provi- 
sions, astonishes  us  by  presenting  to  us  religion  as  an  interpretation,  ...  as 
something  purely  theoretical.  .  .  .  Against  this  definition  religion  itself  must 
be  defended ;  for  the  religious  man  surely  does  not  need  to  be  so  narrow  as  to 
think  the  course  of  the  world  conducted  expressly  for  the  '  securing  of  his 
claims'  by  the  high  spiritual  Powers,  when,  say,  his  house  is  burned  down,  his 
cattle  perish,  his  wife  and  children  are  stolen  away,  and  lie  himself  is  attacked 
by  the  small-pox,  or  is  scourged  by  a  tyrant  and  sent  to  the  quarries." 

^  Kaftan,  Wesen  der  christUchen  Reliffion,  p.  96. 

^  "  Through  the  mere  sensation  of  hunger  the  new-born  child  by  no  means 
gains  the  conception  of  a  means  of  nutrition ;  still  less  through  tlie  mere  feel- 
ing of  his  incapacity  and  impotence,  the  notion  of  the  helping  hand  M'hich  is 


24  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

higher  beings,  it  is  easily  conceivable  that  human  selfishness 
might  be  inclined  to  make  use  of  them  for  its  own  benefit. 
But  to  hold  that  human  impotence  and  selfishness  created  the 
belief  is  quite  another  thing,  and  is  a  pure  assumption.  It 
cannot,  of  course,  even  be  pretended  that  any  positive  proof  of 
such  an  origin  can  be  given.  An  inference  only  is  made  from 
the  actual  characteristics  of  the  prevailing  religions. 

But  the  inference  is  without  any  inherent  plausibility.  That 
men  should  soon  come  to  feel  their  impotence  —  should  find 
that  they  have  desires  which  they  are  unable  of  themselves  to 
satisfy  —  is  easy  to  see.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  this  sense 
of  impotence  would  create  the  belief  in  invisible  helpers.  It 
might  create  the  desire  for  help.  But  from  this  there  is  a  long 
step  to  the  actual  belief  that  help  is  to  be  had,  and  that  the 
help  is  to  come  from  an  invisible,  superhuman  source  At  the 
most,  we  may  conjecture  that  rude  men  might  grasp  at  the  hope 
that  help  could  be  secured  from  some  unknown  source,  and 
might  address  petitions  to  it.  But  unless  we  assume  an  ante- 
cedent notion  of  supernatural  power  as  already  existing  in  the 
mind,  there  is  absolutely  no  reason  why  we  should  suppose 
that  such  men  should,  through  the  mere  experience  of  weakness 
and  helplessness,  come  to  the  assured  conviction  that  there  are 
divine  helpers  to  whom  they  can  appeal.  /  And  this  all  the  less 
inasmuch  as  prayer  addressed  to  merely  imaginary  beings  for 
help  out  of  the  physical  and  material  limitations  and  sufferings 
of  life  could  not  have  met  with  such  answers  as  would  have 
convinced  the  petitioners  that  the  imaginary  beings  were  real. 
On  the  contrary,  the  petitions  must  for  the  most  part  have 
failed  of  a  direct  and  favorable  response ;  and  if  the  notion  of 
the  superhuman  power  was  the  mere  product  of  the  sense  of 
need,  the  most  natural  result  must  have  been  the  direst  atheism. 
The  sense  of  need  must  originally  have  had  reference  to  the 
dangers  arising  from  conflicts  with  enemies,  the  difficulty  of 
making  the  earth  contribute  to  human  comfort  and  sustenance, 

to  care  for  liini.  Just  as  little,  manifestly,  can  tlie  mere  feeling  of  physical 
and  moral  helplessness,  even  when  it  has  come  to  consciousness  in  tlie  adult, 
of  itself  alone  evoke  the  notion  of  a  divine  Helper."  —  Ulrici,  Gott  tind  die 
Natur,  p.  610. 


GROUNDS  OF   THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  25 

the  impossibility  of  resisting  the  destructive  and  devastating 
forces  of  nature,  the  sufferings  and  grief  that  attend  bodily  sick- 
ness and  death;  and  if  the  experience  of  weakness  and  painful 
limitation  led  men  to  desire  superior  help,  ^d  if  nothing  but 
this  desire  led  them  to  make  supplication  to  the  hypothetical 
deities,  then,  as  soon  as  they  found  that  their  supplications  or 
propitiations  failed  to  produce  the  effect  desired,  they  must  have 
abandoned  the  hypothesis.  If  for  other  reasons  the  notion  of 
a  God  had  taken  strong  possession  of  men's  minds,  then  we  can 
understand  why,  even  in  spite  of  little  apparent  success  in  secur- 
ing direct  answers  to  prayers  for  help,  men  should  nevertheless 
persist  in  their  supplications.  But  unless  a  theistic  belief  or  at 
least  a  strong  theistic  impulse  is  presupposed,  the  mere  sense  of 
impotence  could  never  of  itself  have  produced  the  persistent 
theism  which  all  religions  have  maintained. 

It  is  further  to  be  objected  to  all  these  hypotheses,  that  they 
make  the  lowest  forms  of  religion  the  standard  in  determining 
what  the  essence  of  religion  is.  The  avowed  object  is  to  find  a 
definition  which  covers  all  the  forms  of  religion.  But  the  result 
is  a  virtual  assumption  that  those  are  right  who  make  religion 
to  have  originated  in  the  conceits  of  the  lowest  races  of  human- 
ity. It  is  assumed  that  these  rude  forms  of  religion  are  the 
truly  natural,  primitive,  and  purely  spontaneous  forms.  This  is 
an  utterly  unwarranted  assumption.  In  religion,  as  in  other 
things,  that  holds  true  which  Principal  Caird  affirms:^  "  It  is 
not  that  which  is  common  to  barbarism  and  civilization  which 
is  most  truly  human,  but  precisely  that  in  which  civilization 
differs  from  barbarism."  It  is  from  the  genuine,  purest  form  of 
religion,  not  from  its  lowest  corruptions  or  crudest  manifesta- 
tions, that  we  must  derive  a  definition  of  its  essential  nature. 
Aside  from  this,  moreover,  it  is  a  pure  assumption,  when  the 
most  degraded  races  of  men  are  regarded  as  the  true  types  of 
primitive  man,  and  not  rather  as  instances  of  degeneration.^ 

We  come  back,  then,  to  the  ground  that  the  persiste7ice   of 

^  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  82. 

'^  Vide  the  controversy  between  Sir  Jolni  Lubbock,  PreJilsforic  Times,  and 
Oi-iffin  of  Cioilization,  and  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  Primeval  Man.  Cf.  also 
Presseuse,  Studi/  of  Origins,  pp.  467  sqq. 


26  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

theism  in  the  face  of  doubts  and  contradictions  must  furnish  the 
most  probable  indication  of  the  ultimate  ground  of  it,  in  so  far 
as  it  rests  on  the  basis  of  natural  and  spontaneous  tendencies  of 
the  human  mind. 

Now,  when  theism  is  assailed,  no  one  ever  thinks  of  defend- 
ing it  on  the  ground  that  primitive  races,  or  still  existent  races, 
have  found  themselves  hampered  by  natural  forces,  and  unable 
by  their  own  power  to  get  all  the  comfort  and  pleasure  they  de- 
sire. None  the  more  is  theism  defended  on  the  ground  that  it 
originated  in  dreams  or  supposed  visions  of  ghosts.  Eecourse 
to  such  an  explanation  would  only  confirm  the  objector  in  his 
opposition  to  theism.  But  the  fact  remains  that,  in  spite  of 
the  opposition,  the  belief  holds  its  own,  and  holds  its  own 
among  the  most  intelligent  of  men.  Of  course  many  weak  and 
inconclusive  arguments  may  be  resorted  to.  The  impulse  to 
defend  what  one  has  always  held  may  lead  one  to  the  use  of 
ineffective  weapons.  But  in  the  course  of  time  the  contention 
of  the  opposing  forces  cannot  but  have  eliminated  the  essen- 
tially weak  and  useless  defenses.  What  has  maintained  itself 
and  continues  to  be  advanced  as  argument  for  the  theistic  be- 
lief must  be  presumed  to  have  validity,  and  to  be  some  index 
of  what  that  tendency  of  the  human  mind  is  which  has  led 
men  so  generally  to  cling  to  the  belief  in  a  Divine  Being.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  assume  that  precisely  the  same  mental  process 
takes  place  in  the  defense  of  theism  which  originally  gave  rise 
to  the  belief.  Nevertheless  it  is  legitimate  to  assume  that 
whatever  there  may  have  been  in  human  nature  which  origi- 
nally led  to  theism  must  reappear  in  the  arguments  by  which 
theism  is  now  defended.  That  which  was  at  first  only  ger- 
minal, not  yet  analyzed  and  unfolded,  has  come  by  degrees  to 
be  scientifically  grasped  and  stated.  It  matters  Httle  or  noth- 
ing whether  this  original  conception  of  God  be  called  a  feeling 
or  a  cognition,  so  long  as  it  is  regarded  as  constituting  in  some 
sense  a  notion  that  there  is  a  Divine  Being  distinct  from  the 
human  agent. 

2.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the- 
ism is  not  solved  by  asserting  that  the  belief  in  a  God  is  a 
direct  intuition. 


GROUNDS   OF  THE  THEISTIC  BELIEF.  27 

There  are  few  nowadays  who  would  assert  this  in  its  strict- 
est form.  The  notion  of  a  direct  perception  or  intuition  of 
God  has  for  the  most  part  disappeared,  together  with  the  gen- 
eral notion  of  innate  ideas.  But  in  a  modified  form  it  is  still  to 
be  found.  Schleiermacher's  doctrine  of  the  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence  as  being  the  foundation  of  all  religion  is  an  attempt 
to  show  that  the  religious  sense  is  an  ultimate  fact  in  human 
consciousness.  And  when  the  matter  is  put  in  its  most  general 
form,  the  doctrine  contains  an  indisputable  truth.  But  it  is  a 
question  how  far  the  mere  feeling  of  dependence,  the  conscious- 
ness of  general  impotence,  as  over  against  the  forces  of  nature, 
can  properly  be  called  a  religious  feeling.  Even  when  it  takes 
the  form  of  a  sense  of  awe  before  the  mystery  of  man's  origin 
and  destiny,  the  feeling  can  be  called  religious  only  in  a  very 
lax  and  dubious  sense.  Herbert  Spencer  may  regard  this  sense 
of  awe  in  the  thought  of  the  Great  Unknown  Force  as  an 
eminently  religious  feeling,  —  as  being  the  substance  of  all  re- 
ligion. But  in  and  of  itself  it  is  scarcely  more  religious  than 
the  terror  of  a  hare  in  the  presence  of  pursuing  hounds ; 
and  it  is  a  consistent  carrying  out  of  the  Spencerian  doctrine 
when  evolutionists  think  they  detect  in  dogs  and  other  beasts 
the  germs  of  a  religious  sense.  Unless  the  sense  of  dependence 
takes  the  form  of  a  sense  of  dependence  on  a  Divine  Being,  it 
is  not  a  distinctively  religious  feeling.  It  may,  indeed,  be  re- 
garded as  one  of  the  features  of  human  nature  which  lead  men 
towards  theistic  conceptions  ;  but  it  is  not  the  only  one,  and  is 
not  itself  religion. 

Consequently,  when  the  analogy  of  sense-perception  is  ap- 
plied to  this  case,  and  the  feeling  of  dependence  is  said  to 
involve  a  perception  of  God,  just  as  the  perception  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  is  involved  in  the  sensations  which  are  experienced 
in  the  physical  organism,^  we  can  only  say  that  the  analogy  is 
not  a  real  one.  If  it  were  real,  then  the  conclusion  would  have 
to  be  that  God  is  as  directly  perceived  as  the  material  world  is 
perceived;  and  this  is  practically  equivalent  to  the  doctrine 
that  man  has  an  immediate  intuition  of  God.  For  though  sen- 
sation and  perception  may  be  distinguished,  yet  they  are  insep- 
^  So  N.  Smyth,  The  Religious  Feeling,  chap.  iv. 


28  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

arable  and  interdependent.  The  perception  of  an  outward 
object  is  not  the  result  of  a  process  of  reasoning.  One  does  not 
say,  "  I  have  a  sensation  ;  that  sensation  must  have  a  cause ; 
and  therefore  the  cause  must  be  such  and  such  a  material  ob- 
ject." The  perception  is,  on  the  contrary,  just  as  immediate  as 
the  sensation.  They  may  differ  in  intensity;  but  neither  of 
them  precedes  the  other,  or  is  an  inference  from  the  other.  If 
the  religious  feeling  of  dependence  is  called  a  sensation  analo- 
gous to  physical  sensations,  then  the  perception  involved  in  it 
must  be  immediate  and  distinct,  the  direct  consciousness  of 
God ;  and  no  argument  can  be  needed  to  prove  that  there  is 
such  a  consciousness.  As  soon  as  one  undertakes  to  conduct 
such  an  argument,  he  has  yielded  the  very  position  which  he 
professes  to  maintain. 

No  doubt  it  would  seem  to  be  very  desirable  to  be  able  to  be- 
lieve that  the  knowledge  of  God  is  as  positive  and  direct  as  the 
knowledge  of  self.^  A  special  temptation  to  resort  to  this  view 
is  created  by  the  discredit  into  which  the  ordinary  proofs  of 
the  Divine  existence  have  fallen,  especially  since  Kant's  criti- 
cism of  them.  Since  theists  themselves  thus  confess  that  the 
arguments  lack  a  strictly  demonstrative  character,  atheists  are 
fortified  in  their  position ;  and  the  theist,  unwilling  to  concede 
that  his  fundamental  tenet  rests  on  an  uncertain  basis,  is  often 
led  to  resort  to  the  desperate  shift  that  the  belief  needs  no  ar- 
gument, being  a  direct  intuition.  But  such  an  assumption  is 
negatived  at  once  by  the  obvious  objection  that  a  proper  intui- 
tion must  needs  be  universal,  necessary,  and  essentially  uni- 
form, —  which  cannot  be  affirmed  of  the  theistic  sense  and  its 
deliverances ;  and  by  the  further  consideration  that  those  who 
assert  that  they  themselves  are  conscious  of  such  an  intuition 
have  received  the  theistic  doctrine  as  a  communication  from 
others,  and  have  been  so  trained  up  in  it  that  in  any  case  it  has 
become  a  sort  of  second  nature  to  hold  it.  Such  persons  cannot 
possibly  discriminate  between  what  has  come  as  a  traditional 

^  So,  e.  g.,  Ilotlie,  Theologische  EthiJc,  §  6,  who  says  that  the  religious 
man's  "  feeling  of  self  is  at  the  same  time  immediately  a  feeling  of  God  ;  and 
he  cannot  raise  the  former  to  a  clear  and  distinct  thought  of  the  Ego  without 
at  the  same  time  having  the  thought  of  God." 


GROUNDS  OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  29 

belief  and  what  comes  from  direct  perception.  The  so-called 
intuition  is  nothing  more  than  the  current  belief.  No  effort, 
however  intense,  will  suffice  to  enucleate  the  intuition  as  a  dis- 
tinct thing,  and  make  it  satisfactory  as  an  independent  proof  of 
the  reality  of  the  object  of  the  faith. 

The  temptation  to  assert  the  reality  of  a  direct  intuition  of 
God  is  all  the  greater  inasmuch  as  this  cognition  is  not  only  of 
peculiar  importance,  but  also  of  a  peculiar  kind,  without  any 
exact  analogies.  The  external  world  is  perceived  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses ;  God  cannot  be  seen  or  felt.  The  knowl- 
edge of  mathematical  truths  or  of  logical  principles  is  a  more 
purely  intellectual  cognition ;  but  it  is  a  cognition  of  the  rela- 
tion of  things  or  persons,  not  a  cognition  of  the  existence  of 
them.  If,  therefore,  God  is  directly  apprehended,  there  must  be 
an  altogether  peculiar,  a  separate,  sense  for  this  cognition.  The 
fact  of  such  a  sense  can  be  proved  only  to  those  who  are  already 
conscious  of  having  it.  And  inasmuch  as  most  men  are  not 
conscious  of  any  such  sense,  there  is  an  insuperable  presumption 
that  those  who  assert  that  they  have  it  are  laboring  under  a  de- 
lusion, —  that  they  mistake  a  belief  derived  from  education  and 
strengthened  by  reason  for  an  immediate  intuition. 

3.  In  the  theistic  controversy  the  presum^otion  is  in  favor  of 
theism.  The  mere  fact  that  it  has  been  the  prevalent  belief 
of  mankind  indicates  that  it  is  prolaUy  well-founded.  Though 
we  may  not  claim  that  every  man  intuitively  knows  that  there 
is  a  God,  it  may  be  presumed,  from  the  general  existence  of  the 
belief,  that  there  is  good  ground  for  it.  Atheists,  however, 
usually  attempt  to  fortify  their  position  by  throwing  the  bur- 
den of  proof  on  the  theistic  side.  They  seek  to  make  it  ap- 
pear that  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  atheism,  and  that 
nothing  but  demonstrative  proof  can  suffice  to  overthrow  that 
presumption. 

It  must,  however,  in  the  first  place,  be  remembered  that  in 
the  last  analysis  all  knowledge  is  no  more  than  a  firm  belief, 
and  that  there  cannot  be  a  demonstration  of  anything  as  an 
objective  existence.  One  can  irresistibly  demonstrate  nothing 
but  the  necessity  of  the  mind  to  think  so  or  so  concerning  the 
relations  of  things  whose  existence  is  assumed :  the  demonstra- 


30  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

tioii,  however,  is  nothing  but  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
the  mind  cannot  contradict  itself,  cannot  affirm  and  deny  one 
and  the  same  thing.  With  regard  to  everything  else  so-called 
demonstrations  are  nothing  but  inductions  which  yield  a 
greater  or  less  degree  of  probability,  and  produce  more  or  less 
firm  belief. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  it  should  be  remembered  that  though 
it  may  seem  more  incumbent  on  the  theist  to  prove  his  positive 
doctrine  than  on  the  atheist  to  prove  his  negative  one,  yet  in 
reality  the  atheist  maintains  a  positive  proposition  as  much  as 
the  theist  does.  He  must  hold  the  positive  doctrine  that  the 
universe  is  self-existent.  He  must  hold  the  positive  doctrine 
that  the  origin  and  changes  of  the  various  forms  of  existence  are 
to  be  attributed  to  a  purposeless  chance.  Whether  the  atheistic 
or  the  theistic  doctrine  is  to  be  called  positive  depends  simply 
on  the  form  of  statement.  In  either  case  the  problem  is  to 
give  a  philosophical  explanation  of  acknowledged  facts.  The 
atheist  is  as  much  bound  to  explain  them  as  the  theist  is.^ 

4.  The  argument  for  theism  is  felt  most  forcibly  when  it  is 
seen  in  the  light  of  the  legitimate  and  necessary  implications  of 
atheism.  When  the  theistic  argument  is  conducted  directly, 
every  defect  in  it,  every  inconclusive  feature  in  it,  is  looked  on 
by  the  atheist  as  an  evidence  of  the  weakness  of  the  general 
doctrine.  Whereas,  if  atheism  is  for  the  moment  assumed  to  be 
the  true  theory  of  the  universe,  we  meet  with  difficulties  in- 
comparably greater  than  those  which  can  be  alleged  against 
theism.     Let  us  pursue  this  line  of  thought. 

One  thing  is  certain :  Either  there  is  a  personal,  sovereign 
God,  or  there  is  not.  Even  if  the  proofs  of  his  existence  were 
ever  so  inconclusive,  the  result  at  the  most  would  be  only  that  we 
are  left  in  doubt.  But  the  doubt  whether  the  one  or  the  other 
theory  is  correct  does  not  make  any  middle  ground  possible  as 
to  the  fact.     If  one  is  not  satisfied  that  the  universe  is  governed 

^  Vide^.  P.  Bowiie,  Studies  in  Theism,  p.  5.  Also  G.  Matheson,  Can  the 
Old  Faith  Hoe  with  the  New?  1885,  who  forcibly  shows  that  the  atheist  does 
not  even  avoid  the  supernaturalism  which  it  is  his  object  to  expel  from 
thought,  but  is  forced,  at  certain  points,  to  assume  a  violation  of  the  laws 
which  he  declares  to  be  inviolable  (pp.  35  sqq^. 


GROUNDS  OF  THE  THEISTIC  BELIEF.  31 

by  a  personal  God,  then,  if  thoroughly  rational,  he  must  adjust 
his  conceptions  to  the  opposite  assumption,  with  all  its  neces- 
sary consequences.     What  are  those  consequences  ? 

The  atheist  must  hold  that  the  universe,  with  all  its  processes 
and  history,  is,  as  a  whole,  aimless  and  meaningless.  He  must 
hold  that  the  material  world  is  uncreated  and  eternal,  but  un- 
dergoes an  endless  series  of  changes.  If  the  cause  of  these 
changes  is  inquired  after,  it  must  be  answered  that  the  cause 
inheres  in  the  universe  itself.  That  is,  it  must  be  the  nature 
of  things  to  change  just  as  they  do  change.  A  rigid  necessity 
must  appertain  to  everything ;  and  that  necessity  is  a  force 
without  thought,  will,  or  feeling.  For  the  world  as  a  whole 
there  can  have  been,  on  this  theory,  no  purpose ;  for  purpose 
implies  a  personal  agent,  and  originally  there  was  nothing  but 
impersonal  matter.  In  the  process  of  evolution,  it  is  true, 
matter  in  some  cases  takes  on  the  form  of  organisms  which 
think,  feel,  and  will ;  and  these  organisms  are  called  persons. 
But  no  personal  agency  was  operative  in  producing  these  per- 
sons. It  was  simply  the  nature  of  things  to  evolve  at  a  certain 
stage  these  thinking  objects.  Nature,  itself  utterly  unconscious, 
produces  beings  that  know  more  than  nature  does.  But  all  the 
knowledge,  all  the  purposes  and  choices  of  men,  are  only  a  part 
of  the  necessary  course  of  things.  Even  though  the  course  of 
things  should  be  called  fortuitous,  still  everything  must  have 
been  just  as  it  has  been,  since  to  say  that  anything  else  was 
possible  is  to  say  that  there  was  some  other  power  distinct 
from  the  forces  of  nature,  —  another  power  which  might  have 
produced  a  different  result.  But  this  is  contrary  to  the  atheistic 
postulate,  which  does  not  allow  that  any  such  merely  possible 
force  can  exist.  The  hypothesis  can  indeed  have  no  meaning, 
unless  this  other  power  is  a  ijcrson,  possessing  a  free  ivill.  But 
free  will,  even  in  the  persons  produced  by  the  impersonal  force 
of  nature,  is  impossible  on  the  materialistic  theory.  Men  may 
have  purposes ;  but  whatever  they  purpose  is  determined  rigidly 
by  the  blind  forces  back  of  all.  Mind,  so-called,  is  nothing  but 
matter  acting  in  a  certain  way.  G-iven  certain  combinations  of 
particles,  and  the  result  must  be  certain  thoughts,  volitions,  and 
actions,  as  truly  as  under  certain  conditions  water  must  freeze. 


32  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

That  which  compels  men  to  form  purposes  has  itself  no  purpose  in 
this  compulsory  act.  The  blind,  unintelligent,  purposeless  force 
which  underlies  everything  is  stronger  than  all  conscious  purpose, 
and  transforms  all  apparent  purpose  ultimately  into  unmeaning 
purposelessness.  For,  the  designs  which  individuals  conceive 
and  execute  are  only  links  in  a  great  complex  of  causes  and 
effects,  which  is  itself  without  thought  and  design.  The  greater 
force  must  control  the  lesser.  The  universe,  as  a  whole,  has, 
on  the  hypothesis  in  question,  no  meaning,  —  no  aim,  no  pur- 
pose. There  is  no  reason  why  anything  is  as  it  is,  except  that 
it  must  be  so.  Free  will  and  moral  responsibility  are  impos- 
sible. The  common  notion  that  there  is  such  a  thing  is  an 
illusion.  But  everything  being  necessary,  the  illusion  also  is 
necessary.  When  one  thinks  he  has  discovered  the  fact  of  the 
illusion,  this  discovery  is  also  something  necessary ;  and  when 
another  thinks  he  has  shown  that  free  will  is  no  illusion,  this 
demonstration  is  equally  necessary.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
world  that  can  be  called  good  in  the  sense  that  a  good  intention 
determined  the  production  of  it.  That  which  produces  the  so- 
called  bad  has  no  less,  and  no  more,  of  good  in  it  than  that 
which  produces  the  so-called  good.  Good  and  evil  are,  in  fact, 
relative  terms,  —  evil  meaning  only  that  which  is  disagreeable 
to  certain  temporary  sensations  of  certain  of  the  beings  who 
have  come  into  existence  through  no  purpose,  good  or  bad. 
Ill  desert  and  good  desert  in  a  moral  sense  are  of  course  impos- 
sible. That  which  must  be  is  not  to  be  blamed  for  being,  and 
is  entitled  to  no  praise  for  being.  When  men  blame  or  praise, 
as  they  do,  they  cannot,  it  is  true,  do  otherwise  ;  but  their 
praise  and  blame  cannot  imply  that  anything  could  have  been 
other  than  it  is.  If  nothing  could  have  been  different,  then  it  can- 
not be  said  that  anything  ought  to  have  been  different.  Moral 
good  and  moral  evil  being  only  illusory  notions,  the  urging  of 
moral  motives  upon  men,  the  attempt  to  excite  in  them  emo- 
tions of  remorse,  or  to  spread  before  them  moral  ideals,  is  a 
sort  of  fraud.  Yet  there  being  nothing  morally  praiseworthy  or 
blameworthy,  it  is  as  well  to  practise  the  fraud  as  not ;  do  as 
we  may,  we  cannot  do  otherwise.  Enthusiasm  over  moral  ex- 
cellence and  indignation  over  moral  depravity  are  both  absurd, 


GROUNDS   OF  THE  THEISTIC   BELIEF.  33 

but  both  are  unavoidable.  All  our  emotions  and  thoughts  are 
only  phenomena  necessarily  produced  by  the  mighty  force 
which  in  itself  has  no  thought,  or  emotion,  or  purpose,  or 
moral  character,  —  nothing  good  and  nothing  bad.^ 

Furthermore,  not  only  are  all  moral  distinctions  and  judg- 
ments illusory ;  but  also,  on  the  basis  of  atheistic  material- 
ism, truth  and  untruth  become  also  illusory  and  meaningless. 
Thought  being  nothing  but  a  secretion  of  the  brain,  it  is  as  ab- 
surd to  call  one  thought  true  and  another  untrue,  as  it  would  be 
to  call  the  secretion  of  saliva  true  or  false.  The  theist's  thoughts 
being  just  as  unavoidable  as  the  atheist's,  the  latter  cannot, 
without  absurdity,  call  his  own  thoughts  true  and  the  theist's 
false.  "  If  thought  and  all  combinations  of  thought  are  noth- 
ing but  the  result  of  a  simple  natural  process,  which,  being  as 
such  under  the  given  circumstances  and  conditions  unavoidable, 
must  result  so  and  not  otherwise,  then  all  thoughts,  all  concep- 
tions, judgments,  and  conclusions  have  dbsoliUdy  equal  right; 
to  none  of  them  can  be  ascribed  any  superiority  to  the  others."  ^ 
In  short,  pure  materialism  ends  in  pure  absurdity. 

Essentially  the  same  result  is  reached  if  we  adopt  the  specula- 
tions of  Herbert  Spencer.  Whether  the  system  should  be  called 
atheism  or  pantheism,  materialism  or  idealism,  may  be  disputed;  ^ 
but  its  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  is  logically  the 
doctrine  of  despair  concerning  the  attainment  of  truth.  When 
experience  is  made  the  sole  criterion  of  knowledge,  and  experi- 
ence is  affirmed  to  have  to  do  only  with  phenomena,  and  phenom- 
ena are  declared  to  be  nothing  but  modifications  of  consciousness, 
it  is  manifest  that,  according  to  this,  all  experiences  are  equally 
valid  and  equally  invalid,  and  all  so-called  knowledge  is  nothing 
but  a  series  of  more  or  less  permanent  impressions. 

But  is  not  human  knowledge  imperfect  and  full  of  mistakes  ? 
Certainly.  Yet  this  affirmation  itself  could  not  be  made  unless 
some  things  were  assuredlij  known.  Possible  or  even  probable 
truth  does  not  make  the  fact  of  error  certain.     But  nothing  is 

^  Cf.  Dorner,  Christian  Ethics,  §  9. 

^  Ulrici,  Gott  und  der  Mensrh,  vol.  i.  p.  4  (ed.  1).    Cf.  also  Professor  Fisher, 
Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief,  p.  82. 
^  See  Excursus  11.  iu  the  Appendix. 


34  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

more  certain  than  that  errors  are  real.  And  it  is  just  because 
the  mind  does  know  that  human  knowledge  is  mixed  with 
error,  while  yet  this  prerogative  of  knowledge  is  seen  to  be  that 
which  marks  mind  as  infinitely  superior  to  the  irrational  objects 
of  its  cognition,  —  it  is  just  for  this  reason  that  there  springs 
up,  as  by  instinct,  in  the  soul  the  feeling  that  there  must  be  a 
Person  whose  knowledge  is  free  from  error  and  imperfection. 
The  more  men  come  to  know,  through  microscopic,  telescopic, 
and  chemical  observation,  of  the  marvellous  beauty  and  com- 
plexity of  the  universe,  the  more  is  there  suggested  of  the 
immensity  of  the  realms  yet  unknown  ;  and  the  more  urgent 
is  the  impulse  to  believe  that  all  things  that  can  be  known  are 
known  by  an  omniscient  Being,  And  another  side  of  the  same 
impulse  is  the  feeling  that  this  faculty  of  knowledge,  so  glo- 
rious in  spite  of  its  imperfections,  could  not  have  been  the 
chance  product  of  a  force  which  is  itself  without  it.^ 

^  Mr.  Royce,  in  his  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy/,  argues  acutely  against  the 
doctrine  of  the  total  relativity  of  truth,  and  from  the  indisputable  fact  of  error 
builds  up  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  an  Infinite  Thought.  "Either  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  error,  which  statement  is  a  flat  contradiction,  or  else  there  is 
an  infinite  unity  of  conscious  thought  to  which  is  present  all  possible  truth  " 
(p.  424).  This  Infinite  Thought,  however,  is  conceived  to  be  destitute  of 
Power ;  and  so  his  God  is  the  direct  opposite  of  the  Spencerian's.  The  one  is 
Intelligence  without  Power;  the  other  is  Power  without  Intelligence.  And 
in  both  cases  the  existence  of  evil  seems  to  be  in  part  the  fact  which  leads  to 
tlie  assumption  adopted.  Travelling  by  a  different  route,  both  come  to  a  form 
of  Idealism.  But  tlie  Spencerian  accepts  Berkeley's  God  with  the  knowledge 
left  out,  while  Mr.  Royce  accepts  him  with  the  power  left  out.  Both  leave 
out  final  causes.  Mr.  Royce  is  particularly  zealous  for  liis  theory,  because  it 
was  the  means  of  leading  him  out  of  blank  skepticism.  It  is  doubtfid,  how- 
ever, whether  it  will  be  so  successful  witli  others.  His  argument  (pp.  375  sq.) 
that  there  is  an  absolute  distinction  between  truth  and  error,  is  irresistible. 
But  when  he  afterwards  (chap,  xi.)  argues  from  this,  not  merely  tliat  there  is 
absolute  truth,  but  that  there  must  be  an  Infinite  Thougiit  that  judges  be- 
tween truth  and  error,  the  argument  will  hardly  compel  conviction.  It  is  not 
enough,  lie  urges,  to  say  that  "  an  error  is  a  thought  such  that,  if  a  critical 
thought  did  come  and  compare  it  with  its  object,  it  would  be  seen  to  be  false  " 
(p.  426).  "  No  barely  possible  judge  .  .  .  will  do  for  us.  He  must  be 
there,  this  judge,  to  constitute  the  error  "  (p.  427)-  Apart  from  the  absolute 
knowledge  no  human  judgment,  he  says,  can  be  called  an  error,  since  "  we 
cannot  see  how  a  single  sincere  judgment  should  possibly  fail  to  agree  with  its 


GROUNDS  OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  35 

Now,  it  may  be  admitted  that  this  is  not  a  demonstrative  ar- 
gument.    Truth  would  be  truth,  even  if  it  were  true  that  there 

own  chosen  object"  (p.  405).  Wlien  two  persons  judge  each  other,  each 
one  thinks  only  about  his  idea  of  tlie  other  ;  "  each  thinks  of  his  phantom  of 
the  otlier.  Only  a  third  person,  who  included  them  both,  .  .  .  only  such  an 
inclusive  thought  could  compare  the  phantom  with  the  real,  and  only  in  him, 
not  in  themselves,  would  John  aud  Thomas  have  any  ideas  of  each  other  at 
all,  true  or  false"  (p.  416).  It  is  hard  to  see  how  so  acute  a  mind  can  ar- 
gue so  absurdly.  How,  in  the  name  of  reason,  can  the  Infinite  Thought, 
either  by  inclusiou  or  exclusion,  cotislitute  my  thought  either  an  error  or  a 
truth  ?  If  my  thought  is  contrary  to  the  fact,  neither  finite  nor  infinite 
knowledge  (spelled  with  or  without  a  capital  K)  can  constitute  it  truthful; 
if  it  is  a  trutliful  thought,  no  Knowledge  or  Power  can  constitute  it  a  false- 
hood. This  Absolute  Knowledge  is  called  also  Absolute  Truth  (p.  423), 
What  does  this  mean  unless  that  it  knows  absolutely  what  is  true  ?  But  this 
implies  tliat  judgments  are  true  or  false  in  themselves.  If  not,  this  Knowledge 
must  be  supposed  to  be  possessed  of  power  (which  it  is  not  allowed  to  have) 
to  make  judgments  false  or  true  according  to  its  own  caprice.  A  similar 
misty  pantheism  is  found  in  Mr.  Royce's  doctrine  of  evil.  The  fact  of  evil, 
physical  and  moral,  he  admits.  But  "  partial  evil  is  universal  good  "  (p.  264). 
"  The  fundamental  postulate  of  religion  [is]  that  universal  goodness  is  some- 
how at  the  heart  of  things"  (p.  331).  So  far  we  might  go  with  him.  But 
(p.  335)  we  find  this  interpreted  to  mean  that  "  the  deepest  assertion  of  ideal- 
ism is,  not  that  above  all  the  evil  powers  in  the  world  there  is  at  work  some 
good  power  mightier  than  they,  but  rather  that  through  all  the  powers,  good 
and  evil,  and  in  them  all,  dwells  the  higher  spirit  that  does  not  so  much  create 
as  constitute  them  what  they  are,  and  so  include  them  all."  "  In  God  the 
evil  will  of  all  who  sin  is  present,  a  real  fact  in  the  Divine  Life,  no  illusion  in 
so  far  as  one  sees  that  it  exists  in  God  and  nowhere  else,  but  for  that  very  rea- 
son an  element,  and  a  necessary  element,  in  the  total  goodness  of  the  Universal 
Will.  .  .  .  The  good  act  has  its  existence  and  life  in  the  transcending  of  ex- 
perienced present  evil.  .  .  .  Goodness  is  the  organism  of  struggling  elements. 
.  .  .  God's  life  is  this  infinite  rest,  not  apart  from,  but  in  the  endless  strife  " 
(pp.  458  sqq.").  So  far  as  any  meaning  can  be  got  out  of  this,  it  seems  to  be 
either  that  evil  is  a  necessary  means  of  good  (which  the  author  denies, 
p.  268),  or  else  that  evil  is  really  no  evil  (which  he  also  denies,  p.  266). 

Principal  Caird  {Philosophi/  of  Religion,  1880)  propounds  a  similar  argu- 
ment to  the  above,  so  far  as  the  standard  of  truth  is  concerned.  "  The  secret 
or  implicit  conviction  on  which  all  knowledge  rests,  and  to  which  all  individual 
opinions  and  beliefs  are  referred,  is  that  absolute  truth  is  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
that  though  my  thought  may  err,  there  is  an  absolute  thought  or  intelligence 
which  it  is  impossible  to  doubt "  (p.  128).  "  No  assertion,  no  single  ex- 
perience or  act  of  consciousness,  is  possible,  save  as  presupposing  an  ulti- 
mate intelligence  which  is  the  measure  aud  the  ground  of  all  finite  thought  " 


36  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

were  no  God.  It  would  still  be  true  that  the  earth  revolves 
around  the  sun,  even  if  there  were  no  personal  Power  con- 
trolling and  observing  the  celestial  motions.  All  we  insist  on 
is  that  there  is  an  almost  insuperable  impulse  in  the  human 
soul  which  tends  to  make  men  believe  that  truth  is  not  only  a 
fact,  but  a  hioivn  fact ;  that  above  all  the  ignorance  and  error 
which  beset  human  knowledge  there  must  be  an  omniscient 
Being  whose  knowledge  constitutes  a  perfect  standard  of  truth. 
Similarly,  if  the  question  is  concerning  the  origin  of  intelli- 
gence, it  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  inconceivable  that  the  blind 
working  of  atomic  forces  might  in  process  of  time  develop  a 
combination  of  atoms  which  has  the  faculty  of  knowledge.  Yet 
since  nothing  can  be  in  an  effect  which  is  not  implicitly  in  the 
cause,  it  must  be  assumed  that  in  this  case  the  original  atoms 
were  germinally  endowed  with  intelligence.  What  this  germi- 
nal intelligence  could  have  been  ;  in  what  sense  the  ultimate 
particles  of  matter  may  be  conceived  to  be  all  of  a  psychical 
nature  (according  to  the  notion  of  Leibnitz  or  of  Schopenhauer), 
it  might  be  hard  to  make  clear  to  one's  mind.  It  is  at  best  a 
misty  notion,  and  cannot  explain  the  unity  and  persistence  of 
an  individual  consciousness. ^  Still,  if  one  chooses  to  hold  such 
a  view,  there  is  no  means  of  demonstrating  that  it  is  absolutely 
absurd.  But  the  ordinary  mind  will  not  be  able  to  repress  the 
impulse  to  feel  that  the  phenomena  of  human  intelligence  re- 
quire for  their  production  an  intelligence  at  least  equal  to  that 
of  man  himself. 

(p.  129).  Such  assertions  can  hardly  carry  conviction  except  to  a  Hegelian 
mind.  Dr.  Caird  argues  thus  (p.  131)  :  "  If  we  try  to  annul  all  existence,  to 
think  that  nothing  exists,  the  nothing  is  still  a  thinkable  nothing,  a  nothing 
that  is  for  thought,  or  that  implies  a  thought  or  consciousness  behind  it. 
Thus  all  our  conscious  life  as  individuals  rests  on  or  implies  a  consciousness 
that  is  universal.  We  cannot  think,  save  on  the  presupposition  of  a  thought  or 
consciousness  which  is  the  unity  of  thought  and  being,  or  on  which  all  indi- 
vidual thought  and  existence  rest."  All  which  has  no  point  unless  on  the 
idealistic  assumption  that  thought  creates  the  object  of  thought,  though  even 
then  it  does  not  appear  how  an  individual's  thought  necessarily  presupposes  a 
universal  consciousness  which  unites  thought  and  being. 

^  Vide  Lotzc's  discussion  of  tliis  in  his  Mikrokosmus,  vol.  i.  pp.  176-1S2 
(Eng.  transl.,  vol.  i.  pp.  158-163). 


GROUNDS  OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  37 

And  wliat  holds  true  respecting  Intelligence  holds  also  respect- 
ing Morality.  Numberless  as  are  the  theories  concerning  morals, 
and  various  as  are  the  manifestations  of  the  moral  sense  in  men, 
nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  in  the  developed  man  the 
moral  sense  is  a  fact.  Men  think  not  only  of  what  is,  but  of 
what  ought  to  be.  Notions  of  right  and  wrong  form  a  class  by 
themselves,  and  the  highest  class  of  notions  which  spring  up  in 
the  soul.  Even  the  coarsest  forms  of  hedonism  fail  to  eliminate 
the  unique  peculiarity.  If  the  highest  good  is  made  to  consist 
simply  in  the  procuring  of  pleasure  for  one's  self  or  for  others, 
still  the  conclusion  is  that  one  ovght  to  labor  to  secure  that  pleas- 
ure, —  that  to  do  so  is  right,  and  not  to  do  so  is  wrong.  Even  the 
extremest  theory  of  the  evolutionary  origin  of  conscience  still 
leaves  the  conscience  an  undisputed  fact.  Though  it  may  be 
argued  that  the  moral  sense  is  only  the  final  outcome  of  cosmic 
forces  that  have  been  working  for  ages  upon  ages,  having  its 
germ  in  the  unconscious  efforts  of  the  lower  forms  of  animal 
life  to  maintain  themselves,  and  gradually  developing  into  the 
conscious  egoism,  ego-altruism,  and  altruism  which  are  found  in 
the  human  race,  still  the  fact  remains,  that  in  the  developed 
form  the  notion  of  dutg  is  the  one  essential  feature,  whereas  in 
the  germinal  form  that  notion  could  have  had  no  place.  It  is 
in  a  sense  true,  no  doubt,  that  the  acorn  is  the  germ  of  the  oak ; 
but  the  characteristic  features  of  the  oak  cannot  be  determined 
by  any  amount  of  microscopic  or  chemical  examination  of  the 
acorn.  And  no  more  can  the  essence  of  morality  be  analyzed 
and  unfolded  by  any  amount  of  observation  of  the  phenomena 
of  animal  life,  from  those  of  the  lowest  of  the  invertebrata  up 
to  the  highest  of  the  non-human  species.  Even  the  most  un- 
qualified form  of  necessitarianism  leaves  the  unique  character- 
istic of  the  moral  nature  undisturbed.  The  moral  ideal,  the 
feeling  of  obligation,  the  sense  of  remorse,  the  condemnation  or 
approval  of  other  men  as  blameworthy  or  praiseworthy,  —  all 
this  remains,  and  is  implicitly  admitted,  even  when  explicitly 
denied.  The  notion  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  especially  in  the 
sense  of  unreasoning  caprice,^  may  be  triumphantly  proved  to 

^  A  notion  held  by  almost  no  one,  yet  the  one  reasoned  a^^ainst  most  ener- 
getically by  necessitarians;  e.g.,  J.  S.  Mill,  lijramination  of  Sir  Wm.  Hamil- 
ton s  Philosophy,  chap.  xxvi. 


38  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

be  absurd  and  illusory.  It  may  be  argued  that  no  one  can 
create  the  motives  that  lead  him  to  action,  and  that  every  one 
must  be  determined  by  the  strongest  motive.  It  may  be  in- 
sisted that  the  truth  of  this  principle  is  assumed,  when  men 
attempt  by  legislation  or  other  means  to  deter  others  from  bad 
actions  or  to  incite  them  to  good  ones.  But  underneath  all  this 
lies  the  tacit  implication  that  it  is  right  to  deter  men  from 
crime  by  the  threat  of  punishment,  that  it  would  be  wrong 
not  to  use  whatever  measures  will  tend  to  further  the  general 
welfare  of  men,  that  it  is  our  duty  to  use  means  to  promote  the 
operation  of  good  motives.^  A  sense  of  obligation  is  felt  which 
is  not  self-imposed,  and  which  cannot  be  created  or  annulled  by 
one's  self  or  by  the  authority  of  other  men,  however  numerous 
or  powerful  they  may  be.  The  law  of  righteousness,  whether 
obeyed  or  not,  is  acknowledged  to  be  the  supreme  standard  ac- 
cording to  which  conduct  should  be  regulated. 

Now,  what  is  the  bearing  of  this  fact  upon  the  question  of  the- 
ism ?  From  the  mere  existence  of  this  idea  of  a  moral  law  we 
cannot  directly  and  necessarily  infer  the  existence  of  a  Divine 
Lawgiver,  —  a  being  whose  power  and  will  created  the  law.  To 
such  an  inference  the  unanswerable  objection  at  once  presents 

^  An  instance  of  tliorough-going  necessitarianism  is  found  in  H.  G.  Atkin- 
son and  Harriet  Martineau's  Letters  on  the  Laws  of  Man^s  Nature  and  De- 
velopment:  "lam  what  I  am,  a  creature  of  necessity;  I  claim  neither  merit 
nor  demerit"  (p.  30.).  "  I  am  what  I  am;  I  cannot  alter  my  will,  or  be  other 
than  what  I  am,  and  cannot  deserve  either  reward  or  punishment"  (p.  191). 
"  Free  will !  the  very  idea  is  enough  to  make  a  Democritus  fall  on  his  back 
and  roar  with  laughter,  and  a  more  serious  thinker  almost  despair  of  bringing 
men  to  reason  "  (p.  194).  "  Of  course,  as  a  part  of  nature,  as  a  creature  of 
necessity,  as  governed  by  law,  man  is  neither  selfish  nor  unselfish,  neither  good 
nor  evil,  worthy  or  unworthy,  but  simply  nature,  and  what  is  possible  to 
nature,  and  could  not  be  otherwise  "  (p.  232).  Yet  even  the  one  who  writes 
thus  can  belabor  those  who  disagree  with  him,  and  discourses  on  morality 
"  The  knowledge  which  mesmerism  gives  of  the  influence  of  body  on  body,  and 
consequently  of  mind  on  mind,  will  bring  about  a  morality  we  have  not  yet 
dreamed  of"  (p.  280).  So  H.  Czolbe  {Neue  Barstellvng  des  Sonmalismus, 
p.  92)  says  the  criminal  is  "  forced  by  physical  necessity  "  to  commit  crime, 
laut  that  society  is  "justified"  in  punishing  him.  "Justified,"  we  suppose, 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  the  ocean  is  justified  in  breaking  through  the 
dams  which  are  built  up  to  hinder  its  free  flow.  But  why  do  we  not  speak  of 
the  oceans  rights  or  duties ? 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF,  39 

itself  that,  if  this  Divine  Being  is  conceived  as  a  moral  being, 
then  he  must  himself  be  amenable  to  the  moral  law.  He  can- 
not have  made  the  law  capriciously.  There  must  be  an  eternal 
and  immutable  reason  for  its  requirements.  The  law  must, 
therefore,  logically  precede  divine  volition,  and  cannot  be  the 
mere  product  of  it.^ 

Is,  then,  atheism  as  consistent  with  high  moral  ideals  and 
aims  as  theism  is  ?  Far  from  it.  No  doubt  an  atheist  may  cher- 
ish a  lofty  ideal  of  moral  character.  Certain  notions  and  rules 
of  justice  may  become  prevalent,  and  be  essentially  the  same, 
whatever  religious  instruction  accompanies  ithem.  But  if  athe- 
istic theories  of  the  moral  law  and  the  moral  sense  become  gen- 
erally and  practically  accepted,  they  cannot  but  ultimately 
react  fatally  on  the  moral  sense  itself ;  or  if  they  do  not,  the 
fact  that  they  do  not  is  itself  a  proof  that  the  theories  are  false. 
Atheism  breaks  down  in  its  effort  to  explain  the  moral  sense  as 
regards  either  its  origin,  its  present  loorking,  or  its  ultimate  end. 

a.  As  to  the  origin  of  the  sense  of  moral  obligation,  the  the- 
istic  theory  is  simple.  It  cannot  indeed  be  held  that  God  arbi- 
trarily created  the  moral  law ;  but  it  can  be  held  that  God  is 
the  personal  embodiment  of  the  law,  and  that  he  implants  in 
the  human  soul  the  moral  sense  which  apprehends  the  law  and 
recognizes  the  obligation  to  conform  to  it.  Atheism,  on  the 
contrary,  has  no  better  hypothesis  than  that  moral  notions  and 
feelings  have  been  gradually  evolved  from  mere  animal  impulses 
of  self-preservation.  Eegard  for  the  comforts  and  pleasure  of 
others  is  held  to  be  the  outgrowth  of  a  discovery  that  such  re- 
gard will  in  the  long  run  best  promote  one's  own  pleasure  and 
advantage.2     But  this  is,  after  all,  no  explanation  of  the  real 

'  Oil  this  vide  Noali  Porter,  Moral  Science,  §  46 ;  I.  A.  Doruer,  Christian 
Doctrine,  §  6;  S.Harris,  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism,  §  37. 

*  H.  Spencer,  Data  of  Ethics,  cliaps.  xi.,  xii.  The  theory  that  the  moral  sense 
and  moral  conceptions  are  purely  matters  of  heredity,  though  often  propounded 
as  if  it  were  an  axiomatic  truth,  is  simply  not  true  to  the  facts  of  observation. 
Whatever  there  may  be  (and  there  is  no  doubt  something)  in  the  notion  of  the 
hereditary  transmission  of  moral  tendencies,  the  general  fact  is  that  moral 
notions  are  inculcated  by  training,  not  infused  by  physical  propagation.  A 
man's  character  depends  much  more  on  his  education  than  on  his  parentage. 
Even  physical  habits  are  largely  due  to  the  imitativeness  of  children  more  than 
to  physical  inheritance.     Much  more  is  this  true  of  moral  tendencies. 


40  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

phenomenon.  For,  in  the  firet  place,  if  the  moral  sense  is  noth- 
ing but  a  development  of  the  mere  instinctive  love  of  pleasura- 
ble life,  it  does  not  appear  where  the  sense  of  duty  comes  from 
or  what  it  means.  It  may  be  very  true  that  men  might  by 
gradual  experience  have  come  to  see  that  certain  lines  of  con- 
duct towards  other  men  are  most  advantageous  to  themselves ; 
but  it  does  not  appear  why  men  should  come  to  think  that  they 
ought  to  labor  for  the  promotion  either  of  their  own  happiness 
or  of  the  happiness  of  others.  If  men,  like  brutes,  have  in- 
stincts or  impulses  leading  them  to  care  for  their  offspring  or  to 
be  kind  to  their  associates,  or  if  they  have  made  the  discovery 
that  their  own  greatest  enjoyment  is  thus  secured,  very  well, 
this  may  explain  why  they  do  so  and  so,  but  does  not  explain 
in  the  least  why  they  should  think  that  they  ought  to  do  so. 

But,  in  the  next  place,  if  the  conscience  is  supposed  somehow 
to  have  been  evolved,  and  to  be  an  actual  factor  in  human  life, 
still  so  long  as  it  is  regarded  as  being  ultimately  nothing  but  an 
impulse  urging  one  to  the  securing  of  his  own  highest  enjoy- 
ment, it  does  not  appear  how  this  impulse  could  ever  assume 
the  form,  which  it  has  acquired  in  fact,  of  an  imperative  obli- 
gation to  cherish  universal  benevolence.  So  far  as  the  underlying 
impulse  is  a  craving  for  personal  ease  and  pleasure,  the  obliga- 
tion towards  others  can  dictate  only  such  conduct  as  is  seen  to 
procure  this  personal  comfort.  The  impulse  will  prompt  one  to 
outwit  and  deceive  and  injure  others  whenever  the  immediate 
effect  seems  likely  to  be  a  personal  gratification ;  and  on  the 
theory  under  consideration  such  deceit  and  injury  would  be 
duty.  But  even  though  it  should  be  urged  that  experience  has 
ascertained  that  selfish  pleasure  is  in  the  end  always  best  se- 
cured by  promoting  the  pleasure  of  others,  still  this  would  bring 
us  only  to  the  point  of  pursuing  a  certain  course  of  conduct 
towards  one's  immediate  associates;  it  would  not  enjoin  the 
love  of  man  for  man's  own  sake.  The  theory  does  not  account 
for  that  sense  of  the  duty  of  all-embracing  and  uncompromising 
benevolence  which  has  in  fact  been  developed. 

But,  finally,  the  evolutionary  theory  of  conscience  does  not 
account  for  the  conception  of  a  law  that  is  one,  tmwersal,  eter- 
nal, and  immutaUe.     A  rule  of  life  springing  from  an  egoistic 


GROUNDS   OF  THE  THEISTIC   BELIEF.  41 

regard  to  pleasure  would  be  a  rule  for  one's  self  alone,  so  that 
in  strictness  there  would  be  as  many  laws  as  there  are  persons. 
So  far  as  conduct  relates  to  one's  associates,  too,  it  can  on  this 
theory  have  no  unity ;  for  one  man's  neighbors  are  quite  differ- 
ent from  another's ;  and  every  one's  associates  are  always  chang- 
ing.    So  far  as  conduct  has  relation  to  a  distant  future,  there  is 
still  less  occasion  to  attribute  to  it  the  character  of  unity  and 
uniformity.     Now,  of  course  there  is  in  point  of  fact  a  want  of 
unity  and  uniformity  in  the  moral  ideals  and  conduct  of  men. 
The  differences  amount  to  mutual  contradiction,  so  far  as  the 
details  of  moral  duty  are  concerned.     But  in  every  developed 
conscience  the  sense  of  duty  involves  the  idea  of  a  universal 
and  eternal  law.     The  theist,  however,  may  hold  that,  just  be- 
cause this  moral  law  is  not  fulfilled  in  man  as  he  now  is,  while 
yet  the  conscience  insists  on  its  imperativeness,  its  absolute  and 
universal  validity,   therefore  there  must  needs  be  a  Being  in 
whom  the  law  is  actually  realized.     The  more  distinctly  moral 
obligation  is  acknowledged,  and  the  more  elevated  one's  moral 
ideal  is,  the  more  urgently  does  one  feel  the  need  of  a  personal 
God  who  realizes  in  himself  this  ideal,  and  who  presides  over 
the  moral  universe,  able  to  tell  infallibly  what  the  law  of  recti- 
tude is,  and  authorized  to  punish  the  bad,  reward  the  good,  and 
in  general  to  promote,  by  intelligent  agency,  the  interests  of  the 
moral  world. 

But  to  the  atheist  the  phenomena  of  the  moral  sense  must  be 
a  perpetual  enigma.  Tor  him  there  is  no  explanation  of  their  ori- 
gin, no  reconciliation  of  their  divergences,  no  prospect  of  the  ful- 
filment of  the  prophecies  which  lie  wrapped  up  in  the  ideals  and 
the  imperatives  of  the  human  conscience.  But  more  particularly  : 
b.  Atheism,  whether  of  the  materialistic  or  the  pantheistic 
type,  is  not  only  unable  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of 
the  moral  sense,  but  is  put  to  confusion  by  its  present  working. 
A  universe  that  has  come  into  being  through  the  operation  of 
purely  material  and  unconscious  forces  has  no  room  in  it  for  free 
will  or  for  the  notion  that  anything  is  wrong.  If  everything  is  as  ■ 
it  is  by  virtue  of  an  iron  necessity,  then  the  consistent  atheist 
can  recognize  no  such  thing  as  duty,  can  cherish  no  such  feeling 
as  blame,  and  can  make  no  effort  to  effect  any  reform.     It  is 


42  SUPERNATURAI.   REVELATION. 

true  that  many  men  of  this  class  do  lay  great  stress  on  moral- 
ity, and  even  profess  to  advocate  a  purer  morality  than  theists 
do.  But  they  can  do  it  only  by  an  unconscious  denial  of  their 
fundamental  assumptions.  It  is  indeed  almost  amusing,  after 
reading  treatises  whose  object  it  is  to  set  forth  how  all  organ- 
isms have  been  developed  by  a  necessary  process  from  inorganic 
and  unconscious  matter,  to  be  told  at  last  that  this  doctrine  is 
going  to  result  in  great  advantage  to  the  human  race.  Hackel, 
for  example,  predicts  that  "  by  its  aid  we  shall  at  last  begin  to 
raise  ourselves  out  of  the  state  of  social  barbarism  in  which, 
notwithstanding  the  much  vaunted  civilization  of  our  century, 
we  are  still  plunged.  ...  It  is  above  all  things  necessary  to 
make  a  complete  and  honest  return  to  nature  and  to  natural 
relations."  ^  But  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  materialistic  evo- 
lutionism is  that  whatever  is  is  necessary.  "  Barbarism  "  is  a 
word  which  it  has  no  right  to  apply  to  any  stage  of  the  process. 
When  one  speaks  of  the  necessity  of  returning  to  nature  and 
natural  relations,  the  language,  if  it  means  anything,  means  that 
a  part  of  nature — to  wit,  the  human  race  —  has  somehow  got 
away  from  nature.  But  what  is  nature,  in  the  view  of  Hackel, 
but  the  sum  total  of  what  is  ?  What  are  natural  laws  but  the 
actual  method  of  the  working  of  things,  inorganic  and  organic  ? 
If  men  squander  property,  health,  and  life  ;  if  they  lie,  steal, 
and  murder,  —  that  must  be,  according  to  Hackel's  philosophy, 
the  natural  and  necessary  course  of  things.  What,  then,  can 
be  meant  by  saying  that  it  is  necessary  for  men  to  do  otherwise 
than  they  do  ?  From  such  a  source  such  talk  is  an  unconscious 
violation  of  the  very  system  in  whose  name  it  is  uttered.^  It 
involves  the  notion  of  duty,  and  of  a  duty  wrongfully  neglected, 
—  of  unnature  as  being  a  part  of  nature.  The  thing  proposed 
is  to  change  the  course  of  things.  But  if  the  course  of  things 
is  all  natural,  then  why  should  it  be  changed  ?  How  can  it  be 
changed  ?  Such  a  change  would  have  to  be  from  the  natural 
to  the  unnatural,  —  just  the  opposite  of  what  Hackel  pro- 
nounces to  be  the  great  desideratum.     In  short,  atheistic  evolu- 

1  E.  H.  Hackel,  History  of  Creation,  vol.  ii.  pp.  367,  368,  London,  1876. 
lu  the  original  Natilrliche  ScMpfangsgeschichte,  7tli  ed.,  1879,  p.  680. 

2  Cf.  T.  n.  Grccu,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  9. 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  43 

tionism  can  acknowledge  the   binding   obligation   of    a  moral 
law  only  by  committing  suicide. 

c.  Equally,  or  still  more  manifestly,  is  atheism  a  failure  when 
the  future  of  the  moral  world  is  considered.  The  notion  that 
the  mental  and  moral  faculties  of  men  are  nothing  but  the 
evolution  of  physical  forces  necessarily  carries  with  it,  as  a  cor- 
ollary, the  belief  that  physical  death  puts  a  final  end  to  the 
existence  of  the  conscious  soul.  And  in  fact  the  two  notions 
are  almost  always  found  together.^  That  which  is  held  to  be 
nothing  but  a  power  or  function  of  a  physical  organism  must  be 
thought  to  cease  when  the  organism  is  dissolved.  The  inference 
seems  to  be  unavoidable  :  Either  mind  is  something  distinct  from 
the  natural  forces  which  are  supposed  to  have  been  eternally  at 
work,  or  else  it  is  only  one  form  which  those  forces  assume  in 
the  course  of  evolution.  In  the  latter  case  mental  action  must, 
like  all  force,  be  transformable  into  other  forms  of  force.  The 
whole  amount  of  force  being  conceived  as  absolutely  fixed  and 

^  That  Mr.  Fiske  lias  avowed  liis  belief  in  personal  immortality  can  only 
be  regarded  as  a  happy  inconsistency,  wliich  he  can  hardly  convince  any  one 
but  himself  that  he  is  not  guilty  of.  He  insists,  iudeed,  that  his  doctrine  is 
quite  opposed  to  materiahsm  (Cosmic  P/iilosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  79  and  elsewhere) ; 
but  his  reason  is  that,  though  physical  and  mental  action  are  correlated,  yet  the 
physical  does  not  explain  the  mental.  Very  true  ;  and  likewise  inorganic  ac- 
tion does  not  explain  the  organic.  Yet  the  evolutionist  would  hardly  hold  that 
vegetable  life  is  a  distinct  entity,  so  that  e.  g.  the  life  of  the  musliroom  is  to  be 
regarded  as  immortal.  So  long  as  life  and  mind  are  held  to  be  but  an  uncon- 
scious evolution  of  primeval  matter  —  no  force  added  and  none  taken  away  — 
there  is  no  escape,  but  an  illegitimate  one,  from  the  inference  that  death  puts 
an  end  to  mental  action.  Mr.  Piske  assures  us  (vol.  i.  p.  65)  that,  since  the 
use  of  the  balance  has  shown  experimentally  that  nothing  ever  disappears,  it  is 
no  longer  possible  to  believe  in  the  destructibility  of  matter.  The  logic  of 
this  is  rather  remarkable.  To  most  men  the  fact  that  experiments  have  as 
yet  indicated  that  changes  in  the  form  of  matter  do  not  involve  a  disappear- 
ance of  matter  could  hardly  be  a  demonstration  that  matter  never  does  disap- 
pear; at  the  most  one  could  only  infer  that  we  do  not  know  tliat  it  ever  does. 
Still  less  can  it  be  inferred  that  it  has  become  impossible  to  believe  in  the  de- 
structibility of  matter.  But  if  the  balance  is  such  an  infallible  and  omniscient 
test  of  existence  and  persistence,  and  if  the  soul  after  the  death  of  the  body 
persists  as  a  distinct  entity,  then  the  balance  ought  to  be  able  to  show  the  fact. 
For  a  good  treatment  of  this  topic  cf.  J.  Martineau,  Modern  Materialism, 
pp.  137  sqq.,  New  York,  1877- 


44  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

incapable  of  increase  or  decrease,  the  supposition  that,  upon  the 
death  of  the  body,  the  soul  continues  forever  afterwards  as  a 
distinct  force  detached  from  the  evolutionary  process  of  the 
great  complex  of  physical  forces,  is  a  violation  of  the  funda- 
mental doctrine  of  the  system.     It  would  imply  that  mind  is 
something  created  outright  by  the  physical  forces,  —  a  supposi- 
tion for  which  atheistic  or  pantheistic  evolutionism  has  no  room. 
According  to  this  system,  human  life  is  only  a  succession  of  in- 
dividual lives,  each  one  of  which,  after  passing  through  its  brief 
period  of  conscious  pain  and  pleasure,  is  irretrievably  ended. 
Whether  the  pain  or  the  pleasure  is  the  greater,  is  itself  a  mat- 
ter of  dispute.     Whether  one  shall  be  a  pessimist,  with  Scho- 
penhauer and  Von  Hartmann,  or  an  optimist,  with  Herbert 
Spencer,  depends  largely  or  wholly  on  training  and  natural 
temperament.     But  the  prospect  is  dismal  enough  at  the  best. 
Hopes  may  be  cherished  respecting  the  distant  future  of  the 
race  ;  but  there  is  no  sure  warrant  for  the  hope.    Mr.  Spencer's 
own  doctrine  recognizes  a  principle  of  dissolution  as  well  as  one 
of  development.     But  even  if  the  hope  of  a  gradual  elevation  of 
the  human  race  is  cherished,  still  those  who  cherish  it  can  never 
see  it  realized,  since  their  conscious  existence  is  extinguished  at 
death.    And  even  if  we  could  know  that  ages  hence  culture  and 
heredity  combined  would  produce  generations  of   men   whose 
lives  are  to  be  free  from  suffering,  what  of  that  ?     At  the  best, 
each  individual  life  is  short,  and  ends  in  nothing.     There  may 
be  found  a  certain  beauty  in  it,  but  it  is  the  beauty  of  a  torso, 
the  meaning  and  design  of  which  is  an  insoluble  enigma.     Life, 
even  in  that  imaginary  future,  would  consist  only  of  a  series  of 
phenomena  most  fitly  to  be  compared  to  the  rise  and  fall  of 
waves  on  the  great  ocean.     As  the  several  waves  emerge  from 
the  level  surface  and  sink  into  it  again,  so  out  of  the  great  All, 
at  one  point  and  another,  there  emerges  a  conscious  life  which, 
after  its  brief  course  is  run,  is  destined  to  be  lost  again  in  the 
great  unconscious  mass  of  forces  that  constitute  the  ultimate 
reality.     These  fitful  waves  are  endowed  with  the  capacity  of 
thought,  of  pleasure,  and  of  hope.     They  become  inspired  with 
ideals  and  with  aspirations  that  reach  out  into  eternity.    They 
are  possessed  with  a  longing  for  the  privilege  of  unceasing  ad- 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  45 

vance  and  greater  and  greater  freedom  of  development  in  the 
conscious  life  with  which  they  have  been  invested.  But  all  this 
is  a  mere  phenomenon  of  the  fleeting  consciousness.  And  when 
each  individual  life  is  merged  again  in  the  great  unthinking,  un- 
knowing, unfeeling,  unhoping  ocean  of  being,  one  can  only  say 
of  it,  — 

"  Like  tlie  dew  on  the  mountain,  like  the  foam  on  the  river, 
Like  the  bubble  on  the  fountain,  thou  art  gone,  and  forever." 

One  who  adopts  the  materialistic  view  in  earnest  will  hardly 
be  able  to  avoid  asking  himself  the  questions :  Why  should  I 
vex  myself  with  either  hopes  or  fears  respecting  the  future  of 
the  human  race,  seeing  that  I  can  never  know  anything  about 
it  ?  Why  should  I  regulate  my  conduct  with  reference  to  men 
who  are  not  yet  born  ?  Why,  in  general,  should  I  take  pains  to 
work  for  any  particular  development  of  the  race  ?  If  men  are 
nothing  but  brutes  in  a  higher  stage  of  development ;  if  this 
development  has  come  about  by  a  natural  process  which  has 
taken  care  of  itself, —  then  why  not  let  the  future  development 
also  take  care  of  itself  ?  Why  trouble  ourselves  with  notions 
as  to  what  course  the  evolution  ought  to  take  ?  Why  try  to 
take  into  our  own  hands  the  management  of  the  process 
which  belongs  to  nature  herself  ?  How  do  we  know  what  di- 
rection evolution  may  take  in  the  future  ?  How  can  we  be 
sure  that,  even  with  the  best  intentions,  we  may  not  be  working 
against,  rather  than  for,  the  end  towards  which  the  cosmic 
forces  are  tending  ?  This  is  not  a  merely  imaginary  state  of 
mind.  It  is  precisely  what  many  materialistic  evolutionists 
openly  avow.^ 

When  any  one  takes  this  ground,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the 
disbeliever  in  a  personal  God,  however  altruistic,  can  well  reply 
to  him.  For  both  alike  hold  that  there  is  no  free  self-deter- 
mination, that  all  things  are  controlled  by  a  rigid  necessity,  and 
that  human  knowledge  is  limited  to  present  phenomena,  so 
that  what  has  been  in  the  past,  and,  still  more,  what  is  to  be  in 
the  future,  is  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  cognition.     Both  alike 

^  See  illustrations  in  Professor  Harris's  Thilosophical  Basis  of  Theism, 
pp.  475-486. 


46  SUrERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

must  hold  that  no  intelligence  determines  the  process  that  is 
taking  place.  If  so,  then  there  can  be  no  design  in  the  process 
as  a  whole,  no  plan  according  to  which  it  is  working ;  there  is 
accordingly  not  only  no  Moral  Governor  controlling  the  system, 
but  it  has  in  itself  no  known  moral  end ;  there  is  and  can  be  no 
fixed  and  universally  binding  law ;  but  rather  each  individual 
can  only  do  whatever  he  is  impelled  to  do  by  the  forces  which 
are  operating  on  him  and  in  him. 

It  is  only  an  impotent  and  self-contradictory  effort  to  avoid 
this  dismal  conclusion,  when,  after  having  eliminated  a  personal 
Moral  Governor  from  the  universe,  atheists  and  pantheists  per- 
sonify an  abstraction,  and  talk  about  a  moral  order  of  the  uni- 
verse,^ or  about  a  power  outside  themselves  which  makes  for 
righteousness.  Such  talk  implies  that  there  is  something  fixed 
in  the  notion  of  righteousness  or  moral  order.  And  this,  again, 
implies  a  certain  authoritativeness  in  the  conceptions  of  the 
mind,  a  certain  definiteness  and  permanency  in  the  deliverances 
of  the  moral  judgment.  But  such  permanence  and  authority 
are  impossible  on  the  atheistic  or  pantheistic  basis.  The  mind 
which  is  itself  only  the  incidental  product  of  the  play  of  cosmic 
forces  cannot  set  itself  up  as  superior  to  them  or  as  possess- 
ing any  immutable  character  whatever.  What  we  seem  to 
know  we  only  seem  to  know.  The  present  phenomena  of  the 
moral  sense  not  only  differ  among  themselves,  but  are  liable  to 
be  siicceeded  by  other  phenomena  different  from  all  the  present 
ones.  Righteousness  thus  becomes  a  thing  of  no  fixed  meaning. 
The  conception  of  it,  even  if  not  soon  destined  to  become  ex- 
tinct, is  at  tlie  best  variable  and  vague.  To  say  that  a  power 
outside  of  us  is  making  for  it  is  to  say  nothing  intelligible  on 

^  Fiolito's  favorite  plirnse.  Vide  liis  Ucher  den  Grund  uiiseres  Glaubcru  an 
eine  (jollliche  Weltregierung,  where  he  says,  "This  moral  order  is  the  Bicine, 
whicli  we  assume"  (vol.  v.  p.  183  of  his  Bdmmtliche  Werlce,  Berlin,  1845). 
"  That  living  and  active  moral  order  is  itself  God  "  (p.  18G).  Whether  Ficlite 
should  be  called  an  atheist  (against  which  he  vehemently  protested)  may  be 
doubtful.  His  doctrine  was  apparently  somewhat  variable.  In  the  above- 
mentioned  treatise  (p.  187)  he  seems  expressly  to  deny  that  God  can  have 
personality  and  consciousness.  In  his  earlier  work,  Vermch  einer  Kritik  alter 
Offenhaning  (vol.  v.  pp.  40,  41),  he  ascribes  to  God  blessedness,  holiness, 
and  omniscience. 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  47 

the  hypothesis  in  question.  Eighteousness  is  a  word  that  has 
no  meaning  except  as  it  relates  to  j^ersonal  conduct.  To  say- 
that  an  impersonal  power  is  making  for  righteousness,  is  to  say 
that  a  power  knowing  nothing  about  righteousness,  caring  noth- 
ing about  it,  incapable  of  exercising  it,  is  constantly  working  to 
produce  it,  that  is,  is  constantly  aiming  at  it.  Considering  the 
very  partial  success  of  this  power,  as  evinced  in  the  moral  con- 
dition of  mankind,  it  is  marvelous  how  men  could  have  had 
such  faith  in  it  as  Matthew  Arnold  assures  us  the  ancient  He- 
brews had.  Physical  forces  may  be  said  to  be  working  for  cer- 
tain ends  —  to  be  "  making  for  "  them  —  when  they  are  seen 
actually  and  uniformly  to  produce  them.  We  infer  what  is 
going  to  be  from  what  has  been.  But  to  assume  the  existence 
of  a  physical  power  which  is  unconsciously  working  to  produce 
a  moral  effect,  while  that  effect  is  confessedly  not  produced,  or 
at  best  only  in  a  very  imperfect  way,  —  this  is  neither  good 
physics,  good  philosophy,  nor  common  sense. ^  Every  assump- 
tion of  a  moral  goal  towards  which  the  world  is  tending,  —  of  a 
fixed  moral  standard  by  which  human  conduct  is  to  be  regu- 
lated and  judged,  —  every  such  assumption  implies  belief  in  a 
personal  God  of  righteousness.  Pantheists  or  atheists  may 
hold  such  assumptions  concerning  the  tendency  and  destiny  of 
things,  but  they  can  do  so  only  by  a  happy  inconsistency.  Con- 
sistent atheism  or  pantheism  can  find  in  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness and  conscience  nothing  but  a  series  of  illusions. 
Human  life  becomes,  on  this  view  of  things,  a  mass  of  contra- 
dictions ;  the  world,  as  a  whole,  has  no  end,  no  meaning ; 
human  character  has  no  intrinsic  value ;  human  destiny  is  un- 
certain ;  human  history,  with  its  aspirations,  its  griefs,  its 
struggles,  its  hopes,  and  its  disappointments,  is  nothing  but  a 
melancholy  farce, 

^  "  Is  it  possible  to  imagine  a  Being  which,  stimulated  by  the  influence  of 
every  existing  condition  of  the  cosmic  course,  should,  with  purposeless  and 
blindly  working  activity,  impart  to  that  course  the  ameliorating  impulses  by 
which  the  thoroughgoing  dominion  of  what  is  good  is  established,  —  a  Being 
which  cannot  consciously  indicate  the  place  of  each  individual  and  appoint  his 
work,  or  distinguish  what  is  good  in  a  good  action  from  what  is  bad  in  a  bad 
action,  or  will  and  realize  the  good  with  its  own  living  love,  but  yet  acts  as 
thotigh  it  could  do  all  this  ?  "  —  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  vol.  ii.  p.  676. 


48  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

But  not  only  is  the  present  process  of  evolution,  on  the 
atheistic  hypothesis,  without  any  purpose.  The  same  aimless, 
meaningless  process  must  be  infinitely  repeated.  For  if  the 
material  world  is  eternal,  its  processes  of  evolution  must  have 
been  eternally  going  on.  Tlie  mind  even  of  an  evolutionist  can 
hardly  conceive  of  a  material  universe  as  existing  for  ages  in  an 
absolutely  motionless,  unchanging  state,  and  then  suddenly,  at 
some  particular  moment,  beginning  to  undergo  a  process  of 
change.  At  the  same  time,  if,  as  is  commonly  assumed,  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  order  and  progress  in  the  process  of  develop- 
ment ;  if  there  is  an  advance  from  the  simple  to  higher  and  more 
complex  forms  of  existence,  —  why,  then,  a  limited  time,  how- 
ever long  it  may  be  supposed  to  be,  would  suffice  to  bring  the 
development  to  the  stage  which  has  now  been  reached.  If  the 
world  has  existed  eternally  a  parte  ante,  then  the  present  point 
of  progress  must  have  been  reached  ages  ago.  If  there  is  any 
stage  higher  than  the  present  one  conceivable  and  attainable,  it 
too  must  have  been  reached  ages  ago.  For  go  back  as  far  as 
we  may,  we  have  still  an  unlimited  stretch  of  time  in  which 
the  process  must  have  been  going  on.  We  are  therefore  irre- 
sistibly driven  to  the  conclusion  that  if  this  development  did 
not  have  a  beginning  a  limited  number  of  years  ago,  so  that  it 
has  only  just  been  able  to  reach  the  present  stage  of  perfection 
(and  this  the  atheistic  evolutionist  must  deny),  then  there 
must  have  been  an  infinite  series  of  developments,  it  being  a 
law  of  the  evolution  that  at  a  certain  stage  of  the  evolution  the 
developed  world  must  enter  on  a  state  of  regress  or  pass  through 
a  sudden  cataclysm,  thus  returning  to  a  state  of  chaos  out  of 
which  it  must  then  start  again  on  its  course  of  devejopment 
towards  order  and  beauty.  This  is  avowed  by  some  representa- 
tives of  the  materialistic  doctrine.^  Indeed,  there  is  no  escape 
from  it,  if  we  deny  a  divine  creation.  The  farce  of  the  universe 
thus  becomes  doubly,  or  rather  infinitely,  multiplied.  Not  only 
is  there  no  purpose  in  any  development  at  all ;  not  only  is  the 
present  chapter  of  this  process  meaningless  and  aimless;  not 

*  E.  g.,  J.  H.  Thomassen,  Bibel  nnd  Natiir  (Lcipzis:,  18G9),  p.  63 ;  Ge- 
schirhte  vnd  System  der  Natur,  p.  70;  Ilcibert  Spcuccr,  First  Principles, 
chap,  xxiii. 


GKOUNDS  OF  THE  THEISTIC  BELIEF.  49 

only  is  it  as  a  whole  unconscious  of  itself ;  not  only  do  the  indi- 
vidual organisms  in  it  that  have  the  faculty  of  consciousness  find 
their  consciousness  and  conscience  illusive  while  they  last,  and 
destined  soon  to  pass  into  non-existence ;  —  not  only  this;  but  this 
aimless  development  as  a  whole  comes  to  an  end,  and  then  begins 
again  and  passes  through  the  same  or  a  similar  course  ;  and  so 
on  in  an  infinite  succession.  If  it  is  impossible  to  see  the  mean- 
ing or  use  of  a  single  one  of  these  evolutions,  still  more  impene- 
trable is  the  mystery  of  an  endless  succession  of  them.  That  after 
the  world,  through  a  long  process,  has  attained  a  certain  stage  of 
order  and  beauty,  it  should  be  hurled  back  into  chaos  again,  and 
then  Sisyphus-like  work  its  way  up  into  order  again,  only  to  be 
forced  still  again  to  go  through  the  same  process,  each  process 
being  in  turn  but  a  repetition,  for  substance,  of  the  preceding,  and 
all  together  governed  by  no  conscious  power,  —  that  this  should 
be  the  case  is  an  insoluble  puzzle.  It  is  mysterious  enough  that 
there  should  be  one  such  meaningless  process ;  but  to  have  it 
infinitely  repeated  makes  the  mystery  infinitely  dark. 

The  point  of  all  this  is  not  so  much  in  the  implication  that 
the  mind  requires  to  know  what  the  specific  meaning  of  the 
several  phenomena  of  the  universe  is,  as  rather  that  the  mind 
demands  that  the  universe,  as  a  whole,  must  have  some  mean- 
ing, that  there  must  be  some  plan,  some  purpose,  some  aim, 
some  goal,  in  it  all;  —  in  short,  that  there  should  be  a  reason 
for  the  universe  of  things,  even  though  the  reason  should  be 
only  in  part  understood.  The  teleological  problem  of  discover- 
ing particular  adaptations  of  means  to  ends  may  be  ever  so 
complicated  or  difficult;  one  may  be  ever  so  much  in  doubt 
what  this  or  that  means ;  but  none  the  less  does  the  mind  de- 
mand that  the  universe  as  a  whole  shall  mean  something.  The 
teleological  argument  is  often  criticised  and  pronounced  incon- 
clusive, because  of  these  difficulties  or  weaknesses  in  the  par- 
ticular application  of  it.  This  criticism  would  have  great  weight, 
if  the  notion  of  a  God,  or  the  tendency  to  believe  in  a  God,  first 
originated  in  the  observation  of  these  particular  teleological  adap- 
tations, and  if  the  belief  itself  depended  on  finding  everywhere 
indisputable  marks  of  intelligent  contrivance.  The  case  is, 
rather,  the  reverse  of  this.     The  antecedent  instinctive  feeling 


60  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

that  there  must  be  a  design,  and  therefore  a  Designer,  for  the 
universe  in  general,  —  this  it  is  which  prompts  the  search  for 
particular  adaptations.  This  is  the  reason  why  men,  when  the 
particular  design  of  a  thing  cannot  be  seen,  nevertheless  are 
disposed  to  think  that  there  is  some  use,  some  purpose,  even 
when  the  purpose  cannot  be  detected.  Because  it  is  naturally 
assumed  that  there  must  be  a  reason  for  the  whole,  therefore 
it  is  assumed  that  there  is  a  reason  for  each  part,  however 
uncertain  one  may  be  as  to  what  the  particular  reason  is. 
Undoubtedly  this  tendency  to  find  design  in  nature  springs 
from  the  fact  that  in  men  themselves  the  formation  of  plans  is 
an  essential  part  of  their  rational  constitution.  This  is  some- 
times alleged  as  an  argument  against  theism.  It  is  said  that 
the  theistic  impulse  is  nothing  but  a  childlike  tendency  to  per- 
sonify inanimate  things.  Particular  objects,  or  general  forces, 
or  the  universe  as  a  whole,  is  in  imagination  invested  with  a 
personal  will.  But  (so  it  is  reasoned)  as  the  maturing  child 
learns,  little  by  little,  to  recognize  these  personifications  as  il- 
lusions, so  the  developed  reason  of  man  learns  to  recognize  that 
the  tendency  to  assume  a  supreme  Person  as  underlying  the 
forces  of  nature  is  nothing  but  a  child-like  fancy  having  no 
solid  foundation.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  in  reply  that  the  point 
now  urged  is  just  the  fact  of  a  tendency  to  assume  a  personal 
agency  as  operative  in  the  natural  world.  That  this  tendency 
may,  in  particular  cases,  lead  to  an  inaccurate  or  extravagant 
fancy  is  no  disproof  of  its  general  soundness.  It  may  easily  be 
proved  that  many  childish  personifications  are  illusions ;  but  it 
has  never  been  proved  that  there  is  no  God. 

Similar  reflections  may  be  made  concerning  the  moral  argu- 
ment for  the  divine  existence.  The  practical  force  of  it  is  best 
brought  out  when  we  consider  what  the  consequence  is  of  adopt- 
ing atheism  as  the  true  theory.  The  argument  does  not  lie  in 
any  formal  deduction  of  the  fact  of  a  Divine  Being  made  from 
the  phenomena  of  the  physical  or  moral  world.  Neither  the  in- 
tuitions of  the  moral  sense  nor  the  facts  of  the  world's  history 
furnish  any  demonstration  of  the  divine  existence.  But  a  sound 
moral  sense  recoils  from  the  thought  of  a  world  without  a  moral 
Ruler  and  Judge.     The  same  impulse  which,  in  general,  inclines 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  51 

men  to  think  that  the  world  as  a  whole  must  have  some  end 
inclines  them,  in  particular,  to  think  that  the  moral  world  must 
have  some  good  end.  If  it  is  almost  impossible  to  conceive  of 
the  cosmos  as  passing  though  all  its  processes  for  nothing,  as 
not  being  under  the  control  of  an  intelligent  Power  who  plans  its 
movements  and  changes,  it  is  likewise  almost  impossible  for  a 
moral  being  to  conceive  of  the  world  of  moral  beings  as  having 
no  final  cause,  as  not  controlled  by  an  intelligent  and  morally 
upright  Ruler.  Men  are  not  led  to  the  positive  belief  in  such 
a  ruler  by  the  evidences,  found  in  nature  and  history,  of  an  all- 
wise  and  benevolent  Maker  and  Governor.  The  argument  is 
altogether  too  inconclusive.  The  enormous  evils  and  sufferings 
and  wrongs  with  which  the  world  is  filled  might  rather  seem  to 
favor  the  opposite  conclusion,  that  the  Supreme  Ruler,  if  there 
is  one,  is  deficient  in  goodness  and  wisdom.  Accordingly  one  of 
the  principal  arguments  for  the  fact  of  a  future  life  is  found  in 
just  this  moral  disorder  and  inequality  of  the  world  as  we  see 
it.  But  the  argument  presupposes  that  there  is  a  Moral  Ruler 
who  is  disposed  to  rectify  all  evil.  The  truth  is,  that  back  of 
all  attempts  to  find  in  nature  evidences  of  the  perfect  holiness  of 
God  there  is  a  virtual,  even  though  unconscious,  assumption,  that 
there  must  be  a  Divine  Being  who  is  perfect  in  moral  character. 
This  being  the  assumption,  men  search  for  proof  and  illustra- 
tions of  the  assumed  truth.  The  belief,  or  the  tendency  to  be- 
lieve, leads  to  the  argument,  rather  than  the  argument  to  the 
belief.i 

In  saying  this  we  do  not  forget,  what  is  frequently  insisted  on, 
that  religion  often  appears  to  be  quite  independent  of  morality. 
In  the  ruder  forms  of  it  it  seems  to  be  a  selfish  and  super- 
stitious fear  of  unmoral,  or  even  of  malevolent,  beings,  rather 
than  a  recognition  of  a  Moral  Ruler.  It  is  argued,  therefore, 
that  ethical  conceptions  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  genesis  of 
religion.  But  the  more  degraded  races  are  not  to  be  taken  as 
illustrating  the  normal  tendencies  of  humanity.  Where  religion 
is  of  this  rude  sort,  morality  is  also  but  rudely  developed.     And 

1  "All  arguments  [for  the  divine  existence]  are  merely  reasons  given  to  justify 
our  faiik  and  the  particular  manner  in  which  we  deem  it  necessary  to  conceive 
this  highest  principle." — Lotze,  Grundzilge  der  Religionsphilosophie,  p.  5. 


52  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

as  truly  as  the  deities  of  men  are  apt  to  be  regarded  as  charac- 
terized by  traits  hke  those  of  the  men  themselves,  so  truly  must 
the  deities  be  conceived  as  possessing  ethical  traits  at  least  as 
distinct  and  elevated  as  those  of  their  worshippers.  We  are, 
however,  not  now  considering  the  question  of  the  historical 
origin  and  original  form,  but  rather  that  of  the  ultimate  ground, 
of  theistic  conceptions.  It  matters  little,  so  far  as  this  question  is 
concerned,  whether  religion  first  took  the  gross  form  of  fetich  ism, 
which  has  gradually  developed  into  an  ethical  monotheism,  or 
whether,  on  the  contrary,  the  lower  forms  of  religion  are  de- 
generations from  an  original  purer  form.  Wherever  the  higher 
forms  are  seen,  there  an  ethical  element  is  found.  And  when  a 
reflective  analysis  contemplates  the  phenomena  of  theism,  it 
cannot  well  avoid  recognizing  the  moral  sense  as  a  weighty 
factor  in  the  theistic  conception. 

The  atheistic  hypothesis  serves,  therefore,  to  shock  the  mind 
into  a  consciousness  of  its  own  latent  impulses.  The  clear  rec- 
ognition of  the  logical  and  necessary  consequences  of  atheism  — 
the  necessity  it  puts  upon  us  of  assuming  that  a  world  exists, 
full  of  manifold  beauties  and  intelligences,  yet  existing  through 
no  intelligent  cause,  directed  by  no  purpose,  regulated  by  no 
moral  controller,  having  in  general  no  reason  for  existing  and 
issuing  in  no  worthy  end,  —  this,  as  it  forces  upon  us  the  sharp 
alternative  which  theism  versus  atheism  presents,  reveals  the 
strength  and  validity  of  the  theistic  impulse  and  the  real  force 
of  the  theistic  argument.  It  is  easy  to  make  objections  to  the 
theistic  conception.  But  let  one  begin  on  the  opposite  side  and 
try  to  adopt  atheism,  in  its  unadulterated  form,  as  his  theoreti- 
cal and  practical  belief ;  and  then  he  finds  how  much  greater 
and  more  fundamental  difliculties  are  encountered.  Yet  one  or 
the  other  doctrine  must  be  true.  And  men  will  not  in  the  long 
run  be  content  to  embrace  a  doctrine  which  requires  them  to 
hold  that  the  world  in  general  and  the  human  race  in  particular 
arc  the  sport  of  a  blind  power,  all  history  meaningless,  and  all 
life  a  dismal  farce. 

All  this  simply  proves  a  natural  tendency  in  man  to  theism. 
It  does  not  prove  a  direct  perception  of  God,  but  only  the  pos- 
session of  mental  and  moral  impulses  which  favor  a  belief  in 


GROUNDS  OF  THE  THEISTIC  BELIEF.  53 

the  existence  of  one.  Now,  in  so  far  as  the  question  before  us 
is,  how  men  first  came  to  cherish  the  actual  belief,  it  is  not  ab- 
solutely settled  by  this  demonstration  of  the  tendency  to  the 
belief.  The  actual  belief  is  a  communicated  one.  And  the 
reality  of  an  innate  tendency  to  the  belief  can  be  inferred,  not 
from  the  mere  fact  that  children  accept  it  when  communicated 
(for  they  might  with  almost  equal  readiness  accept  many  untrue 
and  even  almost  absurd  things,  if  such  were  universally  taught 
them),  but  still  more  from  the  persistence  with  which  the  the- 
istic  belief  maintains  itself  even  after  the  objections  to  it  have 
been  urged  with  their  greatest  force ;  and  most  of  all  from  the 
repugnance  which  every  sound  mind  and  sound  moral  sense  feels 
towards  the  atheistic  hypothesis  when  it  is  seen  in  all  its  legiti- 
mate consequences. 

Theism  is  thus  seen  to  have  its  roots  in  a  tendency  to  assume 
the  existence  of  a  personal  power  (or  personal  powers)  akin  to 
human  beings  in  intellectual  and  moral  faculties,  but  superior 
to  them,  and  exercising  a  control  over  the  movements  of  nature 
and  of  human  history.  God  is  conceived  as  like  man,  but  with 
a  more  or  less  complete  exemption  from  the  Hmitations  of  hu- 
manity. It  is  an  important  truth  which  Feuerbach  distorts, 
when  he  says,^  "  From  what  a  man's  God  is  you  can  tell  what 
the  man  is ;  and  again,  from  what  the  man  is  you  can  tell  what 
his  God  is :  the  two  things  are  identical."  It  is  indeed  not 
true  that  God  is  only  the  deification  of  man,  —  a  poetic  objecti- 
fication  of  human  emotions  and  thoughts.  But  it  is  true  that 
all  genuine  theism  is  anthropomorphic  ;  it  does  not  assume 
that  man  makes  God  in  his  own  image,  but  it  does  assume  that 
God  made  man  in  His  image.  Unless  God  is  conceived  to  be, 
like  man,  a  being  possessed  of  a  rational  intelligence  and  a  free 
moral  will,^  —  a  person  forming  and  executing  purposes,  —  then 
there  is  no  valid  ground  for  pretending  to  be  a  theist.  The 
ontological  and  cosmological  arguments  at  the  most  do  not  bring 
us  any  farther  than  to  the  assumption  or  recognition  of  a  Uni- 
versal Force,  or  an  Unknown  Something,  which  may  be  identical 

^  Das  Wesen  des  Christenthums,  p.  17,  Leipzig,  1841. 

2  See  this  forcibly  elaborated  by  President  J.  Bascom,  A  Philosophy  of 
Religion,  chap,  iii.,  New  York,  1S76. 


54  SUPERXATUK.U.  KEVELATION. 

with  the  essential  principle  of  a  soulless  material  universe. 
But  such  a  God  is  no  God  at  all.^ 

When  it  is  objected,  whether  by  professed  theists,  like  Mansel, 
or  professed  agnostics,  like  Herbert  Spencer,  that  the  attributes 
of  infinity  and  absoluteness  cannot  in  thought  be  reconciled 
with  a  true  personality,  the  reply  is  short :  Who  is  able  to  as- 
sure us  that  God  is  absolute  and  infinite  in  any  such  sense  as 
to  exclude  the  attribute  of  personality  ?  There  is  no  law  of 
thought,  or  impulse  of  the  religious  nature,  which  compels  us 
to  assume  any  such  absoluteness.  Least  of  all  has  the  agnostic, 
who  professes  to  know  nothing  about  a  Divine  Being,  any  right 
to  know  so  much  as  that  he  is  an  absolute  being  in  such  a  sense 
that  he  cannot  be  personal.  The  religious  impulse  leads  to  the 
assumption  of  a  God  who  is  a  morally  and  intellectually  perfect 
person.  If  this  perfection  is  inconsistent  with  absoluteness  and 
infinity,  very  well ;  let  these  high-sounding  abstractions  be  sac- 
rificed ;  no  harm  will  come  to  any  one.  The  notion  of  a  Deity 
precedes  that  of  his  absoluteness,  and  will  remain  even  if  the 
latter  is  abandoned.^  The  old  ontological  argument  of  Anselm 
presented  the  spectacle  of  an  attempt  to  prove  the  existence  of 
God  by  the  very  definition  of  God ;  the  modern  agnostics  under- 
take to  find  in  the  definition  of  God  a  proof  of  his  non-existence, 
or  at  least  of  his  unthinkableness.  The  one  style  of  argumen- 
tation is  as  futile  as  the  other. 

The  gist  of  the  theistic  argument,  then,  in  brief  is  this :  The 
mind  of  man  is  instinctively  inclined  to  think  that  the  universe 
must  have  a  purpose ;  that,  as  a  whole,  it  is  for  something ; 
further,  that  it  must  have  a  moral  end,  a  good  end ;  and  conse- 
quently that  there  must  be  a  moral  and  intelligent  Power  pre- 
siding over  it,  and  governing  it  in  wisdom,  righteousness,  and 
love.  As  soon  as  one  reflects  on  the  matter,  and  whenever  one 
takes  in  wliat  is  involved  in  any  theory  of  a  universe  destitute 
of  a  personal  Ruler,  one  recoils  from  the  proposition  that  the 
rnin))lifated  system  of  the  universe  is  the  result  of  the  opera- 
tion of  fortuitous  and  unintelligent  physical  forces.     And  then 

'  Sep  Exrnrsiis  ITT.  in  the  Appendix. 

'  Cf.  Basoom,  A  Philosophy  of  Reliijion,  p.  91  ;  E.  R.  Conder,  Basis  of 
Faith,  p|).  G2  sqq  ;  S.  Harris,  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism,  §  55. 


GROUNDS  OF   THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  55 

when  one  observes  the  numberless  individual  marks  of  purpose, 
—  of  particular  adjustments  of  organ  to  organ,  of  things  to  per- 
sons, of  means  to  ends,^  —  this  instinctive  tendency  to  look  for  a 
conscious  design  is  confirmed.  And  when  the  atheistic  sug- 
gestion is  made  that  these  apparent  evidences  of  an  intelligent 
plan  may  be  merely  accidental,  or  that  the  adjustments  which 
we  see  are  only  the  survival,  so  to  speak,  of  a  chaotic  and 
blundering  nisus  of  nature,  only  those  productions  being  per- 
petuated which  hajjpened  to  be  furnished  with  the  organs  and 
environments  favorable  to  development  and  reproduction, —  the 
refutation  of  this  does  not  need  to  depend  on  one's  ability  to 
prove  that  this  was  not,  or  could  not  have  been,  the  actual  fact. 
Kather  one  may  reply :  Why  should  I  make  an  assumption 
which  requires  me  to  regard  the  universe  and  its  history  as  a 
meaningless  farce  ?  For  at  the  best  the  atheistic  hypothesis  is 
nothing  but  a  conjecture,  even  though  the  theistic  one  should 
also  be  pronounced  to  be  the  same.  If,  then,  I  am  obliged  to 
choose  between  the  two  conjectural  modes  of  accounting  for  the 
fact  of  adaptations  and  contrivances,  why  should  I  not  adopt 
that  conjecture  which  harmonizes  with  my  feeling  that  there  must 
have  been  a  reason  for  the  world  as  a  whole  ?  and  consequently 
that  a  Being  possessed  of  Eeasou  and  moral  Purpose  has  deter- 
mined the  course  of  things  in  it  ?  Why  should  I  not  adopt 
that  conjecture  which  allows  me  to  think  that  there  is  a  per- 
sonal God  who  knows  me  and  cares  for  me,  —  a  God  toward 
whom  I  can  cherish  a  filial  trust  and  love  ?  ^ 

^  See  especially  Paul  Janet,  Fiual  Causes  (Edinburgh,  1883,  2d  ed.,  tr.  by- 
TV.  Affleck)  ;  J.  L.  Dimau,  The  Theistic  Argument ;  Wm.  Jackson,  The  Phi- 
losophy of  Natural  Theology  (London,  1874). 

2  Physicus,  in  his  Candid  Examination  of  Theism  (London,  1878),  after 
arguing  that  all  the  positive  theistic  arguments  are  fallacious,  and  that  scien- 
tific thought  finds  no  need  of  a  personal  God  in  order  to  account  for  the  uni- 
verse and  its  phenomena,  yet  finally,  after  sketching  an  imaginary  debate  be- 
tween a  theist  and  an  atheist  on  the  question  of  "  metaphysical  teleology,"  in 
undertaking  to  adjudicate  between  them  says,  "The  degree  of  even  rational 
probability  may  here  legitimately  vary  with  the  character  of  the  mind  which 
contemplates  it  "  (p.  9.5).  "  The  grounds  of  belief  in  this  case  logically  vary 
with  the  natural  disposition  and  the  subsequent  training  of  different  minds  " 
(p.  99).  In  other  words,  if  one  is  theistically  inclined,  he  will  argue  in  one 
way  ;  if  atheisticaliy  inclined,  in  another. 


56  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

^Vhen,  then,  it  is  objected  that  there  are  many  phenomena  in 
nature  whicli  do  not  suggest  a  designing  cause,  that  many  things 
appear  rather  to  be  the  product  of  a  blind  and  unfeeling  power, 
one  does  not  need  to  be  able  to  discover  the  occult  purpose  in 
order  to  parry  the  atheistic  inference ;  it  is  not  even  necessary 
to  show  that  more  careful  research  has  often  disclosed  the  pur- 
pose of  what  had  seemed  to  be  without  it.  It  is  sufficient  to 
fall  back  on  one's  ignorance,  and  to  assume  that  where  there  is 
so  strong  a  presumption  that  the  wliole  is  the  result  of  a  plan, 
and  where  there  are  so  many  obvious  individual  instances  of  in- 
genious adjustment  and  benevolent  arrangement,  the  compara- 
tively few  inexplicable  things  may  well  be  left  for  the  present 
unexplained.  A  parent  does  many  things  which  to  a  young 
child  seem  strange,  unwise,  or  even  cruel.  But  the  child  does 
not  therefore  argue  that  he  has  no  parent.^ 

Finally,  if  it  is  objected  that  this  tendency  to  believe  in  the 
existence  of  a  God  is,  after  all,  no  proof  that  a  God  does  exist, 
the  reply  is  very  simple.  Doubtless  it  is  not  a  compulsory 
proof,  else  no  one  would  ever  doubt  the  conclusion.  But  if  a 
strong  and  general  tendency  to  believe  in  the  objective  reality 
of  certain  principles  or  existences  is  no  evidence  of  such  reality, 
then  the  foundation  of  all  knowledge  is  undermined.  What 
evidence  have  we  that,  whenever  a  change  takes  place  in  the 
world,  there  must  have  been  some  cause  of  it  ?  This  demand  for 
a  cause  is  nothing  but  a  strong  tendency  of  the  mind.  Some 
men  have  undertaken  to  disparage  the  value  of  this  tendency, 
too ;  but  they  find  it  impossible  to  secure  many  followers,  or 
even  to  be  self-consistent  in  their  skepticism.  Men  are  so  con- 
stituted as  to  think  that  what  they  are  impelled  by  a  strong 
natural  impulse  to  believe  to  be  objectively  true  is  objectively 
true.  If  they  can  hardly  help  thinking  that  there  is  a  material 
world  existing  in  space,  that  is  practically  the  convincing  reason 
for  their  thinking  that  it  does  exist.  If  they  find  in  them  an 
insuperable  tendency  to  conceive  of  material  bodies  as  having 

'  The  objections  to  the  teleological  arji^ument  derived  from  evolutionism 
need  not  be  con.sidered  at  length.  Evolutionists  themselves  admit  that  evolu- 
tion does  not  do  away  with  teleology,  but  rather  relieves  it  of  some  of  its 
difficulties.     See  Asa  Gray,  Darwiniana. 


GROUNDS  OF  THE   THEISTIC  BELIEF.  57 

three  dimensions,  that  is  the  decisive  evidence  that  these  bodies 
are  so  constituted.  In  short,  when  we  reduce  any  belief,  how- 
ever unavoidable  or  indisputable  it  may  seem  to  be,  to  its  ulti- 
mate grounds,  we  can  get  no  farther  than  to  say  that  we  cannot 
help  believing  so. 

Now,  the  impulse  to  ask,  What  is  it  for  ?  is  scarcely  less  im- 
perative than  the  impulse  to  ask,  What  is  it  from  ?  The  various 
tendencies  of  the  soul  which  lead  to  the  conception  of  a  su- 
preme personal  Being  are  just  as  legitimate  and  trustworthy  as 
any  others.  If  they  are  discredited  as  not  demonstrating  the 
objective  reality  of  the  God  who  is  believed  in,  then  a  similar 
treatment  applied  to  all  fundamental  and  intuitive  beliefs  re- 
duces us  to  pure  Pyrrhonism  or  Nihilism. 

Of  course  it  cannot  be  contended  that  the  knowledge  of  God 
is  precisely  analogous  to  that  of  the  external  world.  The  sim- 
ple fact  that  men's  conceptions  and  impressions  of  divinity  are 
and  have  been  so  exceedingly  diverse  and  almost  contradictory, 
whereas  they  are  substantially  in  agreement  as  to  the  facts  and 
appearances  of  the  objects  of  sense,  shows  that  there  is  not  the 
same  kind  and  degree  of  force  in  the  two  classes  of  impelling 
tendencies.  The  cognition  of  a  purely  spiritual  being,  either 
because  of  the  limitations  of  our  present  mode  of  existence,  or 
because  sin  has  blinded  our  spiritual  vision,  cannot  be  called 
direct  knowledge  in  the  same  sense  as  the  cognition  of  material 
objects  is.  Left  to  themselves,  men  might  have  agreed  that 
there  is  prohaUy  a  supreme  personal  Power.  They  might  have 
had  a  common  longing  and  hope  for  a  clear  manifestation  of  the 
fact  of  such  a  God.  But  there  would  still  have  been  the  pos- 
sibility that  the  world  was  swayed  by  an  unconscious,  though 
all-pervading,  force.  There  would  still  have  been  the  possibil- 
ity, however  repellent  the  thought,  that  the  universe  both  of 
inanimate  and  rational  beings  was  existing  for  no  purpose. 
Persons  who  had  come  to  the  knowledge  of  other  persons  only 
through  direct  perception  and  intercourse  could  not  be  sure  of  the 
existence  of  a  Divine  person,  if  he  made  no  palpable  and  per- 
sonal manifestation  of  himself.  Still  less  could  they  have  come 
to  a  certain  knowledge  of  the  particular  attributes  of  this  Being. 
Of  course,  in  process  of  time  the  conjecture  concerning  a  Supreme 


68  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Being  might  have  taken  the  form  of  a  belief,  and  the  belief 
again  might  have  assumed  the  aspect  of  an  assured  knowledge. 
Theism  thus  transmitted  would  have  been  implicitly  accepted 
by  each  new  generation  on  the  mere  testimony  of  the  preceding. 
But  in  this  case  the  ground  of  certainty  in  the  belief  would 
have  been  merely  the  testimony  of  others.  Monotheism,  poly- 
theism, fetichism,  would  all  rest  on  the  same  foundation,  mono- 
theism having  only  the  advantage  of  being  most  in  accordance 
with  enlightened  reason.  As  soon  as  the  belief  is  questioned,  it 
is  seen  that  the  mere  fact  of  a  traditional  handing  down  of  the 
belief  is  of  itself  no  strict  proof  of  its  correctness.  The  testi- 
mony is  found  to  be  valuable  only  so  far  as  it  tallies  with  and 
confirms  the  general  impulses  and  tendencies  of  men. 

But  in  another  form  testimony  plays  a  very  important  part 
in  the  confirmation  of  theism.  And  here  we  come  to  the  second 
factor  in  the  basis  of  theistic  belief ;  namely,  — 

II.  Eevelation  as  a  ground  of  assured  belief  in  a  personal 
God  and  of  a  definite  knowledge  of  him.  This  is  testimony,  as 
it  were,  at  first  hand.  It  is  like  the  personal  appearance  of  a 
man  about  whom  we  have  heretofore  known  only  by  conjecture 
or  hearsay.  It  is  evidence  in  addition  to  that  which  is  found  in 
those  innate  tendencies  which  incline  men  to  adopt  theistic 
conceptions.  When  the  Deity  is  supposed  to  have  manifested 
himself  in  some  palpable  way,  even  though  only  for  a  single 
time,  the  fact  of  this  manifestation  is  handed  down  and  be- 
comes the  ground  of  the  assured  confidence  with  which  the  the- 
istic belief  is  held. 

Of  course,  belief  in  a  revelation  must  presuppose  this  inclina- 
tion to  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  Divine  Being.  Absolute, 
stolid  atheism,  —  a  positive  disbelief  in  the  existence  of  any- 
thing superhuman  or  supernatural,  —  if  this  were  the  natural 
and  ordinary  attitude  of  the  human  mind,  could  hardly  be 
overcome  by  any  special  revelation.  Such  atheism  would  neces- 
sarily assume  a  skeptical  attitude  towards  any  apparent  or  pre- 
tended manifestation  of  a  God.  Even  if  the  disbelief  were  in 
a  particular  instance  overcome  by  some  remarkable  demonstra- 
tion, it  would  afterwards  return  again,  if  such  disbelief  were 
indeed  the  natural  attitude  of  the  human  mind.     The  alleged 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   TIIEISTIC   BELIEF.  '  59 

revelation  would  soon  be  repudiated  as  an  illusion.  The  origi- 
nal and  natural  unbelief  would  re-assert  itself,  and  continue  to 
be  the  dominant  sentiment  of  men.  But  given  a  general  dispo- 
sition to  believe  in  a  Divine  Being ;  given  a  general  desire  to  be 
assured  of  the  reality  and  of  the  character  of  a  God  already 
believed  in,  or  at  least  conjectured,  —  then  a  revelation  will  be 
effective  and  lasting  in  its  tendency  to  establish  men  in  the 
sure  conviction  that  there  is  indeed  a  God.  The  revelation, 
when  accepted  as  such,  furnishes  a  ground  of  certainty  concern- 
ing the  Divine  Being  which  exceeds,  and  in  a  sense  supersedes, 
the  belief  which  may  have  existed  before. 

All  this  holds  true  quite  irrespective  of  the  question  whether 
any  particular  alleged  revelation  is  a  genuine  one  or  not.  The 
point  here  to  be  insisted  on  is  that  an  antecedent  tendency  to 
believe  the  world  to  be  under  the  control  of  a  personal  God 
prepares  one  to  desire  and  expect  a  revelation  of  such  a  God. 
If  that  desire  and  expectation  are  or  seem  to  be  realized,  the 
revelation  is  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case  a  clearer  and  more 
positive  source  of  knowledge  than  the  antecedent  theistic  im- 
pulse could  be.  Otherwise  there  could  be  no  ground  for  the 
desire  itself.  Take  the  case  of  the  ordinary  Christian.  He 
finds  himself  in  a  community  filled,  and  even  in  a  sense  consti- 
tuted, by  Christian  doctrines  which  have  been  handed  down,  and 
which  form  the  source  and  substance  of  the  religious  thinking 
of  the  Christian  world.  The  fact  and  the  character  of  a  per- 
sonal God,  together  with  the  account  of  what  he  has  done  in 
order  to  save  mankind,  are  an  essential  part  of  the  Christian 
body  of  doctrine.  All  this  comes  to  each  individual  as  the  con- 
tents of  the  Christian  system,  before  he  has  begun  to  think  inde- 
pendently, before  either  doubt  springs  up  or  he  becomes  clearly 
conscious  of  any  innate  tendencies  to  believe  in  a  Divine  Being. 
The  simple  fact  is  that  the  child  in  a  Christian  community  is 
told  by  his  elders  about  the  fact  and  the  character  of  God  as 
soon  as  he  is  able  to  take  in  the  instruction.  If  we  ask  how 
the  instructors  came  by  their  own  impressions  and  convictions, 
the  same  answer  must  be  given ;  and  so  the  chain  reaches  back 
to  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  Church.  The  first  disciples 
of  Christ  received  from  liim  positive  communications  concern- 


60  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

ing  God,  his  character,  and  his  purposes  respecting  men.  "Show 
us  the  Father,  and  it  sufficeth  us,"  was  their  request ;  and  his  Hfe 
and  words  gave  the  answer.  Whatever  they  may  have  heheved 
and  hoped  hefore,  Christ's  revelations  were  to  them  more  authori- 
tative and  conclusive  than  any  previous  instructions  or  convic- 
tions. That  his  teachings  were  largely  in  harmony  with  their 
previous  convictions  and  opinions  must  have  helped  to  win  their 
confidence  in  him  as  an  inspired  teacher.  But  when  the  confi- 
dence was  created,  and  they  could  say  with  assurance,  "We 
know  that  thou  art  the  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  living  God ;  "  when 
especially  their  confidence  was  confirmed  and  made  invincible 
by  his  resurrection,  —  they  found  in  him  the  ultimate  and  infalli- 
ble source  of  religious  truth.  Though  they  may  before  have  had 
no  doubts  about  the  fact  of  a  Divine  Being,  yet  now,  if  doubts 
had  arisen,  they  would  have  been  at  once  overcome  by  this 
same  confidence  in  the  infallible  authority  of  their  Master. 
Because  Tie  believed  in  God,  because  he  claimed  to  have  come 
from  God  and  to  have  revealed  the  gracious  purposes  of  God, 
therefore  they  could  not  but  believe  in  God.  They  trusted  his 
veracity  and  his  competency  so  implicitly  that  all  previous  tra- 
ditional beliefs  were  worthless,  as  compared  with  their  assurance 
that  he  spoke  the  truth,  and  that  he  had  made  known  to  tliem 
the  Father.  When  they  accepted  Jesus  as  a  divinely  inspired 
Eevealer  of  God,  they  had  a  new  ground  of  certainty.  Their 
previous  beliefs,  themselves  resting  on  the  tradition  of  an  earlier 
revelation,  were  now  strengthened.  The  words  of  one  who  pro- 
fessed to  come  directly  from  God,  and  whose  whole  character 
and  conduct  confirmed  his  claims,  introduced  them  into  a  new 
region  of  religious  assurance.  Whatever  innate  tendencies  there 
may  have  been  to  believe  in  a  God,  whatever  confirmation  this 
tendency  may  have  received  from  reflection  and  tradition,  yet 
the  ground  of  calm  and  firm  assurance  was  now  found  in  the 
self-evidencing  character  and  claims  of  the  great  Prophet  who 
brought  to  light  the  things  lieretofore  dimly  known  or  blindly 
accepted. 

And  what  was  true  of  the  original  disciples  holds  true,  sub- 
stantially, of  Christendom  in  general.  Christians  do  not,  indeed, 
now  have    the   same  immediateness  of  personal  acquaintance 


GROUNDS   OF   THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  61 

with  Jesiis  which  those  disciples  had ;  but  they  have  what  in 
some  respects  more  than  compensates  for  the  want  of  it :  they 
have  tlie  evidence  of  Christian  history  as  a  confirmation  of 
Jesus'  claims.  Christianity  now,  as  then,  rests  on  the  per- 
sonal authority  of  its  Founder.  Christians  trace  to  him  not  only 
their  religious  hopes,  but  also  their  religious  knowledge.  What 
the  Christian  thinks  or  knows  about  God  he  receives  through 
the  medium  of  the  Christian  revelation.  In  spite  of  himself, 
by  virtue  of  a  training  which  began  in  his  earliest  years,  he  has 
become  imbued  with  Christian  principles  and  Christian  beliefs, 
derived  from  the  revelation  brought  into  the  world  by  Jesus 
Christ,  and  accepted  because  he  is  regarded  as  authoritative  and 
true.  And  so  it  is  not  an  extravagant  thing,  —  nay,  it  is  a  most 
reasonable  and  obvious  thing,  —  to  say  that  if  a  Christian  finds 
himself  troubled  by  atheistic  doubts,  he  may  properly  dispel 
them  by  reflecting  that,  if  such  doubts  have  any  validity,  then 
Jesus  ought  still  more  to  have  had  them,  whereas,  on  the  con- 
trary, he  had  none.  He  professed  to  know  the  Father,  to  come 
from  him,  and  to  be  in  constant  fellowship  with  him.  If  athe- 
ism is  true,  then  Christ  was  not  only  no  true  prophet,  but  either 
a  gross  impostor  or  at  the  best  a  misguided  enthusiast.  In 
case,  now,  a  Christian  is  beset  with  speculative  doubts  about 
God,  it  is  legitimate  for  him  to  quell  them  by  the  reflection 
that  Christ  had  no  doubts,  and  that  Christ's  testimony  on  this 
point  is  sufficient  to  outweigh  all  the  difficulties  which  specula- 
tion can  possibly  raise.  Indeed,  so  long  as  one  remains  a 
Christian,  no  other  course  can  be  taken.  It  would  be  simply 
absurd  to  profess  to  have  faith  in  Christ,  if  in  the  very  center  of 
his  religious  life  and  teaching  he  was  the  victim  of  a  delusion, 
or  else  was  guilty  of  a  base  deception.  If  one  has  (as  every 
real  Christian  must  have)  implicit  faith  in  the  absolute  trust- 
worthiness of  Christ  as  a  religious  guide,  then  his  testimony 
concerning  God  is  more  conclusive  than  all  the  arguments  of 
metaphysicians  or  than  all  possible  reflections  of  one's  own. 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  when  the  question  is  raised,  what  it  is  that 
gives  assurance  to  a  Christian  respecting  divine  things,  as  over 
against  the  uncertainties  and  doubts  which  may  arise,  the  answer 
must  be  that  it  is  his  faith  in  the  Christian  revelation  itself. 


62  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

That  God  is  a  living  reality  is  made  certain  to  the  Christian 
mind  by  the  fact  that  God  has  manifested  himself  in  Christ  to 
the  world. 

And  what  is  true  of  those  who  accept  the  Christian  revela- 
tion as  genuine  is  also  true  of  those  who  are  adherents  of  other 
religions.  They  believe  what  they  believe,  not  simply  on  the 
ground  of  innate  intuitions  or  independent  reflection,  but  on 
the  ground  of  a  supposed  revelation  in  which  the  Deity  has 
disclosed  himself.  It  is  not  necessary  to  substantiate  this 
statement  by  a  detailed  examination  of  religious  history.  The 
fact  is  admitted  by  all.  Wherever  a  religious  faith  is  vig- 
orous and  positive,  it  rests  on  a  real  or  supposed  revelation. 
When  faith  in  the  genuineness  of  the  revelation  is  undermined, 
the  religion  itself  loses  its  vitality.  When  the  Greek  and 
Roman  mythologies  began  to  be  recognized  as  fables,  general 
religious  skepticism  came  in  ;  theism  instead  of  being  a  firm  faith 
became  a  matter  of  speculation.  Cicero  found  occasion  to  write 
a  treatise  to  prove  the  reality  of  a  Deity.  And  so  generally, 
when  faith  in  a  supernatural  revelation  is  lost,  faith  in  a  per- 
sonal Deity  is  either  lost  or  becomes  doubtful  and  lifeless. 
Deism  may  live  for  a  time  on  the  strength  of  a  theism  nursed 
by  faith  in  the  supernatural ;  but  by  degrees  it  will  degenerate 
into  pantheism  or  pure  atheism. ^  A  God  whose  existence  and 
character  are  only  inferred  from  the  phenomena  of  the  universe, 
with  its  mixture  of  good  and  bad,  beauty  and  ugliness,  pleasure 
and  suffering,  with  its  doubtful  progress  towards  the  better,  and 
with  no  certain  message  from  its  author  to  tell  men  whether  he 
cares  for  them  or  even  has  a  personal  consciousness  of  their 
existence,  —  such  a  God  cannot  long  retain  the  clear  and  strong 
faith  of  his  creatures.  Religion,  in  order  to  have  any  vitality, 
•taust  involve  a  helief,  at  least,  that  the  object  of  worship  has 
made  himself  definitely  known.  The  speculations  and  con- 
jectures which  may  grow  out  of  the  theistic  tendency  of  men's 
minds  are  too  vague  and  discordant  to  produce  a  cdYnmon  and 
assured  belief.  There  cannot  be  a  community  holding  one 
definite  conviction  concerning  a  Divine  Being  and  united  in  a 
common  worship  of  him,  unless  the  Deity  is  supposed  somehow 
*  Cf.  Lutliardt,  Apologie  des  Christcnthums,  vol.  iv. 


GROUNDS   OF  THE   THEISTIC   BELIEF.  G3 

to  have  authentically  and  authoritatively  revealed  himself. 
Such  a  supposition  will  develop  itself,  with  or  without  good 
grounds.  If  a  Buddha  or  Confucius  merely  by  his  own  in- 
sight detects  the  errors  of  his  fellows  and  teaches  a  new  or  a 
reformed  religion,  and  if  his  teachings  are  accepted  and  become 
the  foundation  of  a  new  religious  community,  he  will  come  to 
be  regarded  (whether  himself  claiming  it  or  not)  as  specially 
inspired,  and  his  teachings  as  therefore  having  a  higher  author- 
ity than  that  of  mere  human  opinion. 

Of  course  it  may  be  argued  that,  inasmuch  as  there  are  many 
pretended  revelations,  not  all  of  which  can  be  genuine,  revela- 
tions in  general  are  discredited  by  this  multiplicity  and  incon- 
sistency, and  that  therefore,  although  assurance  of  faith  in  a 
divine  being  may  come  from  assumed  revelations,  yet  such 
revelations  are  proved  by  their  very  diversity  to  be  spurious ; 
so  that  the  whole  superstructure  resting  on  them  is  deprived  of 
its  security.  Be  that  as  it  may.  Our  present  point  is  not 
that  the  fact  or  the  character  of  God  is  disclosed  by  any  or 
every  alleged  revelation  ;  but  rather  that  definite  and  confident 
hclief  in  such  a  revelation  is  essential  to  a  lively,  and  especially 
to  a  common,  belief  in  a  God.  If  there  is  a  natural  tendency  in 
men  to  believe  in  a  Divine  Being,  none  the  less  certain  is  it 
that  there  is  a  natural  tendency  in  men  to  desire  an  authori- 
tative communication  from  the  Deity  —  some  special  mani- 
festation which  shall  make  men  feel  acquainted  with  him. 
Whether  any  such  revelation  has  been  made ;  which  of  all  the 
alleged  revelations,  if  any,  can  substantiate  itself  as  the  genu- 
ine one,  —  these  are  entirely  different,  though  very  important, 
questions.  But  it  is  of  no  little  account  to  emphasize  this  ten- 
dency to  desire  an  authentic  revelation.  If  the  innate  tendency 
to  believe  in  a  God  is  to  be  accepted  as  one  reason,  at  least,  for 
the  truth  of  theism,  then  equally  the  natural  desire  to  receive 
a  special  communication  from  God  may  be  taken  as  furnish- 
ing a  presumption,  at  least,  that  one  has  been  made.  If  there 
are  intrinsic  reasons  for  believing  that  there  is  a  personal  God 
presiding  over  the  universe,  there  is  also  reason  for  believing 
that  he  must  desire  to  make  himself  clearly  known  to  his 
personal  creatures.     If  it  were  certain  that  no  such  revelation 


64  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

had  ever  been  made,  this  absence  of  a  revelation  would  throw 
doubt  on  the  trustworthiness  of  the  theistic  impulse  itself. 

But  here  there  presents  itself  again  the  troublesome  fact  of  a 
multiplicity  of  alleged  revelations,  and  of  revelations  so  diverse 
from  one  another  that  not  all  of  them  can  have  been  genuine. 
What  shall  be  said,  now,  respecting  this  fact  ?  Three  possible 
courses  can  be  taken  with  reference  to  it :  (1)  It  can  be  con- 
cluded that  all  pretended  revelations  are  spurious,  and  that  all  re- 
ligion is  natural  religion,  or  even  pure  delusion.  (2)  It  may  be 
argued  that  some  one  or  more  of  the  revelations  may  be  genuine, 
the  others  being  spurious.  (3)  It  may  be  argued  that  all  the 
alleged  revelations,  though  conflicting  with  one  another,  are 
derived,  in  a  more  or  less  corrupt  form,  from  one  primeval  reve- 
lation. The  first  course  is  excluded  by  what  has  already  been 
said.  Eespecting  the  other  two  it  may  be  said  that  a  theist 
can  consistently  adopt  either  of  them.  The  genuineness  of  a 
particular  revelation,  like  the  Christian,  does  not  prove  or  dis- 
prove the  genuineness  of  another  one  made  at  a  time  so  remote 
that  no  conclusive  evidence  concerning  it  is  available.  And 
just  because  the  data  for  settling  the  problem  concerning  a 
primeval  revelation  are  so  scant  or  wanting  altogether,  it  may 
seem  to  be  an  idle  occupation  to  discuss  it  at  all.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  every  discussion  about  the  actuality  of  a  revela- 
tion inevitably  runs  into  the  question  about  its  possibility  and 
probability;  and  this  at  once  leads  to  the  question  whether 
the  race  has  ever  been  without  it.  To  many  minds  the  credi- 
bility of  any  alleged  historical  revelation  is  invalidated,  if  it  is 
assumed  that  during  the  whole  previous  history  of  mankind  no 
knowledge  of  God  or  of  his  will  was  had  except  what  had 
come  from  men's  unaided  conjectures.  The  feeling  is  this :  A 
special  or  supernatural  revelation  is  credible  only  in  case  the 
need  of  it  is  obvious ;  but  if  there  was  a  need  of  one  some 
thousands  of  years  after  men  began  to  live  on  the  earth,  there 
must  likewise  have  been  a  need  of  it  from  the  outset.  Either 
this  presumption  in  favor  of  a  primitive  revelation  must  be 
rebutted,  or  the  probability  of  such  a  revelation  must  be 
assumed. 


THE   QUESTION  OF  A  PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  65 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE    QUESTION    OF   A    PRIMEVAL    KEVELATION. 

THE  preceding  discussion  has  made  it  clear  that  whatever 
may  be  true  as  to  this  question,  we  cannot  assume  that 
a  special  revelation  was  the  original  source  of  a  theistic  tendency 
of  mind.  A  predisposition  to  believe  in  a  God,  and  a  desire  to 
experience  some  manifestation  of  his  presence  and  character, 
must  be  assumed  as  implanted  in  the  primeval  man.  If  it 
should  be  held  that  man,  without  any  native  tendency  to  be- 
lieve in  a  God,  had  the  notion  of  one  communicated  to  him  by 
a  special  revelation,  without  which  revelation  he  would  neces- 
sarily have  been  and  remained  a  pure  atheist,  such  a  view 
would  indeed  merit  little  attention ;  for  against  an  atheistic 
bent  of  mind  innate  in  the  human  race  no  special  revelation 
could  for  any  length  of  time  maintain  its  influence.  Indeed,  it 
is  not  clear  how  an  ingrained  atheistic  mind  could  be  made  to 
believe  in  a  God  at  all. 

Yet  some  writers  seem,  in  their  treatment  of  this  subject,  to 
assume  that  the  theory  of  a  primeval  revelation  implies  just 
this  doctrine  of  innate  atheism  as  the  aboriginal  condition  of 
mankind.  Thus  Dr.  A.  M.  Fairbairn,  in  his  discussion  of  the 
matter,  apparently  considers  the  theory  of  a  primeval  revelation 
as  designed  only  to  explain  how  the  first  idea  of  God  arose  in 
the  human  mind.  He  says,  and  says  truly,  "  Eevelation  may 
satisfy  or  rectify,  but  cannot  create,  a  religious  capacity  or  in- 
stinct." But  Dr.  Fairbairn's  argument  goes  further  than  to  de- 
fend this  proposition.  A  primitive  revelation,  he  says,  is  "a 
mere  assumption,  incapable  of  proof  —  capable  of  most  positive 
disproof."!     What,  now,  is  the  argument?     This  is   it:^  "If 

^  Sludies  in  the  Philosophi/  of  Religion  and  History,  pp.  21  sq.,  American 
edition  (pp.  13  sq.  in  the  English). 
2  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

5 


66  SUPEKNATURAL  REVELATION. 

there  was  a  primitive  revelation,  it  must  have  been  —  unless 
the  word  is  used  in  an  unusual  and  misleading  sense  —  either 
written  or  oral.  If  written,  it  could  hardly  be  primitive,  for 
writing  is  an  art,  a  not  very  early  acquired  art,  and  one  which 
does  not  allow  documents  of  exceptional  value  to  be  lost.  If  it 
was  oral,  then  either  the  language  for  it  was  created,  or  it  was 
no  more  primitive  than  the  written.  Then  an  oral  revelation 
becomes  a  tradition,  and  a  tradition  requires  either  a  special 
caste  for  its  transmission,  becomes  therefore  its  property,  or 
must  be  subjected  to  multitudinous  changes  and  additions  from 
the  popular  imagination,  —  becomes,  therefore,  a  wild  commin- 
gling of  broken  and  bewildering  lights.  But  neither  as  docu- 
mentary nor  traditional  can  any  traces  of  a  primitive  revelation 
be  discovered ;  and  to  assume  it  is  only  to  burden  the  question 
with  a  thesis  which  renders  a  critical  and  philosophical  discus- 
sion alike  impossible."  ^ 

^  Similarly  Emile  Burnouf  {Science  of  Religions,  p.  47,  London,  1888.  In 
the  original:  La  Science  des  Religions,  Paris,  1872,  p.  82.  The  translation  is 
simply  execrable)  says,  "  There  is  not  a  scholar  to-day  wlio  considers  this 
opinion  as  anything  but  erroneous.  It  is  contradicted  by  the  knowledge  of 
texts,  which  disclose  no  point  of  contact  between  the  most  ancient  Hebrew 
books  and  the  Veda;  also  by  the  comparative  study  of  languages,  which  sepa- 
rates in  their  origins  and  in  their  systems  the  Semitic  idioms  from  the  Aryan 
idioms ;  .  .  .  lastly,  by  this  simple  reflexion  ruling  all  facts,  that,  when  hu- 
manity is  in  possession  of  a  true  principle,  there  is  no  example  of  its  ever 
being  allowed  to  perish."  This  last  reason  is  a  curiosity  of  logic.  The  propo- 
sition is  of  course  true,  —  true,  even  to  the  extent  of  being  absurd,  if  we 
may  venture  the  paradox,  —  provided  he  refers  to  known  exam})lcs  of  the  loss 
of  a  true  principle;  for  if  such  an  example  were  known,  the  principle  would  not 
be  lost.  But  if  there  were  really  instances  of  such  a  loss,  then  of  course  the 
fact  of  the  loss  must  be  unknown  ;  and  to  try  to  disprove  the  fact  of  the  loss 
by  the  fact  of  our  ignorance  of  the  loss  hardly  deserves  the  dignity  of  being 
called  a  fallacy;  it  is  rather  an  instance  of  Hibernianism. 

Max  Miilier  {Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Religion,  Lect.  I.  p.  30) 
says:  "The  theory  that  there  was  a  primeval  preternatural  revelation  granted 
to  the  fathers  of  the  human  race  .  .  .  woidd  find  but  few  supporters  at  pres- 
ent ;  no  more,  in  fact,  than  the  theory  that  there  was  in  the  beginning  one 
complete  language,  broken  up  in  later  times  into  the  numberless  languages  of 
the  world."  This  comparison  cannot  be  meant  to  imply  that  there  was  not 
one  primeval  language ;  for  in  his  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language  (vol. 
i.  pp.  447,  448)  he  says  :  "We  can  understand  not  only  the  origin  of  language, 


THE   QUESTION  OF  A  PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  67 

This  is  surely  a  very  summary  way  of  despatching  the  theory. 
That  the  primitive  revelation,  if  there  was  one,  was  not  a  writ- 
ten one,  is  of  course  at  once  to  be  granted.  But  why  it  could 
not  have  been  oral,  or  in  some  other  way  palpable  to  the  human 
senses  and  apprehension,  is  not  so  clear.  In  that  case,  we  are 
told,  the  language  for  the  revelation  must  have  had  to  be  cre- 
ated. Just  how  much  is  meant  by  this  is  not  obvious.  It 
might  mean  that  human  language,  as  a  whole,  would  have  had 
to  be  created  in  and  with  the  divine  act  of  revelation ;  or  it 
might  mean  that,  in  addition  to  a  language  already  existent,  a 
new  vocabulary  would  have  had  to  be  created  as  a  medium  of 
the  new  truth  to  be  communicated.  But  neither  supposition  is 
a  necessary  one.  The  problem  concerning  the  origin  of  lan- 
guage is  one  which  scientific  investigation  will  hardly  be  able 

but  likewise  the  necessary  breaking  up  of  one  language  into  many ;  and  we  per- 
ceive that  no  amount  of  variety  in  the  material  or  formal  elements  of  speech  is 
incompatible  with  the  admission  of  one  common  source."  Unless  these  two 
extracts  are  to  be  understood  as  in  direct  contradiction  of  each  other,  the 
first  must  be  read  with  an  emphasis  on  the  word  "  complete."  The  original 
language  may,  and  indeed  must,  have  been  incomplete  as  compared  with  later 
ones.  But  still  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  comparison  of  tlie  theory  of  one  original 
language  with  that  of  a  primeval  revelation  helps  to  fortify  his  denial  of  such  a 
revelation.  If  the  various  languages,  now  so  different  from  one  another,  may  be 
modifications  of  one  common  language,  the  great  variety  of  the  religions  of  the 
world  cannot  be  adduced  as  a  proof  that  they  have  not  been  derived  from 
a  common  source.  The  corruption  and  development,  such  as  Miiller  describes 
in  his  Hibbert  Lectures,  may  have  been  in  a  sense  natural,  the  outgrowth  of 
the  particular  tendencies  and  circumstances  of  each  particular  race ;  but  no 
amount  of  investigation  of  such  development  can  ever  go  to  the  length  of  dis- 
proving the  hypothesis  of  a  primeval  revelation, 

A  similar  comment  may  be  made  on  Professor  Briggs's  remark  (^Messianic 
Prophecy,  p.  4)  :  "  It  was  once  the  fasliion  to  explain  the  good  features  of 
other  religions  as  relics  of  the  primitive  divine  revelations  recorded  in  the 
Bible,  or  as  derived  in  some  mysterious  way  from  the  Hebrews.  But  this  fash- 
ion lias  passed  away  witli  the  unscientific  age."  Yet  Professor  Briggs  himself 
believes  in  a  primeval  revelation;  for  (p.  71)  he  says:  "Messianic  prophecy 
begins  with  the  dawn  of  human  history."  After  the  fall  of  man,  he  says 
(p.  73),  "  God  appears  in  theophany  as  Judge  and  as  Redeemer."  If  now 
there  was  really  a  primitive  revelation,  what  has  become  of  it?  Considering 
the  tendency  of  men  to  hand  down  important  truths  and  beliefs,  which  is  most 
"scientific,"  — to  suppose  that  revelation  to  have  been  quite  lost;  or  to  have 
been  propagated,  diversified,  and  corrupted  ? 


68  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

ever  to  solve.  Philologists  now  generally  reject,  or  even  ridicule, 
the  theory  of  a  supernatural  communication  of  language  to  the 
first  man  or  men.  But  they  are  unable  to  agree  among  them- 
selves in  what  other  way  language  did  first  have  its  origin. 
The  truth  is,  the  problem  relates  to  an  altogether  unique  con- 
dition of  things,  for  which  there  is  now  no  analogy.  Language 
is  now  a  developed  fact ;  and  every  new  generation  receives  it 
from  the  preceding  generation.  There  is  no  instance  of  the 
spontaneous  invention  of  a  new  language  on  the  part  of  infants 
who  fail  to  be  taught  an  already  existent  one.  And  when  we 
transfer  ourselves  in  imagination  to  the  time  when  there  was 
as  yet  no  language  in  use,  we  are  obliged  to  deal  wholly  in  con- 
jectures, if  we  attempt  to  determine  by  what  process  the  first 
language  came  into  being.  It  certainly  cannot  be  proved  that 
its  origin  was  not  supernatural.  If  the  first  man  was,  as  he  is 
assumed  to  have  been  by  the  scientists,  a  mere  infant  in  knowl- 
edge and  thought,  then  the  analogy  of  present  experience  would 
favor  the  supposition  that  he  received  language  as  a  communi- 
cation from  without.  The  capacity  to  speak  must  have  been  in 
him.  He  must  have  had  sensations,  perceptions,  and  thoughts 
which  were  capable  of  being  expressed  in  language.  He  must, 
in  short,  have  had  the  same  fitness  for  being  taught  the  use  of 
language  which  infants  now  have.  Since  he  was  without  any 
human  companions  who  could  teach  him,  the  nearest  possible 
approach  to  the  present  condition  of  things  would  have  been  a 
divine  impartation  of  language. 

But  it  is  quite  immaterial  to  our  present  point  whether  lan- 
guage was  a  supernatural  gift  or  a  natural  growth.  Let  it  be 
assumed  that  it  was  the  latter.  It  is  still  not  obvious  wherein 
the  point  of  Dr.  Fairbairn's  reasoning  lies.  If  the  language  of 
the  revelation  was  oral,  he  says,  it  was  (unless  specially  created) 
no  more  primitive  than  the  written.  This  assertion  is  simply  un- 
intelligible. Suppose  writing  to  have  been  invented  two  thou- 
sand years  after  man  had  existed  and  used  a  spoken  language. 
Suppose,  further,  an  oral  revelation  to  have  been  made  as  soon 
as  man  had  mental  capacity  and  language  enough  to  compre- 
hend it.  What  can  be  meant  by  the  statement  that  such  a 
revelation  would  not  have  been  more  primitive  than  the  written 


THE   QUESTION  OF   A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  69 

language  ?  Both  parts  of  Dr.  Fairbairn's  statement  are  palpa- 
bly baseless.  The  supposed  revelation  would  not  require  the 
creation  of  a  language;  and  it  would  be  more  primitive  than 
writing.  Whatever  the  fact  may  be  as  to  a  primitive  revelation, 
this  argument  certainly  will  hardly  be  sufficient  to  overthrow 
the  hypothesis.^ 

Having  in  this  easy  way  despatched  the  so-called  supernatural 
theory,  together  with  the  so-called  natural  theories  (those  which 
assume  religion  to  have  originated  from  dreams,  delusions,  etc.). 
Dr.  Fairbairn  proceeds  to  solve  the  problem  by  the  "  historical 
method."  This  consists  in  inferences  drawn  from  a  historical 
examination  of  Indo-European  names  of  the  Deity.  The  conclu- 
sion is  that  to  our  early  ancestors  the  sky  was  a  deity  called 
Dyaus,  or  Deva.  So  much  may  be  true  enough.  But  when  Dr. 
Fairbairn  goes  further,  and  undertakes  to  explain  how  men  came 
to  deify  the  heavens,  he  says  that  there  were  two  objective  and 
two  subjective  factors  in  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  Deity.  The 
objective  were  the  heaven  and  its  action  relative  to  the  earth. 
The  subjective  were  conscience  and  imagination.  Conscience 
pointed  to  a  being  to  whom  obligation  was  due,  and  imagination 
discovered  that  being  in  the  "  bright  brooding  Heaven."  And 
so  it  is  concluded  that  "  the  idea  of  God  was  thus  given  in  the 
very  same  act  as  the  idea  of  self ;  neither  could  be  said  to  pre- 
cede the  other,"  And  so  this  "  historical  method  "  ends  with 
coming,  after  all,  to  the  "  natural "  method.  The  historical  part 
of  the  investigation  only  furnishes  us  some  interesting  facts 
concerning  the  names  of  the  Deity,  and  makes  it  probable  that 
the  early  Aryan  religion  was  purer  and  more  monotheistic  than 
the  later.  But  when  the  question  is  attacked,  how  men  first 
came  to  the  conception  of  the  Deity,  resort  is  had  to  pure  con- 
jecture and  assumption.^  The  human  conscience  and  imagina- 
tion are  alleged  to  be  the  determining  forces  which  produced 

*  See  Excursus  IV. 

2  If  any  confirmation  of  this  were  needed,  it  might  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
other  men,  pursuing  tlie  same  course  of  investigation,  come  to  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent result.  Thus  Burnouf  {Science  of  Religions,  p.  243  ;  in  the  French 
original  p.  407)  finds  the  origin  of  religion  in  the  searcli  after  the  causes  of  the 
phenomena  of  every-day  life,  and  makes  no  account  of  morality. 


70  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

the  mighty  conception.  Here  no  historical  or  philological  in- 
quiry leads  the  way.  The  inquirer  simply  falls  back  on  human 
nature  as  he  finds  it  now,  and  guesses  that  the  first  thought  of 
God  must  have  come  from  the  operation  of  conscience  and 
imagination  in  men  who  had  only  their  own  souls,  the  brooding 
heavens,  and  the  surrounding  earth,  from  which  to  derive  their 
conceptions.  This  conjecture  may  be,  and  doubtless  is,  much 
nearer  the  truth  than  the  one  which  derives  religious  ideas  from 
dreams  or  deceptions ;  but  it  is  none  the  less  a  conjecture,  hav- 
ing no  necessary  connection  with  the  historical  discussion,  — 
indeed,  having  no  special  connection  with  that  at  all ;  for  mani- 
festly the  conjecture  must  be  as  applicable  to  Shemitic  as  to 
Aryan  races,  though  the  philological  investigation  applies  only  to 
the  latter.  Moreover,  Dr.  Fairbairn  reasons  as  if  the  Aryans 
were  a  strictly  primitive  race,  and  came  to  their  religion  absolutely 
without  ancestral  help.  But  surely  it  cannot  be  meant  that 
the  Aryan  language  was  the  language  of  the  primeval  man,  and 
that  we  may  infer  from  its  features  precisely  how  the  first  man 
got  his  religious  notions.  The  Aryans,  so  far  as  we  can  trace 
them,  had  their  ancestors,  and  those  ancestors  doubtless  had  a 
religion,  and  doubtless  communicated  their  religion  to  their 
descendants.  The  main  question,  therefore,  is  hardly  touched 
by  any  such  historical  and  philological  investigation.  It  may 
be  said,  indeed,  that  no  one  can  prove  the  reality  of  a  primeval 
revelation,  since  there  are  no  historical  documents  that  reach 
back  far  enough  to  establish  such  a  theory.  But  equally  true 
is  it  that  no  one  can  disprove  the  theory,  —  least  of  all  by  an 
argument  that  concerns  only  one  branch  of  the  human  race  and 
a  period  later  than  the  origin  of  the  race  itself. 

On  any  theory,  the  problem  concerning  the  first  origin  of 
religious  ideas  is  a  peculiar  one,  materially  different  from  the 
question  how  such  ideas  now  originate  or  propagate  themselves. 
Whether  we  regard  man  as  developed  out  of  bestial  forms  or  as 
suddenly  created  with  angelic  capacities  fresh  from  the  hand  of 
God ;  whether  we  think  that  all  human  acquirements  were  the 
result  of  a  long  process  of  experiment,  or  came  directly  by  mi- 
raculous impartation,  —  make  whatever  suppositions  we  may, 
the  one  certain  thing  is  that  the  original  man,  in  respect  to 


THE   QUESTION   OF   A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  71 

intellectual,  moral,  and  religious  development,  existed  under 
unique  conditions.^  Present  analogies  cannot  be  applied  to  him. 
For  the  present  fact  is  that  all  the  culture  of  the  new-born 
child  is  mediated  by  parents  and  elders.  All  knowledge  of  an 
abstract  or  scientific  sort  is  communicated.  Even  the  child's 
direct  perception  of  the  external  world  is  confused  and  unin- 
telligent, till  it  is  directed  and  classified  by  those  whom  he  lives 
with.  Language  is  an  existent  and  universal  possession.  The 
child  learns  it  almost  as  soon  as  he  can  learn  anything,  but 
he  learns  it  from  others.  It  is  the  medium  through  which  his 
teachers  communicate  knowledge  to  him,  and  by  which  he  learns 
to  express  his  own  thoughts  and  feelings. 

But  all  must  have  been  radically  different  with  the  first  man. 
Whatever  theory  of  his  origin  one  may  adopt,  it  must  belong  to 
the  theory  that  this  man  could  not  have  got  his  training  from 
human  intelligent  parents.  It  must  be  assumed  that  no  heredi- 
tary influence  could  have  made  him  naturally  inclined  to  think 
about  religious  things.  It  must,  in  short,  be  assumed  that  what 
is  now  most  influential  and  decisive  in  determining  the  first 
thoughts  concerning  God  was  then  totally  wanting.  The  first 
man,  whether  he  is  looked  upon  as  semi-bestial  or  as  angelic,  as 
an  infant  or  as  an  adult,  had  no  human  help,  such  as  all  human 
beings  have  now,  in  coming  to  his  self-consciousness  and  to  his 
religious  ideas. 

The  absence  of  language  as  a  means  of  communication  and 
of  self-culture  in  independent  reflection,  makes  the  condition  of 
the  first  man  radically  peculiar.  Let  language  have  been  ac- 
quired however  it  may,  at  any  rate  the  first  man,  without  lan- 
guage, stood  in  an  altogether  anomalous  position.  The  most 
exact  analogy  would  be  that  of  an  infant  born  now  and  some- 
how kept  alive,  but  without  any  intercourse  with  other  human 
beings.  But  now,  whenever  anything  like  this  occurs,  the  per- 
son, instead  of  developing  an  independent  culture,  tends  more 
and  more  to  lose  the  traces  of  humanity  entirely.  And  this  is, 
after  all,  not  a  really  analogous  case ;  for  on  the  one  hand  an 
infant  now  has  at  least  certain  hereditary  gifts  and  tendencies 

^  See  this  point  forcibly  presented  in  the  Duke  of  Argyll's  Unit^  of  Nature, 
pp.  523  sqq. 


72  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

which  the  first  man  cannot  have  had,  while  on  the  other  hand 
the  first  man  cannot  have  been  a  mere  infant. 

The  evolutionist  may  seem  to  relieve  the  problem  of  some  of 
its  difficulties,  when  he  assumes  a  gradual  growth  of  animal  in- 
telligence in  some  one  of  the  higher  brute  races,  until  at  last  by- 
slow  gradations  articulate  language  took  the  place  of  inarticulate 
sounds,  and  step  by  step  more  general  and  abstract  conceptions 
were  developed,  and  finally  the  idea  of  God  grew  out  of  the  su- 
perstitious fancies  of  fetichism,  animism,  etc.  But  though  this 
theory  makes  the  notion  of  a  first  man  somewhat  shadowy,  inas- 
much as  it  obliterates  all  sharp  distinctions  between  brutes  and 
men,  and  though  a  slow  growth  of  language  and  of  religious 
conceptions  may  not  a  priori  be  pronounced  impossible,^  yet 
even  then  we  have  to  assume  a  condition  of  things  for  which 
there  is  no  present  analogy.  The  first  thought  of  a  God,  at 
whatever  point  we  may  fix  it,  must  have  been  the  highest  and 
entirely  independent  thought  of  the  most  advanced  adult ;  and 
this  is  a  vastly  different  thing  from  the  thought  of  God  commu- 
nicated to  the  infant  mind  by  elders  who  have  generations  of 
theists  behind  them  from  whom  their  belief  has  been  received. 

With  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God  must  have  been  associated 
words  for  the  expression  of  it.  And  here  arises  a  new  anomaly. 
Now  the  words  are  already  in  existence,  possessing  a  signifi- 
cance which  long  usage  has  stamped  upon  them.  But  then  the 
words  had  to  be  invented.  Whether  simultaneously  with  every 
new  conception,  or  closely  following  it,  the  langunge  had  to  be 
created.  By  what  law  of  association,  by  what  peculiar  impulse 
of  the  soul,  we  cannot  tell.  The  present  change  and  develop- 
ment of  language  always  depends  on  the  language  already  in 
existence.  An  absolutely  new  word  cannot  be  originated  ;  or  if 
it  can  be,  it  can  come  into  use  only  by  mutual  agreement  on  the 
part  of  those  who  can  already  communicate  ideas  by  means  of 
a  common  language.  But  when  there  was  as  yet  no  language, 
and  an  entirely  new  one  was  to  be  invented,  the  whole  relation 
of  things  was  radically  different.     It  does  not  relieve  us  of  the 

*  Yet  the  transition  from  speechlessness  to  speecli  is  still  acknowledged  by 
evolutionists  themselves  to  be  an  unsolved  problem.  Fide  DuBois-Reymond, 
Die  sieben  Weltrdthsel,  p.  83  (Leipzig,  1882). 


THE   QUESTION  OF  A  PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  73 

anomaly  to  assume  an  extremely  slow  development  of  intelli- 
gence and  language  ;  the  anomaly  would  rather  be  only  intensi- 
fied. For  now  the  most  marvellous  fact  in  regard  to  language 
is  not  the  slowness,  but  the  rapidity,  with  which  with  his  un- 
developed faculties  a  child  can  learn  a  language.  Even  if  Sir 
John  Lubbock's  prospective  efibrt  to  educate  dogs  into  men 
should  be  successful,  the  case  would  still  not  be  analogous  to 
the  original  assumed  transformation  of  apes  into  men.  For  that 
original  transformation  is  supposed  to  have  come  about  of  itself 
without  any  education  from  a  higher  source,  whereas  the  poor 
dogs,  though  they  have  lived  for  centuries  in  close  association 
with  men,  remain  dogs  still;  and  their  transformation  into  men 
is  looked  for  only  as  the  result  of  a  very  specially  diligent  and 
patient  training. 

Take  whatever  view  we  may,  then,  there  was  something  al- 
together unique  in  the  mental  history  and  experience  of  the 
being  that  could  first  properly  be  styled  a  man,  when  he  first 
had  what  can  properly  be  styled  a  conception  of  God. 

But  we  are  here  more  particularly  concerned  with  the  problem 
as  it  shapes  itself  to  the  mind  of  a  strict  theist.  The  atheistic 
evolutionist,  whatever  plausibility  he  may  succeed  in  weaving 
around  his  hypothesis,  can  of  course  contribute  nothing  to  the 
solution  of  the  question,  what  relation  the  living  God  assumed 
towards  the  first  being  who  was  able  to  lift  his  thoughts  upwards 
to  his  Maker.  Theists,  especially  Christian  theists,  can  hardly 
content  themselves  with  the  purely  evolutionary  view  of  the  ori- 
gin of  man.  Even  though  some  concessions  may  be  made  as  to 
man's  physical  structure ;  even  though  the  extremest  Darwinian 
theory  of  his  physical  connection  with  the  lower  animals  should 
be  adopted ;  still,  whoever  believes  that  man,  as  a  religious  being, 
holds  vital  relations  to  God,  will  find  it  difficult  or  impossible 
to  believe  that  the  human  race,  on  its  intellectual  and  spiritual 
side,  came  into  existence  by  a  gradual  and  imperceptible  pro- 
cess,—  the  brute  growing  into  a  man,  and  theism  being  the 
slow  development  of  blind  instinctive  cravings  and  superstitious 
conceits  into  a  purer  and  loftier  notion  of  a  Divine  Being  for 
whose  service  he  was  made,  while  yet  that  same  Divine  Being 
let  the  process  take  its  slow  course,  and  never  once  manifested 


74  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

himself  to  the  struggling  and  groping  heart,  never  interfered  to 
help  his  creatures  into  clearer  views,  or  to  bring  to  bear  upon 
their  development  the  knowledge  that  he  cherished  towards 
them  any  conscious  regard  or  paternal  love.  The  influence  of 
the  current  drift  towards  ev^olution  may  be  strong;  and  many 
theists  may  naturally  be  inclined  to  concede  as  much  as  possi- 
ble to  the  theory.  But  at  some  point  they  must  break  away 
from  the  all-embracing  circle.  The  theory  in  its  extreme  form 
has  no  room  for  any  special  interposition.  Mere  scientific  ob- 
servation and  inference  cannot  find  room  for  any  such  disturb- 
ing or  accelerating  force  from  without.  And  shutting  out 
divine  interference  at  one  point,  it  equally  shuts  it  out  in  all. 
Supernatural  revelation  becomes  an  abnormity,  or  even  an  im- 
possibility. Personal  acquaintance  with  God,  even  if  his  exist- 
ence is  assumed,  becomes  also  impossible.  Men  may  speculate 
about  God.  They  may  perhaps  be  right  in  believing  that  some 
higher  Power  exists,  distinct  from  the  visible  universe ;  but  the 
speculation  is  only  speculation,  and  can  never  amount  to  knowl- 
edge, even  theoretical  knowledge,  still  less  to  a  practical  and 
personal  knowledge,  of  the  Absolute  One. 

But  a  theist,  especially  a  Christian  theist,  must  approach  the 
question  about  the  origin  of  the  theistic  belief  with  a  different 
conception  of  things.  He  cannot  but  hold  that  the  creation  of 
man  was  a  marked  event  in  the  history  of  the  universe.  He 
cannot  be  content  to  assume  that  the  human  race  was  evolved 
by  imperceptible  growth  from  an  unhuman  state,  and  that  all 
the  intellectual  and  spiritual  experiences  of  man  are  only  animal 
instincts  in  a  higher  state  of  development.  To  him  man  must 
be  a  very  distinctly  defined  being ;  and  human  history  must 
have  had  a  very  definite  beginning.  To  him,  therefore,  still 
more  than  to  the  atheistic  evolutionist,  the  origin  of  the  notion  of 
a  God  must  have  been  a  unique  thing,  not  to  be  explained  by 
any  present  analogy.  He  must  reject  the  theories  which  make 
religion  the  product  of  superstitious  fears  and  delusions,  not 
only  because  these  presuppose  that  theism  is  without  any 
solid  basis,  but  because  they  are  inadequate  to  account  for  the 
persistence  of  theistic  beliefs.  But,  if  he  speculate  at  all,  he 
must  have  some  theory  as  to  how  the  notion  of  a  God  origi- 


THE   QUESTION  OF  A  PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  75 

nated.  And  he  must  also  recognize,  even  more  than  the  athe- 
ist, the  essential  uniqueness  of  the  conditions  under  which  the 
theistic  idea  first  arose. 

Let  us  now  come  back  to  the  above-mentioned  theory  which, 
under  the  name  of  historic  method,  explains  the  beginning  of 
theism  by  asserting  that  conscience  and  imagination  led  man  to 
ascribe  deity  to  the  sky  above  him.  The  extreme  evolutionist 
would  at  once  say  that  we  need  first  to  define  conscience  and 
inquire  concerning  its  origin.  He  would  find  it  to  be  only  the 
developed  form  of  bestial  instincts,  —  a  development  not  yet 
finished ;  so  that  the  voice  of  conscience  is  an  ever-changing 
one,  and  never  a  mirror  of  any  objective  immutable  truth.  To 
him,  therefore,  conscience  in  the  first  man  (even  if  he  can 
determine  what  degree  of  animal  development  to  dignify  with 
the  name  of  manhood)  would  be  only  another  term  for  the 
mental  fancies  and  illusions  which  his  own  theory  posits  as  the 
source  of  the  theistic  conception.  But  Dr.  Fairbairn,  as  a 
Christian  theist,  who  finds  in  the  action  of  conscience  the 
source  of  theism,  must  assume  a  well-developed  and  distinctly 
defined  conscience.  He  must  attribute  to  the  conscience  of  the 
aboriginal  man  a  certain  clearness  and  authority  of  utterance. 
He  must  have  in  mind  a  conscience  essentially  such  as  men 
have  now;  and  he  must  have  some  theory  as  to  its  origin. 
Now,  unless  he  explains  it,  as  he  hardly  will,  in  the  evolutionary 
way,  he  must  assume  either  that  the  conscience,  as  a  full-orbed 
faculty,  was  brought  suddenly  into  being  by  a  divine  fiat,  or 
else  that  it  was  divinely  implanted  as  a  germ,  which  was  then 
gradually  developed  into  a  real  conscience.  But  in  either  case 
we  have  an  anomalous  state  of  things.  There  is  now  no  such 
thing  ever  known  as  a  complete  conscience  coming  suddenly 
into  existence. 

Conscience,  as  we  know  it,  is  always  a  product  of  training. 
The  new-born  child  appears  to  be  substantially  as  devoid  of 
moral  sense  as  the  new-born  lion.  It  is  only  by  a  gradual  pro- 
cess that  a  well-defined  faculty  of  moral  judgment  manifests 
itself.  If,  now,  the  new-created  man  was  at  the  very  outset  pos- 
sessed of  a  perfectly  constituted  conscience,  it  could  only  have 
been  by  virtue  of  an  immediate  creation  and  impartation.     If 


76  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

without  any  experience  of  the  relations  of  man  to  man  he  was 
able  nevertheless  to  understand  the  requirements  of  the  moral 
law,  such  a  power  could  have  come  from  nothing  less  than  a 
supernatural  act.  It  is  at  the  best  hard  to  conceive  such  an 
impartation ;  but  whoever  can  conceive  it  ought  to  find  no 
greater  difficulty  in  conceiving  the  first  man  as  supernaturally 
instructed  concerning  the  Divine  Being. 

But  let  us  take  the  other  part  of  the  alternative,  and  suppose 
the  first  conscience  to  have  been  ^gradually  developed  out  of  a 
germinal  one.  We  still  find  ourselves  dealing  with  an  entirely 
anomalous  case.  For  the  primeval  man  had  no  parental  or 
other  human  instructors  such  as  all  children  now  have,  and 
without  whom  the  latent  faculties  of  the  child  are  never  devel- 
oped into  distinct  and  normal  activity.  If  the  first  man's  con- 
science required  external  personal  training  to  make  it  a  normal 
conscience,  then,  since  there  was  no  human  teacher,  we  must 
assume  that  God  in  some  peculiar  way  manifested  himself  and 
acted  the  part  of  instructor.  But  this  again  introduces  super- 
naturalism  in  its  sharpest  form.  Dr.  Fairbairn  could  of  course 
not  accept  such  a  view ;  for  it  makes  God  reveal  himself  to 
man  'before  the  conscience  is  sufficiently  developed  to  suggest 
the  notion  of  a  God,  whereas  his  theory  is  that  the  notion  can 
have  come  only  as  the  suggestion  of  a  developed  conscience. 
How,  then,  does  he  conceive  this  primeval  conscience  to  have 
got  its  development  ?  We  are  unable  to  conjecture  ;  but  what- 
ever his  answer  may  be,  the  one  certain  thing  is  that  the  devel- 
opment could  not  have  been  like  that  of  which  we  now  have 
any  knowledge.  It  is  very  certain,  at  all  events,  that  the  "  his- 
torical method  "  of  investigation  is  unable  to  disclose  how  the 
primeval  conscience  became  developed.  The  problem  is  left 
untouched. 

But  however  great  may  be  the  obscurity  which  rests  upon 
the  question,  one  thing,  we  repeat,  is  absolutely  certain  :  The 
primeval  man  was  in  an  exceptional  state ;  the  analogies  of  pres- 
ent life  cannot  be  applied  to  him.  He  had  no  tradition,  no 
instruction,  from  his  ancestors.  If,  then,  one  is  disposed  to 
press  present  analogies  in  judging  respecting  the  religion  of  the 
first  man,  one  is  led  to  favor,  rather  than  to  reject,  the  theory 


THE   QUESTION  OF  A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  77 

of  a  primeval  revelation.  The  revelation  would  have  supplied 
to  him  what  now  is  given  by  tradition.  The  force  of  tradition 
is  now  so  great  in  determining  men's  religious  opinions  that 
some  even  question  whether  the  present  religious  beliefs  of 
mankind  have  any  other  foundation  than  a  blind  adoption  of 
what  has  been  held  before.  The  closest  possible  analogy  to  the 
present  condition  of  things  would  have  been  secured  to  the  first 
man,  if  his  religious  conceptions  had  been  first  called  forth  by 
some  external  communication.  And  in  his  case  this  could  have 
been  nothing  but  a  divine  revelation.  For  him,  so  to  speak,  the 
supernatural  was  the  only  natural  method.^ 

One  need,  therefore,  not  be  overawed  by  the  allegation  that  it 
is  "  unphilosophical "  to  assume  a  primeval  revelation.  And 
when  we  are  told  that  such  an  assumption  is  not  only  not 
proved,  but  capable  of  positive  disproof,  we  can  only  say  that 
the  disproof  is  still  to  be  discovered.  The  ostensible  arguments 
against  it  consist  in  mere  assertions,  or  else  rest  on  radical 
misconceptions  of  what  the  theory  opposed  really  is. 

Thus,  Dr.  Fairbairn  says  that  the  theory  of  a  primeval  rev- 
elation as  the  source  of  the  idea  of  God  would  imply  "  what 
Schelling happily  termed  'an  original  atheism  of  consciousness.'" ^ 
Of  course  a  theory  of  primeval  revelation  may  be  held  in  such 
a  form  as  to  assert  or  imply  a  total  want  of  theistic  sense  in 
the  original  man.  But  probably  the  person  is  yet  to  be  found 
who  ever  really  entertained  any  such  a  notion  as  that  man  was 
first  created  with  no  tendency  to  believe  in  a  God,  and  was 
afterwards  forced  into  the  belief  by  a  supernatural  revelation. 
And  only  such  total  want  of  tendcMcy  to  theism  can  be  properly 
called  "  atheism  of  consciousness."  It  would  seem  to  be  little 
less  than  absurd  to  suppose  that  God  would  make  human  beings 
with  no  constitutional  inclination  to  believe  in  him,  and  then 

^  "  If  the  law  prevailing  in  the  infancy  of  our  race  has  been  at  all  like  the 
law  prevaihng  in  the  infancy  of  the  individual,  then  man's  first  beliefs  were 
derived  from  Authority,  and  not  from  either  reasoning  or  observation.  I  do  not 
myself  believe  that  in  tlie  morning  of  the  world  Theism  arose  as  the  result  of 
pliiiosophical  speculations,  or  as  the  result  of  imagination  personifying  some 
abstract  idea  of  the  Unity  of  external  Nature."  —  Duke  of  Argyll,  Unity  of 
Nature,  p.  3. 

2  Studies,  etc.,  p.  22,  quoting  Schelling,  Thilosophie  der  Mythologie,  p.  141. 


78  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

undertake  to  supply  that  deficiency  by  means  of  a  special  out- 
ward communication.  But  what  is  the  difficulty  of  supposing 
hoth  that  there  is  implanted  the  native  inclination,  and  then 
that  God  gratified  that  inclination  by  an  objective  manifestation 
of  himself  ?  This  would  only  be  in  accordance  with  the  whole 
constitution  of  things  in  general.  Men  come  into  existence 
with  faculties  of  perception  fitting  them  to  take  cognizance  of 
the  material  world.  These  faculties  are  meaningless  and  use- 
less, unless  there  is  an  objective  universe  which  can  be  perceived 
by  the  senses.  The  tendency,  the  ability,  to  perceive  is  first  cre- 
ated, and  then  the  object  of  perception  is  brought  before  us,  and 
we  perceive  it.  The  child  is  created  with  a  tendency  to  seek 
nourishment  from  the  mother.  There  are  the  necessary  facul- 
ties and  organs,  and  there  is  the  strong  instinctive  longing.  But 
the  organs  and  the  longing  do  not  constitute  the  knowledge  of 
the  maternal  source  of  supply.  The  parent  must  be  presented 
objectively  in  order  that  the  instinctive  tendencies  may  be 
transformed  into  positive  cognition.  Suppose,  now,  some  one 
should  object  to  the  necessity  of  this  palpable  appearance  of  the 
mother,  on  the  ground  that  the  innate  capacities  and  instincts 
of  the  child  are  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  arrive  at  the  knowl- 
edge of  his  parentage.  Suppose  he  should  say  that  the  doc- 
trine of  the  necessity  of  such  a  manifestation  implies  an  "  original 
motherlessness  of  consciousness  "  on  the  part  of  the  child  ;  what 
should  we  think  of  such  a  style  of  argumentation  ?  Yet  this  is  a 
precise  parallel  to  the  reasoning  of  those  who  find  in  the  theory 
of  a  primeval  revelation  an  implication  that  the  primeval  man 
was  afflicted  with  an  "  original  atheism  of  consciousness." 

Analogy,  we  conclude,  favors,  rather  than  otherwise,  the  the- 
ory of  a  primeval  revelation.  It  does  so  by  suggesting  that  the 
parental  and  ancestral  traditions  which  now  form  so  large  and 
essential  a  part  in  developing  the  theistic  belief  must  originally, 
when  there  was  no  such  instruction,  have  been  replaced  by  a 
direct  communication  from  God  himself.  This  argument  is,  in- 
deed, not  logically  demonstrative.  It  does  not  necessarily  follow, 
because  all  men,  since  the  first  man,  have  received  their  first 
religious  conceptions  as  a  traditional  impartation,  that  therefore 
the  first  man  also  received  his  from  an  outward  person,  —  who, 


THE   QUESTION   OF  A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  79 

in  his  case,  could  have  been  no  other  than  God.  It  is  possible  to 
suppose  that  the  first  men,  purely  through  the  operation  of  their 
own  minds,  worked  their  way  up  to  some  kind  of  a  theistic  be- 
lief, and  that  then  this  belief  was  transmitted  and  gradually 
modified  as  the  race  increased  in  numbers.  But  in  making  such 
a  supposition  we  are  departing  from  all  analogies ;  we  are  in- 
dulging in  a  pure  hypothesis,  for  the  truth  of  which  not  the  first 
shred  of  positive  proof  can  be  adduced.  This  explanation  of 
the  origin  of  theism  may  call  itself  philosophical,  but  it  can 
hardly  be  called  satisfactory. 

We  are  considering  the  problem  now  as  it  presents  itself 
to  those  who  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  personal  God.  Such 
cannot  but  ask  themselves  whether  God  desires  men  to  knoiv 
him.  To  ask  the  question  is  to  answer  it,  if  God  is  really  re- 
garded as  personal,  and  man  as  made  for  a  worthy  purpose. 
That  God  should  make  men  and  implant  in  them  aspirations 
after  God  and  immortality,  and  not  even  desire  that  they  should 
be  able  to  get  beyond  vague  longings  and  uncertain  guesses  into 
the  peace  of  an  assured  personal  knowledge  of  their  Creator,  — 
this  is  well-nigh  inconceivable.  But  if  we  assume  that  God, 
having  made  men,  must  have  desired  to  be  known  by  them,  the 
next  question  is,  whether  God  must  not  at  once  have  made  him- 
self known  to  men  by  some  special  manifestation  of  himself. 
This  also  seems  almost  self-evident.  If  desirous  of  being  known 
by  men  in  general,  why  not  by  the  first  men  ?  If  such  a  thing  as 
a  revelation  was  ever  to  be  made  at  all,  why  should  it  not  have 
been  made  then  ?  If  it  was  possible  for  such  a  revelation  to  be 
made,  the /ac^  of  it  would  seem  to  follow  of  itself. 

But  the  impossibility  of  a  primeval  revelation  is  just  what  is 
urged  as  an  objection  against  the  theory.  Dr.  Fairbairn's  argu- 
ment dwells  on  the  difficulty  involved  in  the  want  of  a  lan- 
guage. The  argument  from  the  inherent  impossibility  of  a 
divine  communication  is  still  more  sharply  presented  by  Pflei- 
derer,!  who  says  :  "  How  should  primeval  man,  with  mental  facul- 
ties as  yet  entirely  undeveloped,  have  been  capable  of  grasping 
the  difficult  thought  of  the  one  infinite  God  and  pure  Spirit  ? 
.  .  .  The  acquisition  of  higher  general  ideas  presupposes  a  no 
^  Reliffionsphilosophie,  2d  ed.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  6,  7. 


80  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

small  degree  of  preparatory  training.  The  attainment  of  spir- 
itual conceptions,  which  in  the  education  of  our  children  is 
crowded  into  years,  because  they  have  before  them  the  heritage 
of  the  past  which  has  thought  for  them,  —  this  could,  in  the 
case  of  the  childhood  of  the  race,  be  acquired  only  by  a  process 
of  culture  extending  through  hundreds  and  thousands  of  years. 
A  ready-made  communication  of  the  knowledge  of  God  by  a 
primeval  revelation  breaks  down,  therefore,  simply  because 
primeval  man  was,  at  the  outset,  psychologically  incapable  of 
grasping  such  instruction." 

This  is  sufficiently  explicit,  even  if  not  very  conclusive.  The 
force  of  the  argument  depends  on  two  assumptions,  neither  of 
which  is  proved.  The  one  is  that  the  primeval  man  was  a 
mere  child  in  intellectual  power.  The  other  is  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  is  real  only  when  it  amounts  to  a  clear  intellectual 
apprehension  of  him  in  his  infinity.  It  is  described  as  the 
acme  of  philosophic  thought,  and  therefore  as  coming  necessarily 
late  in  human  development. 

The  first  assumption,  though  a  mere  assumption,  can  yet  not 
be  disproved.  But  it  is  unnecessary  to  determine  just  what 
the  intellectual  capacities  of  the  primeval  man  were.  The  argu- 
ment breaks  down  chiefly  because  the  other  assumption  is 
palpably  erroneous.  The  knowledge  of  God  which  may  be 
expected  from  a  revelation  is  not  primarily  or  chiefly  a  phil- 
osophical conception  of  him  in  his  absoluteness  and  infinite 
perfections.  Were  this  the  case,  it  may  be  argued  that  he  can 
never  be  known  at  all.  At  the  best  only  the  more  intellectual 
and  spiritual  in  any  age  of  the  world  could  truly  know  God 
even  in  a  partial  sense.  The  knowledge  of  God,  however,  which 
man  chiefly  needs  to  have  is  an  ethical  knowledge,  —  a  knowl- 
edge of  him  as  a  real  person,  as  a  loving  Father,  and  as  a  just 
Kuler,  —  a  knowledge  of  him  as  a  higher  Being,  holding  con- 
trol of  human  and  earthly  affairs,  and  ready  to  attend  to  human 
wants.  Such  a  knowledge  required  no  elaborate  philosophical 
culture  in  the  primeval  man,  any  more  than  it  requires  the  same 
now  in  the  merest  child,  who,  as  soon  as  he  begins  to  talk,  gets 
some  conception  of  God,  though  utterly  incapable  of  grasping 
the  generalizations  of  the  philosopher.     Let  the  primeval  man 


THE   QUESTION  OF   A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  81 

have  been  ever  so  simple  and  childlike  ;  no  one  can  ever  show 
any  reason  why  he  could  not  have  understood  something  about  a 
Divine  Being,  —  enough  to  serve  the  purpose  of  a  real  knowledge. 
God  is  doubtless  in  some  sense  infinite  ;  but  his  deity  does  not 
consist  merely  in  his  infinity.  And  whatever  the  primeval  man 
needed  to  know  of  God  as  a  Euler,  a  Friend,  a  Father,  he  cer- 
tainly was  capable  of  knowing.  Indeed,  it  sounds  little  less 
than  ridiculous  to  hear  the  primeval  human  race  pictured  as 
such  a  benighted,  groping  company  of  creatures,  stumbHng 
along  through  thousands  of  years,  with  no  positive  knowledge 
of  that  which  it  is  of  most  concern  to  know  —  and  that,  simply 
because  God  could  not  be  known  till  after  these  thousands  of 
years  of  searching.  And  the  strangeness  of  the  theory  comes 
out  all  the  more  strikingly,  when  we  find  that  the  original  man 
is,  after  all,  credited  with  the  faculty  of  seeking  and  finding  a 
superhuman  power  in  the  world.^  Suppose,  now,  that  the  reve- 
lation did  not  attempt  to  go  beyond  what  man  himself  was  able 
to  think  or  conjecture  by  himself ;  suppose  the  revelation  con- 
sisted only  in  a  palpable  self-manifestation  which  simply  con- 
firmed, as  correct,  the  native  longings  and  surmises  of  the  human 
soul ;  suppose,  in  short,  that  God  revealed  himself  in  order 
to  transform  speculation  and  desire  into  assured  knowledge, 
and  without  attempting  to  present  any  higher  and  more  difficult 
conception  than  human  apprehension  could  grasp,  —  what  then  ? 
In  so  far  as  man's  conjectures  and  premonitions  were  correct, 
they  would  be  confirmed.  Man  would  stand  consciously  over 
against  a  God  whom  before  he  had  only  felt  after  if  haply  he 
might  find  him.  What,  then,  is  the  difficulty  in  supposing  a 
revelation  which  attempted  to  give  no  more  than  man  was  able 
to  receive  ?  The  whole  difficulty  in  the  doctrine  of  a  primeval 
revelation  is  an  artificial  one,  coming  from  the  gratuitous  as- 
sumption that  its  only  object  could  have  been  to  impart  a 
neatly  scientific  and  philosophically  perfect  conception  of  God's 
essential  nature  and  infinite  perfections.  There  also  underlies 
this  objection  the  assumption  that  nothing  could  be  imparted 
which  was  not  already  possessed.  The  revelation,  it  is  said, 
could  not  have  been  apprehended  till  hundreds  and  thousands 
^  Religionsphilosophie,  vol.  ii.  pp.  24  sqq. 


82  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

of  years  had  trained  the  human  race  to  grasp  the  necessary 
generalizations.  The  inevitable  inference  is  that  no  revelation, 
earlier  or  later,  could  really  enlarge  the  extent  of  human  knowl- 
edge. In  short,  the  argument  virtually  bears  equally  against 
the  possibility  of  any  revelation. 

And  yet  the  very  argument  by  which  this  conclusion  is 
reached  lays  stress  on  the  advantage  which  children  now  have 
in  receiving  from  their  elders  the  mature  results  of  past  thinking, 
so  that  they  learn  in  a  few  years  what  it  took  primeval  man- 
kind centuries  to  learn.  Surely,  if  the  mere  child  now,  with 
undeveloped  powers,  can  grasp  the  notion  of  a  God,  as  commu- 
nicated by  his  parents,  may  not  the  aboriginal  man,  infantile 
though  we  may  choose  to  conceive  him,  yet  have  been  able  to 
take  in  the  notion  of  God  as  communicated  by  God  himself  ? 

A  similar  reflection  forces  itself  upon  us  when  we  read  the 
discourses  of  such  men  as  Theodore  Parker  and  F.  W.  Newman,  \ 
wherein  they  set  forth  the  doctrine  that  revelation  is  and  can 
be  nothing  but  the  soul's  instinctive  apprehension  of  God.  They 
recognize  the  fact,  indeed,  that  pure  monotheism  has  by  no  means 
been  the  universal  religion  of  men.  They  cannot  shut  their 
eyes  to  the  grossness  of  fetichism  and  many  forms  of  polythe- 
ism. But,  says  Mr.  Parker,^  "  each  of  these  forms  represented 
an  idea  of  the  popular  consciousness,  which  passed  for  a  truth, 
or  it  could  not  be  embraced ;  for  a  great  truth,  or  it  would  not 
prevail  widely ;  yes,  for  all  of  truth  the  man  could  receive  at 
the  time  he  embraced  it." 

It  is  astonishing  to  see  how  serenely  oblivious  such  writers 
seem  to  be  of  the  plainest  facts.  They  apparently  conceive 
that  each  individual  evolves  his  own  religion  and  theology  out 
of  his  own  heart  and  brain,  or  that  if  one  takes  his  religion  from 
another,  he  is  guilty  of  a  grave  offense.  No  revelation  from 
without  is  admitted  to  be  even  possible.  A  "  book-revelation  " 
is  especially  denounced  as  a  delusion  or  even  as  an  absurdity. 
The  argument  is  that  whatever  pretends  to  be  a  revelation 
must  prove  itself  to  be  such ;  that  the  recipient  must  be  com- 
petent to  test  the  claims  of  the  pretended  revelation ;  but  that 
the  very  fact  that  he  is  able  to  test  and  judge  the  worth  of  the 
^  Discourse  of  Religion,  4th  ed.,  p.  102. 


THE   QUESTION   OF  A   PRIMEVAL   REVELATION.  83 

professed  revelation  shows  that  he  must  virtually  already  have 
the  revelation  within  hiui. 

The  truth  in  the  matter  is  very  simple.  Of  course  a  revela- 
tion of  divine  things  cannot  be  made  to  a  stone,  nor  to  a  tree, 
nor  to  a  beast.  There  must  be  a  capacity  to  understand  the 
things  communicated,  else  there  can  be  no  communication. 
Mr.  Parker  himself  ^  admits  the  power  of  one  man  to  "  waken 
the  dormant  powers  "  of  another.  What,  then,  are  we  to  make 
of  his  declaration  that  the  nations  that  have  been  sunk  in  the 
lowest  forms  of  fetichism  and  polytheism  have  had  all  of  truth 
that  they  could  receive  at  the  time  ?  Take  two  tribes  both  of 
which  are  living  in  the  practice  of  cannibalism  and  every  beastly 
vice.  The  one  is  visited  by  missionaries,  and  after  a  few  years  is 
led  to  embrace  a  pure  theism  and  a  pure  morality.  The  other 
meanwhile  remains  in  its  besotted  condition.  Will  any  one  say 
that  now  in  both  cases  the  tribes  have  all  the  truth  that  they 
could  receive  ?  Is  it  not  manifest  that  the  difference  between 
the  two  does  not  lie  in  any  difference  of  capacity,  but  in  the  fact 
that  in  the  one  case  the  dormant  powers  have  been  wakened, 
and  in  the  other  not  ?  In  other  words,  the  one  has  received 
a  human  communication  which  has  been  the  means  of  trans- 
forming its  conceptions  and  its  practices.  Cannot  a  divine  com- 
munication do  as  much  ?  How  is  it  that  a  capacity  to  receive 
a  revelation  from  man  proves  that  one  cannot  come  from  God  ? 
The  world  is  full  of  illustrations  of  the  power  of  some  men  to 
communicate  to  others  what  without  such  communication  they 
would  never  have  thought  or  known.  Nearly  all  knowledge  is 
in  this  sense  the  result  of  revelation.  The  deists  who  under- 
take to  convert  men  to  deism  hope  and  expect  to  awaken  con- 
victions and  opinions  which  otherwise  would  not  be  cherished. 
As  Mr.  Rogers  ^  has  keenly  shown,  they  practically  hold  that 
"  that  may  be  possible  with  man  which  is  impossible  with  God." 

A  similar  comment  is  suggested  by  Mr.  Greg's  proposition 
that  the  human  mind  cannot  receive  an  idea  which  it  could  not 
originate ;  that  is,  could  not  originate  "  in  the  course  of  time 
and  under  favorable  conditions."     If  an  idea,  he  says,  "  from 

^  Diarourse  of  Religion,  4th  ed.,  p.  197. 
2  Eclipse  of  Faith,  10th  ed.,  pp.  63  sqq. 


84  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

its  strangeness,  its  immensity,  its  want  of  harmony  with  the 
nature  and  existing  furniture  of  the  mind,  could  never  have 
presented  itself  naturally,  would  not  the  same  strangeness,  the 
same  vastness,  the  same  incompatibility  of  essence,  incapaci- 
tate the  mind  from  receiving  it,  if  presented  supernaturally  ?"^ 

This  objection,  though  propounded  as  quite  conclusive,  rests 
on  such  a  singular  conception  of  the  relation  of  things  that  it 
is  even  difficult  to  reply  to  it  seriously.  The  author  apparently 
thinks,  in  the  first  place,  that  revelation  can  have  to  do  only 
with  ideas  ;  and  in  the  second  place,  that  these  ideas  must  be 
so  strange  and  so  incongruous  with  nature  and  with  man's 
mental  constitution  as  to  be  intrinsically  hard  or  impossible 
to  receive.  The  reply  is  very  obvious  :  (1)  Even  if  it  were 
true  that  revelation  deals  only  with  ideas,  and  were  also  true 
that  what  is  revealed  might  in  course  of  time  have  been  origi- 
nated by  the  human  mind,  it  would  not  follow  that  these  same 
ideas  might  not  be  communicated  supernaturally,  and  thus  be- 
come a  possession  of  man  vastly  sooner  than  otherwise.  Doubt- 
less the  human  mind  is  capable  of  evolving  the  most  intricate 
principles  of  geometry  ;  but  that  fact  does  not  prevent  their 
being  communicated  to  thousands  who  never  would  of  them- 
selves have  come  to  any  conception  of  them.  But  (2)  revela- 
tion does  not  have  to  do  only  with  ideas ;  it  has  to  do  with 
facts.  Eevelation,  if  it  is  anything,  is  chiefly  a  history,  — it  is 
God  making  himself  known  in  events,  not  merely  inspiring 
thoughts  in  the  human  mind.  If,  for  example,  the  birth,  life, 
deeds,  and  words  of  Jesus  Christ  were  a  divine  revelation  to 
man,  they  might  be  such,  and  present  no  idea  which,  by  its 
strangeness  or  immensity  or  want  of  harmony  with  nature  and 
with  the  human  mind,  should  make  it  difficult  or  impossible 
for  the  mind  to  receive  it.  But  would  it  follow  that  man  in 
the  course  of  time  would  originate  the  facts  and  truths  of 
Christian  history  ?  But  (3)  even  in  so  far  as  we  confine  our 
attention  to  ideas  which  man  might  and  does  originate,  what 
we  want  to  know  is,  what  ideas  are  true.  For  example,  men 
have  had  the  most  various  conceptions  of  God,  —  all  the  way 
from  the  low  conceptions  of  the  fetich-worshiper  to  the  most 
1  Creed  of  Christendom,  8th  ed.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  172  .s^. 


THE   QUESTION  OF  A  PRIMEVAL  REVELATION.  85 

abstract  and  shadowy  conceptions  of  the  pantheist  or  the 
agnostic.  Now,  assuming  that  none  of  these  notions  have 
come  from  revelation,  we  must  still  raise  the  question.  Which 
of  them  is  correct  ?  Which  corresponds  to  the  fact  ?  If  a 
revelation  can  settle  that  question,  it  will  do  a  glorious  ser- 
vice; and  no  one  can  have  any  interest  in  arguing  that  any 
one  or  all  of  these  notions  of  the  Deity  could  not  have  been 
originated  except  by  a  supernatural  revelation.  Religion  does 
not  consist  in  airy  speculations,  without  regard  to  the  truthful- 
ness of  the  speculations.     It  consists  in  serving  the  true  God. 

Plieiderer  has  another  objection  against  the  theory  of  a 
primeval  revelation.  If  actual,  he  says,  it  must  have  been  one 
and  self-consistent,  presenting  the  absolute  truth,  so  that,  if 
the  first  family  had  it,  there  could  have  been  no  such  endless 
number  of  mutually  contradictory  systems  of  religion  in  the 
world.  This  objection  also,  if  valid,  must  of  course  be  equally 
valid  as  against  the  assumption  of  any  actual  revelation  what- 
ever, since  no  alleged  revelation  has  in  fact,  even  when  fixed 
in  a  written  record,  secured  uniformity  of  opinion  even  within 
the  circle  directly  affected  by  the  revelation.  The  possibility 
of  a  modification  or  corruption  of  the  revelation  is  surely  too 
obvious  to  need  demonstration.  If  this  possibility  is  a  reason 
why  a  primeval  revelation  would  have  been  useless,  then  for 
the  same  reason,  if  not  to  the  same  degree,  any  later  revelation 
would  be  made  ineffectual.  Pfleiderer  says :  "  If  God  was ,  able 
to  communicate  the  true  faith  to  mankind  by  means  of  a  pri- 
meval revelation,  must  it  not  have  been  just  as  easy,  and  even 
easier,  for  him  to  make  sure  that  this  valuable  knowledge  of 
primitive  man  should  not  at  once  be  lost  ? "  ^  If  it  is  easier 
to  prevent  a  revelation  from  being  corrupted  or  lost  than  it  is 
to  make  one,  and  if,  as  we  very  well  know,  even  the  so-called 
revelation  the  record  of  which  is  most  fully  preserved  is  never- 
theless subject  to  the  grossest  perversions,  then  the  only  con- 
clusion must  be  that  no  revelation  has  really  been  made  or  can 
be  made.  And  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  revelation,  this  is  no 
more  than  Pfleiderer  himself  would  affirm. 

^  Religionsphibsophie,  vol.  ii.  pp.  5,  6.  So  Zeller,  Ursprung  und  Wesen  der 
Religion,  p.  7. 


86  SUPB-RNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Still  another  objection,  however,  is  urged  by  him.  The 
theory  of  a  primeval  revelation,  he  says,  contradicts  the  facts 
of  history,  inasmuch  as  the  farther  back  we  go,  the  cruder 
become  the  religious  notions  of  men,  whereas  if  the  first  man 
had  an  accurate  revelation,  the  reverse  would  be  the  case. 
There  would  be  much  force  in  this  objection,  if  the  alleged 
fact  were  proved.  But  the  more  thorough  investigation  of 
religious  history  tends  to  show  that  the  real  fact  is  just  the 
opposite  of  the  alleged  one.^  It  has  been  made  evident  that 
the  earlier  forms  of  the  religions  of  India  and  of  Egypt  were 
purer  than  the  later,  so  that  the  argument  against  a  pri- 
meval revelation  from  this  source  is  turned  rather  into  an 
argument  for  it.  When  we  consider  how  easily  the  external 
features  of  a  religion  are  retained  and  emphasized,  to  the  neg- 
lect or  total  loss  of  the  inner  substance  ;  when  we  see  how 
great  superstitions  and  corruptions  have  crept  into  the  Chris- 
tian Church  and  still  hold  sway,  in  spite  of  the  wide-spread 
circulation  of  the  original  Christian  Scriptures,  —  we  find  no 
difficulty  in  believing  that  a  primeval  revelation  may  have 
suffered  great  perversions  as  it  was  handed  down.  But  this 
does  not  prove  it  not  to  have  been  given,  unless  it  proves  that 
no  revelation  ever  has  been,  or  ever  can  be,  given.  All  the 
difficulties  found  by  the  so-called  philosophy  of  religion  in  the 
hypothesis  of  a  primeval  revelation  grow  out  of  assumptions 
which  make  all  revelations  (if  we  retain  the  name  at  all) 
purely  natural  processes.  We  have  found  no  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  such  a  revelation  which  do  not  substantially  lie 
against  any  supernatural  revelation.  The  foregoing  considera- 
tions, therefore,  are  fitted  to  meet,  in  part,  the  objections  which 
are  made  against  the  claims  of  alleged  particular  historical 
revelations.  But  these  require  a  separate  and  fuller  treatment. 
And  as  Christianity  makes  the  most  decided  and  plausible  claims 
to  the  character  of  a  revealed  religion,  the  general  questions 
respecting  revelation  may  be  conveniently  combined  with  the 
special  questions  that  arise  respecting  the  Christian  revelation. 

1  Cf.  Max  Miiller,  Hibbert  Lectures,  2d  ed.,  p.  68;  Renouf,  Bibbert 
Lectures,  2d  ed.,  p.  249  ;  Duke  of  Argyll,  TJnity  of  Nature,  pp.  542  sq. 
Burnouf,  however  {Science  of  Religions,  p.  100),  affirms  the  opposite. 


THE   CHRISTIAN   REVELATION.  87 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE   CHEISTIAN   REVELATION.  —  GENERAL   FEATURES. — MIRACLES 
DEFINED. 

THE  claims  of  Christianity  to  be  regarded  as  a  divine  reve- 
lation may  be  considered  with  reference  to  the  contents 
of  the  alleged  revelation,  or  with  reference  to  the  form  of  it. 
That  is,  we  may  give  prominent  attention  to  the  facts  and 
truths  which  Christianity  professes  to  make  known,  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  the  more  external  features  which  stamp  it  as  a 
special  revelation  from  God.  The  two  methods  of  treatment 
cannot  be  absolutely  detached  from  each  other ;  but  relatively 
they  may  be.  And  it  is  the  second  of  the  two  that  we  propose 
to  pursue  in  the  following  discussion. 

These  more  external  features  which  characterize  the  Christian 
revelation  relate  chiefly  to  three  points :  The  limitation  of  the 
revelation  to  a  particular  time  ;  the  demand  which  it  makes 
upon  men's  faith  in  particular  individuals  ;  the  stress  which  it 
lays  upon  a  particular  mode  of  outward  authentication.  In  each 
of  these  cases  the  peculiarity  may  be  treated  as  an  argument  for, 
or  as  an  objection  against,  the  alleged  revelation. 

I.  It  is  one  feature  of  a  revelation,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
that  word,  that  it  must  be  limited  to  a  particular  time  and  place. 
It  must  be  addressed  to  some  particular  person  or  persons, 
while  men  in  general  can  only  receive  it  mediately  from  the 
organs  of  the  revelation. 

Now,  against  this  there  arises  the  objection  that,  if  a  revelation 
is  needed  at  all,  it  is  needed  for  all,  and  that  there  would  be  an 
inexcusable  partiality  and  inequality  in  shigling  out  some  par- 
ticular persons,  times,  and  places,  as  the  ones  to  be  favored  with 
the  communication,  J.  Stuart  Mill  puts  this  objection  forcibly 
as  follows  :  "  There  is  one  moral  contradiction,  inseparable  from 
every  form  of  Christianity,  which  no  ingenuity  can  resolve  and 


88  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

no  sophistry  explain  away.  It  is  that  so  precious  a  gift,  be- 
stowed on  a  few,  should  have  been  withheld  from  the  many ; 
that  countless  millions  of  human  beings  should  have  been 
allowed  to  live  and  die,  to  sin  and  suffer,  without  the  one 
thing  needful,  the  divine  remedy  for  sin  and  suffering  which  it 
would  have  cost  the  Divine  Giver  as  little  to  have  vouchsafed 
to  all  as  to  have  bestowed  by  special  grace  upon  a  favored 
minority."  ^ 

Furthermore,  the  theory  of  special  revelations  is  open  to  the 
objection,  above  suggested,  that,  in  the  process  of  transmission, 
they  must  become  corrupted ;  and  to  the  additional  one,  that 
the  more  remote  the  time  of  the  revelation,  the  more  imcertain 
become  the  evidences  of  the  reality  of  it. 

Finally,  it  is  objected  that  no  special  historical  revelation  can 
be  accepted  as  such,  if  it  conflicts  with  the  intuitions  and  con- 
clusions of  one's  own  reason ;  while  if  it  merely  agrees  with 
these,  it  is  superfluous.  This  is  Lessing's  "  broad  ditch,"  which 
with  all  his  etibrt  he  was  never  able  to  get  over,  — "  Acci- 
dental truths  of  history  can  never  become  the  proof  of  necessary 
truths  of  reason." 

It  seems,  therefore,  plausible  to  hold  that,  if  God  really  re- 
veals himself  at  all,  he  must  reveal  himself  to  all  men  impar- 
tially, to  each  man  individually,  so  that  there  need  be  no 
uncertainty  as  to  the  fact  or  the  character  of  the  revelation. 

But  if  this  is  the  alternative,  then  of  course  the  conclusion 
must  be  that  there  never  has  been  any  true  revelation  at  all, 
since  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  there  has  been  the  great- 
est diversity  of  religious  beliefs  in  the  world.  Kevelation  has 
not  put  an  end  to  doubt  and  anxious  speculation  ;  it  has  not 
made  all  men  of  one  mind  respecting  God  and  spiritual  things. 
Some  men  (for  example,  Theodore  Parker)  talk  about  "  the 
absolute  religion,"  as  if  amidst  all  the  diversities  of  religious 
beliefs  and  practices  there  could  be  enucleated  a  common  belief 
and  a  common  religion.  But  it  is  manifest  that  there  can  be 
no  agreement  as  to  what  the  absolute  religion  is ;  each  one  will 
have  his  own  definition  of  it.     And  in  any  case  the  term  "  reve- 

1  Three  Essai/s  on  Religion  (JJillity  of  Religion,  p.  115).  Cf.  M.  Tindal, 
Christianity  as  Old  as  the  Creation,  p.  3il. 


THE   CHRISTIAN  REVELATION.  89 

lation  "  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  applied  to  these  varied  theories  as 
to  what  the  absolute  religion  is. 

The  simple  fact,  then,  is  that  there  are  no  infallible  intuitions, 
no  "  necessary  truths  of  reason,"  which  constitute,  or  take  the 
place  of,  a  revelation,  and  furnish  to  mankind  one  common  and 
immutable  system  of  religious  truth.  Whether  the  theist  can 
or  cannot  satisfactorily  explain  to  himself  why  there  is  no  such 
direct  and  uniform  revelation  to  every  individual,  the  fact  re- 
mains that  there  is  none.  And  so  the  question,  whether  there 
may  not  have  been  a  local,  historic,  special  revelation,  is  really 
left  untouched  by  the  objection.  If  there  ivere  a  universal  and 
perpetual  revelation  which  makes  all  special  revelations  super- 
fluous, then  doubtless  belief  in  such  special  revelations  would 
be  irrational.  But  as  the  case  actually  is,  there  is  no  such 
objection  in  the  way  of  special  revelations. 

As  to  the  difficulty  which  is  felt  on  account  of  the  possibil- 
ity of  the  corruption  of  a  revelation  through  tradition,  and  on 
account  of  the  uncertainty  which  lapse  of  time  throws  over  the 
credentials  of  the  mediators  of  the  revelation,  the  reply  is  very 
near  at  hand  :  the  historical  method  of  communicating  religious 
truth  is  simply  in  perfect  accord  with  the  method  by  which 
knowledge  in  general  is  communicated.  What  is  generally 
known  or  believed  is  not  what  comes  intuitively  to  each  indi- 
vidual without  outward  intervention.  On  the  contrary,  even 
what  seems  to  be  most  intuitive  is  in  great  part  accepted  first 
on  the  ground  of  testimony.  The  truths  of  natural  science  be- 
come the  possession  of  the  many  only  through  the  medium  of 
faith  in  the  word  of  teachers  and  elders.  Not  many  can,  and 
still  fewer  do,  go  directly  to  the  sources  of  knowledge,  and 
acquire  immediate  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  propositions  com- 
municated. The  whole  constitution  of  human  society  rests  on 
this  basis.  If  religious  truth  is  liable  to  be  perverted  and 
corrupted  through  transmission,  so  likewise  is  every  kind  of 
truth.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  it,  however  defective  and 
loose  such  a  system  may  seem  to  be,  it  is  a  simple  fact  that  men 
are  so  constituted,  and  so  related  to  each  other,  that  what  they 
know  and  think  comes  almost  wholly  as  a  communication  from 
one  to  another,  and  is  accepted  as  a  simple  matter  of  credible 


90  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

testimony.  Even  what  seems  to  be  the  product  of  individual 
and  independent  thinking  is  never  purely  such.  Strict  origi- 
nality is  nowhere  to  be  found.  Every  mind  bears  the  impress 
of  the  world  of  thought  by  which  it  is  surrounded.  And  even 
those  who  break  away  from  their  environments, — the  reform- 
ers who  seem  to  spring  by  an  innate  impulse  into  some  new  or 
forgotten  truth,  —  these  are  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Luther 
did  not  become  what  he  was  by  his  own  unaided  intuitions. 
He  was  educated  by  Paul,  and  Augustine,  and  Huss,  and 
Tauler,  and  Staupitz ;  and  through  them,  in  combination  with 
his  own  experience  and  reflections  and  his  general  knowledge  of 
Christian  truth,  he  was  trained  for  his  peculiar  work.  Any  one 
who  should  rise  up  with  some  new  and  hitherto  unheard-of 
scheme  of  religious  or  scientific  doctrines,  claiming  that  it  is  the 
direct  product  of  his  intuitions,  might  indeed  find  some  follow- 
ers ;  but  by  the  most  he  would  be  simply  ridiculed,  and  by 
none  more  surely  than  by  those  who  object  to  Christianity  on 
the  ground  that  it  rests  on  history  and  not  on  the  intuitions. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  sophism  to  represent  revelation  as  unsatis- 
factory and  uncertain  because  it  comes  to  us  historically,  and 
not  by  direct  intuition.  If  this  were  the  case,  it  would  be 
proper  and  necessary  to  assume  an  attitude  of  permanent 
doubt  as  to  all  the  science  and  history  which  comes  to  us  as 
a  communication  from  others.  The  doctrines  of  revelation, 
while  they  do  not  contradict  any  of  our  intuitions,  do  not  pro- 
fess to  be  the  product  of  pure  intuition.  The  vital  things  in 
the  revelation  are  historic  facts.  And  what  the  historic  facts 
are  alleged  as  revealing  is  not  doctrines  which  lay  claim  to  be 
necessary  truths  of  reason,  but  truths  concerning  God  which 
the  reason  itself  would  not  have  reached,  or,  at  the  most,  would 
not  have  been  able  to  attain  as  certain  truths.  As  Professor 
Bruce  ^  has  well  observed,  the  facts  of  Christianity  have  in 
reality  done  for  a  large  part  of  the  world  precisely  what  Lessing 
said  no  historical  fact  could  do  for  him :  they  have  introduced 
a  fundamental  change  in  men's  conceptions  of  God. 

It  is,  then,  no  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  revelation,  that 
the  revealed  system  has  to  be  propagated  by  human  tradition. 
1  Chief  End  of  Revelation,  p.  186. 


THE   CHRISTIAN  REVELATION.  91 

From  the  nature  of  the  case  this  must  be  the  method,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  this  method  opens  the  door  to  numerous  per- 
versions and  misunderstandings  of  the  original  revelation. 
This  can  be  avoided  only  by  such  an  absolutely  compulsory 
inspiration,  imparted  to  every  man,  as  should  instruct  him 
infallibly  how  to  understand  the  revelation.  But  if  such  an 
inspiration  were  feasible  and  actual,  then  it  would  practically 
supersede  the  revelation  itself.  The  inspiration,  not  the  ori- 
ginal revelation,  would,  in  fact,  be  the  authoritative  thing. 
A  single  special  revelation,  left  to  be  transmitted  from  one 
generation  to  another,  would  be  replaced  by  an  innumerable 
number  of  special  revelations,  each  independent  of  the  other, 
but  all  perfectly  agreeing  with  one  another.  But  no  one  pre- 
tends that  there  is  any  such  infallible  and  uniform  revelation 
imparted  to  all  individuals ;  so  that  the  question  whether  there 
may  not  have  been  one  or  more  special  historical  revelations 
is  not  touched  by  the  objection.  The  objection  can,  at  the 
best,  have  force  only  on  the  assumption  that,  if  there  were  a 
God,  he  certainly  would  make  himself  infallibly  known  to 
every  man,  and  that,  since  he  is  not  thus  made  known, 
therefore  there  is  no  God  at  alL  But  we  are  not  now  deal- 
ing with  atheists. 

It  remains  possible  to  assume  that,  but  for  the  blinding  and 
corrupting  influence  of  sin,  men  would  have  a  direct  and  cor- 
rect knowledge  of  God,  so  that  special  revelations  would  be 
needless.  This  is  a  very  reasonable  hypothesis,  though  no  one 
can  determine  exactly  what  would  have  been  the  mode  of  man's 
cognition  of  God  in  that  imaginary  state  of  sinlessness.  We 
may  conceive  that  the  knowledge  would  come  as  the  result  of 
an  intellectual  process  of  reflection,  or  as  a  sort  of  ethical 
intuition,  or  would  be  something  analogous  to  our  direct  cog- 
nition of  the  external  world.  But  whatever  speculations  oue 
may  indulge  in  respecting  this  matter,  they  do  not  help  us  ma- 
terially in  the  solution  of  the  question  as  to  the  present  fact. 
Men  are  not  sinless.  They  do  cherish  the  most  false  and 
fantastic  conceptions  of  God.  Even  with  all  their  revelations, 
real  or  pretended,  they  are  sadly  deficient  in  moral  and  spir- 
itual  excellence.     But   even   though  sinfulness   may  make   a 


92  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

direct  and  full  knowledge  of  God  impossible,  it  may  yet  be 
possible  for  God  to  reveal  himself  in  an  exceptional  and  his- 
torical way. 

But  taking  men  as  they  are  —  a  sinful  race  —  it  is  by  no 
means  clear  that  it  would  be  an  advantage  that  the  knowledge 
of  God  should  be  direct  and  complete.  There  are  some  con- 
siderations which  make  a  more  indirect  method  of  communi- 
cation seem  preferable.  An  immediate  presence  of  the  Divine 
Being,  realized  by  men  constantly,  would  have,  we  must  sup- 
pose, an  overpowering  effect  on  them.  In  so  far  as  religious 
character  is  a  matter  of  growth,  it  would  seem  to  be  desirable 
that  a  certain  freedom  should  be  accorded  to  the  mind  in  its 
appropriation  of  religious  truth  and  motive.  An  unavoidable, 
all-absorbing  sense  of  the  Divine  Presence,  involving,  as  it  would, 
a  constant  consciousness  of  the  uncompromising  and  inexorable 
demands  of  the  divine  holiness,  would  simply  overwhelm  one, 
and  make  a  free  development  of  character  impossible.  If  the 
immediate  and  ever-pursuing  sense  of  the  presence  of  the  in- 
finitely Holy  One  should  act  compulsorily,  the  result  would 
not  be  the  production  of  a  moral  character,  since  this  can 
come  only  as  the  product  of  free  choice  acting  under  motive. 
If  such  an  immediate  vision  of  God  were  possessed  by  sinful 
men,  we  can  hardly  conceive  the  consequence  to  be  other  than 
either  a  paralyzing  terror  or  a  hopeless  hardening  of  heart. 
In  order  to  the  attainment  of  a  holy  character,  there  must  be 
the  possibility  of  doubt  and  of  resistance.  Men  are  on  pro- 
bation, and  there  must  be  room  for  faith  and  unconstrained 
choice,  if  there  is  to  be  developed  a  really  moral  personality. 

But  whatever  might  have  been  this  imaginary  relation  of 
God  to  man,  the  fact  is  that  such  a  direct  intuition  is  wanting, 
and  that  men  may  disagree  and  doubt  not  only  concerning  the 
exact  nature  and  character  of  God,  but  also  concerning  his 
existence.  And  we  are  not  required  to  decide  whether  God 
might  not  and  ought  not  to  have  proceeded  otherwise  in  his 
dealings  with  men,  but  simply  to  find  out  what  he  has  in  fact 
done.  If  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  direct  intuition  of  God 
accorded  even  to  sinful  men,  very  well,  we  have  all  the  benefit 
of  that,  whether  there  has  been  a  revelation  or  not.     If  there 


THE   CHRISTIAN  REVELATION.  93 

has  been  a  revelation,  it  is  so  much  in  addition  to  what  we 
should  have  had  without  it. 

This  objection,  therefore,  against  the  hypothesis  of  special 
revelations,  that  revelation  ought  not  to  be  confined  to  par- 
ticular times,  places,  and  persons,  is  an  objection  to  the  consti- 
tution of  things.  It  does  not  invalidate  any  truth  or  advantage 
which  there  may  have  been  in  a  special  revelation,  to  say  that 
there  ought  to  have  been  no  need  of  any  special  revelation 
at  all. 

II.  Cognate  with  the  foregoing  general  characteristic  of  reve- 
lation as  being  something  special  in  time  and  place,  is  another, 
that  revelation  requires  one  to  put  peculiar  confidence  in  cer- 
tain individuals.  Christianity  in  particular  insists  on  making 
the  personal  authority  of  Jesus  Christ  a  controlling  thing  in 
religious  belief  and  life.  To  some  this  is  a  serious  objection. 
It  seems  like  putting  a  man  in  place  of  God.  It  requires  one 
to  pay  allegiance  to  a  fellow-man.  It  requires  us  to  take  on 
trust  what  he  affirms  respecting  God  and  spiritual  things,  and 
to  suppress  our  own  opinions  and  judgments,  however  carefully 
and  conscientiously  they  may  have  been  formed,  provided  they 
disagree  with  his.  Moreover,  what  he  held  and  taught  comes 
to  us,  after  all,  through  the  medium  of  still  other  men,  so  that, 
even  if  he  were  worthy  of  such  implicit  trust,  we  cannot  be 
entirely  certain  as  to  what  he  was,  or  what  he  would  have  us 
believe  or  do. 

This  is  an  objection  the  force  of  which  depends  almost  en- 
tirely on  the  mood  of  the  individual.  Whoever  feels  compe- 
tent to  form  his  own  opinions  concerning  the  universe  and  his 
relations  to  it ;  whoever  feels  no  need  of  any  spiritual  illumi- 
nation or  deliverance,  —  such  a  one  will  always  rebel  against 
the  requirement  of  submission  to  Jesus  Christ  as  his  Master 
and  Redeemer.  Historical  evidence  and  arguments,  however 
cogent,  will  not  be  conclusive  to  such  a  man. 

But  to  others  —  and  those  the  most  truly  rational  —  this 
peculiar  feature  of  Christianity,  that  it  requires  faith  in  a 
historical  person,  is  a  recommendation  rather  than  an  objec- 
tion. It  is  just  in  accordance  with  the  order  of  things  under 
which  all  men  do  and  must  live.     All  men  have  to  be  in- 


94  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

fluenced  in  opinion  and  practice  by  trusted  teachers.  From 
the  beginning  of  life  till  the  end  of  it  all  men  depend  on 
others  for  the  knowledge  they  get  and  the  motives  that  in- 
spire them.  It  cannot  be  otherwise.  Life  is  too  short,  and 
human  faculties  are  too  feeble,  to  make  it  possible  for  us  to 
get  on  otherwise.  If  we  can  receive  information  from  one 
who  can  be  trusted,  that  is  the  short  way,  and  perfectly  satis- 
factory way,  of  getting  knowledge.  But,  the  objection  occurs, 
not  all  those  who  undertake  to  give  instruction  can  be  per- 
fectly trusted.  True  ;  but  none  the  less  are  we  dependent  on 
instructors.  And  the  more  incompetent  they  are  to  give  ab- 
solutely trustworthy  information  and  example,  the  more  need 
would  there  seem  to  be  of  some  authority  eminent  and  trust- 
worthy enough  to  command  the  common  faith  of  men,  and 
to  unite  them  into  a  harmonious  community.^  The  more  evi- 
dence there  is  that  some  one  man,  like  Jesus  Christ,  is  really 
worthy  to  be  trusted  as  a  Revealer  of  divine  truth,  the  more 
reason  is  there  for  rejoicing  that  such  a  source  of  light  has 
been  found,  and  for  accepting  his  revelations. 

Moreover,  if  Christ  is  regarded  not  merely  as  a  revealer  of 
truth,  but  as  a  Leader  claiming  personal  obedience,  trust,  and 
affection,  here  too  the  natural  and  normal  cravings  of  men  are 

^  There  will  doubtless  always  be  found  those  who  will  cherish  the  conceit 
that  the  ideal  condition  of  mankind  is  that  in  which  every  one  evolves  inde- 
pendently his  own  opinions  and  beliefs.  One  of  the  latest  of  tliese  oracular 
and  amusing  utterances  is  to  be  found  in  Mr.  Royce's  Religious  Aspect  of 
Philosophy,  p.  323,  where  we  are  gravely  instructed  as  follows  :  "  Most  of 
us  get  our  prejudices  wholly  from  tlie  fashions  of  other  men.  This  is  cow- 
ardly. We  are  responsible  for  our  own  creed,  and  must  make  it  by  our  own 
hard  work."  But  the  author  himself,  in  his  Preface,  disclaims  any  strict 
originality.  He  has  studied  Kant,  and  Hume,  and  Schopenhauer,  and  Hegel, 
and  Berkeley,  and  other  pliilosophers  ;  and  from  them  he  has  derived  his  creed. 
But  most  men  are  unable  to  have  recourse  to  such  sources  of  "  prejudice." 
They  cannot  spend  so  much  time  and  thought  as  Mr.  Royce  has  been  able  to 
spend  in  elaborating  out  of  learned  books  their  own  belief.  Are  they  to  be 
called  "  cowardly  "  for  not  doing  wliat  they  cannot  do  ?  But  if  the  meaning 
is  that  every  one,  with  or  without  time  and  native  capacity,  must  judge  for 
himself  as  to  the  correctness  of  all  the  information  which  he  receives  from  his 
infancy  up,  then  it  can  only  be  said  that  such  a  notion  is  simply  ridiculous. 
The  ability  to  judge  presupposes  instruction  already  given. 


THE   CHRISTIAN  REVELATION.  95 

met.  The  declamations  often  uttered  against  authority,  the 
demands  made  that  every  one  shall  be  free  to  choose  his  own 
religion  and  work  out  his  own  ideals,  —  all  this  is  simply  ir- 
rational and  impracticable.  Men  are  fitted  and  obliged  to  live 
under  authority.  The  child  must  be  subject  to  the  parent,  the 
citizen  to  the  state.  He  who  submits  most  cheerfully  to  the 
necessary  restraints  of  society  shows  the  most  manliness.  Or 
if  the  laws  of  the  household  or  of  the  state  are  sometimes  un- 
just, the  legitimate  inference  is,  not  that  government  as  such  is 
iniquitous,  but  that  human  government  is  imperfect.  We  are 
thereby  led  to  look  for  a  more  worthy  leader  and  ruler.  What 
means  the  universal  tendency  to  form  parties  founded  on  ad- 
herence to  this  or  that  eminent  man  ?  What  is  the  secret  of 
the  hero-worship  to  which  all  are  more  or  less  inclined  ?  It 
lies  in  the  fitness  and  power  of  personal  character  to  win  en- 
thusiasm and  service  ;  it  lies  in  the  natural  craving  for  concrete, 
rather  than  abstract,  models  of  worthy  living.  Virtue,  to  be 
iinderstood,  must  be  actual.  Mere  ideas  of  excellence,  clothed 
in  words  ever  so  elegant  or  eloquent,  are  cold  and  powerless, 
compared  with  the  incarnate  virtues  of  a  living  man.  There  is 
no  real  virtue,  except  in  virtuous  beings.  To  be  impressed  by 
it,  we  need  to  see  it,  as  much  as,  in  order  to  be  impressed  by 
a  beautiful  landscape,  we  need  to  look  at  an  actual  one,  not 
merely  to  imagine  an  ideal  one.  What  men  need  is,  not  that 
this  instinct  should  be  crushed,  but  that  it  should  be  rightly 
directed.  If  this  craving  for  a  model  of  holy  character  can  be 
met  by  presenting  it  with  a  worthy  object ;  if  all  that  can  be 
conceived  of  purity,  benevolence,  loveliness,  and  grandeur  in 
moral  character  can  be  found  concentrated  in  an  actual  being ; 
if  this  being  is  seen  to  be  connected  with  us  by  ties  akin  to 
those  which  bind  us  to  parents  or  friends ;  if,  instead  of  follow- 
ing a  vague,  abstract,  ideal,  self-imposed  rule  of  action,  we  can 
follow  one  which  is  presented  in  a  concrete  form  in  this  personal 
embodiment  of  all  that  is  excellent  in  thought  and  character ; 
if  those  who  are  enslaved  by  sin  can  be  made  to  feel  the  per- 
sonal presence  of  one  who,  while  sinless  himself  and  irrecon- 
cilably hostile  to  all  moral  evil,  can  yet  bring  to  the  guilty  but 
repentant  soul  the  assurance  of  forgiveness  and  of  help  in  the 


96  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

conflict  with  temptation,  —  then  we  should  have  just  what 
the  instincts  and  exigencies  of  mankind  seem  most  to  require. 
And  this  is  what  Christianity  presents,  when  it  gives  us  Jesus 
Christ  as  a  model,  as  an  authority,  and  as  a  Saviour.  In  him 
the  boasted  "natural  perception  of  truth"  can  detect  that  per- 
fect revelation  of  divine  truth,  that  manifestation  of  God  him- 
self, for  which  the  race  has  been  longing.     In  his  life 

"  Tlie  law  appears 
Drawn  out  iu  living  characters." 

The  great  power  of  Christianity  consists  in  this  very  fact  that 
it  is  a  historical  phenomenon,  an  objective  reality  which  mere 
idealizing  thought  can  neither  produce  nor  nullify.  The  power 
of  it  in  short  is,  and  always  will  be,  found  in  the  fact  that  it  is 
an  authority,  and  that  its  authority  is  invested  in  a  'person. 

If  it  is  still  objected  that  it  does  not  become  a  man  to  commit 
himself  implicitly  to  a  mere  fellow-man  and  to  follow  his  direc- 
tion, the  answer  is  obvious.  It  is  essentially  involved  in  the 
Christian  conception  of  Jesus  Christ,  that  he  is  not  a  mere  man, 
possessing  intrinsically  no  higher  dignity  and  authority  than 
any  other  man,  but  that  he  is  a  unique  man,  peculiarly  linked 
with  God  ;  that  he  has  a  peculiar  nature  as  well  as  a  peculiar 
commission ;  that  he  is  not  only  a  man,  but  at  the  same  time 
more  than  man,  possessing  superhuman  and  supernatural  en- 
dowments, and  therefore  entitled  to  claim  peculiar  allegiance. 

But  this  leads  to  the  consideration  of  another  feature  of  the 
Christian  religion,  often  adduced  as  a  weakness,  though  really  an 
indispensable  condition  of  the  validity  of  its  claims ;  namely,  — 

III.    It  involves  the  assumption  of  a  supernatural  agency. 

Eevelation,  in  its  specific  sense,  denotes  a  self-manifestation 
of  God,  made  at  some  particular  time  and  through  the  agency  of 
particular  individuals.  Such  a  revelation,  being  limited,  his- 
toric, and  local,  must  have  features  which  mark  it  as  peculiar 
and  certify  it  as  genuine.  In  so  far  as  the  self-revelation  of 
God  is  a  universal  and  perpetual  one,  it  is  made  through  the 
ordinary  and  natural  channels.  Special  revelations  must  be 
such  as  are  not  made  in  this  usual  and  natural  way ;  in  other 
words,  they  must  be  supernatural.     In  order  to  be  recognized  as 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  97 

exceptional  and  obvious  expressions  of  the  divine  will,  they 
must  be  attested  by  extraordinary,  miraculous  signs. 

Miracles  have  generally  been  regarded  not  only  as  accom- 
panying facts  of  a  divine  revelation,  but  as  proofs  of  the  reality 
of  the  revelation.  In  recent  times,  however,  it  sometimes 
almost  seems  as  if  the  whole  question  of  miracles  had  under- 
gone a  radical  revolution.  Not  only  is  the  fact  of  their  real 
occurrence  contested,  but  it  is  contended  that  in  any  case  they 
could  serve  no  useful  purpose.  And  Christian  apologists,  instead 
of  treating  miracles  as  an  effective  weapon  to  be  used  against 
the  enemy,  not  unfrequently  appear  to  regard  them  rather  as 
weak  fortresses  undergoing  attack  and  in  imminent  danger  of 
being  captured.  But  while  it  may  be  true  that  the  older  apolo- 
gists have  often  misconceived  the  true  nature  and  meaning  of 
miracles,  and  wliile  there  is  need  of  careful  definition,  the  force 
of  the  argument  remains  essentially  what  it  always  has  been. 

In  defining  a  miracle  we  need  to  guard  against  overstatement 
on  the  one  hand,  and  understatement  on  the  other.  In  general, 
miracles  are  to  be  defined  as  events  produced  by  special,  extraor- 
dinary, divine  agency,  as  distinguished  from  the  ordinary  agen- 
cies of  inanimate  and  animate  nature. 

1.  It  is  an  overstatement,  when  a  miracle  is  spoken  of  as  a 
violation,  or  suspension,  or  transgression,  of  the  laws  or  forces  of 
nature.  Many  theologians  have  been  guilty  of  this  overstate- 
ment, though  it  is  not  true  that  this  is  the  general  conception 
which  has  prevailed,  and  certainly  not  the  one  now  most  com- 
monly propounded  by  Christian  apologists.  And  many  who 
use  these  terms  in  their  definition  of  a  miracle  do  not  mean  by 
them  what  unbelievers  in  miracles  find  in  them.  Thus,  it  is 
certainly  not  meant  that  in  working  a  miracle  God  comes,  as  it 
were,  into  collision  with  himself,  transgressing  his  own  laws,  or 
attempting  to  better  what  is  already  "  very  good."  It  is  not 
meant  that  "  the  same  God  who  is  accustomed  to  work  through 
the  orderly  arrangement  of  the  world  "  is  in  miraculous  events 
"disturbing  and  upsetting  this  orderly  arrangement."^     It  is 

^  M.  J.  Savage,  BeUrf  in  God,  p.  90.  Wliea  Professor  Park  (in  Smith's 
Dictionary  of  the  Bible,  American  ed.  art.  Miracles)  uses  the  term  "  viola- 
tion "  in  his  definition,  he  so  explains  it  as  nearly  to  agree  with  those  who 


98  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

not  meant  that  the  general  system  of  natural  forces  is  sus- 
pended, or  even  that  any  one  of  these  forces  is  temporarily 
abrogated.  But  still  the  expression  is  infelicitous.  Even  in 
the  mildest  sense  it  suggests  a  disturbance  of  the  regular  course 
of  things  such  as  there  is  no  ground  for  assuming.  All  the 
agencies  of  nature  are  divine  agencies.  They  produce  their 
effects  in  an  orderly  and,  to  a  great  extent,  calculable  way. 
There  is  no  necessity  for  supposing  that  they  are  ever  sus- 
pended. A  general  suspension  of  any  force,  such  as  gravitation, 
would  work  general  chaos  and  ruin.  The  ordinary  effect  of 
gravitation  may  sometimes  be  counteracted  by  some  other  force, 
as  when  a  piece  of  iron  is  drawn  up  and  held  by  a  magnet.  If 
now  such  an  effect  were  produced  by  divine  intervention,  but 
not  through  the  ordinary  interaction  of  physical  forces,  the 
effect  would  be  a  miracle.  But  no  law  is  violated  any  more 
than  when  such  a  counteraction  is  produced  by  the  normal 
operation  of  natural  forces. 

Skeptics  are  only  too  eager  to  adopt  this  overstatement  in  the 
definition  of  miracles.  Even  Hume  does  so,  although  his  phi- 
losophy makes  the  expression  "  violation  "  practically  meaning- 
less. For  he  makes  the  notion  of  causality  to  be  nothing  but 
the  consequence  of  an  experience  of  the  repetition  of  one  object 
or  event  following  another.^  But  if  that  is  all  there  is  in  it ; 
if  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  any  force  causing  it  to  pro- 
duce a  certain  effect ;  that  is,  if  there  is  no  inherent  necessary 
connection  between  the  antecedent  and  consequent,  —  then  an 

repudiate  this  term.  Thus  under  "  B.  G  "  he  gives  the  following  definition  of 
a  miracle  :  "  A  work  wrought  by  God  interposing  and  producing  what  other- 
wise the  laws  of  nature  must  (not  merely  tcoiild)  have  prevented,  or  prevent- 
ing (Dan.  iii.  27)  what  otherwise  the  laws  of  nature  must  (not  merely  would) 
have  prodncpd."  This  practically  agrees  with  the  exposition  of  Dr.  W.  M. 
Taylor  (^The  Gospel  Miracles,  p.  11),  who  objects  to  the  word  "violation," 
and  defines  a  miracle  as  simply  the  "introduction  and  operation  of  a  new 
cause."  Mill  {Logic,  Book  III.  ch.  xxv.  §  2)  in  like  manner  defines  a  mira- 
cle as  "a  new  effect  supposed  to  be  produced  by  the  introduction  of  a  new 
cause."  Similarly  J.  H.  Newman,  Two  Essays  on  Miracles,  2d  cd.  1870,  p.  4 ; 
Bushnell,  Nature  and  the  Supernatural,  p.  338  ;  Warington,  Can  we  believe  in 
Miracles!'  ch.  iii.  ;  Principal  Cairns,  Christianity  and  Miracles,  p.  4  {Present 
Day  Tracts,  vol.  i.). 

^  Essays,  vol.  ii.  p.  63,  Green  and  Grose's  edition. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  99 

exception  to  the  ordinary  sequence  is  not  intrinsically  incredi- 
ble. The  general  testimony  to  the  effect  that  certain  antece- 
dents have  been  followed  by  certain  consequents  simply  shows, 
on  this  principle,  that  this  is  in  fact  the  usual  order ;  but  it  is 
intrinsically  just  as  credible  that  a  different  sequence  should 
take  place.  All  that  is  needed  is  trustworthy  testimony  to  the 
exceptional  occurrence.  Such  testimony,  on  Hume's  principle, 
would  not  be  a  contradiction  of  the  ordinary  experience,  although 
Hume  calls  it  such.  The  fact  that  a  hundred  men  have  testi- 
fied to  seeing  A  follow  B  furnishes,  on  his  principle,  no  reason 
for  expecting  that  the  hundred  and  first  man  will  not  testify 
that  on  a  different  occasion  he  saw  B  follow  A.  Each  sequence 
is  a  fact  by  itself  —  an  ultimate  fact  —  believed  in  simply  be- 
cause experienced  or  attested ;  but  there  being  no  ground  for 
supposing  that  there  is  any  intrinsic  and  necessary  connection 
between  the  antecedent  and  consequent,  an  event  deviating 
from  the  perceived  order  is  just  as  much  to  be  believed,  when 
experienced  or  attested,  as  an  ev^ent  which  conforms  to  it. 
Moreover  a  miracle,  on  this  view  of  the  case,  cannot  be  distin- 
guished from  any  unusual  event. 

Hume's  argument,  therefore,  would  have  been  stronger,  if  he 
had  held  to  the  existence  of  natural  forces  operating  by  an  in- 
herent necessity,  —  the  doctrine  which  now  commonly  obtains 
among  scientists.  To  them  the  notion  of  a  violation  of  natural 
law  has  a  genuine  meaning  such  as  it  could  not  have  had  to 
Hume.  An  allegation  that  an  established  natural  force  has 
ever  been  suspended  in  its  operation  has  to  such  men  an  in- 
trinsic incredibility,  because  it  contradicts  their  very  notion  of 
what  a  natural  force  is,  namely,  a  force  operating  uniformly  and 
incessantly.  The  weight  of  a  uniform  experience  and  testimony 
is  supposed  by  them  to  have  proved  more  than  the  mere  indi- 
vidual facts  of  the  experience,  namely,  the  fact  that  there  are 
material  forces  operating  according  to  an  inward  necessity,  and 
therefore  operating  in  a  perfectly  methodical  manner.  Accord- 
ingly, we  find  now  the  author  of  Supernatural  Religion,  before 
he  takes  up  and  defends  Hume's  argument,  combating  Dr. 
Mozley,  who  had  adopted  substantially  Hume's  doctrine  of 
causation,  and  vigorously  contending  that  "  an  order  of  nature 


100  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

is  at  once  necessary  and  fatal  to  miracles."  ^  With  this  anony- 
mous author  nature  is  a  real  thing,  having  a  "  constitution  "  and 
"  laws."  2  This  is  to  him  the  certain  thing.  Whether  there  is 
a  personal  God  or  not,  he  does  not  profess  to  know.  He  ap- 
pears to  doubt  it,  and  demands,  at  any  rate,  a  demonstration 
of  the  tenet  before  he  can  even  entertain  the  thought  of  a 
miracle.^ 

But  atheists  or  agnostics,  so  long  as  they  remain  such  con- 
sistently, can  never  be  made  to  believe  in  miracles.  It  is  more 
important  to  avoid  exaggeration  in  the  conception  of  miracles, 
when  dealing  with  professed  theists  who  are  so  convinced  of  the 
inviolability  of  law,  as  the  eternal  expression  of  the  divine  will, 
that  they  regard  it  as  impossible  to  prove  the  reality  of  any 
event  which  violates  those  laws.  Thus,  Weisse*  argues  that, 
even  in  witnessing  or  hearing  about  miracles,  we  depend 
on  the  validity  and  uniformity  of  natural  laws.  We  can  trust 
the  testimony  of  eye  and  ear  only  in  so  far  as  they  follow 
the  laws  of  sight  and  sound.  It  is,  therefore,  he  says,  absurd 
to  make  our  faculties,  whose  trustworthiness  depends  on  the 
inviolability  of  natural  law,  themselves  accept  an  allegation 
which  implies  the  assumption  that  natural  law  in  other  cases 
has  been  violated.  Consequently,  even  if  we  do  not  see  through 
the  process,  and  are  not  able  to  trace  the  operation  of  natural 
forces,  we  yet  assume  that  they  have  operated. 

This  is  a  more  subtle  objection  to  miracles  than  Hume's. 
But  its  force  lies  in  the  tacit  assumption  that  miracles,  if  oc- 
curring, would  be  violations  of  natural  law.  And  Rothe  adopts 
the  true  and  only  valid  line  of  defense,  when  he  contends  that 
miracles  are  not  violations  of  natural  law,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  the  efficient  force  in  the  working  of  miracles  is  entirely 

1  Vol.  i.  p.  60.  Canon  Mozley,  by  liis  definition  of  miracles  as  "  contra- 
dictions "  or  "suspensions"  of  physical  law  (^Bampton  Lect2t)-es,\>\>.  19,  128, 
ed.  6),  and  by  his  adoption  of  Hume's  doctrine  of  causation,  exposed  himself 
to  some  of  the  severe  strictures  which  lie  received  in  Suprmatural  Religion. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  49.  For  a  criticism  of  the  author's  use  of  Hume  and  Mill,  cf.  T. 
K.  Birks,  Supernatural  Revelation,  ch.  xvii. 

'  See  Excursus  V. 

•*  Philosophische  Dogwatik,  vol.  i.  pp.  96,  100,  229.  Cf.  Rothe,  Zur  Dog- 
matik,  p.  88,  who  replies  to  him. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  101 

independent  of  natural  law.     It  is  not  a  natural  force  reversed 
in  its  operations,  but  another,  higher,  supernatural,  force  per- 
forming an  effect  which  is  perceptible  through  the  natural  use 
of   the  senses. '   Whether  or  when  any  force  is  supernatural 
rather  than  natural,  one  must  decide,  not  by  his  senses,  but 
by  his  judgment.     The  tricks  of  the  juggler,  though  apparently 
contrary  to  all  natural  laws,  are  yet  assumed  to  be,  though  in 
an  unknown  way,  conformable  to  them.      These  displays  of 
skill  produce  results  as  startling  and  apparently  as  miraculous 
as  those  which  are  regarded  as  really  miraculous.     By  what 
right  do  we  call  the  one  miraculous,  and  the  other  not?     The 
juggler,  indeed,  does  not  pretend  to  be  working  a  miracle ;  but 
may  not  the  professed  miracle-worker  be  after  all  only  a  jug- 
gler, though  not  so  honest  as  he  ?      In  any  case,  does  it  not 
depend  on  the  mind  of  the  observer  whether  the  act  or  phe- 
nomenon is  regarded  as  miraculous  or  not?     To  this  it  must 
certainly  be   answered.  Yes.      In   reply  to   Weisse,  who  had 
adopted  as  his  own  the  language,  "  I  would  not  believe  my 
eyes,  if  I  should  see  a  supernatural  miracle  take  place  before 
them,"  Eothe  pertinently  observes,   "The   causal   connections 
and  relations  of   this  visible  fact  no  one  is  ever  able  to  see 
anything  of,  in  heaven  or  on  earth ;  but  that  they  are  super- 
natural,  that   is,  that   the  fact   is  a   miracle,  is    simply  con- 
cluded;  and  the  experience  of  the  fact  is,  in  this  conclusion, 
one  of  the  premises  which  require  it."  ^     In  other  words,  a  phe- 
nomenon is  regarded  as  a  miracle  or  not,  according  as  the  direct 
unseen  cause  is  assumed  to  be  supernatural  or  not.      Whether 
it  is  supernatural,  or  only  a  rare  or  mysterious  action  of  natural 
forces,  must  be  inferred,  as  one  best  can  infer,  from  the  cir- 
cumstances.    In  either  case,  an  adequate  cause  is  assumed  :  it 
may  be  a  natural  cause ;  it  may  be  a  divine  agency,  acting  aside 
from  natural  laws  in  an  exceptional  way.    Whether  one  believes 
the  latter  to  be  the  fact,  depends,  first,  on  whether  he  believes 
in  a  God  at  all,  and  next,  on  whether  he  is  convinced  that  in 
this  particular  instance  there  is  sufficient  reason  for  assuming 
a  special  divine  intervention.     There  is  no  violation  of  law  in 
one's  seeing  the  objective  phenomenon ;  the  only  question  is, 
^  Zur  Dof/matik,  p.  92. 


102  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

whether  the  cause  of  the  phenomenon  is  natural  or  not.  In 
a  given  case,  therefore,  for  example,  an  apparent  multiplication 
of  loaves,  making  what  would  be  enough  for  only  a  few  suffice 
for  thousands,  whoever  sees  the  appearance  must  judge  for  him- 
self whether  the  extraordinary  supply  has  come  in  some  natural, 
though  unknown,  way,  or  whether  a  supernatural  power  has 
directly  furnished  the  supply.  In  such  a  case,  the  judgment 
must  depend  chiefly  on  the  consideration,  what  the  character 
and  professions  of  the  principal  visible  agent  are ;  whether  he 
professes  to  have  wrought  a  miracle  or  not;  and,  if  he  does, 
whether  he  is  one  who  could  be  supposed  to  deceive  intention- 
ally, or  to  be  easily  deceived  himself;  also  on  the  consideration, 
whether  the  person  performing  the  deed  claims  to  be,  and  prob- 
ably is,  divinely  commissioned  to  work  miracles. 

The  vexed  question,  what  is  to  be  understood  by  natural 
forces  and  laws,^  does  not  affect  the  decision  of  the  problem 
before  us.  Whether  all  natural  phenomena  be  regarded  as  the 
immediate  product  of  divine  agency,  or  as  caused  by  the  opera- 
tion of  natural  forces  acting  in  a  uniform  and  regular  way,  — 
in  either  case,  a  miracle  is  an  exception  to  the  ordinary  course 
of  events,  and  an  exception  attributable  to  a  special  divine  or 
supernatural  intervention.  It  is  sometimes  said  ^  that  the  an- 
cient Jews  could  have  had  no  well-defined  conception  of  a 
miracle,  since  to  them  everything  was  a  direct  product  of 
divine  power,  and  a  miraculous  event  could  have  been  to 
them,  at  the  most,  nothing  but  an  unusual  or  startling  event; 
whereas  modern  science  has  now  taught  us  to  regard  natural 
forces  as  the  immediate,  if  not  the  sole,  cause  of  the  phe- 
nomena which  we  observe.  These  forces  are  now  conceived 
as  working  uniformly  and  universally.  A  merely  novel  or 
startling  event  is  assumed  to  be  just  as  natural  as  any  other. 
The  investigation  of  such  events  always  tends  to  show  their 
connection  with  the  established  forces   of  nature.     A  miracle, 

^  The  proper  distinction  between  these  two  terms,  often  used  interchange- 
ably, is  well  given  by  Dr.  W.  M.  Taylor  {Gospel  Miracles,  pp.  14,  15),  "  Force 
is  the  energy  which  produces  the  effects ;  but  law  is  the  observed  manner  in 
■which  force  works  in  the  production  of  these  effects." 

2  E.f/.,  by  Hitschl,  Jahrbiicher  fur  deutsche  Theologie,  1861,  p.  410. 


MIRACLES   DEFINED.  103 

therefore,  now  appears  to  be  more  difficult  to  establish  than 
at  a  time  when  no  scientific  conception  of  natural  law  ex- 
isted, and  when  anything  and  everything  might  be  regarded  as 
a  direct  and  special  manifestation  of  the  divine  power  and  will. 
It  is  certainly  true  that  the  question  of  miracles  has  in  this 
way  come  to  have  a  somewhat  different  aspect  from  what  it 
once  had.  But  the  difference  can  never  radically  alter  the 
problem.  The  advance  of  science  and  the  prevalence  of  the 
doctrine  that  secondary  causes  are  everywhere  at  work,  and 
at  work  in  a  uniform  way,  —  this  may  diminish  the  number 
of  events  which  are  to  be  classed  among  the  miraculous ;  but 
it  does  not  do  away  with  the  notion  of  the  miraculous.  On 
the  contrary,  the  more  sharply  one  may  define  and  emphasize 
the  operation  of  natural  forces  as  the  ordinary  cause  of  visible 
phenomena,  the  more  definite  and  clear  becomes  the  concep- 
tion of  a  miracle.  So  long  as  God  is  conceived  as  directly 
doing  everything,  a  miracle  could  at  the  best  be  to  men's 
minds  only  some  tmusual  display  of  divine  power;  there 
could  be  no  sharp  line  of  demarkation  drawn  between  the 
miraculous  and  the  non-miraculous.  Now,  however,  a  miracu- 
lous event  must  be  regarded  as  caused  by  an  altogether  special 
intervention  of  God,  over  and  above  the  ordinary  operation  of 
his  natural  forces.  But  the  practical  problem  of  miracles  re- 
mains essentially  the  same  that  it  always  was.  The  ancient 
Jews,  though  they  may  have  had  no  theory  of  natural  force 
and  natural  law,  like  that  of  modern  times,  yet  certainly  had 
a  conception  of  the  regularity  of  ordinary  events.  They  knew 
what  to  expect  when  they  awoke  from  day  to  day.  They 
expected  to  see  the  sun  rise  regularly,  and  to  see  the  seed 
sprout  which  they  put  into  the  ground.  God  was  to  them  a 
God  of  order.  But  if  any  unexpected  and  wonderful  thing 
occurred,  and  especially  if  it  occurred  in  connection  with  a  pro- 
fessed communication  from  God,  —  this  was  to  them  a  miracle, 
an  exceptional  mode  of  working  on  the  part  of  God,  designed 
to  call  special  attention  to  the  divine  communication.  And 
this  is  essentially  the  present  conception  of  miracles.  To  use 
the  words  of  Prebendary  Eow,i  the  idea  of  a  miracle  "  postu- 
■^  T/w  Supernatural  in  the  New  Testament,  p.  127« 


104  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

lates  the  presence  of  a  force  or  forces  which  are  adequate  to 
counteract  the  action  of  those  already  in  existence  and  to  pro- 
duce the  adequate  result."  In  other  words,  a  miracle  is  a  new 
and  supernatural  agency  inserted  into  the  complex  of  forces 
ordinarily  in  operation,  just  as  a  man,  by  the  exercise  of  his 
volition  and  physical  power,  diverts  the  forces  of  nature  from 
their  ordinary  course  of  working. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  we  need  to  guard  against 
understatements  in  the  definition  of  miracles. 

Eespect  for  the  sovereignty  of  law  need  not  carry  us  so  far 
as  to  seek  to  explain  miracles  in  respect  to  the  mode  of  their 
occurrence,  and  to  show  their  essential  conformity  to,  or  de- 
pendence on,  natural  law.  Some  Christian  writers  weaken 
rather  than  strengthen  the  argument  from  miracles  by  their 
dread  of  anything  "  magical  "  in  them.  Thus  the  miracle  at 
Cana  has  been  explained  as  a  sort  of  acceleration  of  the  natural 
process  by  which  the  moisture  of  the  earth  and  air  are  trans- 
formed into  the  juice  of  the  grape,  and  this  again  into  fer- 
mented wine.  Such  speculations  are  idle,  and  really  explain 
nothing.^  Such  an  acceleration  of  natural  agencies  would  be 
in  any  case  equivalent  to  the  application  of  a  special  force 

^  Cf.  Westcott,  Gospel  of  the  Resurrection,  p.  37.  Olshausen,  who  pro- 
pounds this  view,  says  indeed  that  by  it  "  the  miracle  is  neither  removed,  nor 
explahied  naturally ;  the  essence  of  the  miracle  consists  in  divinely  effecting 
the  acceleration  of  the  natural  process  "  {Comm.  on  John  ii.  7-10).  This 
being  so,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  what  is  gained  by  the  hypothesis  at  all,  especially 
as  it  is  entirely  without  foundation,  if  not  even  without  any  clear  meaning. 
If  the  making  of  the  wine  were  an  accelerated  process  of  nature,  then  since 
the  miural  process  requires  a  grape-vine,  a  growth  of  grape-clusters,  the  opera- 
tion of  sun  and  soil  on  the  vine,  etc.,  an  acceleration  of  this  process  would  be 
impossible  without  all  these  elements.  It  is  indeed  conceivable  that  all  this 
process  could  be  condensed  into  a  few  minutes ;  but  it  is  very  certain  that 
this  was  not  the  case ;  and  since  it  was  not  the  case,  it  is  impossible  to  see 
how  the  miracle  can  properly  be  called  an  acceleration  of  the  natural  process, 
whatever  may  be  the  hypothesis  which  one  chooses  to  adopt  concerning  it. 
It  may  be  imagined,  for  example,  that  the  elements  of  whicli  wine  consists, 
being  in  existence  in  the  soil  and  in  the  atmosphere,  might  have  been  suddenly 
and  miraculously  brought  into  the  water,  and  so  there  was  no  outright  crea- 
tion of  anything.  But  this  would  not  have  been  the  natural  process ;  and  if 
anything  else  is  meant,  probably  no  one,  not  even  the  propouuder  of  the 
hypothesis,  could  tell  what  the  meaning  is. 


MIRACLES  DEFmED.  105 

which  is  distinct  from  any  natural  force  ;   and  so  the  miracle 
is  in  no  wise  made  intelligible  by  the  hypothesis. 

Still  less  satisfactory  is  the  theory  which  tries  to  mitigate 
the  difficulty  of  believing  in  this  miracle  by  transferring  the 
marvel  from  the  physical  to  the  mental  world.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  the  water  found  in  the  water-pots  continued  to 
be  water,  but  through  the  wonderful  influence  of  Jesus'  preach- 
ing was  made  to  taste  as  if  it  were  wine.  And  the  example  of 
mesmerizers  who  are  able  to  delude  their  subjects  in  a  similar 
manner  is  adduced  as  a  forcible  illustration  of  the  great  proba- 
bility of  this  conception  of  the  case !  ^     It  is  difficult  to  treat 

^  This  is  substantially  the  view  of  J.  P.  Lange  {Leben  Jesu,  vol.  ii.  p.  308, 
English  edition,  vol.  ii.  p.  137),  and  of  Beyschlag  {Leben  Jesu,  vol.  i.  pp.  307- 
309),  following  the  lead  of  Neauder  {Leben  Jesu,  p.  272.  The  English  edition, 
p.  176,  Bohu's  Standard  Library,  makes  Neauder  contradict  himself).  Mat- 
thew Arnold's  comment  on  this  explanation  {God  and  the  Bible,  Popular  edi- 
tion, pp.  22-23)  is  well  deserved:  "This  has  all  the  difficulties  of  the  miracle, 
and  ouly  gets  rid  of  the  poetry.  It  is  as  if  we  were  startled  by  the  extrava- 
gance of  supposing  Cinderella's  fairy  godmother  to  have  actually  changed  the 
pumpkin  into  a  coach  and  six,  but  should  suggest  that  she  did  really  change 
it  into  a  one-horse  cab." 

Rev.  H.  R.  Haweis,  in  his  Picture  of  Jesus,  pp.  54  sqq.,  thinks  it  "trivial 
and  dishonoring  to  Christ"  to  suppose  him  to  have  used  any  such  occult 
power.  His  own  explanation  (called  by  him  a  "  natural  explanation  ")  is  that 
Jesus  and  his  attendants  brought  not  only  wine  enough  for  their  own  use, 
"according  to  custom  "  (how  did  Mr.  Haweis  find  out  about  any  such  custom  ?), 
but  anticipating  the  probable  exhaustion  of  tlie  supply  (why  should  they  ?) 
brought  more  than  they  needed  {i.  e.,  about  five  hundred  quarts  !  )  in  order 
to  be  ready  for  the  emergency.  But  not  wishing  to  "  do  a  kindness  to  get 
praised  by  others,"  Jesus  told  his  disciples  to  leave  the  wine  outside,  so  that, 
when  needed,  the  wine  could  be  "  served  up  out  of  the  host's  own  pots,"  and 
thus  prevent  the  host's  knowing  that  the  supply  had  failed.  For  this  reason 
also  the  rumor  of  something  miraculous  might  have  been  started.  Of  course 
the  command,  "  Pill  the  water-pots  with  water,"  has  to  be  amended  by  strik- 
ing out  the  last  two  words.  Of  course  also  Jesus,  according  to  this  "  natural 
explanation,"  practised  deception  on  the  people  at  the  feast.  But  this  seems 
to  Mr.  Haweis  a  small  offense  compared  with  what  it  would  have  been  to 
"  wound  the  host's  feelings "  by  letting  him  know  that  the  wine  had  run 
short.  It  is  very  kind  in  the  author  of  this  remarkable  hypothesis  to  tell  his 
readers,  both  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  his  exposition  of  it,  that  he 
does  not  ask  any  one  to  accept  it.  Most  persons  will  probably  avail  them- 
selves thankfully  of  this  kind  indulgence. 


106  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

such  a  notion  seriously.  If  the  analogy  of  mesmeric  influence 
means  anything,  it  must  mean  that  the  supposed  miracle  was 
after  all  no  miracle.  If  this  is  not  meant,  then  we  must  sup- 
pose that  a  real  miracle  was  wrought,  only  that  it  was  wrought 
on  the  minds  of  the  company,  not  on  the  water.  But  this  does 
not  relieve  us  of  the  "  magic  "  which  is  so  much  dreaded,  and 
it  does  burden  us  with  the  assumption  that  Jesus  was  guilty  of 
a  stupendous  deception.^ 

Others,  while  refraining  from  the  attempt  to  explain  the 
modus  operandi  of  particular  miracles,  seek  to  propitiate  the 
prejudice  against  miracles  by  laying  down  the  general  propo- 
sition that  miracles,  so  far  from  being  violations  of  natural 
laws,  can  be  wrought  only  with  the  co-operation  of  the  forces 
of  nature.  Thus  Professor  Ladd,  whose  general  view  of  mira- 
cles we  can  assent  to,  seems  to  be  here  needlessly  cautious. 
He  criticises  Rothe  as  being  unwarrantably  unguarded  in  say- 
ing that  nature  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  effect  produced  in 
the  case  of  all  proper  miracles,  and  affirms,  on  the  contrary, 
that  "  no  event  in  history  can  even  be  conceived  of  without  the 
co-operation  of  all  the  preceding  forces  and  laws  of  the  physical 
universe."  "Miracles,"  he  says  again,  "must  be  conditioned 
upon  the  existing  course  of  nature."  ^  These  are  statements 
which  need  qualification,  or  at  least  explanation,  before  they 
can  be  assented  to.  When,  for  example,  it  is  said  ^  respecting 
the  wine  made  at  Cana  that,  "  even  if  we  suppose  its  elements 
to  have  been  wholly  new  creations,  they  were  conditioned  upon 
preceding  and  existing  laws  and  forces  of  nature,"  what  is 
meant  ?  If  it  is  only  meant  that  the  wine  made  by  Jesus  was 
composed  of  the  same  elements  as  other  wine,  the  statement 
affirms  what  is  so  self-evident  that  it  hardly  needs  to  be  made 
at  all.     That  would  be  only  affirming  that  the  wine  made  was 

^  Tliis  is  virtually  admitted  by  Beysclilag,  who  says  {Lehen  Jesu,  vol.  i.  p. 
310)  :  "  That  the  Evangelist  did  not  see  through  tiiis  psychical  miracle,  but 
interpreted  it  as  a  physical  one,  a  miracle  of  transubstantiation,  will  be  urged 
by  no  intelligent  man  [ !]  against  this  view,  which  in  fact  resolves  all  difficul- 
ties, and  even  permits  us  to  assume  a  dream-like  unconsciousness  on  the  part 
of  the  company  concerning  the  occurrence." 

'-'  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  296.  ^  Ibid. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  107 

real  wine,  and  not,  say,  water  somehow  made  to  taste  like  wine. 
But  we  are  reminded  ^  that,  according  to  tlie  narrative  itself 
(John  ii.  9)  "  the  water  was,  so  to  speak,  the  physical  basis 
of  the  miraculous  wine."  But  how  does  this  help  the  mat- 
ter ?  Water  is  indeed  a  large  part  of  wine ;  but  that  which 
makes  it  specifically  different  from  water  is  not  water;  and 
the  statement  that  water  was  the  physical  basis  of  the  wine 
throws  no  light  on  the  question,  how  these  additional,  wine- 
producing  elements  got  into  the  water,  or  in  what  sense  the 
water  itself  was  changed  into  wine.  The  statement  seems  to 
be  intended  as  an  intimation  that  there  was  no  creative  act  in 
the  case ;  but  what  it  can  mean  beyond  this  it  is  difficult  to 
conceive.  When,  however,  it  is  said  that  the  miracle,  even 
though  one  of  outright  creation,  cannot  "  even  be  conceived  of 
without  the  co-operation  of  all  the  preceding  forces  and  laws 
of  the  physical  universe,"  we  must  say  that  it  would  be  more 
nearly  correct  to  affirm  just  the  opposite,  namely,  that  such  a 
miracle  cannot  be  conceived  as  wrought  ivith  the  co-operation  of 
those  forces.  To  affirm  such  a  co-operation  is  to  affirm  that  the 
forces  of  nature  operate  with  the  miracle-worker  in  producing 
the  miracle.  The  fact,  however,  manifestly  is  that,  in  so  far 
as  physical  forces  are  operative  in  the  case,  they  do  not  help 
to  produce  the  miracle,  but  rather  work  against  it.  In  so  far 
as  the  act  is  miraculous,  natural  forces  cannot  be  said  to  tend 
to  produce  it,  for  that  would  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  it  is 
not  miraculous.  Of  course,  the  product  of  the  miracle  becomes 
amenable  to  natural  law.  The  wine  at  Cana,  whether  an  out- 
right creation,  or  otherwise  miraculously  produced,  must  of 
course,  after  it  was  made,  have  operated  like  other  wine.  It 
adjusted  itself  to  the  natural  course  of  things.  And  any  such 
miraculous  effect  must  be  conceived  as  subjected  to  the  ordinary 
laws  of  nature.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  every  miraculous 
cause  must  be  conditioned  on  natural  forces.  It  is  difficult  to 
see  what  fair  exception  can  be  taken  to  Rothe's  proposition,^ 

1  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  296. 

^  Zur  Dogmatik,  p.  102.  And  with  this  Kostliu  entirely  agrees  (Jahrbiicher 
far  deutsche  Theologie,  1864,  p.  258)  :  "  God  who,  being  a  personal  spirit,  is 
self-determining,  whose  power  does  not  discharge  itself,  as  it  were,  in  an  invol- 


108  SUPERNATUKAL   REVELATION. 

"  In  its  genesis  this  miracle  [the  kind  strictly  so  called]  does 
not  touch  the  realm  of  natural  laws  and  their  jurisdiction  at 
all ;  but  as  soon  as  it  is  once  performed  by  God's  absolute  act, 
it  too  is  at  once  an  organic  part  of  '  nature  '  and  amenable  to  its 
law."  Professor  Ladd  says,^  "  To  maintain  that  the  miracle 
is  accomplished  in  a  wholly  supernatural  fashion,  and  without 
the  co-operation  of  second  causes,  is  to  separate  it  from  all 
human  experience."  But  every  miracle  must,  in  a  certain 
sense,  be  separated  from  all  human  experience,  else  it  would  not 
be  a  miracle.  The  effect  of  the  miraculous  agency  must,  it  is 
true,  be  somethmg  palpable,  and  in  that  sense  a  part  of  human 
experience.  But  that  which  is  distinctively  miraculous  in  a 
miracle  is  not  the  effect,  but  the  cause.  The  bread  given  to  the 
multitude  on  Lake  Tiberias  was  doubtless  nothing  wonderful ; 
it  was  simply  bread.  The  miracle  was  in  the  production  of  it. 
And  to  say  that  the  multiplication  of  the  loaves  was  something 
separated  from  all  human  experience,  that  is,  something  utterly 
unlike  ordinary  human  experience,  is  simply  to  say  that  it  was 
a  miracle.  With  Eothe  we  insist  that  a  miracle  is  no  violation 
of  the  laws  of  nature  for  the  very  reason  that  it  has  nothing  to 
do  with  them,  so  far  as  its  causation  is  concerned.  It  may 
have  to  do  with  them,  and  generally  speaking  must  have  to  do 
with  them,  in  the  sense  that  nature  is  the  field  in  which  the 
miraculous  agency  operates,  and  that  therefore  the  existing 
forces  of  nature  must  be  recognized  and  dealt  with.  Those 
forces  may  perhaps  in  the  miraculous  agency  be  used,  may  be 
diverted  into  a  channel  where  of  themselves  they  would  never 
operate.  In  such  a  case,  however,  the  miraculous  agency  is 
not  the  natural  force,  but  the  supernatural  force,  —  something 
above  the  natural  force,  not  conditioned  upon  it,  but  rather  the 
power  which  originally  conditioned  it.     But  we  have  no  right  to 

uutary  impulse,  and  who  in  his  love  himself  voluntarily  created  the  finite  world, 
can  and  will  iu  like  manner,  whenever  he  directly  intervenes  in  it,  so  limit  his 
power,  in  itself  unlimited,  that  it  shall  not  undo  the  finite  world,  but  rather 
only  introduce  into  it  a  product  wliich  then  itself  belongs  entirely  to  the  corn- 
plexus  of  the  finite  world."  So  Christlieb  {Modern  Doubt,  etc.,  p.  307)  :  "The 
laws  of  nature  are  in  no  way  suspended  thereby  [by  miracles] ;  but  .  .  .  the 
products  of  the  miracle  .  .  .  take  their  place  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature." 
^  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  296. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  109 

affirm  that  in  miracles  natural  forces  are  always  or  generally 
used  at  all.  In  miraculous  healing,  for  example,  where  we  might 
be  most  inclined  to  look  for  the  operation  of  natural  processes, 
under  the  direction  of  a  superior  will,  it  is  impossible  to  deter- 
mine how  far,  or  whether  at  all,  the  ordinary  forces  of  nature 
operated  in  effecting  the  cure.  Still  less  have  we  any  ground  for 
assuming  that  such  miracles  as  the  raising  of  the  dead  or  the 
feeding  of  the  multitude  were  wrought  by  making  use  of  forces 
of  nature.^  If  those  forces  of  nature  operated  in  these  cases 
in  a  natural  way,  or  only  as  mere  human  agency  could  di- 
rect them,  then  the  acts  in  question  ivere  not  miracles.  And 
the  only  alternative  is  to  assume  that  the  effects  were  not  pro- 
duced by  natural  forces  operating  in  a  natural  way.  But  in 
this  case  there  are  two  possibilities :  Either  the  effects  were 
produced  by  natural  forces  operating  in  a  non-natural  (super- 
natural) way,  or  they  were  produced  by  a  supernatural  force 
distinct  from  natural  forces.  But  a  natural  force  can  be  made  to 
act  in  a  non-natural  way  only  by  a  supernatural  power,  so  that 
these  two  possibilities  are  practically  identical.  The  distinctive 
thing  in  the  miraculous  deed  is  the  exercise  of  the  supernatural 
power.  Whether  that  power  uses  natural  forces  as  the  means  of 
effecting  the  miraculous  result,  or  effects  the  result  directly, 
without  the  use  of  natural  forces,  is  quite  immaterial.^ 

*  Mr.  Wariugtoii  {Can  ice  believe  in  Miracles?  pp.  117  sq^  in  arguing 
the  point  tliat  miracles  are  not  violations  of  natural  law,  suggests  concerning 
this  miracle  that,  as  the  essential  constituents  of  bread  and  fish  are  derived 
from  air  and  moisture,  the  material  of  the  miraculous  supply  may  have  been 
derived  from  the  natural  source  ;  only  "  the  manner  and  means  of  production 
is  vitally  different."  But,  he  says,  we  cannot  say  that  any  force  was  acting 
in  opposition  to  its  natural  laws.  "  On  the  contrary,  we  simply  do  not  know 
what  forces  were  at  work ;  and  to  talk  of  any  of  their  laws  being  violated  is 
simply  impossible."  This  hypothesis  may  seem  akin  to  the  acceleration  theory 
of  Olshausen,  but  is  essentially  different.  It  does  not  make  the  process  of  pro- 
duction an  acceleration  of  the  natural  process,  but  quite  the  contrary.  But  it 
would  be  equally  true  that  no  natural  law  is  violated,  if,  instead  of  miraculously 
putting  together  materials  derived  from  earth  and  air  and  so  forming  bread  and 
fish,  Jesus  had  created  the  material.  We  do  not  affirm  that  this  was  the  case  ; 
we  only  insist  that  in  either  case  no  law  of  nature  is  violated,  because  in  either 
case  the  efficient  cause  is  something  distinct  from  the  forces  of  nature. 

^  "The  essence  of  a  miracle  consists  in  the  immediate  action  of  a  rational 


110  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  warrant  for  laying  down  the  prop- 
osition that  a  miracle  cannot  be  performed  without  the  co- 
operation of  second  causes.  Indeed  such  a  proposition,  taken  in 
any  strict  sense,  is  quite  untenable,  if  we  retain  any  faith  in 
miracles  at  all,  unless  we  resort  to  the  theory  of  an  outright 
"  violation  "  of  natural  laws,  against  which  this  very  mode  of 
conception  is  directed.  For  if  the  natural  causes  "  co-operate  " 
to  produce  a  miracle,  they  must  do  so  either  by  operating  in 
the  natural  and  ordinary  way,  —  in  which  case  there  is  no  mir- 
acle, so  far  as  this  operation  is  concerned ;  or  else  they  must 
operate  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  natural  and  ordinary  one, 
—  in  which  case  there  would  be  a  violation  of  natural  law  in 
the  strictest  sense  of  that  term.  Absolutely  nothing  is  gained 
by  any  such  attempt  to  connect  miracles  with  natural  forces. 
It  is  impossible  to  specify  what  second  causes  were  used,  for 
example,  in  the  multiplication  of  the  loaves.  All  that  could  be 
known  was  that  the  bread  made  its  appearance  where  it  could 
not  be  naturally  looked  for.  Where  it  came  from,  how  it  was 
produced,  could  of  course  not  be  a  matter  of  perception.  It  was 
simply  inferred  that  in  some  supernatural  way  Jesus  had  pro- 
duced the  supply.  To  the  spectators  and  beneficiaries  of  the 
miracle  it  was  quite  immaterial  whether  Jesus  accomplished 
the  result  by  some  mysterious  manipulation  of  natural  forces 
and  substances,  or  by  an  immediate  exercise  of  supernatural 
force.  It  is  impossible  to  understand  how  a  co-operation  of 
second  causes  was  necessary,  as  Professor  Ladd  asserts,^  in 
order  that  miracles  may  render  service  to  faith  and  realize 
their  final  purpose.  It  is  hard  to  see  why  any  believer  in  real 
miracles  should  not  assent  to  Eothe's  language  when  he  says :  ^ 
"  1 1  has  always  seemed  strange  to  me  when  1  have  seen  exposi- 

free  will  in  nature,  directing  its  pliysical  agencies  to  the  effecting  of  results 
wliich,  without  this  supernatural  direction,  they  would  not  have  effected."  — 
Prof.  S.  Harris,  Thn  Self-rerelation  of  God,  p.  478.  But  would  the  author 
limit  his  definition  to  that  supernatural  action  which  Awrks  on  nature  and 
directs  physical  agencies?  It  mni/  be,  indeed,  that  no  other  miracles  have 
been  performed  ;  but  if  an  absolutely  new  substance  should  be  created  by 
divine  power,  would  not  that  be  a  miracle? 

1  Dor  trine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  296. 

2  Zur  Bogmatik,  p.  101. 


MIRACLES  DEFmED.  Ill 

tors  who  believed  in  a  revelation,  and  were  avowed  defenders  of 
the  Biblical  miracles,  yet  in  some  sort  troubled  by  such  miracles 
as  that  at  the  marriage  in  Cana,  and  the  miracle  of  the  loaves 
(the  very  ones  which  are  especially  well  attested),  and  troubled 
for  the  reason  that  in  the  case  of  these  one  cannot  picture 
the  process  to  the  mind.  I  do  not  understand  the  difficulty; 
for  that  this  cannot  be  done  lies  expressly  in  the  very  notion 
of  miracles,  whenever,  as  here,  they  are  taken  in  all  their 
strictness."     (See  Excursus  VI.  in  the  Appendix.) 

The  preceding  observations  indicate  what  should  be  said  of 
another  mode  of  conceiving  miracles,  which  is  sometimes  re- 
sorted to  in  order  to  remove  the  objection  that  God  would  not 
interfere  with  the  regular  operation  of  his  own  laws.  It  is  that 
miracles  are  the  product  of  the  laws  of  nature,  but  of  a  higher, 
occult  order  of  nature.  A  miracle,  according  to  this  view,  is 
not  only  not  contrary  to  nature,  but  is  strictly  in  accordance 
with  it.  Nature  is  compared  to  a  clock  so  ingeniously  con- 
structed that  certain  wheels  in  it  move  only  once  in  a  century, 
so  that  to  those  living  at  such  times  the  phenomenon  would 
have  all  the  appearance  of  a  miracle,  though  really  the  natural 
and  necessary  result  of  the  construction  of  the  clock.  So  mira- 
cles, it  is  thought,  may  be  provided  for  in  the  divinely  con- 
stituted order  of  nature,  but  wrought  only  by  these  rarely 
operating  forces,  and  therefore  occurring  so  exceptionally  as  to 
produce  the  effect  of  a  special  divine  interposition.  In  short, 
miracles  are  the  necessary  effects  of  a  higher  law  of  nature.^    In 

^  Cf.  Dr.  J.  r.  Clarke's  quotation  from  Epiiraim  Peabody  (^Orfhorloxi/,  etc., 
pp.  64,  65).  Dr.  A.  P.  Peabody  seems  to  favor  this  view  in  Boxion  Lecturer, 
1870,  on  the  Sovereignty  of  Law,  pp.lSO  .?^.,  where  he  compares  miracles  with  the 
meteoric  showers.  In  his  Christ'unnfy  and  Science,  p.  101,  the  more  ordinary 
view  appears  to  be  argued.  In  his  Chridianity  the  Relir/ion  of  Nature,  p.  66. 
however,  he  says,  "  Miracles  may  be  natural,  not  only  absolutely,  as  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Divine  attributes,  but  also  relatively,  so  far  as  the  laws  and  the 
order  of  i\\^  universe  are  concerned."  Sciileiermacher  advances  a  similar  view 
{Der  christliche  Glaulje,  vol.  i.  §  20,  ed.  1).  Professor  von  der  Goltz  {Die 
chriMichnn  Grundicahrheiten,  p.  352)  says  that  miracles  "  have  for  our  human 
conception  the  character  of  the  surprising  and  the  inexplicable,  they  are  signs 
of  divine  power,  witnesses  of  a  supersensnal  order  of  the  world  ;  but  for  God 
they  are  strictly  according  to  law.  .  .  .  The  miraculous  world  of  revelation  is 
supernatural,  in  so  far  as  the  notion  of  nature  is  limited  to  the  sensuous  world. 


112  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

this  way  it  is  thought  that  miracles  can  be  made  more  intelli- 
gible and  credible  than  when  they  are  conceived  as  independent 
of  natural  law. 

But  this  conception  makes  the  essence  of  a  miracle  consist, 
not  in  the  specialness  of  the  divine  agency,  but  in  the  ignorance 
of  man.  The  same  element  of  human  ignorance  may  make  mir- 
acles out  of  inexplicable  tricks  of  jugglers,  or  out  of  irregular 
natural  phenomena,  such  as  the  occasional  appearance  of  new 
stars.  In  both  cases  we  should  have  to  say  that,  while  we  do 
not  suppose  the  occurrence  to  be  independent  of  natural  law, 
we  simply  do  not  know  what  the  law  is.  Such  events  may  be 
startling  and  wonderful,  but  they  are  not  miraculous,  except  in 
the  loose  sense  that  everything  may  be  miraculous  if  one  only 
chooses  so  to  regard  it.  Many  writers,  like  Augustine,^  speak 
of  all  the  works  of  nature  as  marvels,  inasmuch  as  they  all 
involve  inexplicable  mysteries.  This  is  very  true,  but  a  mira- 
cle does  not  consist  in  the  inexplicableness  of  an  event.  And 
no  more  does  it  consist  in  its  mere  rareness,  provided  it  is  yet 
the  product  of  natural  forces  acting  naturally.  If  now  it  is 
assumed  that  the  so-called  miracles  are  really  as  much  the 
product  of  natural  forces  as  any  other,  only  that  the  forces 
operate  in  a  more  occult  way,  then,  as  soon  as  we  have  come  to 
take  this  view  of  the  matter,  the  miracle  loses  all  special  signifi- 
cance. If  the  resurrection  of  Christ  was  brought  about  by 
physical  forces  acting  just  as  necessarily  as  gravitation,  and 
was  therefore  necessary  in  the  same  sense  as  the  irregular 
appearance  of  comets,  then  that  resurrection  cannot  of  itself 
mean  more  or  prove  more  than  any  other  natural  event  which 

It  is  natural,  in  so  far  as  one  takes  into  view  man's  destination  to  lead  a  spir- 
itual life,  and  tlie  relation  of  the  heavenly  nature-world  to  the  earthly  nature- 
world."  Bishop  Temple  {Relations  between  Religion  and  Science,  p.  195) 
likewise  suggests  that  the  miraculous  sequence  of  plienomena  may  be  "  after 
all  that  of  a  higher  physical  law  as  yet  unknown."  Quite  similarly  Canou 
G.  H.  Curteis  {Scientific  Obstacles  to  Christian  Belief,  Lect.  iv.).  He  repre- 
sents miracles  as  designed  to  produce  an  effect,  and  as  having  really  produced 
it,  though  afterwards  they  may  be  recognized  as  having  been  quite  in  accord- 
ance with  physical  law.  Against  this  conception  Prof.  A.  B.  Bruce  {Miracu- 
lous Element  in  the  Gospels,  pp.  48  sqq.)  argues  forcibly  and  conclusively. 
^  Cf.  A.  Dorner,  Augustinus,  sein  theologisches  Si/stem,  etc.,  pp.  71  sqq. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  113 

may  startle  by  its  strangeness,  but  nevertheless  belongs  as 
much  to  the  machinery  of  nature  as  the  most  familiar  things  of 
every  day  life.  This  theory  of  miracles  is  in  fact  harder  to 
believe  than  the  ordinary  one ;  and  therefore  there  is  nothing 
to  recommend  it.  There  is  something  excessively  forced  in  it. 
It  would  be  next  to  impossible,  for  example,  to  make  men 
believe  that  God  from  all  eternity  decreed  that  the  forces  of 
the  universe  should  operate  in  such  a  way  that  on  a  single 
occasion,  in  a  single  place,  water  should  suddenly  be  trans- 
formed into  wine,  or  a  few  loaves  of  bread  should  suddenly  be 
multiplied  into  hundreds.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  in  such 
a  case  the  law  is  occult;  we  cannot  easily  conceive  that  there 
should  be  any  law  in  the  case  at  alL^  But  even  if  the  abstract 
possibility  of  such  a  thing  were  conceded,  the  question  still 
arises,  What  is  gained  by  it  ?  If  the  miracle  is  supposed  to  be 
designed  to  produce  a  special  effect,  to  convey  some  religious 
lesson,  or  to  confirm  the  words  of  some  divinely  commissioned 
messenger,  why,  then  it  must  be  assumed  that  the  whole  ma- 
chinery of  the  universe  was  planned  so  that  these  peculiar 
events  should  take  place  in  a  natural  but  startling  way,  in 
order  to  make  the  impression  of  a  divine  intervention.  But 
if  the  only  reason  for  these  peculiar  provisions  in  the  world's 
machinery  was  to  produce  this  impression  on  these  compara- 
tively few  occasions,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  reason  why  the 
desired  impression  should  not  be  produced  rather  by  that  which 
ought  to  produce  it,  that  is,  why  there  should  not  be  a  real  divine 
interposition  independent  of  physical  laws.  It  certainly  must 
be  just  as  easy  for  God  in  his  eternal  plan  to  determine  here 
and  there,  in  the  course  of  his  providential  government  of  the 
world,  to  interpose  directly  to  produce  effects  which  his  ordi- 
nary natural  forces  would  not  produce,  as  it  is  to  determine  to 
have  the  effect  brought  about  by  a  curious,  and  to  human  eyes 

^  Except  in  the  sense  tliat  whatever  God  does  there  is  a  good  reason  for, 
and  that  it  is  done  in  accordance  with  an  eternal  purpose.  The  law  is,  in  this 
case,  not  a  law  of  nature,  but  a  law  of  the  divine  mind.  This  is  apparently  all 
that  Bushnell  means  when  (^Nature  and  the  Supernatural,  pp.  261  sqq.)  he 
argues  that  God's  supernatural  agency  "  is  regulated  and  dispensed  by  immu- 
table and  fixed  laws." 

8 


114  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

absolutely  untraceable,  operation  of  a  physical  force.  And  if 
just  as  easy,  then  of  course  much  better,  since  surely  the  better 
way  must  be  for  God  to  do  what  he  desires  to  seem  to  do.  As 
Bishop  Alonzo  Potter  well  observes,^  if  miracles  are  only  fore- 
ordained results  of  physical  law,  then  "  not  only  would  the 
language  in  which  they  are  described  in  the  Bible  be  deceptive, 
but  those  who  wrought  them  would  in  one  important  sense  be 
impostors,  and  the  miracles  themselves  a  fraud." 

3.  We  may  here  consider  the  distinction  often  made  between 
absolute  miracles  and  relative  miracles.  The  distinction  is 
differently  made  by  different  writers.  Thus  Thomas  Aquinas 
defines  a  miracle  as  that  which  is  done  contrary  to  the  order  of 
all  created  nature.^  Others  would  define  an  absolute  miracle 
as  one  caused  by  the  suspension  of  only  a  particular  law  or 
application  of  a  law ;  others  again,  as  an  effect  produced  by  the 
intervention  of  a  special  divine  activity  other  than  that  of  the 
forces  of  nature.  Eelative  miracles  likewise  may  be  variously 
conceived.  One  notion  is  that  of  an  act  or  event  which  pro- 
duces the  effect  of  a  miracle,  though  in  strict  reality  a  purely 
natural  occurrence.  Another  is  that  which  makes  all  acts  of 
the  rational  free-will  supernatural,  and  so  in  a  certain  sense 
miraculous.  Another  is  that  which  makes  a  relative  miracle 
consist  in  natural  processes  modified  by  divine  power.^  Or, 
again,  stress  is  laid  on  the  distinction  between  miracles  wrought 
directly  by  divine  agency  and  miracles  wrought  through  the 
agency  of  human  beings.*  It  is  manifest  that  the  whole  dis- 
tinction is  a  somewhat  loose  one ;  what  some  would  call  an 
absolute  miracle  would  be  to  others  only  a  relative  one. 

The  burden  of  the  foregoing  discussion  is  to  the  effect 
that  the  distinction  is  more  apt  to  be  misleading  than  helpful. 
The  principal  distinction  to  be  defined  is  that  between  a  real 
miracle  and  a  pretended  or  seeming  one.  Amidst  all  apparent 
diversities  of  conception  there  need  not  in  fact  be  any  very 

^  Relifjious  Fhilosophy  (Lowell  Institute  Lectures  delivered  1845-53,  pub- 
lished 1872),  p.  124. 

2  Summa  Theolorjirrt,  Pars  I.  Qu.  ex.  art.  iv. 

8  So  Professor  L-idd,  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  334. 

*  Cf.  Dorner,  Christian  Doctrine,  §  55,  4. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  115 

material  difference  in  the  definition  of  a  real  miracle.  The  prin- 
cipal variation  is  to  be  found  in  regard  to  the  question  above 
touched  upon,  whether  in  the  strict  miracle  God  makes  use  of 
existing  natural  forces,  or  works  immediately  without  making 
use  of  them.  But  even  this  difference  is  often  more  apparent 
than  real.  Thus  Gloatz,  after  an  elaborate  survey  of  the  ques- 
tion of  the  relation  of  miracles  to  natural  law,  concludes  that 
Eothe  and  Julius  Miiller  and  others  are  wrong  who  hold  that 
God  works  miracles  without  the  mediation  of  existing  natural 
forces,  and  states  his  own  view  as  follows  :  ^  "  An  absolute  mir- 
acle would  annul  the  existence  of  the  universe,  or  transform  it 
into  God.  God  also  works  miracles,  as  complicated  phenomena, 
by  means  of  the  general  forces  of  nature  and  out  of  the  possi- 
bilities and  conditions  involved  in  them,  from  which  alone, 
however,  they  can  be  as  little  explained  as  the  higher  orders  of 
nature,  and  man  with  his  influence  on  nature.  They  may  .  .  . 
be  conceived  as  performed,  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  God,  by 
higher  spirits,  but  also  immediately  by  himself,  the  Creator,  the 
great  Geometer  and  Mechanic,  who  has  in  his  hands  all  the  threads 
of  the  complex  of  nature,  and  can  connect  them  in  the  most  varied 
ways."  The  working  of  a  miracle  is  thus  made  analogous  to  the 
act  of  man,  when  he  avails  himself  of  his  knowledge  of  natural 
forces  and  substances  for  bringing  about  what  nature,  left  to  it- 
self, would  never  produce.  Similarly  Otto  Flligel,^  illustrating  his 
point  by  reference  to  the  miracle  at  Cana,  says  that,  in  so  far  as 
the  wine  is  not  conceived  as  an  outright  creation,  the  only  manner 
in  which  an  immediate  act  of  God,  without  the  use  of  natural 
agencies,  can  be  conceived,  is  the  pantheistic  one,  according  to 
which  things  are  only  conditions,  inodi,  of  the  divine  substance. 
His  own  conception  is  that  the  miracle  may  have  been,  so  to 
speak,  "an  improved  and  apocopated  natural  process,"  the  ele- 
ments necessary  to  transform  water  into  wine  being  abundant  in 
the  atmosphere,  and  only  needing  by  a  manipulation  of  natural 
forces  to  be  brought  together  in  order  to  produce  the  best  wine. 
But  just  here  we  are  brought  to  the  question,  Hoio  are  these 
natural  forces  manipulated  ?     When  men  avail  themselves  of 

^   Wunder  und  Nafurr/esetz  (in  Sfudien  und  Kritiken,  1886),  p.  543. 
2  Bas  JFunder  und  die  Erkennbarkeit  Gottes,  p.  36.     Leipzig,  1869. 


116  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

their  knowledge  of  nature  in  order  to  bring  about  changes  and 
effects  which  natural  forces  of  themselves  would  never  pro- 
duce, they  accomplish  their  purpose  by  using  natural  agencies, 
by  directing  them  into  such  a  channel,  and  combining  them  in 
such  a  way,  as  to  effect  a  predetermined  result.  It  is  distin- 
guished from  purely  natural  processes  only  by  the  direction 
which  the  human  purpose  gives  to  the  operation  of  natural 
forces.  Thus,  it  is  natural  for  water  to  move  downwards,  and, 
when  there  is  a  descending  channel,  to  move  in  a  body  in  that 
channel.  An  earthquake,  or  some  other  natural  convulsion, 
might  change  the  channel,  and  in  that  case  it  is  simply  natural 
for  the  water  to  move  in  the  new  channel.  If,  now,  men  de- 
termine to  change,  and  do  change,  the  course  of  a  river,  the 
only  thing  not  strictly  natural  about  the  process  is  just  this 
determination,  with  the  several  volitions  that  are  involved  in 
it.  It  is  quite  natural  that  the  spades  should  move  to  the 
place  of  excavation  when  carried  by  the  workmen ;  quite  nat- 
ural that  when  pressed  by  the  feet  they  should  pierce  and 
loosen  the  earth ;  quite  natural  that  the  soil  should  by  the  use 
of  the  proper  instruments  be  removed ;  quite  natural  that  the 
river,  when  the  new  channel  is  deep  enough  and  is  brought  into 
connection  with  it,  should  flow  in  it; — just  as  natural  as  if  a 
similar  change  of  channel  were  produced  by  some  remarkable 
natural  force  or  combination  of  forces. 

But  suppose,  now,  that  such  a  change  were  to  be  effected 
miraculously  by  divine  power.  How  are  we  to  conceive  the 
act  ?  If  the  alteration  of  the  channel  were  suddenly  produced 
by  an  earthquake,  or  a  meteorite,  or  by  some  other  such  agency, 
we  should  still  say  that  the  phenomenon,  however  startling  or 
mysterious,  is  after  all  a  natural,  and  not  a  miraculous,  event. 
If  God  is  to  produce  the  effect  miraculously  by  means  of  any 
natural  force,  he  must  do  it  by  causing  this  force  to  operate 
otherwise  than  in  a  natural  way.  If,  for  example,  an  earth- 
quake is  made  to  take  place  where  or  when  it  would  not 
take  place  under  the  normal  and  natural  working  of  natural 
forces,  why,  then  the  force  which  intensifies  or  accelerates  the 
operation  of  the  natural  agencies  cannot  itself  be  a  natural 
force  ;  it  must  be  a  supernatural  force.     And  so  we  gain  nothing 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  117 

by  the  hypothesis  that  in  a  miracle  natural  agencies  are  made 
use  of.  If  the  elements  by  which  the  wine  was  produced  at 
Cana  were  miraculously  brought  together  from  the  surround- 
ing atmosphere,  this  bringing  of  them  together  is  just  the 
thing  to  be  accounted  for.  If  Imman  ingenuity  should  succeed 
in  inventing  a  way  by  which  the  wine-producing  elements 
of  earth  and  air  could  be  suddenly  brought  together,  the 
combination  would  have  to  be  effected  by  calling  into  service 
natural  forces.  It  could  not  be  done  by  a  mere  volition.  The 
natural  forces  could  be  made  to  operate  in  a  different  direction 
from  what  they  would  if  left  to  themselves ;  but  they  would 
still  be  themselves.  Their  essential  nature  would  not  be 
changed.  If  now  the  same  holds  true  of  God ;  if  in  produc- 
ing a  so-called  miracle  he  is  absolutely  limited  to  the  use  and 
manipulation  of  substances  and  forces  that  already  belong  to  the 
system  of  nature ;  if  the  essence  of  the  miracle  consists  only  m 
a  hitherto  unobserved  combination  of  forces  already  operative,  — 
then  it  becomes  a  puzzling  question,  by  what  right  any  event 
is  designated  a  miracle  at  all.  For  the  combinations  of  physi- 
cal forces  are  constantly  varying.  Every  phenomenon  which 
is  not  exactly  a  repetition  of  some  other  may  be  said  to  be  the 
result  of  a  new  combination  of  natural  forces.  Nearly  every- 
thing that  happens  would  be  miraculous,  if  the  mark  of  the 
miraculous  is  novelty.  The  weather  of  no  one  day  is  exactly 
like  that  of  any  other  day.  The  play  of  motion  in  the  water 
of  a  cataract  is  perpetually  changing.  Every  individual  tree  or 
animal  has  features  of  its  own,  the  result  of  new  combinations 
of  physical  forces.  But  these  peculiarities  of  individuation  are 
by  no  one  called  miraculous.  Nor  are  the  more  rare  and  start- 
ling phenomena  of  nature  called  miraculous,  even  though  they 
are  unparalleled  and  inexplicable.  The  peculiar  hue  of  the 
western  evening  sky  which  began  to  appear  somewhat  suddenly 
in  the  autumn  of  1883,  and  continued  for  two  or  three  years, 
has  never  been  explained,  and  perhaps  never  will  be ;  but  it  is 
not  pronounced  miraculous  ;  it  is  assumed  that  it  was  the  result 
of  natural  agencies  acting  according  to  natural  law,  although 
beyond  the  reach  of  human  research.  The  new  phenomena 
which  result  from  the   new  combinations  are  supposed  to  be 


118  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

the  necessary  effect  of  physical  forces  whose  nature  and  mode 
of  operation  have  been  eternally  prescribed  by  the  Creator. 

Neither  newness,  nor  strangeness,  nor  inexplicableness,  there- 
fore, constitutes  an  event  miraculous.  What  then  is  it  which 
warrants  us  in  calling  any  event  a  miracle  ?  When  we  are  told 
that  miracles  are  phenomena  wrought  "  by  means  of  the  gen- 
eral forces  of  nature,"  though  not  to  be  explained  from  them 
alone ;  when  it  is  intimated  that  God,  as  "  the  great  Geometer 
and  Mechanic,"  so  manipulates  "  the  threads  of  the  complex  of 
nature "  as  to  bring  about  an  occurrence  which  is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  ordinary  ones  that  can  be  explained  from 
the  general  forces  of  nature  alone,  —  we  must  ask,  What  is 
that  force  which  7nodifies  the  forces  of  nature  so  as  to  bring 
about  the  exceptional,  the  miraculous  result  ?  And  if  it  is  a 
force  of  nature  not  acting  according  to  its  own  laws,  then  this 
deviation  from  its  normal  course  of  action  must  be  ascribed  to 
a  supernatural  force ;  and  this  is  what  constitutes  the  anoma- 
lous action  a  miracle.  That  which  produces  the  deviation  can- 
not be  itself  one  of  the  forces  of  nature  acting  according  to 
its  own  laws.  Gloatz  himself  speaks  of  it  as  "  a  newUj  mani- 
fested causality  of  God."  ^  Plainly  it  must  be  such.  And  if  it  is 
a  newly  manifested  causality,  then  it  must  be  an  agency  distinct 
from  the  natural  action  of  natural  forces ;  that  is,  it  must  be  an 
immediate  and  supernatural  exercise  of  divine  power. 

But  may  this  divine  power  produce  an  effect  in  nature  with- 
out making  use  of  natural  forces  ?  Why  not  ?  Human  agents 
are  indeed  obliged  to  depend  on  the  laws  and  forces  of  na- 
ture when  they  undertake  to  modify  the  course  of  nature.  A 
man  who  lifts  a  stone  does  not  abolish  the  force  of  gravitation, 
nor  does  he  create  any  new  physical  force ;  but  he  avails  himself 
of  natural  forces  in  order  to  produce  a  movement  which  other- 
wise would  not  take  place.  But  is  God  limited  in  the  same 
way  ?  Men  can  manipulate  natural  forces  ;  but  they  must  do 
it  by  means  of  the  forces  of  their  own  physical  system.  God 
has  no  physical  body  whose  arms  and  fingers  can  be  thrust 
in  here  and  there  to  modify  or  check  the  operation  of  his  nat- 
ural forces.  Is  he  then  more  limited  than  man  ?  Could  not 
^  JFu/ider  und  Nuturgeselz  (in  Studien  und  Kritiken,  1886),  p.  543. 


MIRACLES   DEFINED.  119 

God  cause  a  stone  to  rise  up  from  the  earth  without  the  use  of 
muscles  or  any  other  physical  instrument  ?  If  it  is  said  that 
he  might  do  this  by  means  of  some  already  existent  natural 
force,  then  we  have  this  dilemma :  If  the  natural  force  which 
raises  the  stone  operates  naturally,  say,  as  when  a  volcano 
hurls  stones  upward,  then  there  is  no  miracle.  If,  however, 
in  order  to  raise  a  stone  miraculously,  some  natural  force  is 
specially  diverted  from  its  normal  sphere  and  mode  of  opera- 
tion, that  is,  is  made  to  act  unnaturally,  or  supernaturally,  then 
there  comes  back  the  question  above  raised,  What  is  the  force 
which  causes  this  exceptional  working  of  the  natural  force  ?  It 
cannot  be  another  natural  force  working  naturally ;  and  if  it  is 
another  working  unnaturally  or  supernaturally,  then  the  ques- 
tion recurs.  What  is  the  cause  of  that  exceptional  effect  ?  And 
so  we  are  driven  to  the  absurd  assumption  of  an  infinite  series 
in  order  to  substantiate  a  miracle,  unless  we  simply  assume 
that  God,  ivithout  the  use  of  a  physical  force,  produces  excep- 
tional effects  in  the  physical  universe. 

The  distinction  between  absolute  and  relative  miracles  is, 
therefore,  untenable.  Whether  actual  miracles  shall  be  called 
absolute  or  relative,  is  a  mere  matter  of  definition.  If  an  ab- 
solute miracle  is  one  which  involves  the  suspension  or  tem- 
porary abolition  of  all  the  laws  of  nature,  then  all  miracles  can 
be  only  relative  ones.  But  if  an  absolute  miracle  is  one  which 
is  produced  by  a  direct  exercise  of  divine  power,  superadded  to 
the  forces  of  nature,  then  all  real  miracles  are  absolute  ones. 
With  regard  to  such  things  as  the  plagues  of  Egypt,  which 
seem  to  have  been  only  an  intensification  of  ordinary  and 
natural  phenomena,  if  they  were  miraculous  at  all,  they  were 
such  by  virtue  of  a  special  divine  power  intensifying  the  opera- 
tion of  the  natural  causes.  In  other  words,  the  natural  forces 
were  not  left  to  be  controlled  by  nature.  But  as  soon  as  we 
make  this  supposition,  we  assume  a  miracle  in  the  strictest 
sense  of  the  word.  If  the  swarms  of  lice  or  of  flies  were 
ordinary  as  to  kind,  but  only  extraordinary  as  to  degree,  the 
question  to  be  answered  is  simply  this :  Was  the  exceptional 
character  of  the  plagues  purely  natural,  just  as  we  assume  the 
occasional  extraordinary  prevalence  of  grasshoppers  to  be  now- 


120  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

a-days  ?  Or  was  it  caused  by  a  special  intervention  of  divine 
agency  for  the  purpose  of  producing  a  special  result  ?  One 
can  take  what  view  he  pleases  :  one  may  deny  the  credibility 
of  the  narrative ;  one  may  eliminate  from  it  all  that  seems  to 
attest  a  supernatural  agency ;  but  one  cannot  do  this  and  at  the 
same  time  properly  call  the  occurrences  miraculous.  The  alter- 
native is  sharp  and  clear:  If  the  forces  of  nature,  operating 
undisturbed  by  special  supernatural  intervention,  produced  those 
plagues,  then  they  were  not  miracles  in  any  sense.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  peculiar  character  of  the  plagues  was  due  to 
a  special  interposition  of  divine  agency,  then  a  miracle  took 
place,  in  as  true  and  emphatic  a  sense  of  the  term  as  if  the 
waters  of  the  Nile  had  suddenly  begun  to  turn  back  and  flow 
up  hill  towards  the  south,  or  as  if  an  entirely  new  species  of 
insects  had  been  created  and  let  loose  on  the  Egyptians. 

In  a  lax  and  improper  sense  the  term  "miracle"  may  be  applied 
to  certain  striking  occurrences  or  coincidences,  while  yet  there 
may  not  be  reason  to  assume  a  special  supernatural  intervention. 
If  one  choose  to  call  such  events  miracles  in  a  relative  sense,  no 
harm  is  done,  provided  a  careful  distinction  is  maintained  be- 
tween them  and  miracles  proper.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that 
the  events  in  question  are  such  as  might  be  called  wonderful  by 
some,  and  not  at  all  by  others.  What  are  called  providential 
events  —  occurrences  which  have  a  striking  and  important  bear- 
ing on  the  character  and  life  of  an  individual  —  become  such 
to  the  individual  by  virtue  of  their  peculiar  relation  to  his  cir- 
cumstances or  feelings.  To  others  the  events  may  be  in  no 
sense  remarkable.  The  peculiarity  of  the  events  does  not  con- 
sist in  themselves,  —  in  their  relation  to  divine  causation  or  to 
natural  laws,  —  but  in  their  accidental  relation  to  the  individ- 
ual's circumstances.  It  is  manifest  that,  according  to  what  is 
called  the  law  of  chance,  such  coincidences  must  be  numerous. 
It  depends,  moreover,  wholly  on  the  mood  of  the  individual 
whether  the  events  which  he  experiences  shall  be  called  provi- 
dential or  not.  Some  men,  of  a  lively  and  impressible  tem- 
perament, may  find  special  suggestions  and  lessons  in  almost 
everything ;  others,  of  a  more  stolid  make-up,  find  nothing 
specially  impressive.      To   make  these  subjective  impressions 


MIRACLES   DEFINED.  121 

constitute  the  essence  of  the  miraculous  (as  is  done  by  Eitschl 
and  his  school),  is  a  caricature  of  the  doctrine  of  miracles.  If 
this  is  all  there  is  in  a  miracle,  then  there  are  no  miracles  in 
the  genuine  sense  at  all. 

The  question  of  so-called  special  providences  is  one  respecting 
the  philosophy  of  which  there  will  probably  always  be  doubt 
and  diverse  opinions.  If  these  providences  acquire  their  special 
significance  solely  from  their  accidental  relation  to  individual 
circumstances,  and  are  of  themselves  as  purely  the  normal 
result  of  the  ordinary  forces  of  nature  as  anything  else  that 
happens,  then  the  specialness  consists  merely  in  the  chance  co- 
incidence, and  there  is  nothing  in  any  sense  miraculous  about 
them.  And  there  is,  generally  speaking,  no  just  ground  for 
assuming  any  special  divine  intervention  in  the  case  of  so- 
called  special  providences.  But  there  have  been  some  events 
in  which  the  providential  lesson  seems  so  striking,  and  the 
coincidence  so  improbable,  if  regarded  as  purely  the  result  of 
the  natural  working  of  ordinary  forces,  that  the  hypothesis  of 
some  kind  of  special  divine  arrangement  will  always  seem 
plausible. 

Here  belongs  also  the  question  of  answers  to  prayer.  If 
specific  prayers  are  answered,  does  the  answer  involve  a  mira- 
cle ?  Or  is  there  some  other  way  of  explaining  the  facts,  yet 
without  denying  that  prayers  are  veritably  answered  ?  There 
are  at  least  two  admissible  suppositions.  (1)  The  universe, 
with  all  the  working  of  its  natural  forces,  may  from  eternity 
have  been  adjusted  with  reference  to  the  foreknown  prayers 
that  were  to  be  answered.  In  this  case,  the  natural  operation 
of  things  brings  about  the  accomplishment  of  the  thing  asked 
for.  The  answer  to  the  prayer  is  as  real  as  if  effected  by  a 
supernatural  and  special  interruption  of  the  ordinary  course 
of  nature.  The  event  which  constitutes  the  answer  may  be 
in  itself  no  more  marvellous  than  many  others  which  occur. 
For  example,  when  Luther  prayed  for  the  life  of  Melanchthon, 
and  ]\Ielanchthon  recovered,  though  he  had  seemed  to  be  at  the 
point  of  death,  the  recovery,  though  striking,  was  not  more 
remarkable  in  itself  than  many  others  which  have  taken  place 
after  all  hope  of  recovery  had  vanished.     The  remarkableness 


122  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION, 

consists,  in  the  case  specified,  only  in  the  coincidence  between 
the  recovery  and  the  fervent  prayer.  It  cannot  be  proved  that 
any  law  of  nature  was  disturbed  or  diverted  in  its  operation; 
but  it  may  be  supposed  that  nature  was  eternally  constituted 
with  reference  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  thing  to  be  prayed 
for.  Or  (2)  it  may  be  supposed,  as  Dr,  Chalmers  ^  conceived, 
that  the  answer  is  effected  by  a  divine  influence  wrought  on 
the  invisible  and  untraceable  powers  of  nature,  while  yet  to 
all  visible  appearance  the  uniformity  of  nature  remains  undis- 
turbed. "  It  may  be  not  by  an  act  of  intervention  among  those 
near  and  visible  causes  where  intervention  would  be  a  miracle ; 
it  may  be  by  an  unseen  but  not  less  effectual  act  of  interven- 
tion among  the  remote  and  occult  causes,  that  he  adapts  him- 
self to  the  various  wants  and  meets  the  various  petitions  of  his 
children."  No  one  can  controvert  such  a  hypothesis;  for  no 
one  is  able  to  trace  out  the  concatenation  of  causes  that  result 
in  the  production  of  any  given  event.  An  answer  to  prayer 
brought  about  by  such  a  method  would  differ  from  a  miracle 
commonly  so  called  only  in  its  not  being  palpable  to  human 
senses  that  an  intervention  had  taken  place.  It  would,  how- 
ever, be  essentially  as  miraculous  as  an  intervention  occurring 
in  some  one  of  "  the  wonted  successions  that  are  known  to  take 
place."  This  hypothesis  differs  from  the  first  one  in  that  it 
represents  God  as  in  a  sense  changeable,  constantly  modifying 
his  activity  in  accordance  with  the  contingency  of  human 
volitions  and  desires. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  respecting  the  method  of  God's 
providential  working  with  reference  to  such  cases,  they  differ 
materially  from  the  palpable  miracles  wrought  in  connection 
with  special  revelations  of  the  divine  will.  The  latter  must 
be  regarded  as  attributable  to  a  special  divine  agency  distinct 
from  the  natural  forces  of  the  material  universe. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  remark  that,  notwithstanding  the  many 
infelicities  and  inconsistencies  in  the  definition  of  miracles,  there 
has  been,  after  all,  no  great  diversity  in  intention  and  in  fact. 
A  miracle  has  by  Christian  thinkers  been  generally  regarded  as  a 

^  In  a  sermon  on  The  Efficacy  of  Prayer  consistent  with  the  Uniformity  of 
Nature. 


MIRACLES  DEFINED.  123 

work  wrought  by  special  supernatural  intervention,  and  serving 
to  attest  the  reality  of  a  divine  revelation. 

But  this  starts  another  question  which  requires  to  be  con- 
sidered :  What  is  the  use  of  miracles  ?  Have  they  any 
evidential  value? 


124  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  EVIDENTIAL  VALUE  OF  MIKACLES. 

IVTO  thoughtful  man  can  ever  have  any  interest  in  trying  to 
-*-  ^  prove  the  fact  of  miracles,  unless  he  antecedently  assumes 
that  miracles  are  useful  and  needful.  And  the  common  opinion 
concerning  their  use  has  been  that  miraculous  works  have  served 
to  attest  the  divine  commission  of  men  (and  especially  of  Jesus 
Christ)  who  have  professed  to  be  the  organs  of  a  revelation 
from  God.  The  argument,  briefly  stated,  is  this :  The  mere 
profession  which  a  man  might  make,  that  he  is  a  special  mes- 
senger of  divine  truth,  would  be  of  itself  no  sufficient  proof 
that  he  is  such.  Men  may  make  false  pretensions ;  they  may 
aim  to  deceive  others,  or  may  even  deceive  themselves.  ^  As  a 
safeguard  against  such  deceptions,  and  as  essential  to  a  full 
proof  of  the  reality  of  a  special  revelation  of  the  divine  mind, 
there  is  need  of  some  palpable  mark  of  divine  attestation .^  An 
inward  inspiration  may  be  sufficient  to  convince  the  messenger 
himself  that  he  has  been  charged  with  a  special  message;  but 
this  inward  experience  cannot  of  itself  serve  to  others  as  a 
proof  of  one's  divine  commission ;  for  they  can  know  of  it 
only  as  he  affirms  it;  and  knowing  the  possibility  of  inten- 
tional or  unintentional  deception,  and  considering  the  general 
presumption  against  the  truth  of  any  such  affirmation,  they 
must  regard  his  mere  assertion  as  no  sufficient  proof  of  the 
truth  of  the  thing  affirmed.  If,  however,  his  assertion  is  ac- 
companied by  the  exertion  of  supernatural  power,  they  have 
the  additional  evidence  needed  that  God  himself  has  accredited 
him  as  a  special  messenger. 

The  argument  presupposes  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  God 
—  a  personal  God  —  and  a  personal  God  disposed  and  able  to 

1  Cf.  Dorner,  Christian  Doctrine,  §  55. 

^  Cf.  Pres.  J.  H.  Seelye,  on  Miracles  (in  Boston  Lectures,  IS 70,  pp.  207 
sqq.). 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  125 

make  himself  known  by  means  of  a  special  revelation.  A 
miracle  cannot  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God  to  an  atheist. 
To  him  any  strange  or  exceptional  occurrence  can  only  be  what 
the  tricks  of  the  juggler  or  lusus  natures  are  to  all  men,  ■ —  sim- 
ply observed  facts,  which  are  presumed  to  be  produced  by  soine 
force  of  nature,  however  unknown  or  rarely  operative.^ 

It  is  scarcely  less  clear  that  miracles  can  have  evidential 
force  only  to  one  who  assumes  the  need  and  antecedent  proba- 
bility of  a  divine  revelation.  Even  a  theist  —  especially  if 
pantheistically  or  deistically  inclined  —  may  hold  that  there  is 
no  need  of  any  special  self-manifestation  of  God ;  that  nature 
and  the  human  intuitions  afford  a  sufficient  disclosure  of  the 
divine  nature  and  will.  Whoever  so  thinks  cannot  believe  in 
miracles ;  for  to  believe  in  them  would  imply  to  him  that  God 
acts  irregularly  for  no  worthy  purpose ;  that  he  acts  capriciously ; 
that  he  acts,  as  it  were,  the  part  of  a  juggler.  To  him,  as  to 
the  pure  atheist,  strange  and  inexplicable  events  would  be  sim- 
ply strange  and  inexplicable,  as  many  things  are  and  must  be 
to  all  men.  They  could  not  prove  to  him  that  the  man 
through  whom  they  seem  to  be  wrought  is  a  prophet  bearing 
a  revelation. 

If,  nevertheless,  men  professing  atheistic  views  have  sometimes 
been  led  by  the  evidence  of  miracles  to  a  belief  in  God  and 
revelation,  it  must  have  been  because  they  were  not  thorough 
and  radical  in  their  disbelief,  but  had  tendencies  and  suscep- 
tibilities of  which  they  may  themselves  scarcely  have  been 
conscious,  and  which  prepared  them  to  welcome  the  evidence 
that  God  had  indeed  made  his  existence  and  his  will  manifest. 

Apart,  however,  from  men  of  this  class  the  evidential  value 
of  miracles    is  denied  or  questioned   by   many  who   are    not 

^  "  Considered  by  itself,  it  [a  miracle]  is  at  most  but  the  token  of  a  super- 
human being.  Hence,  though  an  additional  instance,  it  is  not  a  distinct  species 
of  evidence  for  a  Creator  from  that  contained  in  the  general  marks  of  order 
and  design  in  the  universe.  A  proof  drawn  from  an  interruption  in  the  course 
of  nature  is  in  the  same  line  of  argument  as  one  deduced  from  the  existence 
of  that  course,  and  in  point  of  cogency  is  inferior  to  it.  ...  A  miracle  is  no 
argument  to  one  who  is  deliberately,  and  on  principle,  an  atheist." — J.  H. 
Newman,  Two  Essays  on  Miracles,  pp.  10,  11,  2d  ed.  Cf.  Wariugton,  Can 
tee  believe  in  Miracles!'  p.  219. 


126  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

only  theists,  but  professed  Christians.  The  doubt  takes  some- 
what this  form :  At  the  best  a  miracle  is  an  event  which  re- 
quires peculiarly  strong  evidence  before  its  own  reality  can  be 
accepted.  But  even  if  the  fact  of  one  is  made  probable,  still  it 
is  nothing  in  itself  but  an  outward  physical  phenomenon ;  it 
may,  for  aught  we  know,  and  as  seems  indeed  to  be  affirmed  in 
the  Bible,  be  wrought  by  demoniacal  as  well  as  by  divine 
power.  The  mere  fact  of  a  miracle,  therefore,  at  the  best 
proves  nothing  more  than  the  exercise  of  an  extraordinary  or 
superhuman  power;  it  does  not  prove  that  the  worker  com- 
municates divine  and  infallible  truth.  "VVe  must  know  about 
the  character  and  doctrines  of  the  miracle-worker,  before  we 
can  commit  ourselves  implicitly  to  him.  "We  must  trust 
him,  before  we  can  trust  his  miracles.  It  being  easy  to  pro- 
duce the  appearance  of  something  miraculous  without  the  re- 
ality of  it,  we  may  properly  doubt  the  genuineness  of  the 
miracles  so  long  as  we  have  no  assurance  of  the  trustworthiness 
of  the  person.  Consequently  the  miracles,  even  if  proved,  do 
no  good ;  for  they  are  proved  genuine  only  as  we  presuppose 
the  trustworthiness  of  the  man  who  professes  to  work  them ; 
but  if  this  trustworthiness  is  assumed,  then  the  miracles  are 
not  needed.  The  doctrine  proves  the  miracle,  not  the  miracle 
the  doctrine.  Miracles  are,  therefore,  useless  if  real;  but  be- 
ing useless,  they  are  presumptively  not  real. 

Many  strenuous  defenders  of  the  reality  of  miracles,  how- 
ever, assume,  though  in  a  modified  form,  an  attitude  of  doubt 
concerning  the  evidential  value  of  miracles.^  In  its  least 
objectionable  form  it  is  to  be  found  in  such  men  as  Arch- 
bishop   Trench,   who    says :  ^      "A    miracle    does    not    prove 

1  Vide,  e.  g.,  Kostliu,  Die  Frage  iiber  das  W under,  in  the  JahrbUcher  fiir 
deutsrhe  Theologie,  1864.  "  Who  would  liope,"  he  says  (p.  206),  "  iu  dealing 
with  tlie  unbelief  of  the  present  day,  which  rejects  the  fundamental  truths  of 
the  Bible  respecting  the  living  God  and  Christ  the  Redeemer,  to  be  able  first 
to  bring  the  unbeliever  to  a  conviction  of  the  historical  reality  of  the  story  of 
the  Bible  miracles,  and  thence  to  lead  him  on  to  accept  those  fundamental 
truths  ?  "  Cf.  James  Freeman  Clarke,  Orthodoxy,  Us  Truths  and  Errors,  pp.  68 
sqq.     Bishop  Lightfoot  {Christianity  in  Relation  to  Skepticism,  Report  of  the 


2  Notes  on  Miracles,  p.  27,  cd.  13. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  127 

the  truth  of  a  doctrine,  or  the  divine  mission  of  him  that 
brings  it  to  pass  .  .  .  The  doctrine  must  first  commend  it- 
self to  the  conscience  as  being  good,  and  only  then  can  the 
miracle  seal  it  as  divine."  Later,  however,  when  he  takes  up 
more  particularly  the  evidential  worth  of  miracles,  he  says :  ^ 
"Are  then,  it  may  be  asked,  the  miracles  to  occupy  no  place  at 
all  in  the  array  of  proofs  for  the  certainty  of  the  things  which 
we  have  believed  ?  So  far  from  this,  a  most  important  place. 
Our  loss  would  be  irreparable,  if  they  were  absent  from  our 
sacred  history."  He  then  goes  on  to  say  of  Christ's  miracles 
that  they  are  not,  what  Lessing  would  have  them,  a  part  of  the 
scaffolding  of  revelation.  "  They  are  rather,"  he  says,  "  a  con- 
stitutive element  of  the  revelation  of  God  in  Christ.  We  could 
not  conceive  of  Him  as  not  doing  such  works."  This  concep- 
tion of  the  miraculous  in  Christianity  is  a  common  one  at 
present  among  theological  and  apologetic  writers.  Thomas 
Arnold  of  Eugby,  comparing  the  Biblical  miracles  with  those 
alleged  to  have  occurred  in  modern  times,  says  '^  that  "  miracles 
were  but  the  natural  accompaniments,  if  I  may  so  speak,  of  the 
Christian  revelation ;  accompaniments,  the  absence  of  which 
would  have  been  far  more  wonderful  than  their  presence.  This, 
as  I  may  almost  call  it,  this  a  priori  probability  in  favor  of  the 
miracles  of  the  Gospel  cannot  be  said  to  exist  in  favor  of  those 
of  later  history."     And  later  on  he  says  :  ^    "  Miracles  must  not 

Church  Congress  held  in  Nottingham,  1S71,  p.  78),  regards  the  evidence  from 
miracles  as  varying  according  to  the  intellectual  characteristics  of  different 
ages.  At  first,  he  says,  they  were  of  subordinate  use  because  ihe  miraculous 
and  even  the  magical  vrere  too  readily  believed.  Afterwards  when  the  idea  of 
regular  sequence  became  current,  the  evidence  from  miracles  was  forcible  ; 
"  but  as  the  idea  of  law  still  further  prevails,  and  prevailing  overpowers  the 
mind,  from  being  a  special  evidence  they  become  a  special  objection,  themselves 
needing  extraordinary  testimony  to  establish  their  truth." 

^  Notes  on  Miracles,  pp.  99,  100. 

2  Lectures  on.  Modern  History,  p.  133.  Cf.  Dorner,  Si/stem  of  Christian 
Doctrine.,  vol.  ii.  p.  182 ;  G.  P.  Fisher,  Supernatural  Origin  of  Christianity, 
p.  500 ;  Alexander  Mair,  Studies  in  the  Christian  Evidences,  p.  192. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  137.  Similarly,  S.  T.  Coleridge,  The  Friend,  vol.  ii.  p.  142,  H. 
N.  Coleridge's  ed.  So  F.  D.  Maurice,  Kingdom  of  Christ,  vol.  ii.  p.  209,  3d 
ed.  "  Either  the  strange  stories  spoken  of  are  in  accordance  with  the  Scrip- 
tural idea  of  the  Founder  of  a  spiritual  and  universal  kingdom,  or  they  are  not. 


128  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

be  allowed  to  overrule  the  Gospel ;  for  it  is  only  through  our 
belief  in  the  Gospel  that  we  accord  our  belief  to  them."  But 
Baden  Powell  goes  considerably  farther  when,  after  a  discus- 
sion of  this  question,  he  concludes :  "  If  miracles  were,  in  the 
estimation  of  a  former  age,  among  the  chief  supports  of  Christi- 
anity, they  are  at  present  among  the  main  difficulties  and 
hinderances  to  its  acceptance."  ^ 

The  question  before  us  may  be  put  in  this  form :  Is  the  de- 
cisive evidence  for  Christianity  independent  of  the  alleged  mir- 
acles, so  that  one  may  be  a  good  Christian  with  or  without 
faith  in  the  miracles  ?  Or,  vice  versa,  does  faith  in  Christian- 
ity depend  on  antecedent  faith  in  the  reality  of  the  miracles? 
Or,  finally,  shall  we  adopt  a  middle  course,  and  say,  with  Pascal, 
that  the  miracles  prove  the  doctrine,  and  the  doctrine  proves 
the  miracles  ? 

I.  Is  then  faith  in  miracles  a  matter  of  indifference  ?  It  can- 
not be  questioned  that  nowadays  there  is  in  many,  even  sin- 
cerely Christian,  minds  a  strong  tendency  to  take  this  view. 
The  intrinsic  improbability  of  supernatural  occurrences;  the 
great  number  of  spurious  or  doubtful  miracles  ;  the  problem  pre- 
sented by  the  swarm  of  pretended,  and  often  well-attested, 
ecclesiastical  miracles ;  ^  the  absence  of  any  necessary  connec- 

If  they  are  not,  no  evidence  whatever  could  establish  the  authenticity  of  the 
document  containing  them  ;  for  they  would  be  self-contradictory  ;  we  should 
be  bound  to  reject  them  because  we  believe  in  Jesus  Christ,  the  Sou  of  God. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  they  are,  we  should  require  evidence  to  account  for  their 
omission  in  any  record  professing  to  contain  the  history  of  such  a  person." 

^  Essays  and  Reviews,  p.  158  (New  York,  1874).  Cf.  Sterling,  Essays  and 
Tales,  vol.  ii.  p.  121  ;  R|nan,  Life  of  Jesus,  p.  189.  "If  ever  the  worship  of 
Jesus  loses  its  hold  upon  mankind,  it  will  be  precisely  on  account  of  those 
acts  which  originally  inspired  belief  in  him." 

^  Such  as  Constantine's  vision,  the  Port  Royal  miracles,  and  the  modern  in- 
stances of  alleged  miraculous  healing  in  answer  to  prayer.  Fide  J.  H. 
Newman's  Two  Essays,  essay  ii.,  who  defends  the  genuineness  of  ecclesi- 
astical miracles  (though  the  book  was  written  before  he  became  a  Romanist), 
and  G.  P.  Fisher,  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief,  chap,  x.,  who 
takes  the  opposite  ground.  Tholuck,  Ueher  die  Wunder  der  katholischen  Kirche 
(Part  I.  of  his  Vermischte  Schriflen'),  favors  the  notion  of  a  gradual  disap- 
pearance of  the  apostolic  charismata.  Christlieb,  Modern  Doubt  and  Christian 
Belief,  pp.    330   sqq.,  takes  the  ground  that  miracles  do  occur  nowadays, 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  129 

tion  between  physical  marvels  and  spiritual  truth,  —  all  this 
prepossesses  the  mind  against  miracles  in  general.  And  if, 
nevertheless,  the  fact  of  their  occurrence  is  admitted  on  the 
strength  of  Biblical  testimony,  the  admission  is  a  reluctant  one. 
It  is  this  state  of  mind  which  has  given  rise  to  the  judgment 
frequently  expressed,  that  nowadays  Christianity  is  believed  in, 
not  because  of,  but  in  spite  of,  the  miracles.^  The  spiritual  as- 
pects of  Christianity  are  held  to  be  the  thing  of  chief  concern ; 
and  it  is  felt  to  be  a  burden  rather  than  a  help  to  have  to  ac- 
cept, along  with  the  moral  and  religious  teachings  of  the  Bible, 
all  those  stories  of  marvelous  occurrences  for  which  there 
seems  to  have  been  no  occasion,  and  which  now  expose  Chris- 
tianity to  the  ridicule  of  naturalists. 

We  may  here  distinguish  three  classes.  First,  there  are  those 
whose  disinclination  to  believe  in  miracles  amounts  to  virtual, 
or  even  avowed,  disbelief,  while  still  they  profess  to  hold  to 
all  that  is  essential  in  Christianity.  This  class  is  represented 
by  such  men  as  Pfleiderer  and  Lipsius  in  Germany,  Matthew 
Arnold,  W.  R  Greg,  and  E.  A.  Abbott  in  England.^ 

Another  class  may  be  called  agnostics  as  regards  miracles. 
They  would  leave  it  an  open  question  what  miracles  are,  and 
whether  they  really  occurred  in  the  sense  commonly  attached 
to  them.  The  use  of  them  is  often  declared  to  have  been  con- 
fined to  the  time  of  their  occurrence,  so  that  to  us  of  the  present 
day  it  is  of  no  practical  importance  to  believe  in  them,  or  to  hold 
any  definite  theory  concerning  them.  In  this  class,  though  by 
no   means  all   taking   precisely  the   same   ground,  are    to   be 

especially  on  mission  gronnd.     So  Bushnell,   Nature  and  the  Supernatural,  *^f 

chap.  xiv. 

^  A  terse  form  of  expression,  perhaps  derived  originally  from  J.  J.  Rous- 
seau, who  in  his  Letters  from  t/ie  Mountains  (letter  III.,  vol.  ix.  p.  77,  of  his 
■works,  Edinburgh,  1774),  says,  "  I  know  not  well  what  these  our  fashionable 
good  Christians  think  in  their  hearts  ;  but  if  they  believe  in  Christ  on  account 
of  his  miracles,  I,  for  my  part,  believe  in  him  in  spite  of  his  miracles." 

^  O.  Pfleiderer,  ReUgionsphilosopliie,  2d  ed.  R.  A.  Lipsius,  Lehrbuch  der 
evangeliscti-protestantischen  Dogmatik.  Matthew  Arnold,  Literature  and 
Dogma.  W.  R.  Greg,  The  Creed  of  Christendom.  E.  A.  Abbott,  The  Kernel 
and  the  Husk,  Philochristus.  (The  authorship  of  these  two  last  mentioned 
works,  though  they  are  published  as  anonymous,  is  an  open  secret.) 


130  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

reckoned  such  men  as  Ritsclil  and  liis  school  in  Germany, 
Baden  Powell  and  J.  E.  Seeley  in  England,  Athanase  J.  Co- 
querel  and  F.  Pecaut  in  France,^  and  P.  H.  Hedge  in  the 
United  States.^ 

Thirdly,  there  are  those  who  accept  the  fact  of  the  miracles 
unreservedly,  but  do  so  simply  because  their  general  faith  in 
the  Christian  religion  seems  to  necessitate  it. 

The  modern  rationalistic  school  in  Germany  (Pfleiderer, 
Lipsius,  Biedermann,  etc.)  and  the  Ritschl  school  are  strenu- 
ously opposed  to  each  other;  but  respecting  miracles  they 
come  by  a  different  process  to  a  similar  result.  The  ration- 
alists, who  believe  in  the  value  of  metaphysical  specula- 
tion, question  or  reject  miracles  because  of  the  philosophical 
difficulties  they  involve.  The  Ritschlites,  who  repudiate  meta- 
physics, ignore  or  subordinate  the  question  of  miracles  because 
the  definition  and  discussion  of  them  lead  to  metaphysical  sub- 
tleties. Both  agree  that  they  constitute  no  important  part,  if  in- 
deed any  part,  of  real  Christianity.  Both  agree  in  reducing  the 
supernatural  either  to  a  minimum  or  to  a  nonentity.  The  two 
schools,  in  their  several  wings,  even  overlap  one  another  in  this 
respect.  Rationalists,  like  Keim,  admit  the  reality  of  Christ's 
resurrection,^  while  Eitschlites,  like  Bender,  question  or  deny  it. 

^  Baden  Powell,  The  Order  of  Nature,  Study  of  the  Evidences  of  Christian- 
ity (ill  Essays  and  Reviews).  J.  R.  Seeley,  Natural  Religion.  In  his  Ecce 
Homo  he  was  less  skeptical.  A.  J.  Coquerel,  Quelle  etait  la  Religion  de  Jesus? 
In  the  sixth  of  these  discourses,  Coquerel  says  (p.  42)  :  "Be  Christians,  and 
believe  in  miracles,  if  you  find  them  real  and  if  they  are  useful  to  you.  Be 
Christians  without  the  miracles,  if  they  bring  the  least  obstacle,  the  least 
shadow,  to  your  piety  and  your  faith.  But  be  Christians."  Telix  Pecaut,  Le 
Christ  et  la  Conscience  (1859),  p.  416,  "The  question  of  miracles  is  very 
obscure;  ...  I  do  not  pretend  to  judge  it  definitively."  In  his  later  work, 
Le  Christianisme  Liberal  et  le  Miracle  (1869),  lie  seems  to  be  more  pronounced 
in  the  rejection  of  all  miracles. 

2  F.  H.  Hedge,  The  Mythical  Element  in  the  New  Testament  (one  of  the 
essays  in  Christianity  and  Modern  Thought,  Boston,  1873),  Reason  in  Religion 
(Boston,  1867). 

^  Geschichte  Jesu,  2d  ed.  pp.  358  sqq.,  Geschichte  Jesu  von  Nazara,  vol.  iii. 
pp.  600  sqq.  Keim  does  not  indeed  distinctly  call  the  resurrection  (or  ratlier 
the  reappearance)  of  Jesus  supernatural,  but  he  rejects  empliatically  the  ordi- 
nary "  natural "  explanations.     Professor  Bender,  though  disowned  by  Ritschl 


THE   EVIDENTLVL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  131 

There  is  something  plausible  and  insinuating  in  the  agnostic 
ground  which  is  taken  respecting  the  supernatural  in  its  rela- 
tion to  Christianity.  It  professes  to  exalt  the  spiritual  and 
vital  elements  as  contrasted  with  what  is  simply  external, 
physical,  and  accidental.  Standing  on  this  ground  one  can  say  : 
The  origin  of  Christianity  lies  so  far  back  that  it  is  impossible  to 
learn  with  certainty  the  exact  character  of  the  phenomena  which 
accompanied  its  introduction.  The  miracles  may  have  been  dif- 
ferent in  fact  from  what  they  are  made  to  appear  in  the  narra- 
tives as  transmitted  to  us.  At  all  events,  without  troubling 
ourselves  to  prove  or  disprove  the  fact  of  miracles,  or  even  to 
define  what  they  are,  we  do  most  wisely  to  leave  this  whole 
domain  undefined,  especially  as  the  essence  of  Christianity  is 
something  entirely  different  from  these  outward  phenomena. 
We  cannot  but  recognize  Christianity  as  a  beneficent  institution  ; 
but  whether  there  was  anything  supernatural  in  Jesus  or  in  his 
disciples,  it  is  immaterial  to  know.  The  facts  of  history  prove 
the  superiority  of  the  Christian  religion  to  all  others.  That 
which  is  moral  and  spiritual  in  it  is  impregnable  by  virtue  of 
its  own  intrinsic  merit.  Why  should  we  weaken  our  position 
by  making  the  validity  of  the  claims  of  the  Gospel  depend  on 
the  validity  of  the  argument  for  miracles,  and  thus  run  the 
risk  of  losing  the  main  good  in  trying  to  rescue  what  at  the 
best  is  a  mere  accessory  ?  Whatever  may  have  been  the  origi- 
nal fact,  even  though  we  may  suppose  that  the  miracles  served 
a  useful  purpose  at  the  outset,  they  are  too  remote  and  obscure 
to  serve  such  a  purpose  any  longer.^ 

now,  was  one  of  his  disciples,  and  Las  only  carried  out  to  the  extreme  the  les- 
sons which  he  learned. 

^  Says  Lessing,  Theol.  Streitschrifteu  {Ueber  den  Beweis  des  Geistes  und 
der  Kraft),  "  If  I  had  seen  him  [Jesus]  work  miracles,  and  had  had  no  reasou 
to  doubt  that  they  were  true  miracles,  I  should  certainly  have  felt  so  much 
confidence  in  the  miracle-worker  that  I  should  willingly  have  yielded  my  un- 
derstanding to  his,  and  should  have  believed  him  in  everything  in  so  far  as 
experiences  just  as  indubitable  were  not  opposed  to  him."  And  Schleier- 
maclier  {Der  chrisiliche  Glaube,  vol.  ii.  p.  125,  5th  ed.)  says,  "Though  the 
true  acknowledgment  of  Christ  in  individual  cases  may  have  been  occasioned 
by  miracles,  .  .  .  they  must  be,  with  reference  to  our  faith,  wholly  super- 
fluous." Essentially  the  same  view  is  found  in  G.  H.  Curteis's  Scientific 
Obstacles  to  Christian  Belief,  pp.  81-88. 


132  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Plausible  as  this  may  sound,  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  its 
essential  inconsistency  with  a  genuine  faith  in  Christianity. 
Not  but  that  one  who  takes  this  position  may  be  a  real  Chris- 
tian. But  it  is  a  position  intrinsically  self-contradictory,  and 
logically  tends  to  a  positive  rejection  of  the  distinctive  claims 
of  Christianity.     For, 

1.  This  view  of  miracles  conflicts  with  a  sincere  faith  in 
Christianity  as  being  a  special  revelation.  The  term  "  revela- 
tion "  is  indeed  freely  used  by  thinkers  of  this  class.  But  the 
meaning  which  it  has  always  borne  in  theological  use  is  dis- 
carded. It  has  always  carried  with  it  the  idea  of  a  special, 
historical,  supernatural  communication.  But  writers  belong- 
ing to  the  first  class  above  mentioned  now  use  the  term  quite 
differently.  Religion  is  defined  as  correlative  to  revelation. 
As  Lipsius  puts  it,  "  The  divine  factor  in  the  religious  relation, 
or  God's  relation  to  the  human  spirit,  is  revelation  ;  the  human 
factor,  or  man's  relation  to  God,  is  religion."  ^  In  other  words, 
wherever  there  is  religion  there  is  revelation.  Of  course  "  rev- 
elation "  here  entirely  loses  its  traditional  sense  of  something 
special,  and  is  made  to  denote  a  universal  and  constant  thing. 

The  right  to  use  old  terms  in  a  new  or  modified  sense  need 
not  be  contested,  especially  if  the  deviation  is  distinctly  recog- 
nized and  stated.  But  where  the  deviation  is  great  and  radical, 
there  should  be  some  urgent  reason  for  using  the  old  term 
rather  than  some  other  whose  current  meaning  would  better 
express  the  sense  intended.  Otherwise  a  suspicion  can  hardly 
be  suppressed,  that  the  design  is  to  avoid  opprobrium  by  using 
words  which  sound  orthodox,  but  which  are  used  in  a  radically 
different  sense  from  the  ordinary  one. 

These  writers  profess  to  discard  the  older  rationalism,  and 
even  repudiate  the  name  "  rationalist ; "  and  it  is  one  character- 
istic of  their  deviation  from  the  older  rationalism,  that  they 
emphasize  this  divine  revelation  made  to  all  mankind.  But 
the  difference  is  in  words  more  than  in  fact.  The  older  ration- 
alists emphasized  the  authority  of  the  individual  reason  as  the 
ultimate  source  and  arbiter  of  religious  truth.  The  modern 
rationalists  emphasize  the  reality  of  a  reciprocal  relation  between 

^  Bogmatik,  §  52. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  133 

God  and  man.  The  former,  in  their  fear  of  supernaturalism, 
tended  to  hold  that  no  individuals  ever  were  the  recipients  of 
special  divine  influences ;  the  latter,  in  their  fear  of  supernatu- 
ralism, are  careful  to  insist  that  all  individuals  are  more  or  less 
the  recipients  of  divine  influences.  But  practically  the  upshot 
is  the  same  in  the  two  cases.  According  to  the  older  rational- 
ists, what  men  naturally  came  to  believe  by  the  use  of  their 
own  reason  they  came  to  believe  by  virtue  of  the  reason  which 
God  had  implanted  in  them.  Indirectly,  if  not  directly,  God 
could  be  said  to  have  communicated  himself  to  men,  having 
given  them  a  reason  by  which  they  could  find  him  out.  The 
modern  rationalists  have  less  to  say  about  reason,  and  more 
about  the  religious  impulse  or  instinct.  But  when  they  tell  us 
that  wherever  this  religious  impulse  is  there  is  a  divine  revela- 
tion, it  is  manifest  that  the  thing  meant  is  little  else  than  what 
the  older  rationalists  would  have  assented  to.  Inasmuch  as  all 
miraculous,  exceptional  divine  influences  are  denied  or  ignored, 
the  operations  of  the  mind  are  conceived  as  the  operations  of 
physical  nature  are  conceived,  namely,  as  under  the  universal 
all-controlling  influence  of  the  divine  presence.  The  older, 
deistic  conception  of  an  absentee  God  is  avoided  ;  there  is  more 
of  a  leaning  towards  the  pantheistic  notion  of  an  everpresent 
power.  But  in  the  last  analysis  the  self-manifestation  of  God 
is  in  this  case  plainly  nothing  but  what  the  human  beings  by 
virtue  of  their  natural  constitution  come  to  think  about  God. 
The  only  difference  between  this  and  the  older  representation  is 
that  the  conviction  which  arises  concerning  a  divine  being  is 
here  represented  as  a  recognition  of  a  present  God,  who  is  the 
efficient  cause  of  all  things ;  whereas  the  other  view  made  God 
to  be  farther  off,  and  less  immediately  concerned  with  human 
affairs.  In  neither  case  is  the  self-revelation  of  God  an  ob- 
jective one  ;  in  neither  case  an  exceptional  or  supernatural  one. 
In  both  cases  the  human  judgment,  such  as  it  is,  must  decide 
for  itself  what  religious  truth  and  duty  are.  In  neither  case  is 
man  supposed  to  be  conscious  of  anything  but  his  own  concep- 
tion of  divine  things.  Pfleiderer  ^  says,  "  Everywhere,  where 
any  healthy  religious  impulse,  however  primitive  and  childlike, 
^  Rcliffionsphilosophie,  vol.  ii.  p.  433. 


134  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

expresses  itself,  there  takes  place  also  in  some  degree  a  revela- 
tion of  the  divine  love  which  aims  at  a  fellowship  of  love."  The 
revelation,  then,  consists  in  the  religious  impulse ;  but  the  im- 
pulse must  be  a  "  healthy  "  one.  And  who  is  to  determine  when 
the  impulse  is  healthy  ?  Apparently  the  philosopher  himself, 
who  first  gives  his  definition  of  religion,  and  then  calls  a  reli- 
gious impulse  healthy,  according  as  it  conforms  to  his  definition 
of  religion.  Another  philosopher,  with  a  different  conception  of 
the  essence  of  religion,  will  find  either  more  or  less  of  healthy 
religious  impulses  than  Pfleiderer.  This  theologian  himself  re- 
gards Jesus  of  Nazareth  as  having  possessed  this  impulse  in  the 
highest  perfection.  He  ascribes  to  him  an  "  innate  genius  "  for 
religion.  This  genius,  he  says,  "  has  for  human  eyes  always 
something  of  impenetrable  mystery."  ^  Yet  Jesus'  religious 
development,  "  always  under  the  assumption  of  this  inborn 
genius,"  he  says,  is  explicable :  "  The  impressions  of  a  pious 
parentage,  of  a  cheerful  population,  and  of  beautiful  scenery," 
and  an  early  acquaintance  with  the  words  of  the  prophets, — 
these  were  "  very  favorable  circumstances  for  the  development 
of  the  religious  genius."  ^  Still,  inasmuch  as  many  others,  cer- 
tainly Jesus'  own  brothers,  had  a  like  advantage,  these  outward 
circumstances  cannot  alone  account  for  his  unique  distinction  ; 
therefore  the  assumption  of  special  "genius"  must  be  made. 
His  "  pure  heart,"  more  than  any  other,  was  attuned  to  the 
thought  of  God  as  Father.  The  thought  was  not  strictly  new 
with  him.  He  had  learned  it  from  the  prophets,  at  least  in  its 
essence.  But  he  seized  it,  and  developed  it  as  the  central  truth, 
and  made  it  the  centre  of  his  own  religious  experience.  And 
having  become  penetrated  with  this  idea,  he  naturally  felt  de- 
sirous to  impart  to  others  what  he  had  experienced  in  himself. 
Hence  he  began  to  preach,  and  had  such  success  that  he  gradu- 
ally came  to  think  that  he,  and  no  other,  was  called  to  be  the 
Messiah  of  his  people.^ 

Now  let  us  consider  this  conception.  For  this  is  a  fair 
presentation  of  the  anti-supernaturalistic  view  from  one  of  the 
ablest,  clearest,  and  most  reverent  of  the  modern  representatives 

^  Rpliqio7isphilosophie,  vol.  ii.  pp.  186,  187.  ^  Ibid. 

8  Ibal,  pp.  191,  192. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE  OF  MIRACLES.  135 

of  that  school.  Pfleiderer  claims  to  exhibit  the  real  essence  of 
pure  Christianity.  According  to  him,  then,  revelation  is  the 
conception  of  God  and  of  spiritual  truth  which  God  gives  to 
every  man  who  has  a  healthy  religious  impulse.  By  and  in 
the  religious  impulse  the  revelation  comes.  So  far  as  conscious- 
ness goes,  for  all  practical  purposes,  the  impulse,  the  religious 
impressions,  which  spring  up  in  the  soul  constitute  the  revela- 
tion. The  case  is  precisely  parallel  to  that  of  any  other  class 
of  conceptions  which  are  found  in  the  human  mind.  Thoughts 
about  natural  phenomena,  about  social  life  and  political  institu- 
tions, about  psychological,  metaphysical,  or  moral  principles, — all 
these,  at  least  in  so  far  as  they  are  "  healtliy,"  must  be  divinely 
revealed  •  for  they  come  from  the  mental  impulses  which  God 
has  implanted,  and  come  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  the 
thoughts  concerning  God.  The  only  difference  is  the  difference 
in  the  object  to  which  the  thoughts  relate.  Consequently  Jesus 
was  a  revealer  of  truth  only  in  the  same  sense  in  which  Plato, 
Shakspeare,  and  Newton,  each  in  his  several  sphere,  were  re- 
vealers.  They,  and  such  as  they,  had  an  "  innate  genius," 
through  which  they  were  enabled  to  evolve  more  truth  than 
ordinary  men.  Abraham,  Isaiah,  and  Jesus  were  gifted  in  the 
direction  of  religious  truth;  they  had  a  religious  genius.  In 
the  case  of  Jesus,  we  are  told,  there  was  even  something  of 
"impenetrable  mystery"  about  his  religious  genius.  How 
much  we  are  to  understand  by  this  is  itself  somewhat  mys- 
terious. There  is  a  mystery  about  any  genius.  Why  one 
child  in  a  family  should  be  born  with  a  special  talent  so  that 
he  becomes  renowned  through  his  brilliant  utterances  or  won- 
derful discoveries,  while  his  brothers  remain  insignificant  and 
unknown,  —  this,  too,  is  an  impenetrable  mystery ;  but  it  is  an 
indisputable  fact.  When,  therefore,  Jesus'  extraordinary  re- 
ligious genius  is  called  mysterious,  nothing  more  can  be  meant 
than  that  it  was  extraordinary,  at  least  for  his  time  and  sur- 
roundings. But  the  question  still  remains  to  be  answered, 
How  can  Christ's  life  be  regarded  as  a  revelation  ?  In  the 
vague  sense,  that  everything  in  nature  and  human  history 
reveals  God,  that  is,  in  the  wide  and  loose  sense  of  the  word 
"revelation,"  one  may,  of  course,  speak  of  Christ  as  making 


136  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

a  revelation.  But  in  no  special  and  peculiar  sense  can  the 
term  be  applied  to  him  merely  on  the  ground  of  any  assumed 
moral  excellence.  The  law  of  God  is  revealed  by  disobedience 
to  it  as  well  as  by  obedience  to  it ;  but  in  either  case  there  is 
no  revelation  in  the  distinctive  sense.  The  law  must  be  known 
before  obedience  can  be  rendered,  so  that  not  even  the  divine 
law  is  revealed  by  a  holy  life,  to  say  nothing  of  the  further 
matters  of  God's  character,  his  relations  to  a  sinful  world,  his 
plans  and  purposes  of  mercy  or  of  judgment.  To  speak,  there- 
fore, of  Jesus  as  revealing  the  divine  love,  so  long  as  the  revela- 
tion is  conceived  as  coming  from  his  moral  integrity,  is  to  use 
words  without  any  clear  meaning. 

Manifestly  the  term  "  revelation  "  is  a  misnomer,  as  applied 
to  such  a  conception  of  the  origin  of  religious  belief.  With 
the  same  propriety  all  opinions  and  feelings  —  at  least,  all 
"  healthy  "  ones  —  may  be  called  revelations  ;  and  there  is  no 
reason,  unless  a  disingenuous  one,  why  the  term  "  revelation " 
should  be  so  diligently  used  concerning  the  religious  sentiments, 
and  not  used  concerning  other  things.  No  usus  loquendi  is 
more  familiar  than  the  distinction  between  natural  and  re- 
vealed religion.  But  the  theory  under  consideration  virtually 
calls  all  natural  religion  revealed.^  The  distinction  is  simply 
destroyed  by  denying  the  reality  of  revealed  religion  as  dis- 
tinguished from  natural,  though  the  name  is  retained  as  a 
synonym  of  natural.  One  may  be  pardoned  for  suspecting 
that  the  reason  why  only  religious  opinions  and  feelings  are 
called  revelations  is  that  the  traditional  view  has  regarded 
religious  truth  as  having  been  really,  that  is,  supernaturally, 
revealed,  and  that  the  representatives  of  this  naturalistic  view 
of  religion  are  unwilling  to  give  up  the  appearance  and  sound 
of  a  religious  creed  which  they  have  given  up  in  fact.^     What- 

^  Matthew  Arnold  {Literature  and  Doffma,  5th  ed.,  p.  51)  says  plainly, 
"That  in  us  which  is  really  natural  is,  in  truth,  revealed.  ...  If  we  are  little 
concerned  about  it,  we  say  it  is  natural ;  if  much,  we  say  it  is  revealed." 
How  simple ! 

2  An  interesting  commentary  on  this  attitude  of  modern  rationalists  is  to 
be  found  in  Rohr's  Briefe  iiber  den  Rationalismus,  p.  21,  where  he  speaks  of 
an  untenable  distinction  between  "mediate  and  immediate  revelation."  While 
declaring  that  revelation  (in  which  he  himself  does  not  believe  at  all)  is  prop- 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  137 

ever  may  be  the  truth  on  this  point,  it  is  certainly  a  fact  that 
according  to  the  view  under  consideration  revelation  is  the 
prerogative  of  all  men ;  it  belongs  to  no  one  man,  and  to  no 
class  of  men,  exclusively,  though  some  may  have  a  larger  share 
in  it  than  others.  The  difference  is  like  the  difference  in  mental 
endowments  in  general ;  all  have  a  portion,  but  not  all  the  same 
degree  of  it. 

Moreover,  how  are  we  to  know  what  and  how  much  rev- 
elation is  imparted  by  different  men?  Evidently  through 
the  same  religious  faculty  which  itself  is  the  source  of  the 
revelation.  We  can  call  only  that  a  true  revelation  which 
commends  itself  to  our  judgment.  But  the  power  to  sit  in 
judgment  on  the  revelatory  character  of  other  men  implies 
that  each  must  regard  himself  as  the  ultimate  authority,  suice 
all  are  revealers  in  the  same  sense.  We  may  admit  others  to 
have  had  more  religious  genius  than  ourselves,  but  how  far 
their  impulses  were  healthy  we  must  each  decide  for  ourselves ; 
and  this  decision  is  a  part,  and  to  us  an  all-important  part, 
of  the  religious  revelation  of  the  world.  In  short,  according  to 
the  theory  under  consideration,  there  is  no  really  autlioritative 
revelation ;  every  man  is  ultimately  a  law  to  himself ;  and 
"revelation"  is  only  a  name  to  cover  up  the  negation  of  all 
revelation  in  the  only  honest  sense  of  that  term. 

This  is  made  all  the  clearer  when  we  observe  that  just  this 
class  of  thinkers  recognize  and  emphasize  the  gradual  de- 
velopment of  religious  knowledge  and  sentiment.  But  this 
makes  their  use  of  the  term  "revelation"  doubly  reprehen- 
sible. They  speak  of  revelation  as  a  universal  prerogative 
of  mankind,  in  so  far  as  men  are  religious.  Yet  they  also  lay 
stress  on  the  fact  that  religious  beliefs  are  transmitted  from 
one  generation  to  another.  Now  how  are  these  two  proposi- 
tions to  be  adjusted  to  each  other  ?     It  is  an  obvious  fact  that 

erly  only  immediate,  he  says,  that  "this  distinction  served  a  good  purpose, 
being,  as  it  were,  the  protecting  segis,  under  which  in  modern  times  rational- 
ism developed  itself,  —  an  innocent-appearing  middle  term,  which  concealed 
the  complete  divergence  of  rationalism  from  supematuralism,  until  the  weak 
eye  accustomed  itself  to  the  clearer  light."  It  would  seem  as  if  history  were 
going  to  repeat  itself,  only  that  now  the  term  "mediate"  is  less  current. 


138  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

religion  is  in  reality  mostly  a  matter  of  tradition.  What  a 
man  believes  is  not  the  product  of  his  own  independent  think- 
ing or  instincts,  but  rather  of  the  communications  which  have 
come  to  him  from  other  men.  Undoubtedly  we  may  properly 
speak  of  the  religious  impulse ;  but  it  would  be  a  gross  misrep- 
resentation of  obvious  facts  to  speak  as  if  each  individual  were 
in  any  important  degree  the  author  or  source  of  his  own  re- 
ligion. It  is  true,  the  individual  cannot  in  the  strictest  sense 
make  a  belief  his  own  without  an  independent  act.  But  in 
most  cases  this  independent  act  is  nothing  but  a  mere  adoption, 
on  trust,  of  what  others  recommend ;  there  is  no  intelligent  and 
independent  testing  of  the  doctrine.  And  even  when  there 
seems  to  be  independent  thought,  and  a  man  breaks  away  from 
his  immediate  surroundings,  and  repudiates  the  teachings  which 
he  has  received,  still  in  no  case  does  this  take  place  wholly 
without  the  influence  of  other  minds.  A  certain  contingent 
must  indeed  be  contributed  by  the  individual.  The  gradual  in- 
crease of  knowledge  and  the  widening  of  human  thought  would 
be  impossible,  if  nothing  sprang  up  in  any  mind  which  had  not, 
in  just  the  same  form,  come  from  some  other  mind.  But  the 
originality  itself  is  developed  only  through  the  stimulus  given 
by  others,  and  is  an  elaboration  and  modification  of  the  ideas 
which  have  been  communicated,  rather  than  an  origination  of 
new  ones.  The  general  fact  remains,  that  the  bulk  of  what  is 
known  and  believed  is  a  contribution  from  others  and  is  ac- 
cepted almost  implicitly.  It  therefore  grossly  exaggerates  the 
importance  of  individual  reflection  to  speak  of  all  men  as  hav- 
ing, each  for  himself,  a  divine  revelation.  Aside  from  the  inaccu- 
racy of  the  word  used,  as  applied  to  the  religious  cogitations  or 
feelings  of  ordinary  individuals,  an  utterly  wrong  impression 
is  made  as  to  the  origin  of  the  religious  thoughts  themselves. 
They  are  not  only  no  revelations  from  God  in  the  proper  sense 
of  that  term,  but  they  are  not  thoughts  which  the  individual 
has  evolved  independently  out  of  his  own  mind.  They  are 
simply  a  commonwealth  of  sentiments  which  he  inherits  and 
which  he  shares  with  his  fellows. 

Now  the  doctrine  in  question  really  admits  this,  in  that  it 
lays  stress  on  the  necessity  of  a  progressive  development.    Even 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  139 

Jesus'  religious  impressions  are  declared  not  to  be  strictly 
original ;  he  received  the  substance  of  his  doctrines,  we  are 
told,  from  the  Hebrew  prophets.  Much  more,  then,  must  it  be 
said  of  ordinary  men,  that  the  revelation  which  they  receive  is 
after  all  only  the  knowledge,  or  the  notions,  which  they  derive 
from  their  elders.  But  in  so  far  as  this  is  admitted,  of  course  the 
notion  of  "  revelation  "  even  in  the  loose  sense  which  this  school 
gives  to  it,  fades  away  into  something  akin  to  nonsense.  The 
term  can  at  the  best,  on  this  view  of  things,  be  applicable  only 
to  the  new  contributions  which  certain  gifted  individuals  make 
to  the  religious  knowledge  or  sentiments  of  the  world.  But 
this  cannot  be  reconciled  with  that  other  statement,  that  wher- 
ever there  is  a  healthy  religious  impulse  there  is  a  revelation,  or 
with  the  still  more  sweeping  statement,  that  religion  and  revela- 
tion are  reciprocal  terms,  the  one  being  as  universal  as  the  other. 
In  short,  there  is  an  irreconcilable  inconsistency  in  the  use  of 
the  term  "  revelation,"  clearly  betraying  the  fact  that  the  real 
thing  ordinarily  and  properly  meant  by  it  is  not  believed  in. 

2.  The  negative  or  agnostic  attitude  towards  miracles  leads 
to  self-contradiction  and  confusion  in  the  views  concerning  the 
uniqueness  and  authority  of  Jesus  Christ.  The  special  relation 
of  Christ  to  revelation  is  left  undetermined.  In  deference  to 
naturalism  it  is  assumed  that  he  could  have  been  nothing 
but  a  man,  that  he  must  have  been  begotten  like  other  men, 
and  that  in  his  intellectual  and  moral  life  he  must  have  been 
subject  to  the  same  laws  of  development  as  other  men.  But 
iu  deference  to  supernaturalism  it  is  asserted  that  he  was  a 
unique  man,  that  he  attained  a  degree  of  moral  excellence 
absolutely  perfect,  or  at  least  so  exceptionally  exalted  as  to 
amount  practically  to  a  state  of  perfection.  But  how  this 
uniqueness  is  to  be  conceived  or  accounted  for  is  not  stated. 
As  being  simply  a  man  among  the  millions  of  men,  he  must 
on  this  theory  be  regarded  as  not  having  been  radically  different 
from  others.  The  most  that  can  be  assumed  concerning  him 
is  that  he  had  a  superior  genius  in  the  direction  of  religion ; 
that  he  had  a  clearer  view  and  a  deeper  feeling  of  certain  truths 
than  others  had ;  that  he  had  the  disposition  and  ability  to  set 
forth  ethical  and  religious  truth  with  peculiar  force ;  and  that 


140  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

in  his  life  lie  illustrated  perfectly  his  own  doctrines  and  pre- 
cepts. But  if  Jesus  Christ  is  declared  to  be  absolutely  unique  ; 
if  it  is  said  that  he  can  have  no  superior  and  no  rival ;  if  he  is 
recognized  as  sustaining  a  permanent  relation  to  all  men  who 
seek  to  hold  fellowship  with  God,  —  why,  then  there  must  be 
some  reason  for  such  affirmations.  But  the  reasons  seem  to  be 
purely  arbitrary  on  the  naturalistic  basis  under  consideration. 
If  it  is  affirmed  that  Christ  attained  absolute  perfection,  the 
question  at  once  arises,  on  what  ground  this  is  assumed. 

Now  the  rationalistic  theory  is  essentially  an  evolutionary 
one.  Progress,  according  to  it,  must  be  successive  and  contin- 
uous, each  new  step  being  an  outgrowth  of  the  past  and  the 
necessary  condition  of  a  further  advance  in  the  future.  It  is  a 
violation  of  this  principle  to  assume  that  Jesus  in  any  sense 
completed  the  revelation  of  God  or  the  development  of  religious 
truth,  —  to  assume  that  he  revealed  what  can  in  any  proper 
sense  be  termed  the  absolute  or  final  religion.  Such  an  as- 
sumption strikes  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  anti-super- 
naturalists  directly  in  the  face ;  and  it  is  only  a  subterfuge  to 
attempt  to  hide  the  inconsistency  under  the  vague  phrase 
"  mysteriousness,"  as  characterizing  Jesus'  peculiar  excellence. 
The  mysteriousness  may  be  ever  so  truly  a  fact ;  but  to  say 
that  Jesus'  character  is  mysterious  does  not  account  for  his  ex- 
ceptional superiority;  it  only  asserts  it.  And  the  question 
comes  back :  On  what  ground  is  this  uniqueness  assumed  to  be 
a  fact  ?  No  metaphysical  or  physical  principles  or  theories 
throw  any  light  on  the  matter.  No  a  priori  considerations  are 
adequate  to  make  it  appear  that  Jesus  of  Nazareth  must  have 
been  worthy  to  found  the  universal  religion.  If  one  assumes 
such  a  uniqueness  on  Jesus'  part,  unless  he  does  so  without 
any  reasons,  in  pure  caprice,  he  must  dcjjcnd  on  historical  evi- 
dence. And  this  involves,  directly  or  indirectly,  a  judgment 
respecting  the  trustworthiness  of  the  evangelical  portraiture  of 
Jesus'  character  and  life.  In  reality  whoever  accepts  Christ  as 
an  authoritative  or  unique  leader  does  so  primarily  on  the 
ground  of  traditional  belief.  This  conception  of  Christ  is 
handed  down  to  him,  and  is  first  adopted  on  trust.  And  when 
he  undertakes  to  examine  and  justify  the  belief,  he  can  do  no 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  141 

more  than  analyze  the  grounds  on  which  others  before  him 
have  cherished  it.  And  this  leads  necessarily  to  a  considera- 
tion of  the  grounds  on  which  in  the  first  i^lace  this  belief  gained 
currency.  And  such  an  examination  can  have  no  other  result 
than  the  assurance  that  the  original  belief  was  founded  on  a 
conviction  that  Jesus,  in  his  person  and  works,  was  suinrnatitr- 
ally  endowed.  Pfleiderer  himself  goes  even  so  far  as  to  affirm 
that,  on  account  of  the  superstitions  of  those  times,  Christianity, 
or  any  new  religion,  "  could  hardly  have  made  its  entrance  into 
the  world  "  without  the  belief  that  it  was  accredited  by  miracu- 
lous events.^  There  could  be  no  more  emphatic  admission  that 
Christ  did  in  fact  gain  his  unique  power  through  the  impression 
he  made  of  being  supernaturally  endowed  and  commissioned. 
This  is  certainly  the  testimony  of  the  only  original  witnesses 
and  confessors.  If  this  impression  is  pronounced  a  mistaken 
one,  the  unique  greatness  of  Christ  can  now  be  still  held  only 
by  a  purely  arbitrary  act  of  faith  resting  ultimately  on  no  valid 
ground  whatever. 

But  the  unique  spirituality  of  Jesus  is  not  the  only  peculiar 
feature  in  him  belief  in  which  requires  to  be  justified.  Still 
more  striking  is  the  fact  that  he  assumed  an  altogether  unique 
oAitliorit]]  over  men.  And  historic  Christianity  has  always 
recognized  this  authority.  Christ,  according  to  all  the  records 
and  traditions,  appears  to  have  assumed  to  be,  in  an  altogether 
unique  sense,  the  Son  of  God,  and  divinely  commissioned  to 
establish  a  kingdom  of  God  in  the  world,  of  which  he  was 
himself  to  be  the  Head,  entitled  to  issue  commands  and  to 
exercise  authority  as  the  King  over  the  church  which  was  to 
be  gathered  together  in  his  name. 

'  Religionspliilosophie,  p.  437.  Similarly  Mr.  Greg,  after  arguing  that  the 
resurrection  of  Jesus  did  not  really  take  place,  says :  "  It  seems  to  us  certain 
that  the  Apostles  believed  in  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  with  absolute  conviction. 
Nothing  short  of  such  a  belief  could  have  sustained  them  through  what  they 
had  to  endure,  or  given  them  enthusiasm  for  what  they  had  to  do."  Creed 
of  Christendom,  vol.  ii,  p.  154.  Matthew  Arnold  {God  and  the  Bible,  p.  182, 
popular  edition)  has  to  come  to  the  same  conclusion:  "Only  in  this  way, 
through  profound  misapprehension,  through  many  crude  hopes,  under  the 
stimulus  of  many  illusions,  could  the  metiiod  and  secret,  and  something  of  the 
temper  and  sweet  reason  and  balance,  of  Jesus  be  carried  to  the  world." 


142  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Now  the  attempts  made  to  present  these  things  philosoph- 
ically may  not  always  have  been  successful.  Metaphysical 
subtlety  may  have  undertaken  more  than  v^^as  possible  to  be 
accomplished  by  way  of  setting  forth  the  nature  of  Christ  and 
the  mode  of  the  incarnation.  But  however  inadequate  these 
attempts  may  have  been,  it  is  even  more  certain  that  it  is  still 
less  satisfactory  to  rest  on  a  theory  which  simply  ignores  the 
essential  problem  to  be  solved.  That  problem  is  found  in  the 
question  which  the  Jews  themselves  put  to  Jesus,  "  By  what 
authority  doest  thou  these  things,  and  who  gave  thee  this 
authority?"  Even  if  one  could  be  satisfied  to  believe  that  in 
some  mysterious  manner  Jesus  attained  an  altogether  unex- 
ampled eminence  in  moral  excellence,  still  it  is  unexplained 
how  that  alone  could  give  him  authority  over  others.  His 
own  doctrine  (Luke  xvii.  10)  concerning  obedience  to  the 
moral  law  was  stated  thus :  "  When  ye  shall  have  done  all 
the  things  that  are  commanded  you,  say,  We  are  unprofitable 
servants;  we  have  done  that  which  it  was  our  duty  to  do." 
The  fact  that  Jesus  was  the  first  to  render  full  obedience  to 
the  divine  law  makes  him  worthy  of  our  respect  and  honor ; 
but  if  he  was  merely  one  man  among  others,  it  does  not 
appear  that  his  doing  what  all  are  under  obligation  to  do 
gives  him  any  authority  over  the  rest.  If  he  was  a  perfect 
man,  it  was  simply  because  he  perfectly  fulfilled  the  law  of 
God.  But  his  fulfilling  the  law  does  not  make  him  the  author 
or  executor  of  the  law.  If  it  did,  then  in  case  another  man 
should  also  perfectly  fulfil  the  law,  we  should  have  two  heads 
of  the  kingdom  of  God.  And  when  it  is  said  that  Jesus  has 
a  sort  of  supremacy  because  he  was  the  first  to  attain  perfec- 
tion, we  can  only  say  that  the  being  first  in  time  does  not 
necessarily  make  him  first  in  degree.  EitschP  says,  "Jesus 
being  the  first  to  make  real,  in  his  personal  life,  the  ultimate 
end  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  is  therefore  sui  generis,  because 
every  one  who  should  do  his  duty  as  perfectly  as  he  did  would 
yet  be  unequal  to  him,  because  dependent  on  him."  But  this 
is  only  one  of  the  many  obscurities  which  result  from  the  at- 

1   JJnhrnrlt  in  der  chnstlichen  Religion,  \  22.     Quite  similarly  Lipsius, 
Dogmatik,  p.  541, 


THE  EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  143 

tempt  to  avoid  metaphysics.^  If  Jesus,  without  a  previous 
example  of  perfect  obedience  to  follow,  could  rise  to  the  height 
of  perfect  obedience,  why  may  not  some  one  else  do  the  same, 
even  without  the  knowledge  and  stimulus  of  his  example  ? 
And  though  one  should  make  this  attainment  partly  under 
the  stimulus  of  this  example,  it  is  still  not  clear  how  Christ's 
fidelity  to  duty  gives  him  any  authority  or  peculiar  supremacy 
over  all  other  men.  The  man  who  came  at  the  eleventh  hour 
received  the  same  reward  as  the  men  who  came  early.  If  all 
who  obey  are  on  the  same  level  of  mere  humanity  and  mere 
obligation  to  the  divine  law,  then  all  who  disobey  are  guilty 
each  for  himself,  and  all  who  obey  obey  each  for  himself;  and 
all  are  alike  responsible  to  the  divine  Euler  alone.  It  is  utterly 
impossible,  on  the  mere  ground  of  Jesus'  peculiar  moral  excel- 
lence, to  pronounce  him  entitled  to  any  authority  over  other 
men.  And  his  claim  of  authority,  the  assumption  of  a  right 
to  command,  the  assumption  of  a  personal  headship  over  a  com- 
munity of  followers,  the  requirement  of  faith  in  him  as  the 
prime  prerequisite  of  membership  in  the  kingdom  of  God, — 
all  this  is  inexplicable  on  the  theory  that  there  was  nothing 
supernatural  in  Jesus,  no  superiority  of  nature,  and  no  special 
commission  more  than  any  one  else  could  have  gained  by 
simply  doing  what  he  ought  to  do.     It  is  possible  to  imagine 

^  In  his  Christlirhe  Lehre  von  der  Rechtfertigung  und  Versohmtng,  vol.  iii. 
§  48,  1st  ed.,  Ritschl  is  more  extended,  but  not  more  clear  and  satisfactory, 
in  his  treatment  of  this  point.  He  presents  Ciirist's  work  under  the  point  of 
view  of  an  ethical  vocation.  All  men  have  such  a  vocation.  But  other  men, 
even  founders  of  religions,  combined  the  religious  vocation  with  civil  and 
social  ones.  Christ,  however,  combined  witli  his  no  other  one.  "This  fact 
is  explained  by  the  scope  of  the  vocation  to  wliich  he  gave  himself.  For  the 
vocation  of  the  royal  prophet  to  bring  about  the  ethical  dominion  of  God  is 
the  highest  conceivable  one  among  all  vocations"  (p.  3S9).  Again,  "Being 
the  founder  of  the  kingdom  of  God  in  the  world,  or  the  vehicle  of  God's 
moral  dominion  over  men,  he  is  unique  in  comparison  with  all  who  have 
received  from  him  the  like  end  to  live  for.  Consequently,  he  is  that  personage 
in  the  world  in  whose  ultimate  purpose  God  makes  his  own  ultimate  purpose 
effectual  and  manifest.  His  whole  labor  in  fulfilling  his  vocation  constitutes, 
therefore,  the  material  of  the  revelation  of  God  which  is  present  and  complete 
in  him  ;  in  other  words,  in  him  the  Word  of  God  is  a  human  person."  Ibid., 
p.  393. 


144  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

the  physical  miracles  eliminated  from  the  Gospel  histories,  it 
is  possible  to  construct  an  expurgated  history  with  these  nar- 
ratives omitted  or  made  "  natural ; "  but  in  that  case  we  should 
be  more  than  ever  perplexed  and  staggered  by  these  extra- 
ordinary assumptions  of  authority  on  the  part  of  one  who  had 
done  nothing  except  what  he  would  have  deserved  to  be  pun- 
ished for  not  doing. 

Equal  or  greater  obscurity  and  confusion  appear  in  the  at- 
tempt which  Herrmann,  Pdtschl's  disciple,  makes  to  define  the 
relation  of  Christ  to  Christians  and  the  Christian  Church.  He 
says,^  "  The  source  of  religious  knowledge  is  for  us  neither  our 
morality  nor  any  form  of  metaphysics,  but  revelation."  The 
historical  facts  of  Christianity  are  made  to  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  revelation.  "  Jesus  Christ,"  we  are  told,  "  must 
be  accounted  by  us  as  the  final  manifestation  of  the  divine  will 
to  us."  2  And  not  merely  is  Jesus  declared  to  be  an  exception- 
ally excellent  man,  who  first  attained  moral  perfection  and  made 
known  the  divine  love,  but  it  is  declared  that  "  the  ground  of 
religious  assurance  is  to  be  found  nowhere  but  in  him."^  In 
this  sense,  as  being  the  ground  of  our  religious  assurance, 
"Christ  is  the  revelation.  Our  trust  in  God  is  constantly 
mediated  by  the  view  of  him  in  whom  we  have  discerned  the 
decisive  manifestation  and  illustration  of  the  divine  will  to 
save."*  But  when  Herrmann  takes  up  the  question,  "by  what 
means  Christ  becomes  to  us  a  revelation  or  a  saving  fact,"  he 
discusses  the  evidence  of  miracles  first,  only  to  find  in  them  no 
conclusive,  or  even  weighty,  proof.  He  says,^  "  The  discussion 
of  the  question,  whether  the  evangelical  accounts  of  miracles 
are  trustworthy  or  not,  is  for  the  present  task  of  theology 
wholly  indifferent."  His  fundamental  principle  is  that  nothing 
can  be  really  a  miracle  to  us  except  facts  which  involve  an 
expression  of  God's  love  to  us  individually.  Although,  he  says, 
we  are  obliged  to  regard  every  event  as  "  a  product  of  nature 
the  mediating  causes  of  which  point  us  into  the  endless,"  yet, 

^  Die  Religion  im  Verhdltniss  zum  Welterkennen  und  zur  Sittlichkeit, 
p.  365. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  367.  "  Ibid.,  p.  380. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  382,  383.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  383. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  145 

he  adds,  "  it  is  possible  for  the  Christian  thankfully  to  recog- 
nize in  events  that  keenly  affect  him  miraculous  deeds  of  God 
wrought  on  him,  and  to  believe  in  the  answering  of  his  prayers."  ^ 
This  agrees  with  Eitschl's  definition,^  "For  us,  miracles  are 
those  striking  natural  occurrences  with  which  the  experience 
of  God's  special  help  is  connected."  ^  In  the  metaphysical 
sense,  of  an  act  not  occurring  in  accordance  with  natural  laws, 
we  can,  it  is  said,  not  prove  the  impossibility  of  miracles,  since 
we  cannot  know  the  extent  of  those  laws.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  so  far  as  alleged  or  apparent  facts  have  no  religious 
significance,  we  cannot  call  them  miracles.  The  wonderful 
things  reported  in  the  New  Testament  cannot  be  proved  to  be 
impossible ;  yet,  we  are  told,  "  we  must  demand  of  the  theo- 
logian that  he  see  that  he  has  no  right  to  call  those  facts 
miracles,  unless  he  is  conscious  that  they  form  a  part  of  his 
own  life,  as  proofs  of  the  love  of  God  to  him."  ^  Accordingly 
the  resurrection  of  Christ,  which  Herrmann  believes  in,  he 
accepts  only  as  it  verifies  itself  by  its  practical  effect  on  the 
religious  life.  Faith  in  Christ,  he  says,  must  precede  faith  in 
the  resurrection ;  and  this  event  in  his  life  only  "  exercises  on 
us  an  undefinable  influence  which,  though  it  makes  itself  known 
in  the  mood  of  the  believer,  yet  cannot  be  further  analyzed ; 
and  so  a  demonstration  to  others  who  do  not  so  feel  is  cut 
off."  5 

The  motive  underlying  this  theory,  namely,  the  desire  to  vindi- 
cate to  miracles  a  religious  significance,  is  commendable  ;  but  it 
leads  to  such  a  conception  of  miracles  as  practically  dissolves 
them  into  non-miraculous  events.  Inasmuch  as  the  most  triv- 
ial occurrence  may  have  a  marked  influence  on  a  man's  re- 

^  Die  Religion  im  Verkdltniss  zum  Welterkennen  und  zur  Siitlichkeii, 
p.  38i. 

*  Unterricht,  etc.  The  idea  is  probably  derived  from  Schleiermaelier.  Vide 
his  Reden  iiber  die  Religion  (Piinjer's  ed.,  1879),  p.  115:  "Miracle  is  the 
religious  name  for  occurrence ;  every  occurrence,  even  the  most  natural  and 
common,  as  soon  as  it  is  such  that  the  religious  view  of  it  may  be  the  dominant 
one,  is  a  miracle." 

8  See  Excursus  VII. 

*  T)ie  Religion,  etc.,  pp.  386,  387. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  388. 

10 


146  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

ligious  mood,  and  it  depends  wholly  on  the  man's  own  mood  and 
judgment  to  determine  whether  the  event  is  remarkable  or  not, 
it  clearly  follows  that  what  is  to  one  man  a  miracle  is  not  one 
to  another.  In  other  words,  an  event  is  not  a  miracle  by  virtue 
of  its  relation  to  the  divine  causation,  but  by  virtue  of  its  rela- 
tion to  the  particular  condition  and  conceptions  of  the  individ- 
ual who  considers  it.  Herrmann  says  expressly,  "  The  mistake 
which  cannot  be  sufficiently  condemned  [in  the  ordinary  ortho- 
dox view  of  miracles]  is  that  the  essence  of  miracles  is  looked 
for  in  the  causal  connections  of  the  event."  ^  It  is  difficult  to 
say  whether  the  naivete  or  the  audacity  of  this  assertion  is 
most  to  be  astonished  at.  When  one  undertakes  to  define  a 
word,  he  is  ordinarily  supposed  to  undertake  to  tell  what  men 
in  general  mean  by  it.  But  Eitschl  and  his  school  calmly  in- 
form us  that  what  men  generally  mean  by  a  miracle  is  not  the 
true  idea  of  a  miracle  at  all,  —  that  the  true  idea,  in  fact,  is  not 
understood  except  by  Eitschl  and  his  followers.  The  phenome- 
non thus  presented  is  an  extraordinary  one.  Generally  when 
one  undertakes  to  rectify  the  popular  conception  of  a  word,  he  is 
at  least  expected  to  retain  something  of  the  popular  sense  in  his 
corrected  definition ;  otherwise  the  word  itself  should  be  aban- 
doned. If  it  is  certain  that  no  such  objects  as  centaurs  ever 
existed,  then  let  us  plainly  say  so,  and  not  insist  that,  properly 
speaking,  the  centaur,  instead  of  being  the  horse-man  of  ancient 
mythology,  is  nothing  but  the  giraffe.  Yet  to  do  so  would  be 
quite  as  sensible  as  the  manner  in  which  the  IJitschlites  use  the 
term  "  miracle."  Miracles  not  only  etymologically,  but  in  popu- 
lar estimation,  have  always  involved  an  element  of  the  startling, 
— something  to  be  wondered  at,  something  aside  from  the  natural 
and  ordinary  course  of  things.  But  if  now  a  miracle  is  to  be  de- 
fined merely  as  an  event  in  which  we  recognize  God  as  blessing 
us,  the  element  of  wonderfulness,  as  well  as  the  element  of  extra- 
ordinariness,  is  taken  away.  For  according  to  the  theology  now 
under  consideration,  love  is  the  one  attribute  of  God  which 
swallows  up  all  others ;  and  that  God  should  manifest  his  love, 
especially  to  those  that  love  him,  has  in  it  nothing  of  the  sur- 
prising ;  it  would  be  strange  if  it  were  otherwise.  Moreover, 
^  Die  Rellfjion,  etc.,  p.  385. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  147 

according  to  the  definition  of  miracles  above  given,  miracles  no 
longer  belong  to  the  category  of  rare  things  ;  they  are,  rather,  a 
part  of  the  regular  course  of  nature ;  the  more  men  live  as  they 
should,  the  more  ought  every  event  to  be  to  them  a  miracle ;  for  God 
makes  all  things  work  together  for  good  to  them  that  love  him.i 
It  is  sufficiently  self-evident  that  this  effort  to  transfer  the 
name  miracle  to  something  hitherto  never  meant  by  it,  must 
share  the  fate  of  all  similar  quixotic  undertakings.  What  it  is 
important  to  know  is  how  this  school  of  thought  stands  related 
to  the  question,  whether  miracles,  in  the  sense  always  current 
hitherto,  really  occurred.  Here  Herrmann  unequivocally  sides 
with  the  rationalistic  school,  assuming,  as  scarcely  needing  any 
argument,  that  all  events  are  mediated  by  natural  forces.  He 
differs  with  them  only  in  that  he  denies  that  any  one  is  so  well 
acquainted  with  the  whole  round  of  natural  law  as  to  be  able 
to  affirm  that  any  alleged  event  is  outside  of  it.  Accordingly 
the  reported  miracles  of  the  Bible,  improbable  as  they  may  seem, 
may  yet  be  facts,  only  belonging  to  a  higher  order  of  nature 
than  that  with  which  we  are  familiar.  We  have  previously  (p. 
Ill)  had  occasion  to  treat  of  this  (what  may  be  called)  Stras- 
burg-clock  theory  of  miracles.  The  Eitschl  form  of  the  theory 
has  one  advantage  over  the  other  form  of  it,  namely,  that  it 
does  not  make  the  essence  of  the  miracle  consist  simply  in  the 
element  of  human  ignorance,  but  emphasizes  more  the  religious 
impressiveness  of  the  miracle.  But  it  labors  under  all  the  ob- 
jections which  otherwise  burden  the   hypothesis,  besides  the 

^  Teiclimiiller  (Religiomplnlosophie,  pp.  171  sqq.,  \'i9,sqq^,  though  an  oppo- 
nent of  Ritschl's  theology,  defines  miracles  in  a  very  similar  way.  "Tlie 
seat  of  the  miracle  rests  in  the  religious  interpretation,  that  is,  in  the  un- 
derstanding of  the  believer,"  p.  173.  "The  believer  in  real  miracles  does 
not  feel  llie  slightest  need  of  going  into  the  question  of  natural  laws,  and  pos- 
sesses, morever,  no  physical  or  psychological  knowledge  of  the  natural  course 
of  events,"  p.  174.  "  Miracles  will  take  place  as  long  as  there  are  men  in 
existence  for  whom  they  can  take  place,  no  matter  at  what  time  they  may 
live,"  p.  192.  In  general  Teiclimiiller  seems  to  hold  that  any  so-called  mirac- 
ulous event  which  works  well,  as,  for  example,  the  resurrection  of  Christ 
(p.  180),  or  Paul's  conversion,  may  be  properly  called  miracles,  whereas  such 
stories  as  those  of  the  raising  of  the  young  man  and  Lazarus  *'  cannot  be 
reckoned  as  miracles  in  the  genuine  and  strict  sense,"  p.  224. 


148  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

additional  one,  that  a  much  wider  door  is  opened  to  the  work- 
ing of  mere  caprice  in  the  definition  and  recognition  of  a  mir- 
acle. Anything  and  everything  may,  on  the  Eitschl  theory,  be 
called  a  miracle;  we  cannot  even  define  a  miracle  as  something 
intrinsically  fitted  to  produce  a  good  impression  ;  the  only  test 
is  the  fact  that  it  does  produce  it.  At  the  same  time  this  theory 
recognizes  the  inherent  strangeness  and  improbability  of  cer- 
tain events  which  are  called  miraculous.  It  would  relegate  to 
scientific  investigation  all  such  facts  or  apparent  facts.  And  if 
an  event  should  be  found  to  be  both  improbable  in  itself  and 
also  unedifying  in  a  religious  respect,  then  of  course  it  would 
have  to  be  pronounced  no  miracle,  and  probably  also  not  a  fact. 
In  other  words,  the  theory  opens  the  door  to  unlimited  license 
not  only  as  regards  the  interpretation,  but  as  regards  the  credi- 
bility, of  the  Biblical  narratives  of  miracles.  To  be  sure,  Herr- 
mann himself  admits  the  fact  of  Christ's  resurrection,  and 
perhaps  some  of  the  other  reported  miracles.  But  in  doing  so 
he  involves  himself  in  the  greatest  confusion.  At  one  moment 
(pp.  384,  385)  he  assumes  that  all  events  are  mediated  by  nat- 
ural causes ;  at  another  (p.  388)  he  calls  the  resurrection  of 
Christ  as  inexplicable  as  the  creation  of  the  world.  But  if  it  is 
assumed  once  for  all  that  no  event  takes  place  without  the  medi- 
ation of  physical  forces,  then  every  event  is  practically  just  as 
much,  and  just  as  little,  explicable  as  every  other.  Some  events 
may  be  more  familiar  than  others ;  but  the  causal  connection 
which  determines  all  that  happens  no  one  can  see  in  any  case. 
Only  antecedents  and  consequents  are  seen.  Therefore  the  resur- 
rection of  Christ  ought,  on  this  view  of  things,  no  more  to  be 
singled  out  and  called  inexplicable  than  any  other,  even  the 
most  trivial,  occurrences.  They  are  all  alike  inexplicable  in  that 
we  cannot  detect  the  secret  forces  which  connect  the  antecedent 
with  the  consequent ;  they  are  all  alike  explicable  in  that  natural 
forces  are  always  assumed  as  in  fact  at  work  in  producing  the 
effects. 

The  problem  before  us  is,  how  those  who  assume  this  negative 
or  agnostic  attitude  respecting  miracles  become  convinced  of  the 
uniqueness  and  authority  of  Jesus  Christ.  His  extraordinary 
works  do  not  constitute  the  ground  of  the  conviction.     It  is 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  149 

not  known  whether  any  of  these  works  were  strictly  miracu- 
lous or  not ;  but  in  any  case,  we  are  told,  the  alleged  miracles 
of  Christ  "  cannot  be  in  themselves  manifestations  of  God  to  us ; 
for  they  gain  for  every  one  a  religious  significance  only  by  the 
fact  that  they  stand  in  connection  with  the  person  of  Jesus."  ^ 
But  though  there  is  unquestionably  a  certain  truth  in  this,  yet 
the  assertion  must  hold  equally  of  all  the  acts  of  Jesus,  whether 
miraculous  or  not.  And  the  question  still  remains.  How  do  we 
come  to  a  conviction  of  the  uniqueness  of  Christ's  person  ? 
Why  do  we  ascribe  to  him  a  peculiar  authority  ?  The  mode  of 
proof,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  which  is  resorted  to  by  the  class 
of  theologians  now  under  consideration,  is,  as  might  be  inferred 
from  the  foregoing,  purely  subjective.  While  despising  all  met- 
aphysical arguments,  and  while  emphasizing  the  importance 
of  the  historical  element  in  Christianity,  they  yet  make  one's 
personal  experience  the  ultimate  proof.  Christ  is  called,  with 
great  emphasis,  the  Eevelation  of  God.  "  But,"  says  the  same 
author  above  quoted,^  "  only  that  which  delivers  us  from  con- 
flict with  evil,  that  is,  lifts  us  out  of  our  previous  lost  estate, 
makes  on  us  the  impression  of  something  overwhelmingly  new, 
—  of  a  veritable  revelation."  "  To  the  Christian,"  he  says  again,^ 
"  revelation  is  the  self-revelation  of  God,  that  is,  the  fact  that  God 
has  overpowered  him  by  an  indisputable  proof  of  his  almighty 
love,  and  has  changed  him  from  an  unhappy  man  to  a  cheerful 
and  confident  one."  But  this  revelation  comes  from  "  the  his- 
torical appearance  of  Jesus,  which  belongs  as  much  to  our  own 
reality  as  the  coat  which  we  put  on,  and  the  house  which  we 
inhabit."  *  In  our  experience  of  trouble  and  of  remorse  "  we 
can  come  to  understand  what  there  is  wonderful  and  saving  in 
the  person  of  Jesus.  That  is,  we  perceive  that  he  is  the  only 
part  of  the  actual  world  which  is  not  drawn  down  into  this 
turbid  confusion."  ^  This  recognition  of  Jesus  as  sinless  works, 
we  are  told,  as  a  liberating  force  on  us.® 

^  Herrmann,  Die  Reliffion,  etc.,  p.  387. 

^  In  an  essay  entitled  Der  Begriff  der  Offenbarung,  read  at  a  theological 
conference  in  Giessen,  1887,  p.  6. 

8  md.,  p.  13.  *  Ibid.,  p.  16.  6  Ibid.,  p   20. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  22.    CLDie  Religion,  etc.,  p.  391,  where  a  similar  line  of  thought 


150  SUPERNATUKAL  REVELATION. 

There  is  altogether  too  much  obscurity  and  confusion  of 
thought  here  for  a  system  which  makes  large  claims  to  being 
the  only  one  worthy  of  adoption  in  the  present  day.  Eevela- 
tion  used  to  be  regarded  as  a  disclosure  made  concerning  God, — 
his  character  and  his  purposes.  According  to  the  above-given 
statement,  revelation  is  nothmg  but  a  new  experience  within 
ourselves,  —  another  name,  in  fact,  for  conversion  or  regenera- 
tion. The  old  conception  of  Christ  as  having  a  supernatural 
nature  and  commission  is  abandoned  ;  and  the  substitute  for  it 
is  the  obscure  oracle,  that  the  historical  appearaace  of  Jesus 
belongs  as  much  to  our  own  reality  as  the  coat  which  we  put 
on,  or  the  house  which  we  live  in.  Christ's  uniqueness  is 
affirmed.  The  more  the  old  notion  of  his  Deity  is  abandoned, 
the  more  diligently  is  the  attribute  of  Deity  ascribed  to  him. 
But  when  we  ask  what  is  meant  by  the  attribute,  we  are  told 
that  it  means  that  Jesus,  in  his  life  and  teaching,  so  perfectly 
represented  the  divine  character  that  he  may  be  called  divine. 
But  it  is  added  that,  in  whatever  sense  the  appellation  properly 
belongs  to  him,  it  belongs  also  to  all  men  who,  through  faith  in 
him,  become  the  children  of  God.^ 

But  in  all  this  there  is  no  recognition  of  Christ's  authority ; 
or  if  there  is,  there  is  no  explanation  of  it  which  can  satisfy 
either  the  representations  of  the  Bible  or  the  plain  common 
sense  of  the  Christian.  Christ's  uniqueness  is  made  to  consist 
solely  in  the  fact  that  he  was  the  first  and  only  one  who  has 
realized  in  his  life  the  principle  of  the  divine  love.  By  virtue 
of  his  perfect  obedience  he  came  to  feel  that  he  was  called  to 
found  a  kingdom,  —  a  community  of  men  who  should  aim  to 

is  found,  only  still  more  obscurely  expressed.  He  there  says,  "  The  assurance 
of  faith  tliat  his  [Jesus']  willing  and  working  is  the  willing  and  working  of 
God,  is  permeated  with  the  moral  necessity  from  which  the  consciousness  of 
our  freedom  is  born.  The  moral  necessity  of  recognizing  M'hat  he  willed  as 
of  the  highest  worth,  and  therefore  as  the  substance  of  the  divine  will,  makes 
the  faith  a  free  act.  .  .  .  Becoming  conscious  of  one's  own  freedom,  and  un- 
derstanding the  end  of  Jesus'  activity  as  the  ultimate  end  to  which  we  must 
conceive  everything  to  be  subject,  —  these  two  are  one  and  the  same  thing." 

^  Ritschl,  Rec.htfertigung ,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  351.  He  refers  to  Athanasius's 
expression  {Be  inrarnatione  verbi  Dei,  §  54),  "  He  was  made  man  that  we 
might  be  made  God." 


THE  EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  151 

regulate  their  lives  by  the  same  principle.  So  far  as  appears, 
he  received  from  God  no  clearly  attested  commission,  and  had 
no  intrinsic  right  to  exercise  authority  over  others.  The  one 
peculiarity  was  his  moral  superiority  over  others,  on  the  strength 
of  which  he  found  himself  "  called  "  to  establish  a  kingdom  of 
God  on  earth.  But  this  leads  us  to  consider  more  particularly 
another  point. 

3.  The  skeptical  Christians,  in  their  attempt  to  subordinate 
or  eliminate  the  miraculous  features  of  the  Gospel  histories,  vir- 
tually admit  the  greater  miracles,  while  they  deny  the  lesser 
ones. 

In  acknowledging  the  fact  of  a  special  revelation,  or  of  the 
sinlessness  of  Christ,  one  must  acknowledge  the  fact  of  the 
miraculous.  One  may  indeed  ask :  Cannot  God  make  himself 
authoritatively  known  except  by  working  a  miracle  ?  Can  he 
not  reveal  himself  through  chosen  prophets  who  need  no  cre- 
dentials but  the  power  and  impressiveness  of  their  own  words  ? 
Can  there  not  be  a  real  revelation  which  does  not  involve  such 
a  strain  on  intelligent  minds  as  comes  from  the  assumption  of 
the  disturbance  of  natural  law  ?  Is  the  spiritual  so  dependent 
on  the  natural,  or  so  indissolubly  connected  with  it,  that  a  rev- 
elation of  spiritual  truth  need  be  accompanied  by  an  interfer- 
ence with  the  order  of  nature  ? 

We  reply  :  The  essential  question  is,  whether  there  are  special 
revelations  or  not.  Let  it  be  supposed  that  they  are  purely  spir- 
itual ;  yet  if  they  are  exceptional,  that  is,  made  at  a  particular 
time  and  to  particular  men  as  they  are  not  to  others,  —  made  so 
as  to  be  recognized  by  the  recipients  as  something  special  to  them, 
—  made  to  be  communicated  by  them  as  something  authorita- 
tive to  other  men,  —  why,  then  all  the  difficulty  which  is  urged 
against  the  ordinary  view  of  revelation  holds  against  this.  If 
there  is  any  sacredness  or  fixedness  in  physical  law,  the  same 
tendency  of  mind  which  leads  us  to  assume  this  must  lead  us  also 
to  assume  an  equal  fixedness  in  the  operation  of  mental  and  spir- 
itual forces.  If  the  supposed  revelation  infringes  this  fixed 
regularity  of  the  mental  world,  then  we  have  as  real  a  miracle 
as  when  water  is  turned  into  wine  by  a  word.  The  revelation 
would  not  be  a  special  revelation  without  in  some  way  disturb- 


152  SUPEENATURAL   REVELATION. 

ing  the  ordinary  operation  of  spiritual  forces.  It  would  other- 
wise simply  be  a  revelation  only  in  the  loose  sense,  that  all 
nature  and  all  mind  is  a  revelation  of  God.  That  is,  the  reve- 
lation, if  such  it  could  be  called,  would  be  something  continuous 
and  universal,  such  as  every  mind  can  perceive,  and  every  mind 
may  be  an  organ  of.  In  other  words,  it  would  not  be  a  revela- 
tion in  any  distinctive  sense  at  all.  If,  however,  the  revelation 
is  to  be  genuinely  special,  and  yet  purely  spiritual,  that  is,  if  it 
is  to  consist  in  an  extraordinary  operation  of  the  divine  spirit  on 
the  human  spirit,  then  that  is  simply  to  say  that  there  is  a 
miracle  of  inspiration.  It  implies  an  exceptional  act  of  God, 
vesting  in  some  one  man  an  absolutely  unique  function.  Even 
apart  from  the  question  how  such  a  choice  is  attested,  the  selec- 
tion itself  of  one  man  out  of  the  millions  around  him  as  the 
medium  of  revealing  to  the  rest  of  men  the  divine  character 
and  will,  involves  what  is  inexplicable  by  any  of  the  known 
laws  of  the  universe  ;  it  is  a  greater  breach  of  the  continuity  of 
things  than  any  merely  physical  miracle  would  be,  by  as  much  as 
the  moral  is  higher  than  the  physical.  Whether  the  ordinary 
influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit  on  men  are  called  supernatural  or 
not,  such  extraordinary  influences  as  constitute  a  special  and 
authoritative  revelation  of  divine  truth  would  be  supernatural 
in  the  most  emphatic  sense.  Here  would  be  involved  all  that 
is  difficult  or  obnoxious  in  the  ordinary  doctrine  of  miracles. 
The  mere  getting  rid  of  physical  and  visible  miracles  would 
be  a  small  gain  ;  it  would  be  rather  a  positive  loss ;  for  the 
addition  of  the  physical  and  palpable  miracle  furnishes  just  the 
evidence  which  is  needed  of  the  genuineness  of  the  alleged  spir- 
itual revelation.  To  take  pains  to  ignore  or  deny  the  physical 
miracle,  while  admitting  the  spiritual  one,  would  be  like  admit- 
ting the  genuineness  of  a  royal  edict,  while  yet  denying  the 
genuineness  or  value  of  the  royal  seal  which  vouches  for 
the  genuineness  of  the  document.  True,  the  sealing-wax  and 
the  stamp  on  it  are  intrinsically  of  little  worth,  compared 
with  the  royal  will  expressed  in  the  words  sealed  up.  But 
it  is  yet  of  immense  importance  to  have  a  voucher  for  the 
genuineness  of  the  royal  edict.  Just  so  a  spiritual  revelation 
without  any  outward  mark  of  it  could  not  be  verified  as  such. 


THE  EVIDENTIAL  VALUE  OF   MIRACLES.  153 

"We  should  have  to  depend  simply  on  the  word  of  the  professed 
revealer.  However  great  might  be  our  confidence  in  him  in 
general,  the  fact  that  he  claims  exceptional  illumination  would 
create  a  demand  for  exceptional  attestation.  To  make  war  on 
the  alleged  attestations  on  the  ground  that  they  would  be  in 
conflict  with  natural  law,  and  at  the  same  time  to  defend  the 
reality  of  the  alleged  revelation,  which  must  equally  have  in- 
volved a  departure  from  the  order  of  nature,  —  this  may  be  a 
rationalistic  course,  but  it  is  not  rational.  He  who  can  admit 
that  Jesus  Christ  was  chosen  of  God  to  communicate  to  men  an 
authoritative  revelation  has  yielded  the  whole  ground  as  against 
the  supernaturalist.  After  granting  the  greater  miracle,  he  cuts 
but  a  sorry  figure  in  trying  to  ignore  or  disbelieve  the  smaller 
ones  which  are  grouped  around  the  greater.  He  will  gain  noth- 
ing in  the  estimation  of  the  common  skeptic,  so  long  as  he  sin- 
cerely retains  what  have  always  been  regarded  as  the  essential 
features  of  Christianity.  And  he  will  gain  little  more  by  using 
the  traditional  phraseology  of  supernatural  Christianity,  while 
yet  virtually  abandoning  the  supernatural  conception  of  it.  The 
only  self-consistent  course  is  either  to  deny  the  supernatural 
absolutely,  and  consequently  to  deny  to  Jesus  Christ  all  au- 
thoritative relation  to  other  men ;  or  else  to  accept  supernatural 
Christianity  frankly  according  to  the  only  trustworthy  sources 
from  which  we  derive  a  knowledge  of  it. 

Similarly,  the  assumption  of  the  sinless  excellence  of  Jesus, 
which  is  admitted  by  many  who  question  his  alleged  miracles, 
is  exposed  to  all  the  objections  which  are  urged  against  mira- 
cles in  general,  and  to  some  peculiar  difficulties  besides.  The 
•possibility  of  perfect  sinlessness  must  indeed  be  admitted.  But 
none  the  less  is  the  'possibility  of  physical  miracles  admitted  by 
all  theists.  But  the  theistic  rationalist  regards  the  improba- 
bility of  miracles  as  so  great  as  to  make  it  practically  impossi- 
ble to  believe  in  their  occurrence.  But  there  is  no  improbability 
of  miracles  in  the  sphere  of  nature  greater  than  the  improba- 
bility that  any  one  man  has  ever  yet  lived  a  perfectly  blameless 
life.  All  experience  and  observation  and  testimony  discredit 
any  such  claim  made  by  any  one  on  his  own  behalf  or  on  be- 
half of  another.     And  if  any  one  were  perfect,  the  fact  would 


154  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

be  peculiarly  difficult  to  prove,  since  moral  perfection  is  not 
something  open  to  public  view,  and  even  apparent  faultlessness 
would  not  generally  be  regarded  as  sufficient  to  outweigh  the 
immense  presumption  there  is  that  every  man  has  in  his  heart 
thoughts  and  feelings  which  cannot  meet  the  approval  of  the 
perfectly  holy  God.  Men  have  sometimes  professed  to  be  per- 
fect ;  even  good  men  have  made  the  claim.  But  the  claim  has 
been  uniformly  disallowed  by  others,  and  perhaps  often  for  the 
very  reason  that  the  claim  was  made.  No  physical  law  is  more 
uniform  in  its  working  than  the  recurrence  of  sin  and  imper- 
fection in  every  human  being.  That  any  considerable  number 
of  men  should  have  been  willing  to  admit  an  exception  in  the 
case  of  Jesus  is  itself  almost  a  miracle.  It  never  could  have 
happened,  if  he  had  been  regarded  as  a  mere  man,  possessed  of 
no  supernatural  powers.  He  was  accounted  sinless  because  the 
appearance  and  claim  of  sinlcssness  were  accompanied  hy  the 
appearance  and  claim  of  superhuman  endowment.  The  claim 
of  superhuman  endowment  would  have  been  disallowed  but  for 
the  moral  excellence  ;  and  the  moral  pre-eminence  would  have 
been  disallowed  but  for  the  claim  of  supernatural  endowment. 
Had  he  been  a  merely  ordinary  man,  so  far  as  his  life  was  con- 
cerned, occupied  with  his  trade,  but  laying  claim  to  the  distinc- 
tion of  sinlessness,  the  claim,  even  if  not  capable  of  positive 
disproof,  would  yet  have  made  no  great  impression,  and  would 
have  gained  no  wide  acceptance,  if  any  at  all.^  It  was  because 
he  assumed  the  part  of  a  divinely  commissioned  reformer  and 
Eedeemer,  because  he  claimed  not  only  uniqueness  of  char- 
acter, but  uniqueness  of  nature  and  uniqueness  of  intrinsic 
authority  over  men,  that  his  claim  of  sinlessness  was  admitted. 
The  two  claims  could  not  but  stand  or  fall  together.  He  who 
admits  the  sinlessness  of  Christ,  unless  he  does  so  blindly,  be- 
cause others  have  done  it  before,  can  find  no  justifying  reason 
for  his  belief,  unless  he  assumes,  together  with  the  sinlessness, 
a  uniqueness  of  nature  or  of  relation  which  involves  all  the 

^  E.  W.  Newman,  in  his  What  is  Christianity  without  Christ?  in  which  he 
arraigns  the  moral  character  of  Jesus  as  extremely  defective  and  faulty, 
shows  what  is  the  tendency  of  a  thorough  abandonment  of  the  belief  iu  the 
supernatural. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  155 

essential  marks  of  a  miracle.  When,  therefore,  one  is  troubled 
by  the  allegations  of  particular  miracles  wrought  by  Christ,  but 
is  ready  to  admit  Christ  himself  to  be  the  one  sinless  individual 
of  the  race,  and  the  one  man  specially  commissioned  by  God  to 
communicate  the  divine  counsels  to  man,  we  can  only  call  this 
a  conspicuous  example  of  straining  out  a  gnat  and  swallowing  a 
camel. 

4.  The  skeptical  or  agnostic  attitude  towards  miracles  leads 
to  irrational  caprice  in  the  treatment  of  the  historical  sources 
of  information  respecting  the  origin  of  Christianity. 

The  miraculous  is  in  fact  so  inextricably  interwoven  with 
the  earliest  extant  narratives  of  Christ  that  it  cannot  be  elimi- 
nated except  by  the  most  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  process. 
The  history  of  modern  criticism  of  the  Gospels  has  shown  that, 
whatever  liberty  may  have  been  taken  and  accorded  in  discuss- 
ing the  questions  relating  to  the  age,  genuineness,  composi- 
tion, and  authenticity  of  the  New  Testament  books,  the  one 
thing  that  cannot  be  got  rid  of  in  them  is  the  supernatural.^ 
Paulus's  attempt  to  explain  the  miracles  as  natural  events  not 
understood  by  the  narrators  to  be  supernatural,  was  long  ago 
discarded  as  ridiculously  arbitrary.  The  mythical  theory  has 
met  an  almost  similar  fate,  though  there  are  still  many  who 
cling  to  some  of  its  assumptions.  But  the  whole  inspiration 
of  the  effort  to  expurgate  the  miraculous  from  the  Gospels 
comes  fro-m  the  general  notion  that  miracles  are  incredible,  — 
from  the  miraculophobia  of  the  present  day.  By  no  sifting  pro- 
cess can  the  miraculous  be  eliminated  from  these  books.  No 
external  or  internal  evidence  goes  to  show  that  this  element  is 
a  later  addition.  Mark's  Gospel,  widely  reputed  to  present  the 
most  primitive  extant  form  of  the  evangelic  history,  is  as  full 
of  it  as  any  other,  and  perhaps  even  gives  it  greater  promi- 
nence. John's  Gospel,  the  latest  of  the  four,  exhibits  no  es- 
sential contrast  with  the  others  in  its  portraiture  of  the 
supernatural  element  in  Christ's  life.  One  may  conjecture 
that   there   are   late   interpolations,    or   that   all   the   Gospels 

^  Vide  Prof.  J.  H.  Thayer,  Criticism  Confirmatory  of  the  Gospels  (in  Boston 
Lectures  for  IS 71);  Prof.  G.  P.  Fisher,  Supernatural  Origin  of  Christianity; 
C.  A.  Eow,  The  Supernatural  in  the  N.  T.;  The  Jesus  of  the  Evangelists. 


156  SUPERNATURaVL   REVELATION. 

were  written  in  the  second  century;  but  this  is  pure  conjec- 
ture, contrary  to  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.  But  if  one 
choose  to  adopt  such  a  hypothesis,  the  only  result  is  to  throw 
the  whole  history  of  the  incipient  church  into  an  impenetrable 
cloud.  The  person  of  Christ,  his  character,  his  claims,  his 
peculiar  relation  to  his  followers,  —  all  this  is  left  to  be  thought 
of  as  one  pleases.  The  "  critical  feeling  "  which  strikes  out  the 
miraculous  stories  must  construct  the  true  story  of  Jesus  as 
best  it  can.  Early  traditions  can  count  for  only  so  much  as 
the  critic  chooses  to  let  them ;  and  this  is  very  little,  for  the 
early  traditions  are  all  saturated  with  the  supernatural. 

Whoever  adopts  the  principle  that  the  narratives  of  miracles 
are  somehow  to  be  got  over  or  explained  away  cannot  consist- 
ently stop  short  of  a  similar  process  with  reference  to  all  those 
passages  which  ascribe  to  Jesus  a  superhuman  dignity  and  au- 
thority. These  representations,  however,  run  all  through  the 
Gospel  histories.  No  critical  suspicion  belongs  to  the  sections 
which  portray  Jesus'  unique  claims  ;  they  belong  to  the  warp  and 
woof  of  the  history.  As  above  shown,  the  same  reasons  which 
can  be  urged  against  the  authenticity  of  the  stories  of  miracles 
bear  with  equal,  if  not  with  greater,  weight  against  everything 
which  pictures  Christ  as  the  only  begotten  Son  of  God.  And  the 
actual  result  is  that,  according  to  the  degree  of  logical  consist- 
ency with  which  the  critical  canon  is  applied,  we  find  the 
miraculophobists  now  acknowledging  almost  the  highest  that 
has  ever  been  held  respecting  the  personal  dignity  of  Christ ; 
now  recognizing  him  as  unique  in  sinlessness,  though  merely 
human  ;  now  putting  him  at  the  head  of  the  world's  sages  and 
prophets  ;  now  making  him  merely  a  good  man  who  somehow 
came  to  be  regarded  as  fulfilling  the  Old  Testament  anticipa- 
tions of  the  Messiah ;  now  regarding  him  as  a  gifted  enthusiast 
who  made  some  impression  on  his  contemporaries ;  now  calling 
him  a  man  of  erratic  impulses  and  of  very  defective  virtue.  Any 
theory  of  Jesus'  character  and  calling  can  be  derived  from  the 
New  Testament  narratives,  provided  one  exercises  his  critical 
feeling  in  such  a  way  as  to  pronounce  mythical  or  unauthentic 
what  he  happens  not  to  like.  There  is  something  almost  piti- 
able in  the  manner  in  which  some  critics  treat  the  question  of 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  157 

Christ's  miracles.  Those  passages  ^  in  which  Jesus  is  reported  to 
have  refused  to  work  miracles  to  gratify  the  curiosity  of  cap- 
tious or  superstitious  men,  or  in  which  he  seems  to  depreciate 
the  value  of  supernatural  manifestations,  are  pronounced  un- 
doubtedly authentic.  But  the  more  numerous  ones,^  in  which 
Jesus  is  represented  as  appealing  to  his  own  miraculous  works 
as  evidence  of  his  divine  commission,  are  assumed  to  be  the 
work  of  a  legendary  imagination.  If  there  were  anything  like 
contradiction  between  the  two  classes  of  passages,  there  would 
be  at  least  some  plausibility  in  this  method  of  explanation  ; 
but  of  contradiction  there  is  not  the  faintest  trace.  The  two 
representations  are  even  found  virtually  combined  in  one  verse 
(John  xiv.  11).  That  Jesus  should  refuse  to  make  a  thauma- 
turgic  display  of  his  power  is  precisely  what  we  should  expect 
of  him,  if  he  was  the  sort  of  miracle- worker  that  the  Gospels 
picture  him  to  be.  That  he  should  not  have  expected  to  con- 
vince the  people  of  his  Messiahship  by  the  mere  exercise  of 
his  miraculous  gifts,  but  rather,  and  chiefly,  by  the  impressive- 
ness  and  authority  of  his  character  and  teaching,  —  this,  too, 
is  quite  in  accordance  with  intrinsic  probability  and  with  the 
narrative  itself.  But  Matthew  Arnold  says  :  ^  "It  is  most  re- 
markable, and  the  best  proof  of  the  simplicity,  seriousness,  and 
good  faith  which  intercourse  with  Jesus  Christ  had  inspired, 
that  witnesses  with  a  fixed  prepossession,  and  having  no  doubt 
at  all  as  to  the  interpretation  to  be  put  on  Christ's  acts  and 
career,  should  yet  admit  so  much  of  what  makes  against  them- 
selves and  their  own  power  of  interpreting.  For  them,  it  was 
a  thing  beyond  all  doubt,  that  by  miracles  Jesus  manifested 

1  As  Matt.  xii.  39  (xvi.  4 ;  Mark  viii.  12 ;  Luke  xi.  29) ;  Luke  xvi.  31 ; 
John  iv.  48,  vi.  30  sqq. 

2  As  Matt.  ix.  6  (Mark  ii.  10;  Luke  v.  24);  xi.  2-5  (Luke  vii.  18-22); 
Markiii.  20-30  (Luke  xi.  20)  ;  Luke  x.  13,  xiii.  32;  John  x.  25,  38,  xi.  42, 
xiv.  11.  Yet  in  the  face  of  this  fact  Schenkel  (Orundlehren  des  Christenthums 
§  263)  does  not  hesitate  dogmatically  to  affirm  that  Jesus,  "  in  order  decisively 
to  assert  himself  as  Redeemer,  never  appealed  to  an  external  superiority,  to 
miracles,  or  to  the  testimony  of  tradition.  This  was  done  by  the  Evangelists 
and  Apostles  after  him,  not  by  himself."  How  convenient  it  is  to  be  om- 
niscient ! 

*  Literature  and  Dogma,  p.  158  (fifth  edition,  1876). 


158  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

forth  his  glory  and  induced  the  faithful  to  believe  in  him.  Yet 
what  checks  to  this  paramount  and  all-governing  belief  of 
theirs  do  they  report  from  Jesus  himself !  "  And  then  he  goes 
on  to  quote  the  passages  above  referred  to,  in  which  Jesus  is 
described  as  blaming  the  people  who  were  greedy  for  signs  and 
wonders.  Of  course,  now,  the  evangelists,  if  they  had  had 
less  "simplicity,"  would  not  have  stultified  themselves  by  admit- 
ting such  contradictory  reports  !  If  they  had  been  intelligent 
enough  to  see  that  they  were  guilty  of  such  self-contradiction, 
they  would  have  omitted  those  passages  in  which  Jesus  is  made 
to  disclaim  the  character  of  a  miracle- worker.  We  should 
not  have  been  so  fortunate  as  to  have  even  these  few  clews 
to  a  correct  knowledge  of  the  fact.  Even  the  author  of  the 
Fourth  Gospel,  although  a  man  of  "philosophical  acquire- 
ments," is  afflicted  with  the  same  simplicity.  "He  deals  in 
miracles  just  as  confidingly  "  as  the  other  historians,^  and,  like 
them,  he  allows  the  reported  language  of  Clirist  to  contradict 
his  own  conception  of  Christ.  How  grateful  we  ought  to  be 
that  the  evangelists  were  so  "  simple "  as  not  to  know  when 
they  were  guilty  of  the  most  flagrant  self-contradiction  !  How 
fortunate  for  the  world  that  the  writing  of  the  Gospel  narra- 
tive fell  into  the  hands  of  men  who  were  so  unintelligent  and 
honest  that  they  told  the  truth,  as  it  were,  in  spite  of  them- 
selves !  Inasmuch  as  they  were  "  men  who  saw  thaumaturgy 
in  all  that  Jesus  did,"^  their  intention  must  have  been  to  rep- 
resent his  whole  life  as  a  grand  thaumaturgical  exhibition,  and 
to  represent  him  as  claiming  the  power  to  do  wonders,  and  as 
appealing  to  the  wonders  in  proof  of  his  extraordinary  com- 
mission, Jesus,  to  be  sure,  did  nothing  of  the  sort.  He  was, 
on  the  contrary,  intensely  opposed  to  the  whole  miracle  mania. 
"  To  convey  at  all  to  such  hearers  of  him  that  there  was  any 
objection  to  miracles,  his  own  sense  of  the  objection  must  have 
been  profound ;  and  to  get  them,  who  neither  shared  nor  under- 
stood it,  to  repeat  it  a  few  times,  he  must  have  repeated  it 
many  times."  ^  The  phenomenon,  then,  according  to  Mr.  Arnold, 
was   this :    Jesus   and   John    the  Baptist   were   contemporary 

1  Literature  and  Dogma,  p.  178  (fifth  edition,  1S70). 

2  I'jid.,  p.  148.  8  iiji^^^  p,  158. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  159 

prophets.'  But  neither  Jesus  nor  John  wrought  any  miracles. 
Of  John  this  is  expressly  recorded ;  ^  and  in  none  of  the  Gospels 
is  there  the  faintest  hint  that  he  exercised  or  claimed  any  mi- 
raculous power.  He  was  the  greatest  of  all  the  prophets  of  the 
Jewish  dispensation.^  He  was  a  second  Elijah.*  But  although 
the  original  Elijah  was  universally  esteemed  a  great  miracle- 
worker  ;  and  although  the  second  Elijah  created  a  most  power- 
ful sensation  by  his  preaching,  —  yet  he  never  wrought  and  was 
never  imagined  to  have  wrought  a  single  miracle.  Not  only 
his  contemporaries,  but  his  reporters,  show  not  the  slightest 
tendency  to  ascribe  to  him  any  thaumaturgic  power  whatever. 
He  had  no  occasion  to  refuse  to  work  miracles,  for  he  was 
never  asked  to  work  them.  He  did  not  need  to  protest  against 
the  popular  tendency  to  expect  miraculous  works  from  great 
prophets ;  for  in  his  case  the  people  seemed  to  be  so  wholly  in- 
tent on  the  sermons  which  he  preached,  and  to  be  so  convinced 
by  his  preaching,  that  they  never  thought  to  ask  for  miracles 
as  his  credentials.^  Jesus,  however,  though  he  preached  the 
same  sermon  of  repentance,  and  also  wrought  no  miracles, 
somehow  found  himself  continually  met  by  a  demand  that  he 
should  perform  them.  He  had  to  refuse  and  keep  refusing. 
He  had  to  tell  the  people  over  and  over,  that  miracles  could  not 
be  performed,  and  would  do  no  good  if  they  could  be.  He  had 
to  din  this  teaching  into  the  heads  of  the  superstitious  people, 
till  at  last,  through  sheer  repetition,  the  words  stuck,  and  were 
handed  down  amongst  the  other  things  that  Jesus  said,  and 
even  found  their  way  into  the  records  that  have  been  preserved 
down  to  our  time ;   although  the  narrators  themselves   could 

^  Mr.  Arnold,  indeed,  does  not  thus  speak  of  Jolin  in  comparison  with 
Jesus ;  but  he  cannot  take  exception  to  this  representation  of  the  Biblical  de- 
scription of  him. 

2  John  X.  41.  8  Matt.  xi.  11.  •*  Mark  ix.  13. 

5  This  fact  seems  to  have  been  overlooked  by  Strauss  also,  who  {Leben 
Jesu,  \  iS)  accounts  for  the  ascription  of  miracles  to  Jesus  by  the  following 
generations  by  saying  tliat,  as  Moses  and  the  principal  prophets  were  reputed 
to  have  wrouglit  miracles,  "it  was  natural  tliat  miracles  were  likewise  expected 
of  every  one  who  claimed  to  be  a  prophet."  Why,  then,  we  must  ask,  did 
not  the  people  ascribe  miracles  to  John?  For  he  certainly  claimed  to  be  a 
prophet,  and  his  claim  was  admitted. 


160  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

not  understand  how  he  could  have  failed  to  be  all  the  time 
doing  marvels,  and  were  so  persuaded  of  this  that  they  have 
filled  their  story  of  him  with  accounts  of  his  thaumaturgical 
doings,  and  represented  him  not  only  as  doing  miracles,  but  as 
appealing  to  them  in  attestation  of  his  divine  commission !  We 
owe  to  nothing  but  to  their  incorrigible  dullness  —  or  "  sim- 
plicity " —  the  fortunate  chance  that,  in  a  few  instances,  this 
refusal  of  Jesus  to  have  anything  to  do  with  miracles  has  crept 
into  the  writings  of  the  very  men  who  did  not  and  could  not 
conceive  of  him  otherwise  than  as  a  great  thaumaturgus. 

Now,  how  does  Mr.  Arnold  account  for  this  marked  difference 
between  the  description  of  Jesus  and  that  of  John  the  Baptist  ?  ^ 
How  does  he  find  out  that  his  is  the  true  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  Gospel  histories  ?  How  can  he  be  so  sure 
that  the  whole  current  of  the  narrative  is  false  as  regards 
miracles,  and  only  these  few  straggling  passages  reveal  to  us 
the  exact  fact?  How  does  he  know,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
Jesus  did  not,  as  E^nan  makes  him,^  yield  to  the  popular  clamor 
for  a  startling  sign,  and  actually  pose  as  a  thaumaturgus  ?  How 
has  he  made  himself  sure  that  his  own  father  was  altogether 
mistaken,  on  the  other,  when  he  said  that  the  absence  of  mira- 
cles in  the  Gospels  would  have  been  far  more  wonderful  than 
their  presence  ?  The  only  answer  to  all  this,  and  other  questions 
that  might  be  raised,  is  that  the  "literary  and  scientific  criticism" 
of  the  present  day  has  decided  that  the  fact  must  be  as  Mr. 
Matthew  Arnold  states  it.  This  kind  of  criticism,  he  tells  us,^ 
requires  "  the  finest  heads  and  the  most  sure  tact."  The  theo- 
logians who  have  undertaken  to  interpret  the  New  Testament 
have  all  been  devoid  of  these  necessary  qualifications,  and  there- 
fore they  have  made  "  a  pretty  mess  of  it."  ^  Men  who  might 
have  done  better  have  devoted  themselves  to  other  departments 
of  work.  We  are  left  to  infer  that  Mr.  Arnold  is  the  critic 
with  a  fine  head  and  a  sure  tact  who  has  had  the  boldness  to 
assail  the  popular  superstitions,  and  to  tell  us  what  is  genuine 
in  the  Gospels  and  what  is  the  product  of  the  legendary  mania. 

^  Cf.  on  tills  point  G.  P.  Fisher,  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief, 
p.  162. 

*  Life  of  Jesus,  p.  193.      ^  Literature  and  Bogma,  p.  184.      *  Ibid.,  p.  185. 


THE   EVIDEXTLVL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  161 

The  sum  of  the  matter  is  that,  according  to  the  theory  in 
question,  the  supernatural  must  be  ruled  out  at  the  outset ;  but, 
inasmuch  as  the  supernatural  permeates  the  whole  evangelical 
history  like  an  indwelling  spirit,  it  becomes  a  difficult  problem 
to  discover  how  to  eliminate  it,  and  yet  define  what  shall  be 
allowed  to  remain  as  genuine  and  authentic.  No  wonder  that 
for  the  task  a  very  fine  head  and  a  most  sure  tact  are  essential. 
Mr.  Arnold,  indeed,  himself,  though  he  affirms  that  the  literary 
and  scientific  criticism  of  the  Bible  is  "  very  hard,"  ^  yet  dis- 
courses as  if  it  were  very  easy  to  him.  He  pronounces  oracu- 
larly that  certain  utterances  bear  unmistakable  marks  of  having 
been  really  uttered  by  Jesus,  and  that  certain  others  as  clearly 
are  spurious,  though  attributed  to  him  just  as  positively.  His 
criterion  is  simply  and  solely  his  conception  of  what  Jesus  was. 
What,  according  to  his  feeling,  Jesus  might  have  said  or  ought 
to  have  said,  that  he  will  accept  as  historic,  —  that,  and  nothing 
else.  Having  decided  that  miracles  never  were  wrought,  and 
that  consequently  Jesus  did  not  work  any,  he  must  solve  the 
problem  how  so  many  narratives  of  miracles  got  into  the  record. 
The  gist  of  the  explanation  given  is  that  the  Jewish  Christians 
had  been  led  by  their  training  to  expect  miracles  as  the  mark 
of  their  Messiah,  and  that,  having  accepted  Jesus  as  the 
Messiah,  they  felt,  when  they  looked  back,  as  if  he  must  have 
wrought  miracles.  Well,  no  doubt  the  Jews  had  had  great 
expectations  of  what  the  promised  Messiah  would  do.  He  was 
to  appear  suddenly,  and  was  to  deliver  Israel  by  irresistible 
power  from  the  hand  of  oppressors.  He  was  to  be  a  great 
king,  immeasurably  greater  than  even  David;  and  under  his 
reign  the  Jews  were  to  enjoy  prosperity  and  peace  such  as  they 
had  never  known  before.  These  were  the  prominent  and  ab- 
sorbing features  of  the  Jewish  Messianic  idea.  That  the  Mes- 
siah was  to  be  a  miracle-worker  of  such  a  sort  as  Jesus  is 
represented  in  the  Gospels  to  have  been,  is  not  one  of  the 
features  of  the  Messianic  idea.  Now,  if  the  characteristics  of 
the  evangelic  records  are  to  be  explained  as  reflections  of  the 
Jewish  expectations  rather  than  as  a  simple  account  of  facts, 
then  the  question  arises,  Why  do  not  the  Gospels  represent 
^  Literature  and  Dogma,  p.  185. 


162  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Jesus  as  a  temporal  king,  and  so  as  fulfilling  the  Jewish  ex- 
pectations ?  If  the  writers  could  not  help  seeing  thaumaturgy 
in  all  that  Jesus  did,  although  neither  the  Jewish  apocalyptic 
writers  ^  nor  the  Old  Testament  writers  had  ever  pictured  him 
in  that  character,  still  more  ought  we  to  infer  that  they  must 
have  seen  royalty  and  regal  power  in  his  whole  life,  since  this 
is  just  what  the  prophets  and  apocryphal  writers  had  emphasized 
as  his  leading  characteristic.  It  is  easy,  of  course,  to  reply  that 
the  facts  were  too  manifestly  opposed  to  such  a  legend.  The 
Jews  were  not  delivered  from  their  oppressors,  and  were  not 
enjoying  the  expected  Messianic  prosperity ;  and  therefore  they 
could  not  imagine  that  Jesus  had  done  what,  as  was  only  too 
obvious,  had  not  been  done.  Very  well;  then  it  appears  that 
the  Jewish  ideal  of  the  Messiah  had  not  been  realized  in  its 
most  prominent  feature  ;  but  nevertheless  Jesus  was  regarded  as 
having  been  the  promised  Messiah.  What  necessity,  then,  was 
there  for  a  legendary  ascription  to  him  of  miracles,  which  were 
not  a  prominent  feature  in  the  Jewish  ideal  of  him  ?  But  more 
than  this :  the  popular  expectation  respecting  the  Messiah  must 
have  been  abandoned  at  the  outset  by  all  those  who  believed 
in  Jesus  as  the  Christ.  If  (as  we  are  asked  to  believe)  he 
wrought  no  miracles  in  fact,  then  he  was  accepted  as  the  Mes- 
siah, although  he  did  not  fulfil  the  expectations  either  as  regards 
royal  power  or  as  regards  miraculous  power.  In  short,  the  carnal 
Jewish  notion  had  to  be  entirely  given  up.  If  still  he  was  con- 
ceived as  the  one  prophesied  of  in  the  Old  Testament,  it  was  by 
virtue  of  a  different  interpretation  from  that  which  had  hitherto 
generally  prevailed.  The  Christian  conception  of  the  Messiah 
(according  to  the  theory  of  Mr.  Arnold)  must  originally  have 
been  entirely  defecated  of  all  those  Jewish  fancies  which  in- 
vested the  Messiah  with  political  and  thaumaturgic  power,  else 
Jesus  could  never  have  been  acknowledged  as  Messiah  at  all. 
If  so,  how  was  it  that  twenty  or  thirty  years  later,  or  even  still 
sooner,  within  the  circle  of  those  same  Christians  and  their  im- 
mediate successors,  it  became  "  a  thing  beyond  all  doubt  that  by 

*  On  the  ante-Christian  Messianic  conceptions,  cf.  Hilgenfeld,  T)if  jiidische 
Apokali/ptik,  and  Messias  Judaeorum.  Also  James  Drunimoiid,  The  Jewish 
Messiah. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  163 

miracles  Jesus  manifested  forth  his  glory  and  induced  the  faith- 
ful to  believe  in  him  ? "  ^  Originally,  according  to  Mr.  Arnold, 
it  must  have  been  beyond  all  doubt  that  Jesus  did  no  miracles 
at  all ;  now,  only  a  little  while  afterwards,  and  among  the  people 
who  had  received  the  Christian  faith  most  directly,  just  the  op- 
posite had  come  to  be  beyond  all  doubt !  The  fleshly  Jewish 
conception,  which  had  been  finally  and  definitively  overcome 
before  the  apostles  publicly  preached  Christ  to  their  country- 
men, returned  and  took  full  possession  of  their  minds  as 
regards  that  one  particular,  although  in  all  other  respects  the 
carnal  Jewish  conception  was  and  continued  to  be  entirely 
repudiated ! 

Take  the  case  of  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  How  plain  the 
whole  thing  is  to  Mr.  Arnold :  "  The  more  the  miraculousness 
of  the  story  deepens,  as  after  the  death  of  Jesus,  the  more  does 
the  texture  of  the  incidents  become  loose  and  floating,  the  more 
does  the  very  air  and  aspect  of  things  seem  to  tell  us  we  are  in 
wonderland.  Jesus  after  his  resurrection  not  known  to  Mary 
Magdalene,  taken  by  her  for  the  gardener;  appearing  in  another 
form,  and  not  known  by  the  two  disciples  going  with  him  to 
Emmaus  and  at  supper  with  him  there ;  not  known  by  his  most 
intimate  apostles  on  the  borders  of  the  Sea  of  Galilee;  and 
presently,  out  of  these  vague  beginnings,  the  recognitions  get- 
ting asserted,  then  the  ocular  demonstrations,  the  final  commis- 
sions, the  ascension ;  one  hardly  knows  which  of  the  two  to 
call  most  evident  here,  the  perfect  simplicity  and  good  faith  of 
the  narrators,  or  the  plainness  with  which  they  themselves 
really  say  to  us :  Beliold  a  legend  growing  under  your  eyes  !  "  ^ 

What  a  blessing  it  is  to  have  a  "  fine  head "  and  a  "  sure 
tact " !  This  legend  which  grows  up  under  our  eyes  grew  up 
in  three  days !  Beyond  all  contradiction,  within  less  than  two 
months  after  the  crucifixion  the  apostles  were  boldly  preaching 
the  resurrection  as  an  undeniable  fact,  and  rested  their  whole 
case  on  the  truth  of  this  allegation.  What  now  were  the  apostles 
alleging  at  that  time  ?  That  Jesus  had  appeared,  but  was  "not 
known  "?  Were  they  preaching  about  Mary  Magdalene's  having 
seen  somebody  whom  she  took  to  be  a  gardener  ?  Were  they 
^  Literature  and  Dofftna,  p.  158.  *  Ibid.,  p.  151. 


164  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

telling  about  some  unknown  person  that  had  appeared  to  them 
on  the  shore  of  the  Lake  of  Galilee  ?  Were  they  urging  the  Jews 
to  accept  Jesus  as  their  Messiah  for  the  reason  that  two  men 
had  had  an  interesting  talk  with  a  mysterious  stranger  on  the 
way  to  Emmaus  ?  Of  course  not.  The  "legend"  was  already 
full-grown.  So  far  as  this  story  is  concerned,  it  might  have 
been  recorded  at  once.  In  a  few  days  or  weeks  after  the  cruci- 
fixion the  disciples  were  telling  confidently,  not  of  an  uyihiown 
Jesus  who  had  appeared  to  them,  but  of  an  unmistakable  reap- 
pearance of  the  Crucified  One.  In  spite  of  Mr.  Arnold's  "  fine 
head,"  it  is  palpable  that  there  was  no  slow  and  gradual  growth 
of  a  legendary  story,  but  that  the  story  was  from  the  beginning 
unequivocal,  well-defined,  in  all  essential  features  precisely  what 
the  New  Testament  records  present  to  us. 

One  thing  is  certain.  The  supernatural  is  so  inwrought  into 
the  very  substance  of  the  New  Testament,  that  unbelieving 
critics  can  eliminate  it  only  by  the  most  arbitrary  and  uncriti- 
cal process,  and  can  never  come  to  any  agreement  among  them- 
selves as  to  what  is  to  be  accepted  and  what  rejected  in  the 
evangelical  portraiture  of  Jesus  Christ  and  his  work.  ^ 

5.  The  agnostic  or  skeptical  attitude  towards  the  supernatural 
leads  to  the  assumption  of  an  unwarrantable  distinction  between 
the  present  Christian  world  and  the  original  Christians  in  their 
relation  to  the  evidences  of  Christianity. 

Miracles,  either  as  real  or  as  apparent,  are  often  acknowledged 
to  have  ser.ved  a  useful  purpose  in  the  original  introduction  of 
Christianity,  but  are  declared  to  be  now  no  longer  serviceable. 
Christianity  is  said  to  be  accepted  now,  not  on  account  of  the 
historical  miracles,  but  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  worth.  The 
miracles  are  so  far  removed  from  us,  so  intrinsically  difficult  to 
substantiate,  and  so  obnoxious  to  the  scientific  spirit  of  the 
times,  that  they  seem  to  be  a  burden  rather  than  a  help.  Even 
some  strenuous  defenders  of  the  reality  of  the  Christian  mira- 
cles are  ready  to  make  this  concession.     Thus  J.  HirzeP  says: 

1  Eor  a  good  exliibltiou  of  tlic  arbitrariness  of  miraculopliobists  in  tlieir 
treatment  of  the  Gospels,  vide  Henry  Kogers's  critique  of  Strauss  and  Renan, 
in  his  Reason  and  Faith,  and  other  Essai/s,  pp.  I'M  sqq. 

2  Ueber  das   Wander,  ]).  3.     Similarly   L.   I.  Kuekert   {Rationalismus,   p. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  165 

'•  We  grant  at  the  outset  .  .  ,  that  the  bare  historical  narratives 
of  miracles  do  not  have  the  evidential  force  for  us  which  the 
miracles  themselves  had  for  the  eye-witnesses  of  them.  We 
can  let  it  pass  as  quite  orthodox  when  one  says,  '  I  believed  at 
first,  not  because,  but  in  spite,  of  miracles.'  Yes,  we  believe 
now,  not  in  Christ  on  account  of  the  outward  miracles,  but  in 
the  miracles  on  account  of  Christ." 

Now  that  there  is  a  difference  between  us  and  the  first  Chris- 
tians in  respect  to  the  acceptance  of  the  gospel  may  be  freely 
admitted.  We  receive  Christianity  as  a  traditional  impartation, 
wliereas  the  first  disciples  had  to  be  convinced  by  the  direct 
evidence.  We  have  not  the  advantage  of  an  immediate  percep- 
tion of  the  miraculous  signs ;  and  we  have  the  advantage  of  the 
history  of  the  practical  working  of  Christianity  in  the  world. 
But  when  we  narrowly  examine  the  matter,  we  find  that  the 
evidential  force  of  miracles  is  after  all  not  essentially  different 
now  from  what  it  was  originally.  If  it  is  true  that  Christianity 
now  is  not  for  the  sake  of  miracles,  but  miracles  for  the  sake  of 
Christianity,  so  was  it  equally  true  when  Christ  was  living  on 
the  earth.  If  the  miracles  are  by  themselves  now  insufficient 
to  convince  all  men  of  the  truth  of  Christianity,  so  they  were  at 
the  time  they  were  performed ;  they  were  either  disbelieved 
or  at  least  were  not  accepted  as  establishing  Jesus'  Messianic 
claims.  The  apostles  appealed,  it  is  true,  to  miracles ;  but 
they  laid  the  chief  stress  on  the  message  of  salvation  which 
Christ  had  come  to  bring.  The  great  command  was  not,  "  Be- 
lieve in  miracles,"  but,  "  Believe  on  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ." 
But  the  two  things  were  not,  and  could  not  be,  disjoined,  as 
though  the  one  could  be  accepted  and  the  other  doubted  or  re- 
jected. The  wonderful  works  were  everywhere  and  always 
treated  as  the  natural  and  appropriate  badge  of  the  wonderful 
person.     Christ,  as  an  altogether  unique  man,  unique  in  his  re- 

13G),  while  lie  admits  the  genuineness  of  some  of  Clirist's  miracles,  yet  says 
of  Christ,  that,  "  since  in  his  death  his  glory  has  been  made  manifest  to  the 
world,  faith  needs  miracles  no  longer,  but  rather  may  begin  and  continue  in- 
dependently of  them,  so  that,  even  if  no  record  of  any  of  his  miracles  had  been 
preserved,  his  nature  and  the  possibility  of  such  a  being  would  suffer  no 
detriment." 


166  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

lation  to  God,  unique  in  his  relation  to  other  men,  was  regarded 
as  unique  also  in  his  relation  to  "nature.  Claiming  to  be  the 
Son  of  God,  the  special  messenger  of  God,  the  Mediator  between 
God  and  man,  he  could  not  have  been  fully  credited  unless  he 
had  brought  convincing  proofs  of  the  trustworthiness  of  his 
claims.  His  extraordinary  claims  needed  to  be  matched  and 
substantiated  by  extraordinary  works. 

And  how  is  the  case  different  now  ?  "We  cannot,  it  is  true, 
be  eye-witnesses  of  Christ's  miracles ;  but  neither  can  we  be  ear- 
witnesses  of  his  words.  And  if  we  had  been  contemporaries  of 
Christ,  and  had  been  witnesses  of  the  physical  miracles,  yet  if 
we  had  received  no  impression  of  the  moral  and  spiritual  mar- 
vellousness  of  his  person,  we  should  still  have  been  unconvinced, 
just  as  the  Jews  were,  who  in  spite  of  all  they  saw  and  heard 
remained  unbelievers.  There  is  indeed  this  difference  between 
the  present  and  the  past,  that  the  claims  of  Christianity  to  be 
divine  have  been  confirmed  by  the  lapse  of  time,  by  the  history 
of  its  progress  and  beneficent  effects.  But  this  history  is  not 
sufficient  to  convince  all ;  many  enemies  of  Christianity  contend 
even  that  it  has  done  more  harm  than  good.  The  difference, 
therefore,  between  the  present  and  the  original  relation  of  men 
to  the  claims  of  Christ,  is  practically  null.  Those  who  are 
ready  to  accept  him  in  all  his  spiritual  claims,  but  stumble  at 
the  miracles,  simply  fail  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  only 
Christ  whom  they  know  about  is  he  who  is  brought  to  their 
knowledge  by  the  Christian  Church  and  the  Christian  Scriptures, 
and  that  this  Christ  is  and  always  has  been  in  the  Christian 
Church  regarded  as  a  person  of  superhuman  nature,  and  as  pos- 
sessing supernatural  powers.  The  person  and  the  works  have 
been  indissolubly  connected.  They  have  supplemented  and 
illustrated  each  other.  The  spiritual  claims,  according  to  all  the 
evidence  before  us,  never  were  in  the  first  place  admitted,  ex- 
cept as  confirmed  by  the  supernatural  manifestations.  And 
from  the  beginning  the  two  have  been  handed  down  together 
inseparably  intertwined.  What  convinced  the  apostles  was 
used  by  them  as  a  means  of  convincing  others.  It  was  the 
resurrection  of  Christ  which  overcame  their  last  fears,  and  be- 
came the  crowning  evidence  to  them  that  Jesus  was  the  real 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  167 

Messiah.  And  this  resurrection  was  used  in  their  preaching  as 
the  argument  whicli  should  persuade  others  than  the  direct 
witnesses  of  it.  He,  then,  who  accepts  the  Messianic  claims, 
while  rejecting  or  ignoring  the  supernatural  proofs  of  those 
claims,  is  simply  accepting  the  apostles'  testimony  as  to  Jesus' 
Messiahship,  without  accepting  their  testimony  as  to  the  facts 
which  convinced  them  of  his  Messiahship.  That  is,  he  admits 
the  truth,  but  does  not  admit  the  validity  of  that  by  which  the 
truth  has  been  established.  This  is  obviously  an  untenable 
position.  One  may  well  believe  that  the  sun  is  the  body 
around  which  all  the  planets  revolve,  on  the  strength  of  astro- 
nomical testimony.  He  may  accept  that  testimony  without  un- 
derstanding or  even  knowing  the  reasons  which  have  convinced 
astronomers  of  the  truth  of  this  proposition.  So  far  one  may 
well  go.  And  indeed  this  fairly  represents  the  state  of  mind  of 
a  large  part  of  mankind  who  accept  the  Copernican  system. 
But  if  a  man  rises  up  and  says  that  he  accepts  the  Copernican 
doctrine  as  to  the  centrality  of  the  sun  in  our  system,  but 
doubts  the  validity  of  the  reasons  which  have  led  to  the  adop- 
tion of  this  doctrine,  we  can  only  say  that  such  a  state  of  mind 
is  irrational.  What  ground  can  a  man  have  for  adopting  the 
theory,  so  long  as  he  questions  the  correctness  of  the  decisive 
reasons  which  have  led  men  to  propound  it  ?  Or  suppose  a  man 
should  say  that  he  believes  in  the  Copernican  doctrine  in  spite 
of  the  reasons  which  have  led  astronomers  to  teach  it,  what 
should  we  think  of  him  ?  Yet  this  is  a  fair  parallel  to  the  atti- 
tude of  those  who  profess  to  believe  in  Christ  without  believing 
in  his  miracles,  or  to  believe  in  him  in  spite  of  the  alleged  mira- 
cles. Whoever  takes  this  ground  must  sooner  or  later,  if  hon- 
est with  himself,  come  to  see  that  it  really  implies  that  he  does 
not  believe  that  the  supernatural  manifestations  ever  took  place 
at  all.  If  they  were  facts  ;  if  God  broke  into  the  uniformity  of 
the  world's  order  by  miraculous  deeds,  —  it  could  not  have  been 
a  matter  of  indifference  whether  the  interruption  was  recognized 
as  a  reality ;  it  could  not  have  been  done  without  some  extraor- 
dinary reason.!     And  if  on  the  strength  of  those  supernatural 

^  It  is  hard  to  see  into  the  state  of  mind  which  can  have  led  Professor 
Sceley  {Natural  Relit/ion,  p.  260),  after  he  has  elaborately  argued  the  needless- 


168  SUPEKNATUEAL   EEVELATION. 

demonstrations  Christ  became  definitely  accepted  as  the  Ee- 
deemer  of  men  and  has  ever  since  been  preached  as  such,  the 
reasons  which  were  sufficient  to  form  the  foundation  of  the  Chris- 
tian church  can  never  have  lost  their  validity.  If  they  have  lost 
their  validity  for  us,  then  they  never  deserved  to  have  validity 
for  the  first  believers.  "  To  this  complexion  it  must  come  at 
last."  To  believe  in  a  Christ  who  wrought  or  perhaps  wrought 
no  miracles  is  to  believe  in  a  Christ  whom  nobody  knows  any- 
thing about.  The  Christ  who  has  been  made  known  to  us  is  a 
supernatural  and  miracle-working  being.  He  is  one  who  veri- 
fied his  claims  to  be  the  Son  of  God  by  his  mighty  works.  If 
those  mighty  works  ever  had  evidential  force,  they  have  it 
now.  Either  Christianity  is  a  delusion,  or  the  supernatural  is 
inseparable  from  it.     But  this  leads  us  to  another  observation. 

6.  The  agnostic  or  negative  attitude  towards  miracles  must 
necessarily  lead  to  the  assumption  that  Christianity  rests  on  a 
fraud.  The  attempt,  and  the  pretense,  indeed,  may  be  simply 
to  leave  it  an  open  question  whether  miracles  occurred  or  not. 
The  intention  is  to  take  Christianity  simply  as  an  operative  sys- 
tem of  truths  and  influences,  and  let  it  be  its  own  recommenda- 
tion, irrespective  of  the  disputed  questions  about  the  external 
accessories  of  its  first  introduction.  But  the  historical  fact  is 
that  Christianity  has  all  along  professed  to  stand  on  a  super- 
natural foundation.  Its  Founder  has  all  along  been  regarded 
as  a  supernatural  being,  proving  his  unique  commission  by 
miraculous  deeds  as  well  as  by  prophetic  message.  When  it  is 
said,  as  is  done  especially  by  the  Ritschl  school,^  that  the  great- 
ness and  uniqueness  of  Jesus  must  be  argued  from  the  effect 
which  he  has  produced,  rather  than  from  any  supernatural  signs 
that  marked  his  life,  it  seems  to  be  forgotten  that  this  effect,  the 
power  of  Christianity  over  men,  has  come  just  from  this  sup- 
posed divinity  of  its  origin  and  authority,  —  a  divinity  attested 
by  divine  proofs  in  the  form  of  miraculous  works  wrought  by 
Christ  and  his  apostles.  The  unbroken  traditions  of  the  church 
agree  with  its  oldest  historical  records  in  insisting  that  this  was 

ness  of  a  supernatural  religion,  to  admit  that,  as  "  supplementing  a  natural  one, 
it  may  be  precious,  nay,  perhaps  indispensable." 

*  Similarly  Weissc,  Philosophische  Bogmatik,  vol.  iii.  p.  306. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  169 

the  fact ;  and  on  the  ground  of  this  fact  a  positive  aittliority  has 
been  ascribed  to  Christianity  over  against  all  opposing  doctrines 
and  systems.  The  New  Testament  shows  incontestably  that  a 
hdief  in  Christ's  superhuman  nature  and  power  pervaded  all  his 
early  followers,  and  in  connection  with  his  unique  purity  and 
exaltedness  of  character  and  prophetic  power  of  utterance  was 
the  condition  of  their  accepting  him  as  the  Messiah  and  Saviour. 
Particularly  his  miraculous  resurrection  from  the  dead  is  every- 
where represented  as  the  vital  fact  without  which  the  Christian 
Church  would  not  have  been  planted,  and  without  a  belief  in 
which  Christianity  is  not  genuine.  Critics  of  the  most  opposite 
schools  agree  in  holding  that  the  establishment  of  Christianity 
originally  depended  on  the  belief  in  Christ's  resurrection.  So 
much  seems  to  be  certain.  All  the  New  Testament  writers  lay 
tlie  greatest  stress  on  it  as  the  turning  point  in  the  incipient 
history  of  Christianity.  The  Evangelists  are  on  this  point  ex- 
ceptionally minute.  The  history  of  the  first  preaching  of  Chris- 
tianity represents  the  resurrection  of  Christ  as  the  central  fact 
insisted  on  as  voucliing  for  his  divine  commission.  The  apostles 
in  their  writings  agree  in  the  same.  Everything  conspires  to 
show  that  Paul  used  not  too  strong  an  expression,  when  he 
declared  that,  if  Christ  was  not  raised,  the  faith  of  the  Chris- 
tians was  vain. 

When,  therefore,  we  are  told  that  men  nowadays  believe  in 
Christianity,  if  at  all,  not  on  account  of  miracles,  but  in  spite 
of  them,  and  when  this  statement  is  designed  to  mean  that  the 
reality  of  the  New  Testament  miracles  is  at  least  to  be  seriously 
doubted,  if  not  flatly  denied,  it  behooves  us  to  consider  just 
what  this  position  implies.  Either  the  alleged  miracles  were 
genuine,  or  they  were  not.  We  may  be  in  doubt  which  horn 
of  the  dilemma  to  seize  ;  but  our  doubt  does  not  alter  the  fact 
of  the  dilemma.  It  is  indeed  possible  for  a  man  to  be  a  good 
Christian  while  beset  by  painful  doubts  respecting  miracles. 
But  an  abnormal  experience  is  no  rule  for  men  in  general. 
Such  a  state  of  mind  can,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  in  any 
thinking  and  logical  man,  be  only  a  transitional  state.  Eor  the 
fact  must  be  either  that  Jesus  rose  from  the  dead,  or  that  he  did 
not.     He  either  did,  or  did  not,  work  veritable  miracles  in  con- 


170  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

firmation  of  his  Messianic  claims.  And  the  necessary  conse- 
quences of  admitting  either  side  of  the  alternative  must  be 
accepted.  Suppose,  then,  the  fact  to  be  that  the  alleged  mira- 
cles were  not  real  miracles.  Be  the  explanation  what  it  may 
be ;  let  it  be  imagined  that  Jesus  and  the  apostles  conspired  to 
deceive,  or  that  they  were  all  together  fanatics  and  self-deceived, 
or  that  the  stories  of  the  miracles  were  a  legendary  growth. 
Suppose  what  one  may,  the  fact  remains,  that  the  founding  of 
the  Christian  Church  depended  on  the  helief  in  Christ's  super- 
natural power  and  authority.  If,  then,  the  miracles  were  not 
genuine,  the  successful  starting  of  the  Christian  religion  on  its 
career  depended  on  a  delusion.  And  not  only  the  starting  of  it, 
but  its  continued  growth  has  rested  on  that  same  delusion. 
For,  though  the  spiritual  elements  of  Christianity  may  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  physical  miracles  which  Christ  is  said  to 
have  wrought,  yet  the  most  vital  truths  of  Christianity  involve 
the  ascription  of  supernaturalness  to  Christ's  person  and  au- 
thority, —  all  that  is  essential,  in  short,  in  the  doctrine  of  mira- 
cles. But  even  on  the  supposition  that  these  conceptions  of  the 
uniqueness  of  Christ's  nature  and  power  are  exaggerations  ;  that 
Jesus'  moral  teachings  constituted  the  essence  of  his  religion, 
and  that  all  else  may  be  discarded,  —  still  the  same  fact  confronts 
us :  that  the  successful  establishment  of  the  Christian  Church, 
with  whatever  of  good  it  has  brought  to  the  world,  depended  on 
the  belief  in  Christ's  supernatural  endowments.  Such  a  rela- 
tion of  things  does  not  trouble  one  who,  like  Strauss,^  regards 
Christianity  in  general  as  of  little  worth.  But  one  who  calls 
himself  a  Christian  and  really  regards  Christianity  as  embody- 
ing God's  revealed  will,  if  he  rejects  or  doubts  the  reality  of  the 
miraculous  attestation,  has  to  face  the  difficulty,  that  a  divine 
revelation,  in  order  to  gain  credence  and  power  in  the  world, 
had  to  be  introduced  by  a  deception.  No  matter  how  innocent 
the  apostles  may  be  imagined  to  have  been  ;  no  matter  how 
ingeniously  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  the  resurrection  and  the 
other  miracles  may  be  explained.  The  blame  of  deliberate  de- 
ception may,  by  a  violent  treatment  of  the  records,  possibly 
be  rolled  off  from  the  human  agents;  but  in  any  case  it 
^  Lcbcn  Jesufiir  das  deutsche  Volk,  p.  601. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  171 

cannot  be  rolled  off  from  the  divine  agent.  For  if  Christianity- 
is  a  real  revelation ;  if  that  term  is  used,  and  no  present  decep- 
tion is  intended  in  the  use  of  it,  —  then,  on  the  assumption  that 
the  miracles  were  not  facts,  our  only  conclusion  must  be  that 
God  arranged  that  they  should  be  thought  to  be  facts,  in  order 
that  he  might  accomplish  what  otherwise  would  have  been 
impossible;  that  is,  he  had  to  arrange  that  the  kingdom  of 
divine  truth  should  be  indebted  to  a  lie  for  its  introduction 
and  firm  foundation  in  the  world. ^ 

This  is  the  inevitable  conclusion,  if  we  adopt  the  one  side  of  the 
alternative.  If  one  is  not  ready  to  take  that,  there  is  no  legiti- 
mate escape  from  taking  the  other,  and  admitting  heartily  that 
the  miracles  were  real  facts.  When  one  says  that  he  believes 
in  Christianity  in  spite  of  the  miracles,  not  on  account  of  them, 
meaning  that  he  has  no  opinion  about  them,  but  would  prefer 
it  if  there  were  no  demand  made  on  him  to  believe  in  them, 

^  "  Revelation,  then,  even  if  it  does  not  need  the  truth  of  miracles  for  the 
benefit  of  their  proof,  still  requires  it  iu  order  not  to  be  crushed  under  the 
weight  of  their  falsehood."  —  Mozley,  On  Miracles,  6th  ed.,  p.  16.  The  only 
plausible  escape  from  this  conclusion  is  to  say  that  God,  in  making  the  estab- 
lishment of  Christianity  depend  on  the  belief  in  the  reality  of  miracles,  was 
only  accommodating  himself  to  the  weakness  of  man.  God  often  overrules  evil 
for  good,  but  without  thereby  approving  the  evil.  If  the  gospel  could  not 
gain  a  foothold  in  the  world  without  being  supposed  to  be  accompanied  by 
miracles,  was  it  not  better  that  it  should  gain  a  foothold  through  such  a 
delusion  than  not  at  all? 

The  reply  is  obvious.  The  objection  assumes  that  miracles  not  only  did 
not,  but  could  not,  occur.  For  if  they  were  possible,  and  if  a  belief  in  them 
was  required  in  order  to  the  introduction  of  the  true  religion,  then  God  would 
surely  have  wrought  real  ones,  rather  than  to  have  allowed  his  truth  to  rest  on 
a  delusive  belief  iu  unreal  ones.  But  that  God  could  work  miracles  is  not  de- 
nied by  any  genuine  Christian  theist.  Consequently  the  dilemma  remains :  the 
miracles  were  either  a  fact  or  a  fraud. 

Moreover,  the  allegatiou  that  a  delusive  belief  in  miracles  was  necessary  in 
order  to  the  introduction  of  Christianity,  is  self-destructive.  Tlie  notion  that 
the  stories  of  the  miracles  were  a  legendary  growth  (the  ordinary  form  of  the 
skeptical  theory  at  present)  presupposes  not  only  tliat  Jesus  himself  wrought 
no  miracles,  but  that  in  his  day  no  one  supposed  him  to  have  wrought  them. 
Therefore  it  has  to  be  assumed  that  Christianity,  after  all,  did  get  a  foothold 
without  a  belief  in  miracles,  and  that  only  its  later  propagation  was  promoted 
by  the  belief.  But  if  tlie  belief  was  not  necessary  in  order  to  tlie  establishment 
of  Chribtiauitv,  then  it  was  not  necessary  in  order  to  the  propagation  of  it. 


172  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

then  we  can  only  say  tlia  b  such  an  attitude  towards  the  miracles 
differs  from  a  downright  denial  of  them  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  the 
offspring  of  an  indolent  or  illogical  mind.  Since  the  fact  can- 
not be  equivocal,  since  the  miracles  must  have  been  either  reali- 
ties or  delusions,  an  intelligent  mind,  alert  to  see  the  necessary 
bearings  of  this  alternative,  cannot  long  remain  in  a  state  of  in- 
decision. No  vague  generalities  about  the  difficulty  of  defining 
miracles,  or  of  ascertaining  the  exact  facts  of  the  gospel  histories, 
can  get  rid  of  this  inexorable  dilemma,  that,  so  long  as  one  ac- 
cepts Christianity  as  a  divinely  revealed  religion,  he  must  hold 
that  the  miracles  were  either  a  fact  or  a  fraud.  But  to  regard 
the  introduction  of  Christianity  as  accomplished  by  a  fraud  is 
of  course  inconsistent  with  any  honest  faith  in  it  as  a  really 
divine  and  special  revelation.  If  one  nevertheless  rebels  against 
the  acceptance  of  the  miraculous  history,  it  only  remains  for  him 
to  treat  Christianity  as  nothing  but  a  purely  human  growth,  and 
the  miracles  as  the  offspring  of  a  more  or  less  unconscious  im- 
agination or  exaggeration.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  middle 
ground  between  the  position  of  such  a  man  as  Strauss,  and  that 
of  him  who  accepts  Christianity  as  a  genuine  revelation,  and  the 
supernatural  as  an  essential  and  indispensable  part  and  proof  of 
the  revelation. 

An  agnostic  or  skeptical  attitude  towards  the  Christian  mira- 
cles is,  therefore,  intrinsically  at  war  with  genuine  acceptance  of 
Christianity,  and  can  be  assumed  by  a  professed  Christian  only 
inconsistently,  or  at  the  expense  of  rejecting,  with  the  miracles, 
fundamental  elements  of  the  Christian  system.  The  refutation 
of  this  negative  attitude  towards  the  supernatural  has  inciden- 
tally indicated  what  the  positive  attitude  must  be.  Miracles 
must  be  regarded  as  having  an  important  evidential  value.  If 
they  were  really  performed,  they  could  not  have  been  without  a 
purpose.  To  suppose  them  to  have  been  useless,  or  to  have 
served  even  as  a  hinderance  in  the  way  of  men's  accepting 
the  salutary  truths  of  the  gospel,  is  to  accuse  God  of  pure 
wantonness. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  173 

CHAPTER   VI. 

THE  EVIDENTIAL  VALUE  OF  MIRACLES  {Continued). 

WJ^  come,  then,  to  the  second  of  the  above-mentioned  views 
'  '  respecting  the  evidential  vahie  of  miracles,  and  ask, 

II.  Does  faith  in  Christianity  depend  on  antecedent  faith  in 
the  alleged  miracles  of  Christ  ? 

The  assurance  which  we  have  reached,  that  miracles  have  a 
positive  evidential  worth,  does  not  necessarily  imply  an  affir- 
mative answer  to  this  question.  On  the  contrary,  there  are 
weighty  reasons  for  answering  it  in  the  negative. 

If  we  take  Christian  faith  in  a  wide  and  loose  sense,  mean- 
ing by  it  merely  a  general  assent  to  the  excellence  of  Christian 
morality,  it  is  manifest  that  men  can  believe  in  it,  while  dis- 
believing or  doubting  the  genuineness  of  the  miracles.  They 
can,  for  they  do.  But  it  may  be  said,  and  justly  said,  that  this 
is  not  the  whole  of  genuine  Christian  faith.  It  is  not  faith 
such  as  Jesus  himself  required,  and  such  as  the  Christian 
Church  has  always  regarded  as  necessary  in  order  to  constitute 
a  man  in  the  proper  sense  a  Christian. 

We  may,  however,  observe  further  that  even  genuine  faith  in 
Jesus  Christ  as  the  Saviour  of  sinners  may  be  exercised  by  those 
who  do  not  first  make  a  study  of  the  apologetic  value  of  mir- 
acles, and  come  to  their  faith  by  that  road.  It  may  he,  for  it  is. 
The  young  who  receive  their  knowledge  of  the  way  of  salvation 
directly  from  the  instruction  of  their  elders  do  not  need,  and 
are  not  able,  to  examine  the  evidences  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
Gospel  miracles  before  they  can  surrender  themselves  to  Christ 
in  penitent  trust.  Doubtless  they  are  taught  also  to  believe 
the  stories  of  the  miraculous  deeds.  But  this  belief  need  not 
precede  the  other,  so  as  to  constitute  the  indispensable  founda- 
tion of  it. 

Furthermore,  if  we  look  at  the  subject  from  the  more  directly 
apologetic  point  of  view,  there  is  an  infelicity  in  making  a  con- 


174  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

viction  of  the  genuineness  of  the  reported  miracles  serve  as 
the  indispensable  antecedent  of  Christian  faith.  We  meet  at 
once  this  serious  difficulty :  that  the  argument  for  the  genuine- 
ness of  the  miracles,  however  plausible  and  cogent  it  may  seem 
to  one  favorably  inclined  to  Christianity,  cannot,  when  taken 
apart  from  the  character  and  professions  of  the  alleged  miracle- 
worker,  be  made  convincing  to  one  who  is  predisposed  against 
both  Christianity  and  stories  of  miraculous  events.  Marvels 
are  not  necessarily  miracles  ;  and  experience  is  so  full  of  strange 
things  and  of  plausible,  though  deceptive,  pretensions  to  miracu- 
lous power,  that  one  can  frame,  if  he  will,  some  explanation  of 
any  alleged  miracle  rather  than  admit  its  genuineness.  The 
miraculous  events  alleged  to  have  accompanied  the  introduction 
of  Christianity  are  now,  moreover,  far  distant.  Even  the  oldest 
vouchers  for  their  occurrence  cannot  be  proved  to  have  been 
eye-witnesses  of  the  events  ;  or  even  if  they  were,  how  is  it  to  be 
demonstrated  that  the  alleged  miracles  were  not  fraudulent  per- 
formances of  impostors  ?  One  may,  with  Paley,^  show  how 
much  better  attested  the  Christian  miracles  are  than  the  Pagan 
or  ecclesiastical  ones.  Still,  at  the  best,  the  difference  is  only 
one  of  degree ;  and  even  if  one  find  himself  unable  to  explain 
away  the  apparent  miracles  and  show  just  what  the  actual  facts 
were,  he  can  yet  frame  hypotheses.  The  immense  presumption 
which  all  intelligent  men  admit  to  lie  against  the  occurrence  of 
all  miracles,  must  be  overcome  before  one  can  be  expected  to 
give  a  favorable  attention  to  the  evidence  for  the  occurrence  of 
any  particular  miracle.  But  even  if  that  has  been  overcome, 
and  one  feels  the  need  of  a  divine  revelation  and  of  a  super- 
natural attestation  of  it,  yet  the  question  is  not  settled,  ivliat 
alleged  revelation,  and  ivhat  pretended  miraculous  accompani- 
ments of  one,  are  to  be  accepted  as  genuine.  Not  only  must 
the  general  presumption  against  miracles  be  overcome,  but  a 
presumption  in  favor  of  some  particular  medium  of  a  revelation 
must  be  created,  else  his  pretended  miracles  will  be  rejected 
as  a  specious  delusion,  even  though  they  cannot  be  explained. 
We  cannot,  therefore,  fully  assent  to  the  position  taken  by 
Dr.  W.  M.  Taylor  in  his  contention  against  Archbishop  Trench, 
^  Eoid&uces  of  Chrislianit!/,  part  i.,  prop.  ii.  chap.  ii. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  175 

In  reply  to  the  objection  that  "  power  cannot  in  the  nature  of 
things  confirm  truth,"  he  says,  "  That  all  depends  on  whose 
power  it  is.  Now,  in  this  instance  it  is  the  power  of  God ;  and 
the  moral  perfection  of  Deity  gives  its  own  character  to  the 
forth-putting  of  that  power  in  confirmation  of  the  claims  of 
him  at  whose  word  the  miracle  is  wrought."  ^  But  this  argu- 
ment presupposes  that  the  fact  of  a  miracle  wrought  by  di- 
vine power  has  been  fully  demonstrated,  and  is  accepted  as 
fact.  If  it  be  assumed  that  God  has  commissioned  a  prophet 
to  work  miracles  in  connection  with  the  prophetic  message, 
why,  then  of  course  this  peculiar  display  of  power  must  nat- 
urally be  regarded  as  a  divine  confirmation  of  the  spoken 
word.  The  difficulty,  however,  lies  further  back.  How  is  one 
to  be  made  indubitably  certain  that  the  alleged  miracle  is  a 
display  of  divine  power  ?  When  the  enemies  of  Christ  ac- 
cuse him  of  being  an  agent  of  Beelzebub  rather  than  of  God, 
or  if  some  one  should  affirm  that  his  marvelous  deeds  were 
nothing  but  skilful  acts  of  jugglery,  how  are  such  men  to  be 
persuaded  that  they  are  in  the  wrong  ?  If  the  character  of  the 
pretended  prophet,  and  the  nature  of  his  utterances,  are  not 
such  as  to  create  a  presumption  in  his  favor ;  if  the  miracles, 
apparently  real,  are  the  work  of  one  whose  demeanor  is  that  of 
a  mountebank  or  of  a  trifler  ;  if  he  makes  the  impression  of 
not  being  an  honest,  earnest,  and  God-fearing  man,  —  shall  this 
impression  go  for  nothing  in  one's  judgment  on  the  question, 
whether  his  extraordinary  deeds  are  the  work  of  supernatural 
power  ?  Would  it  be  possible  for  one  not  to  be  influenced  in 
his  judgment  respecting  the  apparent  miracles  by  this  ante- 
cedent judgment  concerning  the  man  ? 

If  apparent  miracles  were  always  real ;  if  the  genuineness  of 
them  were  always  something  self-evident  and  incontrovertible  ; 
and  if  all  men,  even  the  most  depraved,  were  ready  to  accept, 
as  of  divine  authority,  whatever  a  miracle-worker  says,  —  the 
case  would  be  comparatively  simple.  But  the  problem  is  not 
so  simple.  It  is  true,  as  Dr.  Taylor  says,^  that  the  depraved 
human  conscience  cannot  be  made  "  the  standard  by  which  all 

'  T/ie  Gospel  Miracles,  Lecture  VI.  p.  174. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  192. 


176  SUPERNATURiVL   REVELATION. 

that  claims  to  be  truth  coming  from  God  is  to  be  tried."  But 
the  human  conscience,  depraved  though  it  is,  is  able  to  discern 
between  knavery  and  honesty.  The  very  argument  under  con- 
sideration presupposes,  moreover,  that  the  natural  man  has  a 
belief  in  God,  that  he  acknowledges  a  message  from  God  to  be 
true  and  authoritative,  and  that  he  recognizes  a  miracle  to 
be  a  work  of  God.  Unless  all  this  is  presupposed,  miraculous 
demonstrations  would  be  lost  on  him.  A  certain  degree  of  re- 
ligious and  moral  sense  is  essential,  in  order  that  a  man  may 
believe  in  a  miracle  at  all,  and  in  its  power  to  authenticate 
the  deliverances  of  those  through  or  for  whom  it  is  wrought. 
Suppose  now,  for  example,  that  a  man  should  perform  marvels 
apparently  as  great  as  those  attributed  to  Christ,  but  should 
undertake  on  the  strength  of  them  to  teach  that  murder,  and 
theft,  and  malevolence  are  laudable,  or  that  the  true  Deity  is 
to  be  found  in  the  chimpanzee,  should  we  be  bound  to  accept 
his  doctrines  because  of  his  miracles  ?  But,  it  may  be  replied, 
siLcli  a  man's  performances  cannot  be  real  miracles,  but  only  a 
juggler's  tricks.  Very  well ;  but  why  do  we  presume  them  to 
be  mere  tricks  ?  These  tricks  may,  as  facts  show,  seem  to  the 
ordinary  observer  to  be  quite  as  marvelous,  quite  as  much  be- 
yond human  power,  as  any  of  the  recorded  miracles  of  Christ.^ 
Why  should  those  who  witnessed  the  latter  have  been  ex- 
pected to  accept  them  as  veritable  miracles,  and  as  authenti- 
cating the  word  of  the  miracle-worker,  while  those  of  the  other 
are  regarded  with  suspicion,  and,  even  though  inexplicable,  are 
yet  assumed  to  be  mere  tricks  of  legerdemain  ?  There  is  but 
one  answer:  The  moral  character  of  Jesus,  his  benevolence 
and  sincerity,  his  general  trustioorthiness,  is  supposed  to  have 
been  a  guarantee  that  he  would  not  deceive  men  by  pretending 
to  be  possessed  of  supernatural  power,  when  he  was  in  reality 
only  practising  sleight  of  hand.  This  element  is  essential  in 
any  question  concerning  the  genuineness  of  an  apparent  miracle. 

*  Vide,  e.  g.,  an  account  of  Indian  Juggling  in  Onre  a  Week,  Jan.  1861, 
where  it  is  narrated  how  a  coin  was  apparently  transformed  into  a  snake, 
and  a  girl  murdered  and  restored  to  life.  Every  one  wlm  has  witnessed  the 
exploits  of  prestidigitators  can  testify  to  tlie  reality  of  things  which  seem  to 
defy  all  explanation,  except  on  the  supjjosition  of  magical  power. 


THE  EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  177 

If  the  ostensible  miracle-worker  teaches  immorality,  and  ad- 
duces his  miracles  as  evidence  of  his  divine  commission  to 
teach  it,  in  such  a  case  we  conclude  at  once  that  the  claim  of 
a  divine  commission  is  false,  and  that  the  miracles  are  tricks. 
Here  the  doctrine  certainly  is  held  to  disprove  the  miracle. 
We  do  not  deem  it  even  necessary  to  expose  the  nature  of  the 
tricks;  we  may  be  unable  to  do  so.  We  simply  take  it  for 
granted  that  they  are  tricks. 

What  a  man  is  and  what  he  says  must,  therefore,  go  very  far 
in  determining  our  judgment  as  to  the  validity  of  his  claim  to 
be  a  supernaturally  endowed  messenger  from  God.  It  does  not 
follow  that  men,  especially  irreligious  men,  can  determine  a 
priori  just  what  doctrines  a  prophet  may  or  must  preach.  But 
they  may  be  very  sure  concerning  certain  doctrines,  that  a 
prophet  of  God  will  not  preach  them.  And  equally  true  is  it 
that  the  character  of  a  professed  prophet's  utterances  may  pre- 
possess men  in  his  favor  before  he  has  ever  wrought  any  mir- 
acles, and  predispose  them  to  believe  in  the  genuineness  of  the 
miracles  when  he  does  perform  them.  The  "  authority "  with 
which  Jesus  taught  (Matt.  vii.  29),  and  "the  gracious  words 
which  proceeded  out  of  his  mouth  "  (Luke  iv.  22),  prepared  the 
Jews  to  give  credit  to  his  mighty  works. 

Archbishop  Trench  says,^  that  "  miracles  cannot  be  appealed 
to  absolutely  and  finally  in  proof  of  the  doctrine  which  the 
worker  of  them  proclaims ;  and  God's  word  expressly  declares 
the  same  (Deut.  xiii.  1-5)."  Dr.  Taylor  replies  ^  that  the  signs 
or  wonders  spoken  of  in  the  passage  referred  to  are  not  genuine 
miracles,  and  that  Trench  himself  admits^  that,  "while  the 
works  of  Antichrist  and  his  organs  are  not  mere  tricks  and  jug- 
gleries, neither  are  they  miracles  in  the  highest  sense  of  the 
word."  Hence  it  is  concluded  that  the  case  supposed  by  Moses 
does  not  affect  the  position  that  works  "  possessing  all  the  essen- 
tial elements  of  the  miracle  do  absolutely  and  simply  prove  a 
doctrine."  Now,  whatever  may  be  said  on  the  disputed  ques- 
tion whether,  according  to  the  Bible,  Satan  and  his  minions  do 
perform  real  miracles,  the  point  of  Trench's  argument  is  that, 
in  view  of  the  striking  and  plausible  character  of  these  demon- 

1  Notes  on  Miracles,  p.  27.      ^  Gospel  Miracles,  p.  193.      »  Ibid.,  p.  26. 
12 


178  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

strations,  the  decision  of  the  question  whether  a  pretended 
miracle  does  possess  all  the  essential  elements  of  the  miracle 
depends,  in  part  at  least,  on  the  nature  of  the  doctrine  which 
claims  to  be  authenticated  by  it.  Otherwise,  unless  those  who 
witness  the  pretended  miracles  are  able  to  detect  the  secret  of 
the  magic  or  legerdemain  by  which  they  are  performed,  they 
cannot  be  blamed  for  following  after  every  one  who  seems  to  be 
invested  with  miraculous  power.  In  reference  to  the  case  of 
Deut.  xiii.  1-5,  Dr.  Taylor  says  ^  that  "  the  appeal  here  is  not  to 
the  moral  nature  of  man  at  all,  but  to  the  consistency  of  God 
himself.  The  Hebrews  had  already  received  a  revelation  mirac- 
ulously attested  from  God,  and  the  argument  is  that,  as  God 
cannot  deny  or  contradict  himself,  any  wonders  or  signs  wrought 
in  opposition  to  the  precepts  of  that  revelation  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  impostures."  But  this  reply  proceeds  on  the  sup- 
position that  the  false  prophet  against  whom  the  people  are 
warned  is  going  to  represent  his  sign  or  wonder  as  wrought  by 
Jehovah ;  otherwise  there  would  be  no  question  of  Jehovah's 
consistency  with  himself.  But  this  supposition  is  manifestly 
wrong.  The  false  prophet  who  seeks  to  draw  the  people  away 
from  Jehovah  and  to  "  go  after  other  gods  "  would  be  little  better 
than  a  fool,  if  he  should  pretend  that  Jehovah  enabled  him  to  per- 
form the  miracles  on  the  ground  of  which  he  invites  them  to  for- 
sake Jehovah  !  No  ;  the  false  prophet  would  of  course  represent 
the  "other  gods"  as  enabling  him  to  work  the  wonders ;  and  so 
the  question  before  the  people  would  be  whether  to  believe  the 
new  prophet  or  the  old  one.  There  would  be  no  question  of  God's 
consistency,  but  simply  the  question  whether  Jehovah  is  the 
God,  or  whether  some  other  God  is  to  be  accepted  instead  of 
him.  Of  course  the  accepting  of  the  new  one  would  involve 
the  forsaking  of  the  old  one ;  but  the  people  might  be  led  to 
think  that  not  the  new  signs,  but  the  old  ones,  were  deceitful. 
Just  because  the  pretended  miracle  was  liable  to  be  very  spe- 
cious and  dazzling,  while  the  recollection  or  tradition  of  the 
Mosaic  miracles  was  liable  to  grow  dim  and  unimpressive,  there- 
fore ]\Ioses  enjoins  that  the  test  should  not  be  the  mere  appar- 
ent miracles,  but  the  doctrine  of  those  who  wrought  them. 
^  Gospel  Miracles,  p.  198. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  179 

TIL  AVe  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  evidential  value  of 
miracles  cannot  be  detached  from  the  personal  character  and 
the  teachings  of  the  miracle-worker,  but  that  the  two  co-operate. 
The  doctrine  proves  the  miracle,  and  the  miracle  proves  the 
doctrine. 

By  this  is  meant  that  the  doctrine  —  the  prophetic  commission 
—  is  self -evidencing,  but  not  in  such  a  degree  that  the  accom- 
panying miracles  are  a  superfluous  accessory,  to  be  believed  in 
indeed  because  wrought  by  one  whose  word  has  proved  him  a 
prophet,  but  themselves  unnecessary  as  a  proof  of  the  prophet's 
divine  vocation.  A  useless  miracle  would  be  an  abnormity. 
The  more  clearly  it  should  be  recognized  as  useless,  the  more 
doubtful  would  be  the  reality  of  it.  God  does  not  trifle  with 
the  laws  of  nature  or  with  us. 

Scarcely  more  satisfactory  is  the  view  of  those  who  believe 
indeed  in  miracles,  not,  however,  as  having  evidential  value, 
but  simply  as  being  just  what  might  have  been  expected  from 
so  wonderful  a  person  as  Jesus  was.  This  view  is  now  much  in 
vogue.  According  to  it  Jesus  wrought  miracles,  not  for  the 
purpose  of  substantiating  his  claims,  but  merely  because  such 
work  was,  as  it  were,  the  spontaneous  and  normal  expression  of 
his  nature  and  character.^ 

There  is  plausibility  and  force  in  this  representation.  Assum- 
ing the  essentially  supernatural  character  of  Jesus'  origin  and 
person,  we  find  it  comparatively  easy  to  believe  that  he  could 
do  supernatural  deeds.  We  may  say  truly  that  in  such  a  be- 
ing miracles  seem  quite  appropriate  and  normal,  provided  there 
is  occasion  for  performing  them.  But  this  suggests  the  diffi- 
culty which  besets  the  view  in  question.  What  is  meant,  when 
it  is  affirmed  that  "  miracles  were  but  the  natural  accompani- 
ments of  the  Christian  revelation,"  that  they  were  "  a  constitu- 

1  See  above  (p.  127)  tlie  references  to  Trench,  Coleridge,  Thomas  Arnold, 
Maurice.  Similarly  Professor  Ladd  {Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  311),  "  The 
supernatural  contents,  inclusive  of  the  miraculous,  belong  to  the  very  essence 
of  Christianity,  and  can  no  more  be  separated  from  it  than  can  the  principle  of 
life  from  the  living  organism."  And  on  p.  316  he  speaks  of  miracles  as  "the 
natural  result  of  his  superhuman  power."  Page  315,  the  power  of  healing  is 
regarded  "as  the  normal  product  of  his  personality."  Cf.  also  J.  Stoughton, 
Nature  and  Value  of  the  Miraculous  Testimony  to  Christianil)/,  p.  46. 


180  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

tive  element  of  the  revelation  of  God  in  Christ,"  that  their 
absence  "  would  have  been  far  more  wonderful  than  their  pres- 
ence ? "  There  seems  to  be  here  a  want  of  clearness  of  concep- 
tion. Is  it  meant  that  Jesus  wrought  miracles  because  he 
could  not  help  it  —  because  he  was  driven  to  it  by  a  sort  of 
natural  necessity  ?  Doubtless  not.  But  if  not,  then  the  only 
alternative  is  that  he  wrought  miracles  freely,  and  for  an  ethical 
reason.  What,  then,  was  the  reason  why  he  wrought  them  ? 
Probably  the  answer  would  be :  For  the  purpose  of  doing  good. 
But  he  could  do  good,  he  could  give  expression  to  his  benevo- 
lent disposition,  without  resorting  to  supernatural  power.  No 
doubt  he  could  do  many  acts  of  kindness  through  miraculous 
agency  which  he  could  not  have  done  by  ordinary  means.  But 
is  it  meant  that  he  was  bound  to  do,  and  did  do,  all  that  it  was 
possible  for  supernatural  power  to  do  by  way  of  beneficent 
action  ?  Hardly  this ;  for  if  so,  then  we  should  have  to  assume 
that  God,  being  possessed  of  supernatural  power,  is  bound  to  ex- 
ercise it  miraculously  all  the  time  and  in  all  possible  ways  for 
the  sake  of  alleviating  the  evils  of  the  world.  If  ordinarily  and 
in  general  God  sees  fit  to  manifest  his  benevolence,  and  to  let 
men  manifest  their  benevolence,  only  through  the  uniformly 
operating  forces  of  nature,  why  did  he  make  an  exception  in  the 
case  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  in  him  manifest  his  benevolence  in  a 
supernatural  way  ?  The  question  has  all  the  more  point,  inas- 
much as  the  miraculous  deeds  of  Christ  had  to  do  almost  ex- 
clusively with  the  relief  of  physical  pain,  whereas  his  mission 
was  primarily  and  chiefly  a  purely  spiritual  one. 

As  a  manifestation  of  benevolence,  then,  the  exercise  of 
miraculous  power  could  not  accomplish  more  than  unmiracu- 
lous  beneficence.  The  doing  of  the  miracles  did  not  prove  that 
Christ  had  more  love  than  other  men ;  it  only  proved  that  he 
had  more  power.  And  so  we  are  brought  back  to  the  position 
that  the  miracles  had  primarily  an  evidential  value ;  they  were 
an  evidence  of  the  superior  power,  or  superior  nature,  of  Christ, 
or  at  least  of  a  superior  divine  commission.  For  we  should 
bear  in  mind  that  ultimately  the  power  to  work  miracles  is  as- 
cribed, even  by  Christ  himself,  to  God.  It  was  "  by  the  finger 
of  God"  (Luke  xi.  20)  that  he  professed  to  cast  out  demons; 


THE  EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  181 

the  raising  of  Lazarus  he  represented  as  an  answer  to  prayer, 
and  as  a  manifestation  of  the  glory  of  God  (John  xi.  40-42). 
And  his  resurrection,  the  crowning  miracle  of  all,  is  almost 
uniformly  declared  to  be  the  work  of  God.^ 

Moreover,  if  the  miracles  of  Jesus  are  to  be  regarded  as  a  sort 
of  outflow  or  efflorescence  of  his  superhuman  nature,  what  shall 
we  say  of  the  miracles  wrought  by  his  apostles  ?  They  are  uni- 
formly declared  to  have  had  powder  to  work  the  same  kind  of 
miracles  as  Jesus  wrought  himself ,2  not  excepting  the  raising  of 
the  dead.^  Are  these  miracles  to  be  explained  as  simply  the 
natural  outworking  of  the  unique  character  and  endowments  of 
the  apostles  ?  Plainly  not ;  their  miraculous  power  was  a  power 
conferred ;  they  were  the  commissioned  agents  of  a  higher  au- 
thority.* Now,  doubtless,  Jesus'  relation  to  miraculous  works 
is  pictured  as  somewhat  different  from  that  of  his  apostles.  He 
himself  it  is  who  bestows  on  them  the  miraculous  power.  In 
his  own  working  of  miracles  he  often,  perhaps  most  often,  seems 
to  speak  as  if  the  power  inhered  in  himself,^  even  the  power  to 
raise  himself  from  the  dead.^  But  such  representations  find  a 
natural  explanation  in  the  intimate  union  with  the  Father  which 
Jesus  always  ascribed  to  himself,  and  which  the  apostles  always 
ascribed  to  him.  If  he  wrought  miracles  by  his  own  power, 
then  he  did  it  by  virtue  of  his  being  possessed  of  divine  power. 
Mere  eminence  in  intellectual  or  moral  excellence  constitutes  no 
sufficient  ground  for  ascribing  to  any  mere  man  the  power  inde- 
pendently to  work  a  miracle. 

But  this  brings  us  back  to  the  starting-point.  The  doctrine 
under  consideration  is,  that  in  so  wonderful  a  person  wonderful 
deeds  are  to  be  expected  and  excite  no  surprise.  The  answer  is : 
Yes ;  in  a  remarkable  man  remarkable  deeds  may  be  expected, 
but  not  necessarily  miraculous  deeds.  Is  it  a  general  truth  that 
the  more  gifted  or  spiritual  a  man  is,  the  more  nearly  he  comes 
to  working  miracles  ?     But  even  if  it  were  admitted  that  Jesus 

1  Acts  iii.  15,  26,  ii.  24,  v.  30,  xiii.  .30;  Rom.  i.  4 ;  1  Cor.  xv.  15,  etc. 

2  Matt.  X.  1 ;  Mark  iii.  15,  vi.  7  ;  Luke  ix.  1,  2  ;  Acts  iii.  1-8,  ix.  33,  34, 
xiv.  8-10.  8  Acts  ix.  36-40.  *  See  Note  2  and  Acts  iii.  16. 

6  E.  g.,  Matt.  ix.  5  ;  Mark  v.  30 ;   Luke  v.  23,  24,  vi.  5-10,  vui.  40. 
«  Joiiux.  18;  of.  ii.  19. 


182  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

was  so  unique  that  veritable  miracles  might  be  expected  of  him, 
the  question  must  still  be  asked,  How  do  we  know  that  he  was 
so  unique  ?  What  does  the  conviction  of  this  uniqueness  rest  on  ? 
Plainly,  tliis  cannot  be  quietly  assumed  without  reason.  And 
the  reason  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  evidence  afforded  by 
tradition  and  the  New  Testament.  The  uniqueness  claimed  for 
him  has  reference  especially  to  two  points  :  (1)  his  unique  moral 
character,  and  (2)  his  unique  relation  to  God  and  men.  Now, 
one  may  indeed  forcibly  argue  the  sinless  excellence  of  Jesus 
on  grounds  which  are  independent  of  his  supernatural  power.^ 
Mere  power  would  certainly  be  an  inadequate  proof.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  so  stupendous  an  exception  to  all  experience  as 
absolute  freedom  from  sin  could  hardly  be  made  convincingly 
certain,  if  there  were  only  the  evidence  of  an  exceptionally  good 
life,  and  the  absence  of  all  self-accusation.  He  also,  it  is  true, 
asserted  his  own  perfection.^  But  many  other  even  good  men 
have  done  the  same ;  and  the  few  utterances  of  his  which  seem 
to  affirm  his  absolute  sinlessness  might,  if  necessary,  be  under- 
stood to  signify  only  a  relative  perfection.  In  like  manner,  it 
might  be  said  that  the  absence,  in  the  record,  of  all  confession 
of  sin  and  petition  for  pardon  on  his  part  is  only  a  negative 
argument,  and  does  not  prove  that  in  his  solitary  prayers  no 
such  confession  was  ever  made.  Undoubtedly  Jesus  must  have 
been  either  an  enthusiast  with  remarkable  powers  of  persuasion, 
or  else  a  man  of  wonderful  purity  and  exaltedness  of  character. 
Undoubtedly  the  general  impression  produced  by  the  records, 
and  confirmed  by  tradition,  is  that  he  was  no  self-deluded  fan- 
atic, but  a  person  of  altogether  exceptional  virtue  and  moral 
power.  Undoubtedly  it  seems  most  reasonable,  when  we  con- 
sider his  rare  combination  of  excellences  and  the  extraordinary 
claims  and  professions  which  he  made,  to  conclude  that  his  dis- 
ciples were  justified  in  declaring  him  to  have  been  free  from  sin.^ 
But  when  we  reach  this  conclusion,  there  meets  us  at  once  the 

^  As  Ullmann,  Sinleas  Character  of  Jesus  ;  Doriier,  Jesu  siaidlose  Vollkom- 
menheit ;  Scliaff,  The  Person  of  Christ ;  How,  The  Jesus  of  the  Eoangelists ; 
Bushiiell,  Nature  and  the  Supernatural. 

2  Jolm  viii.  29,  46 ;  cf.  iv.  34,  v.  36,  vi.  38. 

8  Heb.  iv.  15,  vii.  26;  1  Pet.  11.  22, 1.  19 ;   1  Joliu  111.  5  ;  2  Cor.  v.  21. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  183 

objection  that  there  is  an  overwhelming  presumption  against  the 
proposition  that  any  mere  man,  enjoying  ordinary  privileges  and 
subjected  to  ordinary  temptations,  has  ever  passed  through  life 
absolutely  free  from  sinful  emotions,  desires,  and  actions.  If 
any  one  has  ever  so  deported  himself  as  to  make  the  impression 
of  being  such  a  unique  exception  to  all  the  experience  of  the 
world,  then  the  further  impression  cannot  but  force  itself  on 
the  mind,  that  such  a  man  is  not  an  ordinary  man  in  his 
antecedents,  environments,  and  endowments. 

And,  accordingly,  this  is  precisely  what  the  records  say  of 
Jesus  of  Nazareth.  He  is  pictured  to  us  as  a  man  not  only 
imique  in  moral  eminence,  but  unique  also  in  his  origin,  endow- 
ments, and  commission.  He  is  called  the  only-begotten  Son  of 
God,  miraculously  conceived,  a  person  who  reflects  in  himself 
the  divine  character  and  glory,  and  is  specially  anointed  and  set 
apart  by  God  as  the  one  Eedeemer  of  men.  In  other  words,  the 
proof  of  absolute  uniqueness  in  respect  of  holiness  is  not  com- 
plete and  satisfactory  until  it  is  confirmed  by  the  evidence  of 
uniqueness  in  respect  of  nature,  prerogative,  and  relation. 

But  how  is  this  uniqueness  of  nature  and  office  to  be  itself 
proved  ?  Is  it  enough  that  Jesus  himself  declared  that  he  was 
thus  unique  ?  He  having  by  his  irreproachable  conduct  estab- 
lished his  reputation  for  uprightness  and  veracity,  would  his 
bare  word  have  sufficed  to  produce  conviction,  when  he  laid 
claim  to  be  the  Son  of  God  in  an  altogether  exclusive  sense, 
and  demanded  of  all  men  that  they  should  come  to  him  for 
salvation  ?  It  might,  indeed,  be  plausibly  urged  that,  if  Jesus 
had  gamed  the  confidence  of  men,  or  at  least  of  his  followers,  to 
such  an  extent  that  they  ascribed  to  him  absolute  faultlessness, 
then  any  affirmation  which  he  made  concerning  himself  must 
have  been  accepted  as  trustworthy.  But  we  must  remember 
that  "confidence  is  a  plant  of  slow  growth."  Jesus,  in  the 
short  time  during  which  he  plied  his  vocation,  could  hardly 
have  compelled  universal  and  undoubting  confidence  in  his 
absolute  perfection.  We  know  that  the  people  in  general  had 
no  such  confidence  in  him.  Many  who  followed  him  for  a  time 
fell  away  from  him.^  There  is  no  evidence  that  even  his  most 
^  John  vi.  66. 


184  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

intimate  disciples  at  first,  or  even  up  to  his  death,  regarded  him 
as  absolutely  sinless.  A  man's  moral  character  is  something 
which  can  reveal  itself  only  by  slow  degrees.  And  though 
transcendent  goodness  and  purity  would  doubtless  anywhere 
soon  make  a  deep  impression,  yet  the  general  presumption  that 
every  man  has  faults  and  imperfections  would  in  any  case  stub- 
bornly assert  itself  against  any  claim  or  suggestion  of  perfect 
faultlessness.  And  therefore  we  are  not  surprised  at  finding 
that  the  apostles  and  friends  of  Christ  did  not  hesitate  to  re- 
monstrate with  him,  and  to  question  the  wisdom  or  propriety 
of  his  conduct.-^  Such  indications  are,  indeed,  not  numerous  ; 
those  who  attached  themselves  to  him  undoubtedly  felt  more 
and  more  the  peculiar  power  and  sublimity  of  his  character. 
But  it  was  not  until  after  his  resurrection  that  they  unquali- 
fiedly asserted  his  perfect  freedom  from  sin. 

How,  then,  did  the  disciples  of  Jesus  become  fully  convinced 
of  his  Messiahship  and  of  his  peculiar  dignity  and  unique  office  ? 
All  the  indications  of  the  Gospels  are  to  the  effect  that  the  con- 
viction, however  early  the  intimations  and  hopes  may  have  been, 
was  of  gradual  growth,  and  that  it  was  not  a  full  and  unshaka- 
ble assurance  till  after  the  resurrection.  He  was  not  such  a 
Messiah  as  had  been  commonly  expected ;  and  though  at  his 
birth  and  baptism  he  was  heralded  as  a  Eedeemer,  and  though 
some  persons  seem  early  to  have  attached  themselves  to  him  in 
the  faith  that  he  was  really  the  expected  one,  yet  the  faith  ap- 
pears to  have  been  a  wavering  one.  Jesus'  own  claim  was  such 
as  required  to  be  verified  by  a  continued  experience  of  fellow- 
ship with  him  and  observation  of  his  deportment  and  work. 
And  prominent  among  the  evidences  expected  and  received  were 
miraculous  manifestations.  These  manifestations  could,  it  is 
true,  not  be  implicitly  trusted  as  divine,  unless  confirmed  by  a 
previous  confidence  in  the  trustworthiness  of  him  in  whose  be- 
half they  were  made ;  but  in  connection  with  this  confidence 
they  served  as  an  emphatic  ratification  of  the  Messianic  claim. 
That  the  Jews  generally  looked  for  some  miraculous  demon- 
strations as  accompaniments  of  the  appearance  of  the  Christ  is 
evident  from  the  question  in  John  vii.  31,  "  When  the  Christ 
^  E.  ff.,  Mark  iv.  38,  viii.  32 ;  Luke  x.  40 ;  John  xiii.  6. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF  MIRACLES.  185 

shall  come,  will  he  do  more  signs  than  those  which  this  man 
hath  done  ? "  and  from  the  narrative  of  the  effect  of  the  raising 
of  Lazarus  (xi.  46-48),  and  of  the  miracle  of  the  loaves  and 
fishes  (vi.  15).  And  that  the  disciples  of  Christ  were  influenced 
by  the  same  expectation  is  evident  from  John  ii.  11,  where, 
after  the  miracle  of  the  wine,  it  is  said,  "  This  beginning  of  his 
signs  did  Jesus  in  Cana  of  Galilee,  and  manifested  his  glory ; 
and  his  disciples  believed  on  him."  Had  they  not  believed  on 
him  before  ?  In  the  previous  chapter  we  read  that  Andrew  and 
another  man  had  followed  Jesus,  trusting  in  the  assurance  of 
John  the  Baptist ;  that  Andrew  reported  to  Peter  that  he  had 
found  the  Messiah  (i.  41) ;  and  that  Philip  and  Nathanael  at 
once  accepted  him  as  such  (i.  45,  49).  Now  it  is  said  of  these 
same  disciples  that  in  consequence  of  Jesus'  first  miracle  they 
believed  on  him.  Evidently  the  meaning  is  that  the  faith 
already  existing  was  confirmed  by  this  display  of  miraculous 
power.  But  even  this  faith,  though  continually  strengthened 
by  personal  fellowship  and  by  repeated  miracles,  was  not  so 
strong  but  that  the  crucifixion  staggered  it.  The  two  disciples 
who  walked  to  Emmaus  had  "hoped  that  it  was  he  which 
should  redeem  Israel"  (Luke  xxiv.  21),  but  the  hope  had  evi- 
dently turned  into  despair.  The  apostles  were  dismayed  by  the 
tragical  end  of  their  Master's  life,  and  could  hardly  be  persuaded 
that  he  had  risen  from  the  dead.  Once  persuaded  of  this,  how- 
ever, they  regained  their  faith,  and  never  again  lost  it. 

Now  it  should  be  observed  that  this  shock  which  had  come  to 
the  apostles'  faith  in  Jesus'  Messiahship  must  have  affected  also 
their  faith  in  his  absolute  trustworthiness.  He  had  declared 
himself  to  be  the  Messiah,  the  Son  of  God,  the  Light  of  the 
world.  If  now  there  had  come  into  their  minds  a  doubt  as  to 
the  fact  of  his  being  the  Messiah,  then  there  must  necessarily 
have  come  a  doubt  as  to  his  truthfulness  in  declaring  himself  to 
be  the  Messiah.  The  two  things  were  indissolubly  bound  to- 
gether. Christ's  miracles  and  his  life  had  worked  together  pre- 
viously in  producing  and  strengthening  the  disciples'  confidence 
in  his  uniqueness  both  of  character  and  of  commission.  And 
now  the  resurrection  fully  restores  and  finally  seals  their  confi- 
dence in  both  these  things.     How  the  evidential  function   of 


186  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

miracles  can  be  questioned  by  one  who  credits  the  New  Testa- 
ment, it  is  difficult  to  see.  The  testimony  is  unanimous  that 
the  miracles  wrought  by  Jesus  and  for  him  were  efficacious  and 
even  indispensable  in  bringing  about  the  final  unwavering  con- 
viction that  Jesus  was  the  one  sinless  man  and  perfect  Ee- 
deemer.  John  wrote :  "  These  [signs]  are  written,  that  ye  may 
believe  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ,  the  Son  of  God."  ^  Paul  wrote 
that  Jesus  was  "  declared  to  be  the  Son  of  God  with  power  .  .  . 
by  the  resurrection  from  the  dead."^  To  the  Athenians  he  said 
that  God  had  ordained  Jesus  to  be  the  one  by  whom  he  would 
judge  the  world,  "  whereof  he  hath  given  assurance  unto  all  men 
in  that  he  hath  raised  him  from  the  dead."^  Peter  on  the  day 
of  Pentecost  declared  that  Jesus  had  been  "approved  of  God 
...  by  mighty  works,  and  wonders,  and  signs,"  ^  foremost 
among  which  he  put  Jesus'  resurrection.^  Jesus  himself  is 
represented  as  directly  appealing  to  his  miraculous  power  as  a 
proof  of  his  authority  to  forgive  sins.^ 

Assuming  the  substantial  authenticity  of  the  New  Testament 
we  are,  therefore,  forced  to  conclude  that  the  miracles,  especially 
the  resurrection  of  Christ,  did  serve  an  evidential  purpose.  It 
is  consequently  hard  to  see  how  such  a  man  as  Professor  Bruce  " 
can  argue  as  he  does  in  opposition  to  Canon  Mozley.^  The 
disciples  of  Clirist,  he  says,  "  seem  to  have  arrived  at  the  con- 
viction that  Jesus  was  the  Holy  One  through  an  intimate 
knowledge  of  his  character  made  possible  by  habitual  compan- 
ionship," whereas  "  the  conventional  saints  and  sages  of  the  time, 
giving  heed  to  the  miracles,  .  .  .  were  not  only  not  convinced 
thereby,  but  arrived  at  the  opposite  conclusion,"  namely,  that 
he  was  in  fellowship  with  Beelzebub. 

But  what  a  pitfall  the  Christian  apologist  is  preparing  for 
himself  by  such  a  conception !  According  to  Dr.  Bruce  the 
miracles  were  real,  but  were  not  needed  in  order  to  the  faith  of 
the  disciples,  and  exercised  a  positively  baneful  influence  on  the 
unbelievers.    What  good  reason  was  there,  then,  for  the  miracles 

1  John  XX.  31.         2  i^o,„.  i  4_        8  ^cts  xvii.  31.        «  Acts  ii.  22. 
«  Acts  ii.  24-3fi.    Cf.  iii.  15,  iv.  10,  x.  40-43 ;  1  Pet.  i.  3. 
6  Matt.  ix.  6  (Mark  ii.  10;  Luke  v.  24).     Cf.  also  note  2  on  p.  157. 
'  Miraculous  Element  in  the  Gospels,  pp.  288  sqq.     ^  On  Miracles,  p.  11. 


THE  EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  187 

at  all  ?  Dr.  Bruce  says,  to  be  sure,  that  the  disciples  "  saw  in 
all  his  acts,  miraculous  or  otherwise,  the  self-manifestation  of 
the  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  living  God."^  No  doubt,  if  he 
wrought  miracles,  they  were  in  harmony  with  his  character. 
No  doubt,  in  working  them  he  followed  holy  impulses  of  benevo- 
lence, and  was  not  impelled  merely  by  a  cold  calculation  as  to 
their  evidential  effect.  But  the  question  is  still  unanswered, 
What  sufficient  reason  was  there  for  working  them  ?  Accord- 
ing to  the  theory  now  before  us  they  were  not  necessary  to  the 
full  self-manifestation  of  Jesus;  they  accomplished  nothing 
which  could  not  have  been  accomplished  without  them  in  the 
way  of  making  obvious  his  dignity,  divine  commission,  love,  and 
wisdom.  If  this  is  indeed  the  fact,  then,  in  case  the  miracles 
are  held  to  have  been  real,  they  appear  to  have  accomplished  no 
substantial  end  except  to  furnish  a  stumbling-block  both  to  the 
philosopher  and  to  the  intelligent  Christian,  and  to  justify  the 
affirmation  that  miracles  are  a  burden  rather  than  a  help  to 
the  Christian  apologist.  And  in  this  case  the  conclusion  can 
hardly  be  avoided,  that  the  alleged  miracles  were  after  all  no 
miracles  at  all. 

What,  then,  is  the  correct  view  as  to  the  use  of  miracles  ? 
Manifestly  this  :  that  miracles  have  a  positive  and  indispensable 
evidential  worth,  but  not  anterior  to,  and  independent  of,  the 
evidence  afforded  by  personal  character  and  testimony.  There 
must  be  a  strong  confidence  in  the  general  integrity  and  veracity 
of  the  professed  messenger  of  God,  before  his  alleged  miracles 
can  be  accepted  as  genuine.  But  the  more  extraordinary  his 
claims  are,  the  more  need  is  there  of  extraordinary  attestation. 
Apparent  sincerity,  simplicity,  and  purity  prepare  the  way  for" 
faith  in  whatever  he  may  affirm ;  but  if  he  professes  to  have  a 
special  divine  commission,  then  he  needs  to  be  "approved  of 
God  by  mighty  works  and  wonders  and  signs."  He  who  pro- 
fesses to  be  the  bearer  of  an  authoritative  revelation  from  God 
needs  a  divine  authentication.  Whatever  may  be  true  respect- 
ing the  power  of  prophets  in  general  to  work  miracles,^  when- 

1  Miraculous  Element  in  the  Gospels,  p.  289. 

2  Jolm  the  Baptist  wrought  no  miracles ;  and  of  many  of  the  O.  T.  pro- 
phets there  is  no  record  that  they  claimed  or  exercised  this  power.     Yet  they 


188  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

ever  one  undertakes  to  introduce,  as  divine  and  authoritative, 
something  new  in  doctrine,  legislation,  or  redemption,  some 
warrant  must  be  produced  over  and  above  the  prophet's  own 
assertion  that  he  represents  the  divine  will.  The  introduction 
of  a  new  dispensation,  the  making  known  of  truths  concerning 
God  and  the  future  life  which  neither  nature  nor  past  reve- 
lations have  made  clear  and  certain  to  men,  —  this  requires 
some  objective  evidence  that  the  professed  prophet  has  been 
specially  authorized  to  do  this  peculiar  work.  One  who  pro- 
fesses to  be  commissioned  to  make  such  disclosures  must  expect 
to  be  challenged  to  present  his  credentials.  An  ambassador  of 
the  Great  King  must  bring  some  other  token  of  a  plenipoten- 
tiary commission  than  a  good  personal  character. 

When,  therefore,  it  is  said  that  the  doctrine  must  prove  the 
miracle,  the  meaning  is  not  that  the  doctrines  are  all  self-attest- 
ing, so  that  the  miracles,  though  attested  by  the  doctrines,  have 
no  real  use,  and  become,  rather,  a  burden  to  the  Christian  apol- 
ogist. The  meaning  is,  that  the  character  and  teachings  of  the 
professed  messenger  of  God  must  commend  themselves  to  the 
moral  judgment  of  men,  else  not  even  apparent  miracles  will 
be  able  to  secure  him  recognition  as  an  inspired  prophet.  The 
more  pure,  sincere,  unselfish,  and  elevated  he  seems  to  be,  the 
more  readily  will  he  be  credited,  when  he  lays  claim  to  special 
authority  and  professes  to  prove  it  by  supernatural  power.  A 
part  of  the  proof  of  the  genuineness  of  the  miracles  lies  in  the 
evident  trustworthiness  of  the  one  who  professes  to  work  them. 
But  another,  and  an  essential,  part  of  the  proof  is  the  need  of 

were  acknowledged  to  be  true  prophets.  Hence  it  is  sometimes  argued  that  a 
miraculous  attestation  can  never  be  pronounced  essential.  (So,  e.  g.,  in  the 
anonymous  pamphlet,  Positives  Christenthum  und  orthodoxer  Pietismus,  p.  47, 
one  of  the  many  productions  connected  with  the  controversy  respecting  Pro- 
fessor Bender  of  Bonn,  18S3-84).  As  to  this,  however,  it  is  to  be  considered 
that  the  prophets  in  general,  in  so  far  as  they  were  feared  and  followed,  owed 
their  authority  to  a  previous  supernatural  revelation,  which  they  were  inspired 
to  expound  and  enforce.  They  rose  up  amongst  a  people  who  recognized  the 
genuineness  of  this  revelation.  In  so  far  as  they  were  merely  preachers,  enfor- 
cing the  obligation  of  a  law  already  received  as  divinely  given,  they  needed  no 
miracidous  power  to  enable  them  to  make  an  impression  on  the  consciences 
of  their  hearers. 


THE   EVIDENTIAL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  189 

miracles,  which  is  felt  when  the  prophet  makes  extraordinary 
claims.  We  would  not  believe  in  the  genuineness  of  the  mira- 
cles, unless  the  general  tenor  of  the  man's  life  and  teachings  were 
good ;  we  would  not  credit  his  claims  to  special  authority,  unless 
we  see  evidence  that  God  has  given  him  a  special  authorization. 
The  advantage  of  this  conception  of  the  evidential  character' 
of  miracles  over  the  other  is  obvious.  If  the  belief  in  the  reality 
of  a  revelation  is  made  to  depend  on  an  antecedent  demonstra- 
tion of  the  genuineness  of  the  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of 
it,  the  faith  can  only  be  as  strong  as  the  demonstration  is  irre- 
fragable. Every  defect  in  the  evidence,  every  possibility  of  a 
natural  explanation  of  the  alleged  miracle,  every  diificulty  of 
distinguishing  the  evangelical  miracles  as  more  palpably  and 
demonstrably  genuine  than  other  apparent  ones,  — all  this  would 
bear  against  Christianity  as  a  whole.  The  ground  of  faith  would 
depend  on  nice  distinctions,  and  on  minute  investigations,  such 
as  only  scientifically  trained  minds  could  adequately  appreciate. 
And  the  result  would  at  the  best  be  dubious.  The  w^eight  of 
evidence  for  the  reality  of  the  miracles,  taken  apart  from  the 
character  and  professions  of  those  alleged  to  have  performed 
them,  would  be  insufficient  to  overcome  in  intelligent  minds 
the  distrust  which  is  felt  towards  stories  of  miracles  in  general. 
There  is  a  presumption  against  the  truth  of  all  such  stories. 
The  speculative  presumption  may  be  overcome  by  the  general 
consideration  that,  if  a  revelation  is  to  be  made,  it  needs  to  be 
attested  by  supernatural  signs.  But  the  special  presumption 
against  the  genuineness  of  particular  alleged  miracles  can  be 
overcome  only  by  evidence  that  those  for  or  by  whom  they  are 
alleged  to  have  been  wrought  are  otherwise  shown  to  have  been 
trustworthy  men,  and  the  alleged  revelation  to  be  not  repugnant 
to  men's  moral  sense.  The  internal  and  the  external  evidence 
for  the  revelation  can,  therefore,  not  be  separated.  No  apologist 
would,  it  is  true,  discard  the  internal  evidence.  But  sometimes 
the  two  kinds  are  treated  as  if  they  had  no  vital  connection 
with  each  other;  they  are  added  together  in  a  mathematical 
way,  as  if  one  of  them  could  be  presented  in  its  full  force  in 
isolation  from  the  other.^  The  fact  is,  that  such  a  sundering  is 
^  Dr.  W.  M.  Taylor,  to  whose  treatment  of  the  subject  (in  his  Qospel  Mira- 


190  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

impossible.  In  judging  of  tlie  reported  miracles  of  Christ  we 
cannot  disregard  the  personal  character  of  the  miracle-worker. 
When  we  compare  his  miracles  with  the  marvels  wrought  by 
other  men,  the  difference  is  found  largely  in  the  difference  be- 
tween the  persons  operating.  We  believe  in  the  one  rather 
than  in  the  other,  not  simply  because  the  miraculous  testimony 

cles)  we  Lave  beeu  constrained  to  take  exception,  sometimes  recognizes  the 
inseparableuess  of  the  two  kinds  of  evidence,  and  even  seems  to  go  over  to  tlie 
other  extreme  against  which  elsewhere  he  contends.  In  his  Second  Lecture 
he  says  there  are  two  classes  of  minds,  the  reflective  and  the  perceptive  (p.  32), 
the  former  of  which  is  most  impressed  by  that  which  lays  hold  on  the  moral 
nature.  And  later  (p.  M),  he  says  that  "  the  personality  of  Christ "  has  now 
become  "  the  great  solvent  of  his  miracles.  It  enables  us  to  understand,  ex- 
plain, and  defend  them."  Still  later  (p.  57),  he  says  that,  after  we  have  come 
to  see  the  uniqueness  of  Christ's  person,  "  the  mii'acles  of  these  narratives  fall 
into  their  proper  places,  and  are  seen  to  be  the  natural  accompaniments  of  the 
greater  moral  miracle  in  Christ  himself."  These  statements,  however,  hardly 
seem  to  consist  with  some  others.  Thus  (p.  32) :  "  Tiiese  two  methods  of 
arriving  at  virtually  the  same  result  are  separate  and  independent  processes." 
And  (p  182):  "In  the  line  of  proof  the  miracles  come  first,  introducing  the 
messenger  from  heaven ;  then  on  the  ground  of  that  divine  testimony  which 
they  bore  to  him  we  believe  his  teacliing  and  receive  himself;  and  after  that, 
his  teaching  having  been  believed,  experience  begins  to  bear  its  witness."  If 
Christ's  personality  is  the  solvent  of  the  miracles,  if  it  is  that  which  enables 
us  to  understand  and  defend  them,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  two  methods  of 
treating  the  Christian  evidences  can  be  declared  to  be  separate  and  independent, 
and  especially  how  it  can  be  declared  that  in  the  line  of  proof  the  miracles 
come  first.  If  it  is  on  the  ground  of  the  miracles  that  Christ  is  believed  and 
received,  then  the  miracles  would  hardly  seem  to  be  in  need  of  explanation  and 
defense ;  they  must,  ex  hi/pothesi,  be  understood  before  Christ  is  received ;  other- 
wise they  furnish  no  satisfactory  ground  for  receiving  him.  There  is  no  way 
out  of  this  self-contradiction,  but  to  admit,  together  with  the  inseparableuess 
of  the  two  methods,  tlie  priority  of  the  moral  argument.  As  President  Hop- 
kins puts  it  {Eridpnres  of  Chnstianifi/,  pp.  78  sq.):  "  Certainly,  I  think  the  his- 
torical  evidence  conclusive;  and  it  is  indispensable,  because  the  Christian 
religion  .  .  .  has  its  foundation  in  facts.  .  .  .  But  if  the  external  evidences 
are  tims  indispensable  and  conclusive,  so  are  also  the  internal.  What  M'ould 
have  been  the  effect  and  force  of  Christ's  miracles  without  his  spotless  and 
transcendent  character?  If  I  am  to  say  which  would  most  deeply  impress 
me  with  the  fact  that  he  was  from  God,  the  testimony  respecting  his  miracles, 
or  the  exhibition  of  such  a  character,  I  think  I  should  say  the  latter ;  and  I 
think  myself  as  well  qualified  to  judge  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other;  and,  as 
I  have  said,  I  think  this  is  the  evidence  which  now  presents  itself." 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  191 

is  more  ample  and  unmistakable,  but  because  we  have  more 
confidence  in  the  agent,  and  discern  an  occasion  for  his  miracles 
which  we  do  not  discern  in  the  other  cases. 

The  advantage  of  recognizing  this  organic  connection  between 
the  internal  and  the  external  evidences  appears  also  when  we 
consider  the  differences  in  the  minds  addressed  by  them.  There 
are  those  who  have  an  almost  invincible  prejudice  against  all 
stories  of  miracles ;  till  that  prejudice  is  shaken,  such  stories 
can  have  little  or  no  weight  with  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  are  those  who  easily  believe  in  almost  any  alleged 
miracle ;  to  them,  therefore,  a  miracle  really  proves  nothing. 
There  are,  however,  still  others,  not  so  credulous,  who  dis- 
believe ordinary  stories  of  miracles,  but  are  ready  to  believe 
thoroughly  well  attested  ones,  and  regard  them  as  having  evi- 
dential force.  Even  for  these,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
evidence  of  miracles  to  the  truth  of  Christianity  never  has  been 
and  never  can  be  detached  from  the  impression  produced  by  the 
person  and  the  doctrines  of  Christ.  Still  more  obvious  is  it  that 
to  the  other  two  classes  — •  to  those  who  believe  too  hardly,  and 
to  those  who  believe  too  easily  —  the  most  convincing  proof  is, 
in  the  first  instance,  an  exhibition  of  the  intrinsic  spiritual  ex- 
cellence of  Christianity,  of  the  unique  grandeur  of  the  character 
of  Christ,  and  of  the  power  of  Christian  faith  to  transform  and 
elevate  the  human  soul.  This  proof  once  admitted,  the  mirac- 
ulous side  of  Christianity  will  be  acknowledged  afterwards,  and 
will  be  seen  to  be  a  confirmation  of  the  internal  and  the  experi- 
mental evidence. 

But,  it  may  now  be  asked,  is  not  just  this  experimental  evidence 
after  all  the  principal  thing  ?  If  one  has  experienced  Christian- 
ity as  a  reforming,  inspiring,  comforting,  and  saving  power,  what 
matters  it  whether  the  historical  evidences  of  a  supernatural 
revelation  are  made  stringently  conclusive  to  his  mind  ?  If  he 
has  got  the  substantial  and  ultimate  good  which  the  Christian 
religion  professes  to  bring,  has  he  not  the  most  satisfactory 
proof  of  its  divine  origin  ?  And  is  not  the  most  convincing 
argument  that  can  be  addressed  to  an  unbeliever  the  one  which 
is  derived  from  the  manifestly  beneficial  effects  of  Christianity 
on  the  individual  and  the  world  ?    Do  we  not  find  this  intimated 


192  SUl'EKNATURAI.   REVELATION. 

by  Jesus  himself,  when  he  prays  for  his  disciples,  "  that  they 
may  all  be  one,  even  as  thou,  Father,  art  in  me,  and  I  in  thee, 
that  they  also  may  be  in  us :  that  the  world  may  believe  that 
thou  didst  send  me"  (John  xvii.  21)?  That  is,  he  prays  that 
the  world  may  be  led  to  believe  in  his  divine  commission  by 
the  unifying  spiritual  effects  of  his  gospel. 

Now  all  this  may  be  freely  conceded.  If  Christianity  should 
fail  to  accomplish  what  it  undertakes  and  promises,  that  failure 
would  neutralize  all  arguments,  however  forcible,  in  favor  of  its 
supernatural  origin.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  that  spiritual  renova- 
tion and  purification  which  is  professedly  its  chief  aim  should  be 
everywhere  and  perfectly  accomplished,  this  would  be  the  most 
conclusive,  though  still  not  the  only,  proof  that  it  is  indeed  of 
God.  In  reality,  however,  neither  of  these  suppositions  represents 
the  exact  fact.  Christianity  thus  far  is  neither  a  perfect  failure, 
nor  a  perfect  success.  In  numberless  instances  it  has  effected 
remarkable  transformations  of  character ;  it  has  elevated  whole 
tribes  and  nations ;  it  has  counteracted  vicious  and  downward 
tendencies  of  men,  even  when  it  has  not  been  able  wholly  to  out- 
root  them.^  But  on  the  other  hand  the  Christian  church  must  be 
held  responsible  for  many  evils  and  wrongs.  Large  portions  of  it 
are  found  to  be  more  devoted  to  outward  forms  than  to  inward 
purity.  It  has  often  given  its  sanction  to  cruelty  and  even  crime. 
According  to  one's  prepossession  stress  can  be  laid  on  the  brighter 
or  the  darker  side  of  the  history  of  Christianity.  Only,  fairness 
requires  that  Christianity  as  such  should  not  be  held  responsible 
for  all  that  has  been  done  and  said  by  nominal  Christians.  Pre- 
cept or  practice  which  plainly  conflicts  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  Christian  religion,  as  laid  down  in  the  New 
Testament,  is  not  Christian,  even  though  bearing  a  Christian 
name.  Conduct  or  feeling  that  is  loveless  can  only  be  a  perver- 
sion, not  a  true  product,  of  a  religion  whose  great  and  compre- 
hensive injunction  is  universal  love.  The  failure  of  Christianity 
wholly  to  renovate  the  world  is  due  simply  to  its  not  being  true 

1  On  tlie  elevating  elTect  of  Christianity  in  general,  vide  C.  L.  Brace,  Gesta 
Christi ;  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals ;  Uhlhorn,  Christian 
Charily  in  the  Ancient  Church ;  II.  S.  Storrs,  The  Dicine  Origin  of  Christian- 
ity, New  York,  1885. 


THE   EVIDEXTIiVL   VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  193 

to  itself.  If  it  had  done  nothing  in  the  work  of  moral  improve- 
ment, or  if  some  opposing  system  had  done  more,  then  this 
might  be  fairly  urged  as  a  reason  for  discrediting  its  claim  to  a 
divine  origin.  But  no  one,  unless  ignorant  or  biased,  can  make 
either  of  these  assertions. 

Still  it  may  be  contended  that  what  is  good  and  beneficent  in 
Christianity  is  purely  natural  and  not  revealed,  that  the  notion 
of  the  duty  of  general  benevolence,  though  adopted  by  Chris- 
tianity, is  a  product  of  the  process  of  evolution,  and  that  what 
is  peculiar  in  Christian  morality  is  a  hinderance  rather  than  a 
help  to  ethical  progress.  What  are  the  peculiar  features  of 
Christian  morality  ?  They  concern  the  motives  and  the  sanc- 
tions of  the  moral  life.  On  the  one  hand,  the  originating  im- 
pulse to  a  Christian  life  is  found  in  the  sense  of  sin  as  an  offense 
against  a  righteous  God,  accompanied  by  the  assurance  that  God, 
out  of  his  fatherly  love,  will  freely  forgive  those  who  repent  of 
sin  and  seek  to  forsake  it.  This  love  is  revealed  and  exempli- 
fied in  Jesus  Christ,  the  sinless  Son  of  God,  who  passed  through 
the  extreme  of  humiliation,  temptation,  and  suffering,  in  order 
that  he  might  become  a  sympathetic  and  perfect  Eedeemer  of 
men.  Faith  in  him  as  such  a  divinely  commissioned  Eedeemer, 
love  to  him  as  a  self-sacrificing  Friend,  imitation  of  him  as  a 
model  of  all  human  virtue,  —  this  is  made  the  motive  power  in 
the  Christian's  striving  after  moral  perfection.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  future  life  is  held  out  to  men,  in  which  unhappiness  is 
to  be  the  consequence  of  persistence  in  wickedness,  and  the  re- 
ward of  a  holy  life  is  to  be  eternal  fellowship  with  the  Father, 
the  Son,  and  the  spirits  of  the  just  made  perfect. 

Over  against  this  a  non-Christian,  or  natural,  morality  holds 
that  there  is  and  can  be  no  such  thing  as  the  forgiveness  of 
sin,^  that  the  sole  motive  of  a  moral  life  is  a  sense  of  obligation 
to  promote  the  happiness  of  men,  and  that  the  reward  of  a  good 
life  is  in  the  good  life  itself.  Now  the  question  might  be  raised, 
how  far  this  so-called  natural  morality  is  after  all  indebted  to 
Christianity  for  its  moral  ideal.  According  to  the  evolution 
doctrine,  all  ideas  are  the  product  of  heredity  ;  and  men  in  Chris- 

1  See  W.  K.  Clifford,  T/ie  Ethics  of  Religion  (!n  Lectures  and  Essays,  vol. 
ii.  p.  241).     Cf.  J.  C.  Morison,  The  Service  of  Man,  chap.  v. 
13 


194  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

tiau  lands  who  have  inherited  the  lessons  of  Christian  ethics, 
even  though  they  may  abandon  the  Christian  faith  in  many  of 
its  distinctive  features,  yet  cannot  claim  that  they  have  evolved, 
independently  of  Christian  traditions,  a  moral  sense  and  a  moral 
code.  But  not  to  insist  on  this,  the  Christian  position  is  that 
Christianity  recognizes  and  enforces  all  the  truth  that  natural 
morality  contains,  and  adds  to  it  a  revelation  which  tends  to 
intensify  and  accelerate  the  moral  development  of  men.  It 
deepens  the  sense  of  guilt,  making  sin  to  be  not  a  mere  natural 
and  necessary  disposition  of  the  soul,  but  culpable  impiety  and 
disloyalt}'  towards  a  loving  Father  and  Sovereign.  It  provides 
a  powerful  motive  to  repentance  and  radical  conversion  in  that 
it  reveals  God  as  loving  the  sinner  while  he  abhors  sin,  and  as 
urging  him  to  accept  a  free  salvation.  It  presents  in  Jesus 
Christ  the  love  of  God  incarnate,  and  makes  the  ideal  of  holi- 
ness not  an  abstract  and  vague  thing,  but  an  ideal  realized  in 
the  person  of  Christ.  It  gives  warmth  and  stimulus  to  the  cul- 
tivation of  personal  holiness  by  thus  identifying,  as  it  were,  the 
motives  to  virtue  with  grateful  devotion  to  a  personal  Friend. 
This  common  allegiance  to  one  Head,  moreover,  leads  to  an 
organized  union  of  believers  through  which,  by  mutual  fellow- 
ship and  aid,  the  work  of  sanctification  in  the  Church  and  in 
the  world  is  promoted. 

Now  this,  in  brief  outline,  is  what  is  peculiar  to  Christianity 
as  a  moral  force  in  the  world.  And  the  question  now  before  us 
is  this :  If  Christianity  proves  to  be  successful  in  regenerating 
mankind,  will  not  this  success  be  the  best  and  most  convincing 
proot  that  the  Christian  scheme  is  indeed  from  God  ?  And  will 
not,  therefore,  miracles  be  needless,  and  belief  in  them  a  matter 
of  indifference  ? 

We  reply  :  The  Christian  religion  may  be  accepted  by  one 
man  because  others  have  seemed  to  be  the  better  for  it ;  hut  no 
one  can  he  the  hctter  for  it  without  faith  in  the  truth  of  it;  and 
this  faith  has  ahvays  depended  on  a  helicf  in  its  supernatural 
attestation.  Declarations  concerning  God's  feelings  towards  men 
and  his  willingness  to  forgive  sin ;  concerning  a  plan  of  redemp- 
tion and  an  incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God;  concerning  the 
regenerating   and    sanctifying   influences  of   the  Holy  Spirit; 


THE   EVIDENTIAL  VALUE   OF   MIRACLES.  195 

concerning  a  future  life,  a  resurrection,  and  a  state  of  final 
award,  —  these,  and  such  like  statements,  respecting  realms  of 
truth  and  fact  beyond  the  cognizance  of  men,  must  forever  be 
regarded  as  uncertain  speculations,  unless  they  are  ratified  and 
confirmed  by  something  that  can  be  recognized  as  a  divine  at- 
testation. So  long  as  they  are  regarded  as  nothing  but  uncer- 
tain speculations,  they  cannot  move  and  mould  the  inner  life. 
If  they  have  had  this  effect  in  the  world,  it  is  because  they  have 
been  believed  to  rest  on  the  foundation  of  a  testimony  sealed 
and  certified  by  signs  from  heaven.  This  faith  must  be  a  con- 
scious or  latent  one,  in  every  man  who  adopts  these  doctrines  of 
Christianity  and  makes  them  a  controlling  power  in  his  life. 

So  far  we  have  considered  the  relation  of  miracles  to  a  divine 
revelation  without  having  undertaken  to  prove  the  fact  of  their 
occurrence.  And  the  reason  for  pursuing  this  course  is  obvious. 
The  proof  of  the  necessity  of  supernatural  signs  as  attestations 
of  a  divine  revelation  prepares  the  way  for  a  proof  of  their  actu- 
ality. If  miracles  are  useless,  this  uselessness  itself  is  a  valid 
argument  against  their  reality.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is 
antecedent  reason  to  expect  miracles,  the  proof  of  their  occur- 
rence is  easy.  The  only  difiiculty  is  that  of  deciding  which  of 
the  religions  professing  to  be  of  supernatural  origin  brings 
the  most  satisfactory  credentials.  And  this  difficulty  is  not  very 
great.  Even  the  most  radical  skeptics  hardly  question  that  the 
Christian  miracles  are  more  plausibly  attested  than  any  others 
connected  with  an  alleged  revelation.  Having  considered  the 
definition  and  the  evidential  value  of  miracles,  we  come  now  to 
the  question,  What  is  the  proof  of  the  genuineness  of  the  Chris- 
tian miracles  ? 


196  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 


CHAPTEE  VIL 

PROOF   OF   THE    CHRISTIAN    MIRACLES. 

THIS  topic  has  been  so  often  and  largely  treated  that  only 
a  brief  summary  will  here  be  attempted.  Moreover,  the 
foregoing  discussion  has  largely  anticipated,  in  an  indirect  way, 
many  of  the  positive  arguments. 

I.  First  and  foremost  in  the  line  of  proof  must  always  be  the 
evidence  concerning  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ.  On  this 
point  the  following  propositions  may  be  laid  down  :  — 

1.  The  apostles  and  the  other  immediate  disciples  of  Christ 
believed  that  he  rose  from  the  dead  on  the  Sunday  after  the 
crucifixion.  This  is  now  admitted  by  scholars  and  critics  of  all 
classes,  —  by  the  extreme  negative  as  well  as  by  the  extreme 
positive  school,  and  by  all  between.  The  Christian  Church  was 
founded,  and  developed  its  first  fresh  ardent  life,  on  the  strength 
of  this  belief.  So  much  may  be  regarded  as  an  established  fact. 
The  divergence  of  opinion  begins  when  this  belief  of  the  dis- 
ciples is  to  be  accounted  for. 

2.  The  Christian  Church  spread  rapidly,  and  was  firmly  estab- 
lished in  Palestine  in  a  very  few  years  after  the  crucifixion. 
The  undisputed  testimony  of  Paul,  confirmed  by  the  narrative 
in  the  book  of  Acts,  shows  that  the  Church  which  he  persecuted 
with  so  much  fury  had  in  that  short  time  become  a  formidable 
power.i  There  was  evidently  no  time  for  a  myth  to  grow  up 
respecting  the  resurrection.  All  the  evidence  and  all  the  indi- 
cations show  conclusively  that  the  belief  in  it  originated  within 
a  few  days  after  the  crucifixion,  and  must  have  sprung  from  an 
actual  sight  of  the  risen  Christ  or  from  some  kind  of  delusion. 

3.  This  energetic  belief  in  Christ's  resurrection  is  satisfactorily 
explained  only  by  the  hypothesis  that  the  resurrection  was  a 

^  Fide  Rev.  K.  Twining  on  the  Evidence  of  the  Resurrection  of  Jesus 
Christ  (in  Boston  Lectures,  1872). 


PROOF   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  197 

fact.  This  hypothesis  explains  everything,  —  the  sudden  trans- 
formation of  the  depression  of  the  disciples  into  renewed  cheer- 
fulness and  courage ;  the  unanimity  of  the  historical  records 
and  the  traditional  belief ;  the  admitted  absence  of  the  body  of 
Jesus  from  the  grave.  In  short,  all  that  we  know  about  the 
circumstances  is  intelligible  on  the  supposition  of  the  fact  of 
the  resurrection,  while  every  other  supposition  involves  the 
most  arbitrary  and  improbable  conjectures. 

If  the  fact  of  the  resurrection  is  questioned  or  denied,  then 
there  remain  only  such  conjectures  as  these : 

(1)  That  Jesus  did  not  really  die  on  the  cross,  but  only 
swooned,  and  afterwards  revived.  This  hypothesis,  favored  by 
so  eminent  a  man  as  Schleiermacher,^  may  adduce  for  itself  that 
Jesus  is  said  to  have  died  sooner  than  the  crucified  robbers,  and 
was  sooner  taken  down  from  the  cross.  Now,  if  the  death  was 
only  apparent,  it  is  supposed  that  he  was  after  a  while  revived 
by  the  cool  air  of  the  sepulchre  and  by  the  effect  of  the  spices, 
and,  when  able,  rose,  walked  out,  and  showed  himself.  This 
hypothesis,  however,  hardly  needs  refutation.  Not  only  does 
it  plainly  contradict  the  whole  narrative,  as  we  have  it,  but,  as 
Strauss  observes,^  "  it  does  not  solve  the  problem  which  needs 
to  be  solved,  namely,  the  founding  of  the  Christian  Church 
through  the  belief  in  a  miraculous  revivification  of  Jesus  the 
Messiah.  A  man  crawling  half-dead  out  of  the  grave,  steal- 
ing around  infirmly,  in  need  of  medical  care,  of  bandages,  of 
strengthening,  and  of  tender  care,  and  after  all  succumbing  to 
his  suffering,  could  not  possibly  have  made  on  his  disciples  the 
impression  of  being  the  Conqueror  of  death  and  the  grave,  the 
Prince  of  Life,  —  the  impression  which  underlies  their  subse- 
quent deportment." 

(2)  That  the  whole  story  of  the  resurrection  was  a  deliberate 
fiction  of  the  disciples.  This  is,  if  possible,  still  more  inconceiv- 
able than  the  foregoing,  though  in  part  involved  in  it.  For  a 
revival  from  a  swoon  could  not  have  been  regarded  as  a  resur- 

^  Leben  Jesu,  pp.  449  sqq. 

^  Leben  Jesufiir  das  dettiscke  Folk,  §  47.  See  farther  C.  A.  Row,  Historical 
Evidence  of  the  Resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ,  pp.  29  sq.  {Present  Day  Tracts, 
vol.  i.). 


198  SUPERNATUEAL   REVELATION. 

rection  from  death ;  yet  it  was  certainly  so  represented.  The 
present  supposition  is  that,  without  any  reappearance  of  Jesus 
in  life,  the  disciples  agreed  to  pretend  that  they  had  seen  him. 
This  theory  breaks  down  with  its  own  weight.  Whatever  weak- 
nesses may  be  attributed  to  the  apostles,  they  cannot  be  sup- 
posed to  have  been  men  capable  of  such  a  depth  of  dishonesty ; 
and  most  certainly  men  never  endure  privation,  suffering,  and 
death  in  defense  of  a  known  falsehood,  as  the  apostles  did  on 
this  supposition.  We  need  not  dwell  on  this  theory,  as  scarcely 
any  one  can  be  found  ready  to  maintain  it. 

(3)  That  the  disciples  mistakenly  supposed  Jesus  really  to 
have  risen  from  the  dead.  This  theory,  the  only  one  that  with 
any  plausibility  can  be  held  as  against  the  common  one,  may 
take  various  forms :  as  (a)  that  the  disciples  inferred  the  resur- 
rection from  the  Old  Testament,  or  from  intimations  made  by 
Jesus  before  the  crucifixion,  but  did  not  see  him.  In  this  case, 
the  stories  of  his  appearances  must  be  regarded  as  a  later  legend- 
ary growth.  (&)  Mary  Magdalene  and  the  women  with  her 
imagined  that  they  saw  an  angel,  or  two  angels,  who  said  that 
Jesus  was  risen,  or  even  saw  some  one  whom  they  took  to  be 
Jesus,  and  that  in  the  excitement  of  a  full  belief  they  reported 
to  the  apostles  what  they  had  seen,  and  these  believed  the  re- 
port, but  still  without  having  any  vision  themselves,  (c)  The 
disciples  themselves  imagined  that  they  saw  Jesus  in  bodily 
form  alive  after  the  crucifixion.  These  different  views  may  be 
to  some  extent  united,  as  they  are  by  Strauss.^ 

It  is  obvious  that  the  hypothesis  of  honest  delusion,  however 
ingeniously  it  may  be  defended,  is  from  beginning  to  end  a  mere 
hypothesis,  unsupported  by  a  single  scrap  of  positive  evidence. 
It  is,  moreover,  opposed  to  all  the  intrinsic  probabilities  of  the 
case.  The  whole  burden  of  the  narrative  shows  that  the  dis- 
ciples were  disheartened  by  the  crucifixion,  and  were  not  ex- 
pecting a  resurrection.  The  women  who  first  went  to  the  grave 
went  expecting  to  embalm  Jesus'  body,  not  to  see  him  alive. 
The  apostles,  when  they  were  told  of  his  reappearance,  were 
at  first  skeptical.  Moreover,  when  they  did  see  him,  or  thought 
they  saw  him,  he  appeared  not  merely  to  a  single  one  at  a  time, 
1  Lebeii  Jesu,  \  49. 


PROOF   OF   THE   CHRISTIAN   MIRACLES.  199 

but  to  groups  of  persons,  —  at  one  time  to  more  than  five  hun- 
dred at  once.  This  is  not  the  manner  of  ecstatic  visions,  or  of 
subjective  fancies  which  clothe  themselves  in  objective  form. 
The  operation  of  pure  imagination  in  this  matter  can  be  cer- 
tainly proved  to  have  taken  place  only  in  the  invention  of  this 
hypothesis  itself.     Here  imagination  runs  riot. 

The  testimony  of  Paul  is  naturally  regarded  as  of  prime  im- 
portance, since  it  is  the  earliest  that  we  have,  and  the  only  one 
whose  genuiueness  is  as  good  as  absolutely  uncontested.  What 
is  the  purport  of  it  ?  Two  things  are  most  certainly  made  clear 
by  it :  first,  that  the  fact  of  Christ's  resurrection  was  commonly 
assumed  by  Christians  at  that  time ;  secondly,  that  Paul  repre- 
sents his  own  seeing  of  the  risen  Messiah  as  homogeneous 
with  that  of  the  other  witnesses  whom  he  mentions  (1  Cor. 
XV.   1-11). 

It  is  not  strange  that  those  who  will  not  believe  in  miracles 
should  try  to  find  in  Paul's  testimony  evidence  that  all  the 
supposed  appearances  of  the  risen  Jesus  were  mere  visions,  that 
is,  subjective  experiences  having  the  vividness  of  an  actual  per- 
ception of  outward  fact.  Paul,  they  say,  not  only  was  given  to 
having  such  visions  (2  Cor.  xii.  1,  Acts  xvi.  9,  xviii.  9),  but  in 
this  case  also  evidently  saw  Jesus  only  in  a  vision.  In  the 
three  accounts  of  his  conversion  in  Acts,  he  is  not  even  said 
to  have  seen  Jesus  at  all,  but  only  to  have  heard  him.  This 
event  took  place,  moreover,  probably  at  least  a  year  ^  after  the 
other  reputed  appearances  of  Jesus,  and  when  a  literal  bodily 
manifestation  of  himself,  even  if  such  ever  took  place,  could 
hardly  have  been  made.  Now,  if  Paul's  seeing  of  the  Eisen 
One  was  only  a  vision,  then  by  parity  of  reasoning  those  ex- 
periences of  the  other  disciples  which  he  makes  parallel  with 
his  own,  must  be  supposed  to  have  been  also  purely  sub- 
jective. 

What  shall  we  say  to  this  ?  We  must  say  that,  if  Paul's 
testimony,  as  being  the  most  direct  and  unimpeachable,  is  to 
be  used  as  the  key  by  which  to  unlock  the  mystery  of  the 
resurrection  stories,  we  must  take  his  testimony  as  it  stands. 
And  what  is  it  ?  He  is  endeavoring  to  establish  the  fact  of  a 
^  Fide  Keim,  Geschichte  Jesu  con  Nazara,  vol.  i.  p.  631. 


200  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

bodily  resurrection.  And  he  argues  it  from  the  admitted  fact 
that  Jesus  is  already  risen.  Unless  this  resurrection  had  been 
a  bodily  resurrection,  the  argument  would  have  no  meaning. 
The  argument  is  preceded  by  an  account  of  the  fact  that  Jesus 
rose  three  days  after  the  crucifixion,  and  was  «een  by  Peter,  the 
twelve,  more  than  five  hundred  disciples,  James,  and  finally  by 
himself.  His  statement  furnishes  the  basis  of  the  following 
argument.  Such,  he  says,  being  the  truth  that  has  been 
preached,  "  how  say  some  among  you  that  there  is  no  resurrec- 
tion of  the  dead?  But  if  there  is  no  resurrection  of  the  dead, 
neither  hath  Christ  been  raised."  Now  nothing  can  be  plainer 
than  that  Paul  here  makes  everything  rest  on  the  fact  of  Jesus' 
bodily  resurrection.  A  mere  continued  existence  of  the  spirit, 
apart  from  the  body,  cannot  possibly  be  meant  when  he  tells 
of  Jesus  rising  three  days  after  his  crucifixion.  And  it  is  no 
less  plain  that  the  appearances  to  Peter  and  the  others  are 
understood  by  Paul  to  be  appearances  of  Jesus'  resurrection- 
body.  The  language  used  is  not  that  which  describes  a  mere 
vision.  Nor  do  visions  occur  simultaneously  to  men  in  groups. 
Moreover,  these  appearances  are  adduced  as  proofs  of  the  fact 
of  the  bodily  resurrection  having  really  taken  place.  If  any- 
thing is  certain,  it  is  certain  that  Paul  does  not  here  mean  to 
describe  the  experience  of  the  disciples  as  an  ecstasy,  but  as  a 
literal  fact.  Consequently,  in  that  he  makes  his  own  experi- 
ence parallel  with  theirs,  he  is  to  be  understood  as  not  de- 
scribing Jesus'  appearance  to  him  as  a  visionary,  but  as  a 
bodily,  one. 

Even  if  Paul's  experience  is  to  be  called  a  vision,  it  is  still  an 
open  question  what  is  meant  by  a  vision.  Was  it  a  morbid  im- 
pression, a  hallucination  due  to  an  excited  nervous  state  ?  Or 
was  the  cause  of  it  something  really  objective  ?i  The  world, 
both  Christian  and  heathen,  has  abounded  in  alleged  visions, 
the  most  of  which  we  may  presume  to  have  been  merely  sub- 
jective, caused  by  an  excited  state  of  the  subjects  of  the  vision. 
But  the  fact  that  such  experiences  are  possible  does  not  prove 
that  no  other  kind  of  visions  is  possible.  Even  if  we  should 
concede  that  the  appearances  of  Jesus  after  the  crucifixion  were 
1  Cf.  Professor  Fisher,  Supernatural  Origin  of  Christianity,  p.  468. 


PROOF  OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  201 

visions,  we  should  still  have  to  maintain  that  according  to  the 
narrative  the  appearances  were  not  subjective  fancies  simply, 
but  objective  revelations.  This  is  the  character  ascribed  in  the 
Bible  to  the  visions  of  prophets  and  apostles.  When  Peter  had 
a  trance  (Acts  x.  9-16),  and  saw  the  vision  of  the  beasts,  and 
heard  the  command  to  eat,  this  was,  according  to  the  mind  of 
the  narrator,  clearly  not  an  experience  growing  out  of  mental  or 
nervous  excitement,  causing  his  own  thoughts  and  feelings  to 
objectify  themselves  in  the  form  of  apparently  visible  and  audi- 
ble outward  objects.  Peter  took  it  as  a  divine  communication 
correcting,  not  springing  out  of,  his  previous  notions.  Of  course 
a  skeptic  can  still  say  that  the  whole  thing  may  have  been  a 
diseased  fancy ;  or  that  the  narrative  itself  is  wholly  or  in  part 
fictitious.  But  our  point  now  is  that  the  Biblical  representation 
of  these  ecstatic  experiences  is  that  they  are  not  purely  subjec- 
tive states,  but  are  states  produced  by  divine  power  for  the  pur- 
pose of  special  illumination  and  instruction.  Consequently  it 
follows  that,  when  Paul  speaks  of  these  appearances  of  the  risen 
Christ,  he  means  to  describe  a  real  objective  fact,  even  though 
we  should  still  call  it  a  vision.  In  the  light  of  this  reflection  it 
is  obvious  how  much  weight  is  to  be  attached  to  such  an  asser- 
tion as  that  of  Mr.  Greg,  when  he  says,^  "  Now  we  know  that 
his  appearance  to  Paul  was  in  a  vision,  —  a  vision  visible  to 
Paul  alone  of  all  the  bystanders,  and  therefore  subjective  or 
mental  merely."  The  reply  is:  If  we  knoio  this,  we  do  not 
know  it  because  Luke  or  Paul  has  told  it,  but  because  we  are 
unwilhng  to  believe  what  they  say.  The  phrase  used  by  Paul 
(Mcfydr)  Kr](f)a,  "  he  was  seen  to  Cephas,"  etc.)  is  the  same  that  is 
used  in  the  account  of  the  appearance  of  the  angel  to  Zacharias 
(Luke  i.  11),  of  Moses  and  Elijah  on  the  mount  (Matt.  xvii.  .3,  etc.), 
of  the  cloven  tongues  (Acts  ii.  3),  of  God  to  Abraham  (Acts  vii. 
2),  of  the  angel  in  the  bush  (vii.  30).  Once  it  is  used  in  con- 
nection with  an  experience  called  a  "vision"  (6pa/xa),  namely, 
in  Acts  xvi.  9,  where  it  is  said  that  "a  vision  appeared  to  Paul 
in  the  night."  On  the  other  hand  it  is  also  used  (Acts  vii.  26) 
of  so  matter-of-fact  a  thing  as  Moses'  "  appearing  "  to  the  quarrel- 
ing Hebrews  in  Egypt.  Now  in  each  of  these  cases  the  writer 
^  Creeds  of  Christendom.,  vol.  ii.  p.  147. 


202  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

obviously  understands  these  appearances  as  not  "  subjective  or 
mental  merely."  Mr.  Greg's  statement,  moreover,  is  not  true 
even  on  his  own  ground;  for  the  other  bystanders  are  repre- 
sented as  sharing,  in  part  at  least,  in  the  vision.  They  saw 
the  light  (which  is  all  that  Paul  is  said  to  have  seen) ;  and 
the  only  difference  relates  to  the  hearing,  respecting  which 
two  of  the  accounts  (Acts  xxii.  9,  ix.  7)  scc7n  not  to  give  the 
same  representation.^ 

The  theory  of  Schenkel,^  Keim,^  and  others,  that  the  reappear- 
ance of  Jesus  was  a  fact,  but  not  the  appearance  of  a  risen  body, 
is  nearer  the  truth  than  the  notion  that  the  appearance  was 
a  mere  fancy  growing  out  of  extraordinary  excitement.  If  not 
in  words,  yet  in  fact,  this  hypothesis  admits  the  supernatural 
character  of  the  phenomenon.  The  glorified  Christ  is  conceived 
to  have  really  manifested  himself  in  some  special  manner  those 
few  times,  in  order  to  impart  the  needed  courage  and  assurance 
to  the  down-cast  disciples.  But  the  stories  of  Jesus  as  appear- 
ing in  a  bodily  form,  now  semi-ghostly  and  now  literal  flesh  and 
blood,  they  discard  as  unintelligible,  self-contradictory,  and  man- 
ifestly legendary.  Paul  is  with  them,  as  with  the  others,  the 
witness  whose  testimony  is  depended  on.  But  Paul's  language 
refuses  to  accommodate  itself  to  this  theory,  even  though  the 
contradiction  is  less  sharp  than  with  the  other.  As  has  been 
above  said,  he  is  arguing  for  a  hodily  resurrection ;  and  his  use 
of  the  facts  following  the  crucifixion  is  without  meaning,  unless 
they  go  to  show  that  Jesus  had  risen  in  bodily  form.  The  dis- 
tinct specification  that  Jesus  rose  the  third  day  cannot  be  tor- 
tured into  harmony  with  this  effort  to  sublimate  the  Christo- 
phanies  into   merely   spiritual    manifestations.     Keim   has   no 

^  As  both  the  accounts  are  recorded  by  the  same  man,  it  is  no  more  than 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  meant  no  contradiction,  and  that  the  positive 
statement,  that  the  men  did  hear,  should  be  made  to  explain  the  negative  one 
that  they  did  not  hear.  Moreover,  though  not  in  the  historical  narrative,  yet 
in  1  Cor.  ix.  1,  and  xv.  8,  Paul  declares  himself  to  have  seen  the  Lord  Jesus 
himself. 

2  CharaUerbiU  Jesu,  pp.  231,  232,  3d  ed. 

*  Gesch.  Jesu  v.  Nazara,  vol.  iii.  pp.  600  sqq.  Similarly  Weizsacker,  Unter- 
suchi.ngen  iiber  die  etanrj.  Geschichie,  pp.  573  sq.  ;  E.  A.  Abbott,  The  Kernel 
and  the  Husk,  Letters  20-23. 


PROOF  OF   THE   CHRISTIAJST  MIRACLES.  203 

better  explanation  of  this  notion  about  the  third  day  than  that 
it  was  one  which  grew,  not  out  of  any  palpable  appearance,  but 
out  of  Jewish  notions  concerning  the  length  of  time  intervening 
between  death  and  entrance  into  Hades,  and  out  of  a  misin- 
terpretation of  Hos.  vi.  2,  and  of  certain  utterances  of  Jesus 
himself.^ 

The  real  reason  for  rejecting  the  traditional  notion  respecting 
the  resurrection  is  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  such  a  body  as 
that  described  in  the  Gospels.  Just  so  the  Corinthian  doubters 
asked,  "  How  are  the  dead  raised  ?  and  with  what  manner  of 
body  do  they  come  ? "  (1  Cor.  xv.  35.)  If  one  is  unwilling  to 
accept  Paul's  reply,  and  believe  that,  whatever  mystery  there 
may  be  about  it,  it  is  yet  a  veritable  body,  he  cannot  with  any 
plausibility  or  consistency  deny  the  bodily  resurrection  of  Christ 
on  the  ground  of  Paul's  testimony. 

Paul's  testimony  respecting  the  other  disciples  is  of  course 
only  testimony  at  second  hand.  But  it  is  at  any  rate  that  of  a 
trustworthy  man  who  got  his  account  from  the  original  wit- 
nesses, and  got  it  within  a  few  years,^  at  the  most,  of  the  time  of 
the  alleged  resurrection.  And  it  follows  from  this  that  a  short 
time  after  the  death  of  Jesus  the  apostles  and  many  others  all 
affirmed  that  Jesus  had  been  seen  by  them  in  bodily  form  after 
the  crucifixion.  And  the  firm  assurance  of  this  fact  had  embold- 
ened them  to  preach  the  gospel.  Paul's  testimony,  then,  estab- 
lishes the  fact  that  the  original  disciples  of  Jesus  helievcd  that 
they  had  seen  him  alive  in  bodily  form  after  the  crucifixion,  and 
that  these  appearances  had  not  been  to  single  individuals  only, 
who  might  possibly  have  been  deluded  through  mental  or  ner- 
vous excitement,  but  simultaneously  to  groups  of  persons. 

Now  it  would  seem  to  be  difficult  to  evade  the  conclusion 
that  the  evidence  in  the  case  establishes  the  fact  of  the  resur- 
rection. And  when  we  add  to  the  testimony  of  Paul  that  of  the 
four  Gospels  and  the  book  of  Acts,  all  of  which  unite  in  emphat- 
ically bearing  the  same  testimony,  one  might  suppose  that  the 
assurance  would  be  made  doubly  sure.  But  the  skeptical  critics, 
having  started  with  the  predetermination  not  to  believe  in  a 

^  Gesch.  Jesu  v.  Nazara,  vol.  iii.,  pp.  600,  sqq.  He  even  questions  the  story 
about  the  empty  grave.  «  Cf.  Acts  ix.  26,  27 ;  Gal,  i.  18. 


204  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

miracle,  and  having  decided  (in  plain  opposition  to  Paul  himself) 
that  Paul  at  his  conversion  had  only  a  subjective  experience,  — 
a  mere  illusion  growing  out  of  mental  excitement  and  conscienti- 
ous qualms  (of  which  also  the  only  proof  is  the  skeptic's  imagi- 
nation^),—  it  is  of  course  a  foregone  conclusion  that  the  historical 
books  must  somehow  be  discredited.  Now  an  unbiased  reader 
of  these  books  would  naturally  be  inclined  to  say  that  in  the 
matter  of  Christ's  resurrection  their  testimony  is  especially 
strong.  Whereas  most  other  incidents  in  the  life  of  Christ  are 
narrated  by  only  one,  two,  or  three  of  the  Evangelists,  this 
event  is  narrated  by  all  of  them,  and  with  exceptional  emphasis. 
It  lies  on  the  surface  of  the  narratives  that  the  resurrection,  or 
supposed  resurrection,  had  made  a  most  profound  impression. 
And  it  is  anything  but  a  mark  of  candor,  when  critics  dwell  on 
the  variations  and  discrepancies  in  the  details  of  these  several 
narratives,  and  then  draw  the  inference  that  the  story  as  a  whole 
is  unworthy  of  belief.  It  requires  little  acumen  to  see  that,  if 
the  four  stories,  instead  of  disagreeing  with  one  another  in  this 
or  that  particular,  were  minutely  harmonious,  this  very  exact- 
ness of  harmony  would  itself  be  taken  as  a  suspicious  circum- 
stance, indicating  collusion  among  the  authors,  or  else  the  work 
of  a  harmonizing  redactor.^ 

It  is  a  fact  that  there  are  disagreements  in  these  several  nar- 
ratives. Some  are  slight ;  many  of  them  may  be  explained  by 
conjectural  suppositions ;  others  can  be  removed  only  by  hy- 
potheses which  at  the  best  seem  somewhat  violent  and  arbi- 
trary. When  Luke  confines  the  Christophanies  to  Jerusalem 
and  vicinity,  and  even  reports  Jesus  as  forbidding  the  apostles 
to  depart  from  the  city  till  after  Pentecost  (xxiv.  49 ;  Acts  i. 
4),  while  Matthew  records  no  Christophany  as  occurring  in 
Judea,  but  only  in  Galilee,  and  reports  Jesus  as  directing  the 
apostles  to  go  at  once  to  Galilee  (xxviii.  10),  the  natural  im- 

^   Vide.  "Fislier,  Supernatural  Origin  of  Christianity,  pp.  464  sq. 

^  This  is  illustrated  by  tlie  case  of  Mark  xvi.  9-20,  wliicli,  according  to 
both  internal  and  external  evidence,  seems  hardly  to  be  an  integral  part  of  the 
Gospel,  but  an  editorial  appendix,  giving  a  compendious  account  culled  from 
John,  Matthew,  and  especially  Luke.  And  so  Strauss  {Leben  Jem,  \  97), 
Keim  {Gesch.  Jem  v.  Nazara,  vol.  iii.  pp.  56G  sqq),  and  others,  treat  it. 


PROOF  OF  THE   CHRISTIAN   MIRACLES.  205 

pression  made  is  that  the  two  authors  did  not  have  the  same  con- 
ception concerning  the  facts.  We  need  not  assume  an  absolute 
contradiction.  We  may  suppose  ^  that  the  command  to  remain 
in  Jerusalem  was  uttered  after  the  return  from  Galilee,  so  that 
then  the  difference  remaining  is  only  the  negative  one,  that  the 
one  Gospel  records  only  the  Judean  appearances,  while  the  other 
records  only  the  Galilean ;  and  the  reconciliation  consists  in 
assuming  that  the  two  narratives  give  accounts  of  distinct 
events,  and  must  be  united  in  order  to  make  a  complete  his- 
tory. We  find  also  numerous  other  apparent  discrepancies, — 
respecting  the  women  who  first  went  to  the  grave,  the  angelic 
appearances,  etc.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Synoptical  Gospels 
which  corresponds  naturally  with  John's  story  about  Mary 
Magdalene,  John,  and  Peter  visiting  the  tomb.  Luke  makes 
Mary  go  with  several  other  women ;  John  makes  her  go  quite 
alone.  So,  while  Mark  (xvi.  8)  describes  the  women  as  too 
much  afraid  to  report  what  they  had  seen,  Matthew  and  Luke 
relate  that  they  carried  the  information  to  the  apostles. 

Now,  by  piling  together  such  variations  one  can,  if  he  please, 
make  a  considerable  show  of  inexplicable  disagreement.  It 
is,  we  must  confess,  impossible  to  determine  just  how  this 
diverseness  in  the  histories  is  to  be  explained.  But  we  may  say 
precisely  the  same  respecting  the  rest  of  the  gospel  history .^ 
If,  wherever  two  accounts  of  the  same  event  vary  in  their 
details,  or  one  Evangelist  omits  what  another  one  records,  we 
are  to  question  the  authenticity  of  the  whole,  then  we  shall 
annihilate  almost  the  whole  of  the  gospel  history.  No  two 
Evangelists  give  the  same  account  of  Jesus'  birth  and  early 
life.  John's  account  of  the  Baptist  coincides  in  almost  no  point 
exactly  with  that  of  the  Synoptists.  Luke's  narrative  of  the 
temptation  of  Jesus  differs  from  Matthew's,  while  Mark  only 
mentions  it  summarily,  and  John  not  at  all.     John  also  makes 

1  Witli  Alford  on  Luke  xxiv.  49,  and  others.  Yet  this  explanation  does 
not  remove  the  difficulty,  that  Luke  seems  to  represent  the  command  not  to 
depart  from  Jerusalem  as  having  been  given  on  the  very  day  of  the  resurrection. 

'  Lessing  (Fine  Dupli/c),  while  stoutly  maintaining  the  impossibility  of  har- 
monizing the  several  narratives  of  the  resurrection,  was  candid  enough  to 
affirm  that  in  spite  of  the  contradictions  the  fact  of  the  resurrection  might  be 
credited. 


206  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

no  mention  of  the  baptism  of  Jesus.  There  are  noticeable 
variations  in  the  accounts  of  the  first  calling  of  the  apostles. 
Luke  makes  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  rather  a  Sermon  on 
the  Plain  (vi.  17),  and  makes  it  shorter  and  in  many  points 
other  than  Matthew  does.  There  is  disagreement  as  to  the  very 
names  of  the  apostles.  As  to  the  order  of  events,  the  three 
Synoptists  diverge  from  one  another ;  and  John  greatly  diverges 
from  them  all,  dwelling  on  Christ's  activity  in  Jerusalem,  about 
which  the  others  are  almost  wholly  silent.  As  to  Jesus'  in- 
timate friends  in  Bethany,  Matthew  and  Mark  do  not  seem  to 
know  about  them  ;  Luke  (x.  38-42)  mentions  the  names  of  Mary 
and  Martha,  but  gives  no  hint  of  special  intimacy,  and  does  not 
mention  the  name  of  the  village.  And  so  we  might  go  on.  If, 
in  order  to  the  authentication  of  the  evangelical  history,  we  must 
insist  on  exact  agreement  between  the  four  Gospels,  we  shall  end 
in  having  as  good  as  no  history  at  all.  When,  therefore,  Strauss 
and  his  followers  parade  the  variations  in  the  narratives  of  the 
Christophanies,  and  infer  that  no  credit  is  to  be  given  to  any  of 
them,  consistency  would  require  that  the  same  principle  should 
be  applied  to  the  history  of  Jesus  all  the  way  from  his  birth  to 
his  death.  Mr.  Greg  ^  says  that  the  different  narratives  of  the 
resurrection  "  agree  in  everything  that  is  natural  and  probable, 
and  disagree  in  everything  that  is  supernatural  and  difficult  of 
credence.  All  the  accounts  agree  that  the  women,  on  their 
matutinal  visit  to  the  Sepulchre,  found  the  body  gone,  and  saw 
some  one  in  white  raiment  who  spoke  to  them.  They  agree  in 
nothing  else."  And  Mr.  Greg  appears  to  be  much  confounded 
by  this  fact.  He  says  ^  that,  if  the  case  rested  only  on  the  testi- 
mony of  Paul  and  the  fact  that  the  resurrection  was  believed  by 
the  whole  original  Christian  Church,  "  our  grounds  for  accepting 
the  resurrection  as  an  historical  fact  would  be  far  stronger  than 
they  actually  are.  In  truth,  they  would  appear  to  be  nearly  un- 
assailable and  irresistible."  But  it  is  the  "  vague,  various,  and 
self-contradictory  "  narratives  in  the  Gospels  which  trouble  him. 
Now  it  is  manifest  that  these  discrepancies  would  seriously 
trouble  nobody  who  is  predisposed  to  believe  in  supernatural 

1  Creeds  of  C/insiendom,  vol.  ii.  p.  148. 
^  lu  his  Preface,  p.  xxviii. 


PROOF   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  207 

manifestations  as  the  accompaniments  of  a  chosen  Eevealer  of 
divine  truth.  Such  a  one  finds  the  evangelical  histories  a  strong 
confirmation  of  Paul's  testimony.  Such  a  one  would  say :  "  True, 
the  several  accounts  vary  in  details,  as  we  might  expect.  But 
they  agree  in  the  important  fact  of  the  resurrection,  the  visible 
and  tangible  reappearance,  of  Jesus.  They  agree  that  he  rose 
before  the  dawn  of  the  first  day  of  the  week.  They  agree  that 
Mary  Magdalene  was  the  foremost  of  tbose  who  visited  the 
sepulchre.  They  agree  that  Jesus  appeared  to  his  apostles  as- 
sembled together.  They  agree  in  representing  his  resurrection- 
body  as  the  same  as  the  crucified  one,  while  yet  they  agree  in 
ascribing  to  it  a  peculiar,  semi-spiritual  character.  Tbey  agree 
in  describing  the  disciples  as  all  fully  convinced  of  the  reality  of 
the  resurrection,  and  as  confirmed  thereby  in  their  faith  in  him 
as  the  Messiah  of  God.  The  disagreements  concern  unimportant 
details ;  and  even  if  some  of  them  could  be  shown  to  be  irrecon- 
cilable contradictions,  they  would  not  invalidate  the  main  drift 
of  the  stories  of  the  resurrection." 

But  this  is  not  the  whole  of  the  testimony.  The  book  of  Acts 
records  that  the  apostles  made  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  the 
central  fact  of  their  preaching,  and  made  thousands  of  converts 
in  the  very  place  where  he  had  just  been  ignominiously  put  to 
death.  The  Church  made  such  progress  within  a  year  that  per- 
secution was  resorted  to  as  a  means  of  checking  its  dangerous 
growth.  But  we  are  not  confined  to  the  testimony  of  Paul, 
the  book  of  Acts,  and  the  Gospels.  Even  if  we  do  not  insist 
that  John  wrote  the  Fourth  Gospel,  or  that  Matthew  wrote 
the  First,  we  still  have  direct  apostolic  testimony.  We  have 
John's  testimony  in  the  Apocalypse,  which  the  skeptical  critics 
generally  concede  to  be  a  genuine  work  of  the  apostle.  He 
there  calls  Christ  "the  first-born  of  the  dead"  (i.  5),  and  repre- 
sents Christ  as  saying,  "  I  was  dead,  and  behold  I  am  alive  for 
evermore  "  (i.  18) ;  and  again  he  says,  "  These  things  saith  the 
first  and  the  last,  which  was  dead,  and  lived  again"  (ii.  8).i 

*  Wliile  not  doubting  that  John  the  Apostle  is  the  author  of  tlie  Tourth 
Gospel  (the  proof  of  which  has  been  given  by  so  many,  especially  by  Dr.  Ezra 
Abbot  in  his  Authorship  of  the  Fourth  Gospel),  we  take  the  evidence  which  the 
skeptics  themselves  do  not  impugn. 


208  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

These  passages  are,  indeed,  not  explicit,  as  from  the  connection 
we  could  not  expect  them  to  be ;  but  they  manifestly  imply  the 
belief  in  Jesus'  bodily  resurrection.  In  what  other  sense  could 
he  be  called  the  "first-horn  of  the  dead  "  ?  As  Christlieb  ^  well 
remarks,  in  reply  to  Strauss,  who  says  that  the  book  of  Revela- 
tion only  affirms  in  general  that  Jesus  had  been  killed,  and  was 
now  alive  again,  "  This  certainly  cannot  mean  the  first  of  those 
who  lived  immortal  after  death,  for  there  were  enough  such 
before  Christ."  But  we  have  Peter's  testimony  in  his  First 
Epistle,  the  genuineness  of  which  is  almost  as  well  established 
as  that  of  Paul's  Epistles  to  the  Corinthians.  In  this  epistle 
Peter  mentions  Jesus'  resurrection  at  the  very  opening  of  it 
(i.  3)  as  the  event  which  had  begotten  the  Christians  unto 
a  living  hope ;  and  again,  in  i.  21,  he  speaks  of  God  "  which 
raised  him  [Jesus]  from  the  dead;"  and  still  again,  in  iii.  21, 
the  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  is  spoken  of  as  a  means  of 
salvation. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  it  is  conceded  that  the  immediate  dis- 
ciples of  Christ  thought  they  had  seen  him  alive  after  the  cruci- 
fixion. May  they  not,  however,  have  been  mistaken,  honestly 
mistaken  ?  Well,  if  it  is  a  question  of  bare  possibility,  yes,  it 
is  possible  tha't,  while  in  the  deepest  despondency  of  grief,  the 
apostles  suddenly  swung  themselves  up  into  the  mental  atti- 
tude of  assured  expectation  of  seeing  the  Messiah  again  in 
bodily  form.  It  is  jyossible  that  the  nerves  of  Mary  Magdalene 
and  of  Peter  became  suddenly  disordered  on  that  Sunday  morn- 
ing, and  that  they  consequently  imagined  that  the  risen  Saviour 
appeared  to  them  visibly.  It  is  possible  that  a  similar  disorder 
seized  all  the  eleven,  when  they  were  together,  and  affected  them 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  not  only  seemed  to  see  Jesus,  but 
heard  him  speak  and  saw  him  eat.  It  is  possible  that  five 
hundred  persons  might  simultaneously  be  afflicted  with  such 
a  nervous  affection  that  they  should  imagine  that  they  had  a 
vision  of  Jesus  in  bodily  form.  "  All  things  are  possible  to " 
the  critic  "  that  believeth."  But  ordinary  men  of  plain  common 
sense  can  hardly  be  so  credulous. 

The  conflict  of  opinions  is  very  easily  explained.  It  does  not 
^  Modern  Doubt  and  Christian  Belief,  p.  467- 


PROOF   OF   THE   CHRISTIAN   MIRACLES.  209 

come  from  paucity  of  evidence,  but  simply  from  a  conflict  of 
prepossessions.  The  critical  doubts  respecting  the  resurrection 
are  primarily  dogmatic  doubts.  They  spring  from  a  predeter- 
mination not  to  believe  in  alleged  miracles,  —  a  fixed  conviction 
that  miracles  are  incredible  or  impossible.  Those  who  believe 
in  the  resurrection  of  Christ,  on  the  other  hand,  not  only  be- 
lieve in  the  general  possibility  of  the  miraculous,  but  in  the  spe- 
cial need  of  a  self-manifestation  of  God,  and  the  need  of  special 
attestation  of  him  who  professes  to  be  the  instrument  of  such 
a  manifestation.  This  prepossession  makes  it  comparatively 
easy  to  believe  in  the  occurrence  of  supernatural  events  which 
are  alleged  to  have  served  the  purpose  of  such  attestation.  The 
scientific  presumption  against  miracles  is  more  than  outweighed 
by  the  religious  presumption  in  favor  of  miracles  wrought  for 
such  a  purpose.  The  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  from  the 
dead  seems  intrinsically  probable  and  fit,  when  he  is  regarded 
as  a  divinely  appointed  and  furnished  Mediator  between  God 
and  men.  Consequently  to  such  minds  evidence  of  the  fact  of 
the  resurrection,  such  as  the  New  Testament  furnishes,  is  ample 
and  even  overwhelming. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  evidence  for  the  resurrection 
of  Christ  is  so  strong  as  to  be  almost  or  quite  convincing  to 
many  men  who  refuse  to  believe  in  any  other  recorded  miracle 
of  the  Gospels.  While  this  illustrates  the  strength  of  the  argu- 
ment for  the  reality  of  this  particular  event,  it  illustrates  also 
the  illogicalness  of  those  who  occupy  this  position.  For  surely 
if  the  greater  is  proved,  it  must  be  easy  to  prove  the  less. 
We  need  therefore  to  dwell  at  less  length  on  — 

II.  The  proof  of  the  miracles  wrought  by  Christ.  If  he  was 
a  being  of  altogether  unique  character ;  if  he  sustained  an  al- 
together peculiar  relation  to  God  and  to  men;  and  if  this 
uniqueness  was  effectually  authenticated  by  his  miraculous 
resurrection,  —  all  a  'priori  and  scientific  objections  to  miracles 
wrought  by  hirn  are  at  once  swept  away.  We  not  only  can  be- 
lieve that  he  performed  miracles,  but  we  naturally  expect  mir- 
acles from  such  a  being.  Their  absence  would  surprise  us  more 
than  their  presence.  At  all  events,  granted  the  greater  miracle, 
the  one  by  which  most  emphatically  God  set  his  seal  on  the 

14 


210  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

ministry  of  Christ,  other  miracles  can  be  easily  proved,  if  the 
evidence  is  sufhciently  ample.     What,  then,  is  the  evidence  ? 

Speaking  generally,  we  may  say  that  the  proof  of  miraculous 
events  as  characteristic  of  the  life  of  Christ  is  almost  co-exten- 
sive with  the  proof  that  he  lived  at  all.  The  earliest  records  of 
his  life  are  saturated  with  the  supernatural.^  Not  only  are 
specific  miracles  reported  in  great  numbers  and  often  with 
great  minutenesss  of  detail,  but  all  the  incidental  features  of 
the  Gospel  history  indicate  the  presence  of  an  altogether  pe- 
uliar  element  in  his  character  and  works.  The  tone  of  au- 
thority which  he  assumed  ;  the  fear  and  deference  which  he 
inspired  in  those  who  saw  and  heard  him ;  the  general  state- 
ments about  him,  —  all  this  indicates  not  only  that  the  writers 
believed  him  to  be  a  great  miracle-worker,  but  that  he  was 
such. 

The  manner  in  which  the  stories  of  miracles  are  interwoven 
with  the  general  sketch  of  Jesus'  character  and  life  harmonizes 
perfectly  with  the  extraordinary  claims  which  he  made  for 
himself.  These  claims  themselves,  though  they  are  unparal- 
leled in  their  extravagance,  unless  he  was  indeed  the  Son  of 
God  and  Son  of  man  in  an  altogether  unique  sense,  yet  consti- 
tute an  element  in  the  gospel  history  that  cannot  by  any  pos- 
sibility be  eliminated.  He  announced  himself  at  the  outset  as 
the  introducer  of  the  kingdom  of  God  (Matt.  iv.  17).  In  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount  he  assumed  authority  to  interpret  and 
modify  the  Mosaic  law  (v.  21-48) ;  he  represented  obedience  to 
his  words  as  that  on  which  the  destiny  of  men  was  to  turn 
(vii.  21-27).  He  made  no  confession  of  sin  and  challenged  his 
enemies  to  convict  him  of  sin  (John  viii.  29,  46).  He  required 
an  allegiance  to  himself  transcending  the  closest  earthly  ties 
(Matt.  X.  34-39).  He  called  himself  the  Light  of  the  World 
(John  viii.  12).  He  invited  all  men  to  come  to  him  for  rest 
(Matt.  xi.  28).     He  promised  his  followers  eternal  life  (Luke 

'  Holtzmann,  who  certainly  cannot  be  called  too  credulous  a  critic,  says 
{Die  symptischen  Evangelien,  p.  509),  "The  narratives  of  miracles  constitute 
so  truly  the  substance  of  the  Synoptical  account  that,  as  soon  as  ono  tears 
them  out,  the  whole  mosaic-work  loses  all  perceptible  plan,  all  intelligible 
characteristics." 


PROOF   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  211 

xviii.  30).  He  assumed  the  prerogative  of  universal  and  final 
Judge,  before  whom  all  nations  are  to  be  gathered  (Matt.  xxv. 
31-46).  He  claimed  the  power  to  forgive  sin  (Matt.  ix.  2-6; 
Luke  vii.  48).  He  bade  men  pray  to  the  Father  in  his  name 
(John  XV.  16,  xvi.  24),  and  represented  himself  as  the  dispenser 
of  spiritual  life  (John  vi.  35,  47-58).  These  are  only  speci- 
mens of  the  general  attitude  of  extraordinary  authority  and 
dignity  to  which  he  is  said  to  have  laid  claim.  And  that  these 
representations  correctly  picture  the  attitude  which  he  really 
assumed,  is  confirmed  by  the  conception  of  Christ  \vhich  runs 
all  through  the  Epistles  of  Paul,  who  calls  Christ  the  Son  of 
God  (Rom.  i.  4) ;  sinless,  yet  set  forth  by  God  to  be  a  propitia- 
tion for  the  sins  of  men  (Rom.  iii.  25  ;  2  Cor.  v.  21) ;  the  sole 
IVIediator  between  God  and  man  (1  Tim.  ii.  5)  ;  the  Head  of  the 
church,  from  whom  all  the  members  derive  their  life  (Rom.  xii. 
4,  5  ;  1  Cor.  xii.  27;  Eph.  v.  30 ;  Col.  ii.  19). 

That  such  a  person,  charged  with  so  peculiar  a  mission, 
should  have  been  able  to  authenticate  his  claims  by  means  of 
extraordinary  works,  is  so  natural  that  the  narratives  of  the 
miracles  excite  no  surprise,  but  everywhere  seem  to  be  per- 
fectly in  keeping  with  the  general  style  of  the  description.  The 
right  of  criticism  to  sift  the  narratives  and  eliminate,  if  possi- 
ble, unauthentic  portions,  cannot  be  denied.  But  what  must  be 
denied  is  the  right  to  make  the  presence  of  the  supernatural 
the  invariable  touchstone  by  which  narratives  are  to  be  pro- 
nounced "  unhistorical."  Yet  this  is  substantially  the  principle 
of  modern  negative  criticism.  That  Christ  healed  many  sick 
people  the  critics  are  willing  to  admit,  in  so  far  as  the  healing 
can  be  accounted  for  as  caused  by  medical  skill  and  the  influ- 
ence of  a  sympathetic  nature  on  Christ's  part,  and  the  influence 
of  "  faith,"  that  is,  strong  confidence  in  Christ's  healing  power, 
on  the  part  of  the  patients.  But  whenever  the  disease  assumes 
a  serious  form,  the  alleged  miracle  is  at  once  pronounced  incred- 
ible, and  some  other  explanation  of  the  story  is  resorted  to. 
Thus  Scholten  ^  says  of  the  story  of  the  leprous  man  (Mark  i. 
40-45),  "  This  narrative  seems  not  to  be  historical,  since  it  is  in- 
conceivable that  physical  leprosy  should  have  yielded  to  a  mere 

^  Das  dlteste  Eoangelium,  p.  202. 


212  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

command  of  Jesus."  Armed  with  this  sweeping  principle,  the 
critics  construct  elaborate  hypotheses  to  account  for  the  numer- 
ous stories  of  miraculous  events  with  which  the  life  of  Christ  is 
filled. 

Disagreement  among  the  critics  cannot  be  fairly  adduced  as 
a  proof  that  none  of  them  can  be  in  the  right.  But  the  dis- 
agreement may  serve  to  show  how  little  they  can  all  lay  claim 
to  having  offered  a  scientific  and  historical  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem presented  by  the  miracles.  Let  us  take  a  single  specimen. 
The  miracle  of  the  loaves  is  the  best  attested  of  all  the  miracles, 
except  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  It  is  the  only  one  narrated 
by  all  the  four  Evangelists.*  No  serious  objection  on  the  score 
of  discrepancy  between  the  several  accounts  can  be  made  out. 
The  narrative  is  full,  explicit,  unequivocal.  Now,  how  shall 
the  story  be  explained  "  critically  ? "  Strauss  ^  finds  in  it  a 
myth  growing  out  of  certain  Old  Testament  passages  like  Ps. 
cvii.  4-9 ;  1  Kings  xvii.  7  sqq.  ;  and  out  of  the  importance 
attached  by  Christ  and  the  early  Christians  to  the  breaking  of 
bread  in  common.  Keim  ^  finds  the  explanation  of  the  story  in 
Christ's  parable  of  the  sower,  which  (in  Matthew)  is  given 
in  the  preceding  chapter.  Scholten  *  refers  to  Jesus'  language 
in  Mark  vi.  34  ("  sheep  not  having  a  shepherd"),  and  says  that 
this  refers  to  spiritual  want,  —  a  want  which  was  supplied  by 
the  sermon  mentioned  in  the  same  verse.  He  gave  the  people 
the  "bread  of  life,"  —  a  phrase  which,  though  it  occurs  only 
in  the  Fourth  Gospel,  "Jesus  may  really  have  used."  And 
"hence  arose  the  symbolic  notion  of  the  miraculous  feeding  of 
thousands."  Paulus^  finds  in  the  story  nothing  but  the  simple 
fact  that  Jesus  persuaded  those  of  the  multitude  who  had  food 

^  By  the  exercise  of  a  violent  imagination  two  or  three  others  also  are  found 
in  all  the  four.  E. g.,  Keim  identifies  the  story  of  the  paralytic  in  Matt.  ix.  2 
sqq.,  Mark  ii.  3  xqq.,  Luke  v.  18  sqq.,  with  the  story  of  the  lame  man  in  John 
V.  5  sqq.,  thoug-h  the  locality,  the  disease,  the  cure,  and  the  accompanying  con- 
versation are  totally  different ! 

2  Lnhen  Jesu,  §  7*J.  *  Gesrh.  Jesu  v.  Nazara,  vol.  ii.  p.  133. 

*  L.C.,  p.  210.  Similarly  Ewald,  Geschichte  Christus'  und  seiner  Zeit,  p.  443, 
but  with  less  positiveness.  Also  E.  A.  Abbott,  Philochristus,  pp.  214  sq.; 
The  Kernel  and  the  Husk,  Letter  19. 

^  Leben  Jesu,  vol.  i.  pp.  349  sq. 


PROOF   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN   MIRACLES.  213 

to  impart  it  to  tliose  who  had  none.  Weisse  ^  discovers  the  key 
to  the  mysterious  narrative  in  the  conversation  between  Christ 
and  his  disciples  respecting  the  leaven  of  the  Pharisees  (Matt. 
xvi.  5-12 ;  Mark  viii.  14-21).  There  Christ  makes  direct  ref- 
erence to  the  two  miraculous  feedings,  and  yet  explicitly  says 
that  he  does  not  refer  to  bread,  but  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Pharisees.  Consequently,  Weisse  infers,  that  the  reference  to 
the  miraculous  feedings  is  nothing  but  an  allusion  to  a  discourse 
in  which  Jesus  had  used  figurative  language  respecting  bread 
which  the  disciples  had  understood  literally.  Weisse  is  so  sure 
of  the  correctness  of  this  explanation  that  he  thinks  it  must  be 
perfectly  convincing  "  to  every  one  whose  eyes  are  not  as  dull, 
or  whose  mind  is  not  as  hardened,  as  were  the  eyes  and  mind  of 
those  disciples  "  themselves.  Weizsacker  '^  conjectures  that  in 
some  way  not  narrated  Jesus  had  impressed  upon  his  hearers 
the  lesson  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  that  they  should  not 
be  anxious  about  food  and  clothing,  and  had  impressed  it  so 
powerfully  that  they  somehow  got  the  impression  of  a  miracle 
of  feeding,  though  it  was  in  fact  only  a  miracle  of  faith. 

Now,  without  a  special  examination  and  refutation  of  these 
and  other  such  would-be  scientific  explanations  of  this  miracle, 
we  may  be  content  with  simply  putting  them  side  by  side,  re- 
membering that  each  author  lays  down  his  explanation  as  the 
only  correct  one.  If  it  were  certain  that  the  narrative,  as  it 
stands,  must  be  regarded  as  false,  and  if  therefore  it  follows 
that  it  must  have  originated  from  some  misconception,  why, 
then,  of  course,  we  should  have  to  say  that,  though  not  all  of 
these  explanations  can  be  correct,  yet  perhaps  some  one  of  them 
is  correct.  But  if  we  assume  that  the  miracle  really  hap- 
pened as  related,  we  are  relieved  of  the  necessity  of  choosing 
between  these  various  conjectures  as  to  what  the  underlying 
fact  was. 

What,  then,  is  the  reason  why  this  miracle,^  so  strongly  at- 

^  Die  evangelische  Geschichfe,  vol.  i.  pp.  510  sqq. 

^  Untersuchungen  uber  die  evang.  Gesch.,  p.  449. 

*  As  we  do  not  undertake  a  minute  examination  of  tbe  several  miracles,  we 
refrain  from  discussing  the  question,  whether  the  second  miracle  of  feeding, 
recorded  by  Matthew  (xv.  32-39)  and  Mark  (viii.  1-9),  but  not  by  Luke  and 


214  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

tested,  is  so  reluctantly  admitted,  as  compared  with  the  narra- 
tives of  miraculous  healings  ?  The  only  explanation  is  that  the 
latter,  though  called  miraculous,  are  not  really  regarded  as  such. 
The  power  of  one  person  over  another,  both  in  mental  and 
physical  respects,  has  been  so  often  illustrated  in  actual  life  ; 
the  phenomena  of  remarkable  cures  wrought  apparently  by 
direct  physical  contact,  or  even  by  an  exertion  of  will  with- 
out physical  contact,  are  so  numerous  and  well  attested,^  that 
it  is  easy  to  believe  that  Jesus  may  have  been  one  of  those 
exceptionally  gifted  persons  who  possess  this  magnetic  heal- 
ing power.  Moreover,  the  miracles  of  healing,  according  to 
the  Evangelists  themselves,  far  outnumbered  all  others,  and  are 
often  mentioned  in  a  general  way  as  continually  performed  by 
Jesus ;  whereas  the  miracles  wrought  on  irrational  nature  are 
more  manifestly  rare  and  exceptional.  When  in  addition  to 
this  we  consider  how  little  accurate  scientific  knowledge  there 
could  have  been  in  those  days,  and  how  easily  such  cures  might 
have  been  magnified,  we  can  understand  the  plausibility  and 
fascination  of  a  theory  which  sharply  distinguishes  between 
effects  wrought  on  the  human  body  under  the  co-operating  in- 
fluence of  a  lively  hope  and  faith  on  the  part  of  the  invalid, 
and  effects  said  to  have  been  wrought  on  inanimate  nature.  In 
the  former  case  no  real  miracle  is  assumed  at  all.  The  effects, 
though  perhaps  startling,  are  yet  such  as  have  always  had  their 
counterparts.  And  even  if  one  holds  ^  that  Jesus'  healing 
power  was  proportioned  to  his  spiritual  pre-eminence,  and  was 

John,  is  not  really  the  same  as  the  first  in  a  somewhat  different  form.  Even 
if  we  should  assume  that  it  was,  the  assumption  would  not  invalidate  the  evi- 
dence of  the  reality  of  the  one  miracle,  but,  if  possible,  would  strengthen  it. 

1  Vide  Carpenter,  Mental  Phynolof/y,  §§  500,  569-571;  Tuke,  Influence  of 
the  Mind  upon  the  Body,  vol.  ii.  pp.  269  s^qq.;  Braid,  Neurypnology,  pp.  161  sqq. 

2  As  Weisse,  Bie  emngelische  Geschichte,  vol.  i.  pp.  366  sqq.  Weisse,  while 
strenuously  contending  against  the  reality  of  miracles  in  the  ordinary  sense, 
yet  retains  the  term  as  appropriately  designating  the  unique  works  of  Jesus. 
Lange  {Lehen  Jem,  vol.  ii.  p.  268)  expresses  a  notion  somewhat  like  this  of 
Weisse's.  The  miracles,  he  says,  "  constitute  the  twigs  of  a  tall,  strong  tree, 
and  appear  quite  simply  as  its  natural  expression,  its  works.  .  .  .  Should  not 
tlie  tree  of  life  of  this  new  aon  be  able  to  wear  this  crown  which  it  wears 
without  breaking  down,  ■ —  to  put  forth  these  blossoms  which  deck  it  out  of  its 
own  wealth  of  inward  life  ?  " 


PROOF   OF   THE   CHRISTIAN   MIRACLES.  215 

a  sort  of  physical  consequence  of  his  spiritual  gifts,  still  one 
can  avoid  admitting  any  miracle  in  the  proper  sense.  We 
admit,  in  such  a  case,  at  the  most  only  a  higher  degree,  not 
another  kind,  of  power  than  that  possessed  by  many  men  in  all 
ages. 

What  shall  we  say  to  this  ?  We  must  say,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  hypothesis,  just  mentioned,  that  a  physical  power  of 
healing  is  co-ordinate  with  spiritual  eminence,  is  a  pure  fiction 
without  the  shadow  of  foundation.  Neither  eminence  in  intel- 
lectual power  nor  eminence  in  piety  has  any  special  connection 
with  that  peculiar  power  over  disease  which  some  men  seem  to 
possess.  Else  we  should  find  Goethe,  the  intellectual  giant, 
and  Eichard  Baxter,  the  eminent  saint,  each  remarkable  for  his 
power  to  heal  the  sick.  But,  in  the  second  place,  if  Christ's 
healing  power  was  not  a  sort  of  natural  and  necessary  product 
of  spiritual  pre-eminence,  but  merely  a  faculty  in  which  he 
happened  to  surpass  the  most,  or  all,  of  those  who  have  had  a 
like  talent,  the  fact  loses  absolutely  all  significance  for  us,  ex- 
cept as  being  an  interesting  phenomenon  in  the  history  of 
medical  science.  We  cannot,  from  his  supereminent  success  as 
a  healer,  infer  his  supereminence  as  a  teacher,  still  less  his 
divine  appointment  to  bring  salvation.  The  healing  power,  on 
this  theory,  only  happens  to  be  associated  with  a  high  degree 
of  moral  worth,  but  in  itself  serves  no  religious  purpose  to  the 
world  whatsoever.  The  fact  of  it  is  believed  in  simply  because 
it  is  well  attested  and  is  not  intrinsically  difficult  to  believe. 
That  Jesus  by  his  cures  created  a  great  sensation  and  got  the 
name  of  a  miracle-worker,  may  also  readily  be  admitted ;  for 
such  cures  naturally  seem  to  the  ignorant  and  uninitiated  to  be 
real  miracles ;  but  the  fact  still  remains,  on  the  hypothesis  before 
us,  that  the  cures  were  not  miraculous,  but  were  really  nothing 
but  "  mind-cures  "  on  a  somewhat  grand  scale.^ 

^  This  is  substantially  the  view  of  Bishop  Temple  {Relations  between  Reli- 
gion and  Science,  p.  201)  :  "  It  is  quite  conceivable  that  many  of  his  miracles 
of  healing  may  have  been  the  result  of  this  power  of  mind  over  body.  .  .  . 
Some  can  influence  other  men's  bodies  more,  some  less.  Possibly  he  may  have 
possessed  this  power  absolutely  where  others  possessed  it  conditionally.  ...  If 


216  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

But  by  taking  this  view  of  Jesus  as  a  healer  we  not  only 
deny  to  the  cures  all  supernatural  character  and  all  religious 
significance,  but  we  even  imperil  faith  in  his  superior  morality. 
For  the  same  narratives  which  record  the  wonderful  cures  also 
give  us  to  understand  that  the  healing  power  was  a  divine  gift 
of  a  supernatural  sort.^  Christ  appealed  to  his  works  as  proofs 
of  his  divine  calling.^  In  case  now  his  cures  were  not  miraculous, 
but  were  only  the  result  of  a  fortunate  natural  endowment, 
then  he  can  hardly  be  acquitted  of  a  dishonest  use  of  his 
power,  if  he  himself  appealed  to  it  as  proof  of  his  Messiahship, 
or  if  he  even  allowed  others  to  derive  such  an  inference.  The 
wonderful  healings  thus  become  a  positively  embarassing  ele- 
ment in  his  history.  If  they  did  not  really  authenticate  him 
as  a  supernaturally  endowed  messenger  of  God,  but  were  only 
thought  to  do  so,  then  their  only  religious  use  was  a  deceptive 
one.  At  the  best,  in  this  case,  we  can  only  ascribe  to  him  the 
merit  of  having  used  his  power  benevolently.  But  far  better 
would  it  have  been  for  him  to  refrain  from  exercising  the 
power  at  all  than  to  gain  by  it  the  reputation  of  having  an 
authority  to  which  it  did  not  really  entitle  him.  Curing 
diseases  is  not  the  only  way  in  which  philanthropy  can  mani- 
fest itself.  He  could  have  shown  himself  to  be  full  of  love 
and  compassion,  to  be  a  comforter  and  helper,  in  many  ways 
besides  by  a  sudden  banishment  of  sickness  and  physical 
suffering.  If  the  essential  thing  was  to  make  himself  known 
as  a  spiritual  benefactor,  he  could  have  accomplished  the  end 
without  making  use  of  a  talent  which  he  himself  represented, 
or  at  least  allowed  to  be  understood,  as  a  proof  of  a  super- 
natural commission.  Unless  his  healing  power  really  was  such 
a  proof,  unless  it  was  a  supernatural  power,  the  physical  relief 
which  it  rendered  to  a  few  hundreds  of  his  contemporaries 
would  but  feebly  compensate  for  the  moral  injury  done  by 
gaining  a  reputation  under  false  pretenses. 

this  were  so,  these  acts  of  healing  would  not  be  miracles  in  the  strictly  scien- 
tific sense." 

^  E.g.,  Luke  xi.  20;  Mark  ii.  9, 10;  Matt.  xi.  5  ;  John  iii.  2;  Acts  ii.  22. 

2  Matt.  xi.  5. 


PROOF  OF  THE   CHRISTIAN   MIRACLES.  217 

Unless,  therefore,  the  would-be  philosophical  critic  means  to 
make  Jesus  a  mere  mesmerizer,  magician,  or  false  prophet, 
hardly  equal  to  the  wonderful  Apollonius  of  Tyana ;  ^  if  he 
really  means  to  set  him  forth  as  a  unique  reformer  and  bene- 
factor, or  even  as  an  inspired  Head  of  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
then  no  worse  means  to  attain  the  end  could  be  adopted  than 
to  reduce  his  miracles  to  nothing  but  effects  of  a  peculiar 
nervous  temperament,  or  of  a  secret  art,  such  as  many  another 
has  possessed  before  and  after  him.  Christ  is  by  such  a  process 
degraded  to  the  rank  of  an  impostor,  rather  than  honored  as  a 
chosen  Eevealer  of  the  divine  character  and  counsels.  It  is, 
therefore,  a  suicidal  criticism  which,  while  professing  to  be 
Christian,  yet  whittles  down  the  stories  of  miracles  till  nothing 
but  the  cures  is  left,  and  whittles  down  the  cures  till  nothing  is 
left  but  what  can  be  "  comprehended,"  that  is,  conceived  to  be 
accomplished  by  natural  means.  Thus  Weizsacker  ^  says  :  "It 
is  not  the  use  of  medical  means,  or  treatment  according  to 
medical  knowledge,  by  which  the  wonderful  successes  of  this 
healing  can  be  brought  within  the  law  of  nature.  It  is  rather 
the  peculiar  phenomenon  of  a  great  storm-like  excitement  of 
men's  minds,  which  is  reflected   in  these  effects  wrought  on 

1  On  whom  cf.  F.  C.  Baur,  Apollonius  von  Tyana  und  Christ  us  ;  J.  H.  New- 
man, Life  of  Apollonius  Tyaneus,  in  the  Encyclopedia  Metropolitana,  vol.  x. 

2  Untersuchunr/en  ilber  die  evang.  Oesch.,  p.  369.  The  ease  with  which  a 
tlieory  can  be  deduced  is  well  illustrated  by  Weizsacker.  The  theory  is  that 
the  work  of  healing  was  a  sort  of  accidental  consequence  of  the  excitement 
which  Jesus'  preaching  had  produced.  He  refers  to  the  narrative  in  Mark  i. 
21  sqq.,  and  finds  in  it  an  indication  that  a  general  commotion  had  been  pro- 
duced by  the  preaching,  and  that  the  excitement  manifested  itself  especially 
in  the  demoniac.  The  thought  of  acting  the  part  of  a  healer,  Weizsacker 
thinks,  did  not  occur  to  Jesus  till  after  the  demoniac  addressed  him.  Then 
"as  if  himself  carried  away  with  the  experience,  he  takes  without  hesitation 
the  hand  of  the  woman  sick  of  a  fever,  in  order  to  raise  her  up;  and  when  the 
others  bring  him  their  sick  he  cannot  do  otherwise  than  heal  them  "  (|).  365). 
The  Evangelist,  he  further  says,  has  "  involuntarily  shown,"  in  the  following 
narrative,  "  liow  Jesus  entered  upon  this  new  career  because  of  an  inward 
and  outward  compulsion  rather  than  intentionally  "  (p.  366).  We  shall  next 
be  informed,  perhaps,  that  the  whole  work  of  salvation  was  the  result  of  some 
fortunate  accident,  so  that  Jesus  will  seem  to  have  blundered  into  it  rather 
than  to  have  had  any  deliberate  and  conscious  plan  about  it. 


218  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

physical  life  and  its  diseases.  If  one  will  have  a  natural 
explanation  of  these  signs,  they  belong  to  the  realm  of  what 
faith  —  a  state  of  the  feelings  stirred  up  to  the  highest  pitch  — 
is  able  to  do  in  such  respects.  Even  if  this  effect  may  have 
surpassed  in  intensity  and  extent  everything  else  known  of  a 
similar  sort,  yet  it  is  not  absolutely  incomprehensible,  but  falls 
into  the  category  of  phenomena  which  repeat  themselves  in 
accordance  with  a  law." 

Now  such  speculations  may  seem  to  the  authors  of  them 
very  profound  and  satisfactory ;  but  in  reality  they  explain 
nothing,  and  create  greater  difficulties  than  they  remove.  A 
wonderful  cure  is  "  explained  "  just  as  truly  when  it  is  said  to 
have  been  effected  by  a  direct  intervention  of  supernatural 
power,  as  when  it  is  said  to  have  been  effected  by  the  use  of 
so-called  natural  means.  In  neither  case  can  we  follow  out  the 
connection  between  causes  and  effects  ;  in  both  cases  we  assume 
an  adequate  cause,  —  in  the  one  a  natural  cause,  in  the  other 
a  supernatural.  It  is  true  that  a  phenomenon  is  said  to  be 
scientifically  "explained"  when  it  is  associated  with  others 
which  have  similar  antecedents  and  consequents,  that  is,  when 
it  is  found  to  have  been  produced  by  a  force  which  acts  uni- 
formly and  regularly  under  like  circumstances.  But  just  so  a 
miraculous  event  is  "  explained,"  when  it  is  assumed  to  have 
been  produced  by  a  force  which  does  not  act  uniformly  and 
regularly,  but  exceptionally  and  for  an  extraordinary  reason. 
As  to  the  modus  operandi,  we  understand,  in  the  last  analysis, 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  It  is  a  simple  question  of  fact, 
to  be  decided  according  to  the  evidence,  whether  the  cures 
wrought  by  Jesus  belong  to  the  one  or.  to  the  other  of  these 
categories.  Those  who  are  determined  to  make  them  "com- 
prehensible "  by  making  them  natural  can  of  course  do  so  by 
a  sufficient  number  of  hypotheses  and  by  a  sufficient  manipu- 
lation of  the  records.  One  can  discover  the  "  original "  docu- 
ments by  judiciously  sifting  out  all  the  stories  of  marvels  that 
cannot  be  made  to  square  with  the  "  natural "  explanation  of  the 
events.  Not  only  miracles  wrought  on  inanimate  nature,  but  also 
the  cures  which  seem  too  difficult  to  be  effected  by  any  known 
natural  means,  —  such  as  the  healing  of  lepers,  the  sudden  gift 


PROOF   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  219 

of  sight  to  one  born  blind,  or  of  soundness  to  one  lame  from 
birth,  and,  especially,  the  raising  of  the  dead  to  life,  —  are 
"  scientifically  "  transferred  into  the  category  of  later  legendary 
accretions.  And  so,  as  genuine  history,  we  have  nothing  left 
which  may  not  find  its  parallel,  in  kind  at  least,  if  not  in 
degree,  in  events  which  take  place  in  all  ages. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  all  this  is  arbitrary  criticism,  and  plays 
into  the  hands  of  the  downright  disbeliever  in  Christianity. 
It  leads  almost  inevitably  to  the  frivolous  Eenan's  doctrine,  that 
Jesus  became  a  party  to  a  deception,  in  that  he  allowed  himself 
to  be  urged  on,  almost  in  spite  of  himself,  into  the  assumption 
of  powers  which  he  knew  to  be  natural,  but  which  he  allowed 
the  people  to  regard  as  supernatural  and  as  therefore  an  attest- 
ation of  his  divine  calling.  But  this  is  as  irreconcilable  with 
the  lofty  simplicity  of  Christ  as  it  is  with  the  uniform  assertions 
and  implications  of  the  Gospel  narratives.  The  works  of  healing, 
like  the  other  miglity  works,  were  outward  credentials  of  Jesus' 
supernatural  commission.  All  alike  were  included  by  Peter  on 
the  day  of  Pentecost  when  he  spoke  (Acts  ii.  22)  of  Jesus 
Christ  as  "  a  man  approved  of  God  by  mighty  works  and  won- 
ders and  signs  which  God  did  by  him."  And  what  Peter 
claimed  for  him,  Christ  claimed  for  himself,  when,  in  affirma- 
tion and  proof  of  his  Messiahship,  he  sent  back  the  messengers 
of  the  doubting  Baptist  with  the  reply  (Matt.  xi.  5.),  "  The  blind 
receive  their  sight,  and  the  lame  walk,  the  lepers  are  cleansed, 
and  the  deaf  hear,  and  the  dead  are  raised  up,  and  the  poor 
have  good  tidings  preached  to  them." 

In  general,  therefore,  the  miracles  ascribed  to  Christ  must 
be  regarded  as  real  miracles.  The  general  presumption  that  a 
special  revelation  must  be  authenticated  by  supernatural  mani- 
festations ;  the  particular  fact  of  Christ's  resurrection  ;  the 
impossibility  of  eliminating  the  accounts  of  miracles  from  the 
Gospels  by  any  fair  principles  of  criticism,  —  all  this  makes 
the  fact  of  Christ's  miraculous  works  practically  as  certain  as 
that  of  his  existence.     But  the  question  still  remains, 

III.  May  not  the  miraculous  stories  of  the  New  Testament 
be  critically  examined  ?  Must  we  accept  every  miraculous  story 
just  as  it  is  found  in  the  Gospels,  without  regard  to  its  partic- 


220  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

iilar  character,  use,  and  meaning  ?  Alleged  miracles  may  be, 
apparently  at  least,  useless  or  grotesque  or  even  hurtful.  If 
any  of  the  reputed  miracles  of  Christ  seem  to  be  of  this  sort, 
may  we  not,  for  any  such  reason,  question  their  genuineness  ? 
Or  if  the  narrative  of  the  miracle  appears,  according  to  internal 
or  external  indications,  to  be  of  doubtful  authenticity,  may  we 
not  at  least  hold  our  judgment  in  suspense  as  to  the  fact  of  its 
literal  occurrence  ? 

In  general  our  answer  must  be  an  affirmative  one.  For  we 
can  as  yet  make  no  assumptions  respecting  any  exceptional 
inspiration  and  infallibility  of  the  Biblical  records.  As  Profes- 
sor Ladd  well  says,^  "  The  record  cannot  of  itself  give  an  un- 
failing guaranty  to  the  miracle  it  records  without  being  itself 
a  kind  of  universal  miracle."  Our  argument  simply  assumes 
that  the  Biblical  history  shall  be  treated  with  the  same  fairness 
as  other  histories.  Criticism  cannot  be  denied  the  right  of 
questioning  the  origin  and  authenticity  of  the  New  Testament. 
The  results  of  criticism  must  be  reckoned  with,  in  coming  to  any 
legitimate  theory  of  inspiration.  We  only  insist  now  that,  the 
general  fact  of  the  occurrence  of  miracles  and  their  purpose  as 
signs  of  a  supernatural  commission  being  sufficiently  established, 
all  intrinsic  objections  to  the  miraculous  as  such  are  to  be  dis- 
missed. But  it  does  not  follow  that  every  alleged  miracle  is 
therefore  a  real  one.  And  among  the  grounds  for  believing  in 
the  genuineness  of  some  rather  than  in  that  of  others  are  the 
character  and  apparent  object  of  the  miracle  itself.  Albert 
Barnes  says  :  ^  "  It  is  a  striking  proof  of  his  [Jesus']  benevolence 
that  his  miracles  tended  directly  to  the  comfort  of  mankind. 
It  was  a  proof  of  goodness  added  to  the  direct  purpose  for  which 
his  miracles  were  wrought.  That  purpose  was  to  confirm  his 
divine  mission  ;  and  it  might  have  been  as  fully  done  by  split- 
ting rocks,  or  removing  mountains,  or  causing  water  to  run  up 
steep  hills,  as  by  any  other  display  of  power.  He  chose  to 
exhibit  the  proof  of  his  divine  power,  however,  in  such  a  way 
as  to  benefit  mankind."     Pressensd,  on  the  other  hand,  says :  ^ 

^  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  328. 

2  Comni.  on  Matt.  viii.  33. 

'  Jesus  Christ,  his  Times,  Life,  and  Work,  3d  ed.  p.  279. 


PROOF  OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  221 

"  Let  us,  first  of  all,  make  a  distinction  between  a  miracle  and 
a  prodigy.  A  prodigy  is  only  a  manifestation  of  power,  an  as- 
tonishing fact,  which  arrests  the  attention,  and  elicits  admiration 
and  amazement  quite  apart  from  its  moral  character.  Clearly 
it  has  no  religious  value  ;  it  appeals  to  the  eye,  and  not  to  the 
heart  and  conscience ;  it  cannot  serve  to  establish  either  a  divine 
mission  or  a  new  truth ;  for  evil  itself  may  have  extraordinary 
manifestations,  and  we  read  in  Scripture  of  prodigies  aiding  and 
abetting  error." 

Now  in  judging  between  these  opposing  views,  each  held  by 
a  firm  believer  in  the  reality  and  evidential  value  of  the  Chris- 
tian miracles,  we  cannot  do  better  than  to  ascertain  what  were 
Christ's  own  claims  and  representations  respecting  his  miracles. 
In  John  X.  32,  Jesus  says  to  the  Jews,  "  Many  good  works 
have  I  shewed  you  from  the  Father."  And  in  the  answer 
returned  to  John  the  Baptist  concerning  his  Messiahship  he 
enumerates  nothing  but  works  of  mercy,  the  climax  being  the 
preaching  of  good  tidings  to  the  poor.  Similarly  Peter  (Acts  x. 
38)  says  of  him  that  he  "  went  about  doing  good,  and  healing 
all  that  were  oppressed  of  the  devil ;  for  God  was  with  him." 
In  other  cases  (as,  for  example,  Luke  x.  13)  Christ  speaks  more 
generally  of  his  "  mighty  works  "  as  evidencing  his  commission. 
But  those  works  were  confessedly  almost  or  quite  all  benevolent 
works  ;  and  a  general  appeal  to  them  would  therefore  be  practi- 
cally an  appeal  to  "  good  works."  Manifestly,  stories  of  miracles 
of  malevolence  or  of  revenge,  such  as  abound  in  some  of  the 
apocryphal  Gospels,^  would  be  regarded  as  intrinsically  incredi- 
ble in  one  who  was  what  Jesus  is  represented  as  being.  But 
might  not  mere  prodigies  be  consistent  with  his  character? 
And  would  they  not  serve  as  proofs  of  his  claims  ?  What  we 
have  urged  above  would  indicate  a  negative  answer.  Mere 
prodigies,  unless  proceeding  from  one  already  well  authenticated 
as  a  messenger  from  God,  might  be  regarded  as  works  of  leger- 
demain or  of  the  devil.  But  in  the  case  of  one  whose  divine  com- 
mission is  already  established  by  miraculous  works  of  benevolence, 

^  Cf.  Cowper,  The  Apocryphal  Gonpels  ;  especially  the  Gospel  of  Pseudo- 
Matthew,  which  describes  the  child  Jesus  as  killing  his  playmates  by  a  word 
when  they  were  naughty. 


222  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

works  of  mere  miraculous  power,  expressive  of  no  character  and 
no  important  truth,  would  be  needless,  and  because  needless, 
suspicious.  They  would  seem  to  be  mere  ostentatious  displays, 
not  in  consonance  with  the  character  of  the  alleged  miracle- 
worker.  Accordingly  in  the  few  instances  in  which  the  re- 
ported miracles  of  Christ  seem  to  partake  of  the  character  of 
prodigies  no  one  can  be  content  to  regard  them  as  being  a  mere 
display  of  power.  For  example,  the  miraculous  draught  of  fishes 
(Luke  V.  1-11),  or,  still  more,  the  finding  of  a  coin  in  a  fish's 
mouth  (Matt.  xvii.  24-27),  is  usually  regarded  as  having  some 
other  object  than  a  mere  exhibition  of  miraculous  power.^  If 
no  other,  no  worthy,  use  or  meaning  could  be  found  in  them, 
that  would  of  itself  lead  one  to  wonder  whether  the  narrative 
could  be  fully  trusted.  If  Jesus  came  in  order  to  reveal  the 
grace  and  truth  of  God,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  his  works, 
as  well  as  his  words,  should  be  full  of  grace  and  truth.^  The 
miracles,  in  order  to  prove  the  teachings,  must  be  cognate  and 
consistent  with  the  teachings. 

While,  therefore,  we  deny  that  it  is  possible  for  criticism  to  do 
away  with  the  miraculous,  and  must  leave  the  Gospel  narra- 
tives substantially  as  they  are,  we  cannot  deny  one's  right  to 
question  the  accuracy  of  certain  particular  narratives  of  mir- 
acles, provided  there  are  especial  reasons  for  doubt.  If  to  any 
one  who  accepts  the  general  description  of  Jesus,  his  character, 
and  his  works,  as  truthful,  any  particular  narrative  seems  to  be 
irreconcilable  with  the  general  account,  and  seems,  besides,  to 
be  feebly  attested  or  inconsistent  with  other  certain  facts,  such 
a  one  cannot  be  charged  with  inexcusable  temerity,  if  he  hesi- 
tates to  give  unqualified  credence  to  the  narrative.  So  long  as 
tlie  particular  doubts  are  grounded  in  the  general  faith  itself, 
they  cannot  be  called  unchristian  doubts,  even  though  others 
may  deem  them  without  sufficient  warrant.  To  take  a  particu- 
lar instance :  may  one  doubt  the  miraculous  conception  of 
Jesus  Christ,  and  yet  retain  a  belief  in  the  New  Testament  nar- 
ratives of  miracles  in  general  ?     It  is  certain  that  many  do  take 

^  Cf.  Trencli,  No(es  on  the.  Miracles. 

^  Cf.  Bruce,  Chief  Etui  of  Revelation,  pp.  157  sq.  The  Miraculous  Element  in 
the  Gospels,  pp.  301-314. 


PROOF   OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  223 

this  position.  The  account  of  the  birth  is  given  in  two  narra- 
tives difficult  to  reconcile  with  one  another.  The  strict  Davidic 
descent  of  Jesus,  everywhere  assumed  in  the  New  Testament, 
seems  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  narratives.  John,  who  ought 
to  have  known  as  well  as  any  one  else  about  the  facts,  and 
whose  general  representation  of  Jesus  as  the  divine  Logos  made 
flesh  would  incline  bim  to  lay  stress  on  such  an  origin,  nowhere 
asserts  or  implies  it.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Paul.  The  rea- 
sons which  may  seem  to  tell  in  favor  of  an  incarnation  taking 
place  without  the  agency  of  a  human  father  may  equally  be 
urged  against  the  agency  of  a  human  mother.  Accordingly 
such  a  scholar  as  Meyer,  who  finds  no  difficulty  in  accepting 
the  miracles  in  general,  regards  the  stories  found  in  Matthew 
and  Luke  as  legendary. ^  Dorner,^  on  the  other  hand,  while  con- 
tending that  the  historic  record  is  presumptively  genuine  and 
authentic,  yet  does  not  depend  simply  on  the  ipse  dixit  of  the 
historian  for  the  proof  of  the  miracle,  but  brings  forward  rea- 
sons for  thinking  it  a  priori  probable  that  the  birth  was  mirac- 
ulous. There  is  a  possihility  of  an  early  admixture  of  legendary 
matter  in  the  evangelical  narratives.  On  the  other  hand,  no 
one  can  ever  prove  that  these  particular  narratives  are  legend- 
ary. To  the  most  the  narrative  of  the  miraculous  conception 
will  always  appear  to  be  in  excellent  harmony  with  the  general 
description  of  the  life,  character,  and  work  of  the  Messiah.  It 
will  doubtless  continue  to  be  believed  by  the  most  of  tliose  who 
hold  to  supernatural  Christianity  at  all.  But  there  will  always 
be  some  Christian  minds  to  whom  this  account  of  the  mi- 
raculous conception  will  seem  inherently  improbable.  A  still 
greater  number  probably  will  stumble  at  the  story  of  the  de- 
monized  swine  (Matt.  viii.  28-33),  and  of  the  cursing  of  the  bar- 
ren fig-tree  (Matt,  xxi,  18-20),  and  for  the  reason  that  they  do  not 
seem  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  general  character  and  ordinary 
miracles  of  Christ.  In  like  manner  the  story  of  the  rising  of 
the  saints  after  the  crucifixion  of  Christ,  told  only  by  Matthew 
(xxvii.  52,  53),  seems  to  many,  who  are  not  anti-supernatural- 
ists,  intrinsically  so  improbable  that  they  hesitate  to  believe  in 

1  Comm.  on  Matt.  i.  18,  and  Luke  i.  54f-56. 
^  Si/stem  of  Christian.  Doctrine,  §  105. 


224  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

its  literal  truth.^  Now  with  regard  to  these  and  a  few  other 
narratives  we  can  only  say  that  they  are  to  be  judged  like  the 
Biblical  history  in  general,  that  is,  are  to  be  condemned,  if  con- 
demned at  all,  not  because  they  narrate  miracles,  but  because 
they  tell  of  such  miracles,  or  because  for  other  reasons  the  nar- 
ratives appear  to  be  of  doubtful  authenticity. 

But  it  cannot  be  too  carefully  borne  in  mind  that  one  may 
easily  be  led  to  set  up  a  canon  which  is  not  warranted  by  the 
facts.  Thus  one  may  lay  it  down  as  a  fixed  rule  that,  because 
the  most  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  are  acts  of  kindness  to  the 
suffering,  therefore  no  acts  of  his  shall  be  conceded  to  be  mir- 
acles which  have  not  that  character.  What  right,  however, 
has  one  to  adopt  any  such  criterion  ?  Why  may  not  a  miracle 
serve  some  other  purpose  than  merely  to  render  physical  relief  ? 
Why  may  it  not  embody  a  spiritual  lesson  ?  So,  when  it  is  as- 
sumed that  the  miracles  cannot  operate  directly  upon  inanimate 
nature,  but  must  be  confined  to  the  realm  of  rational  beings, 
we  must  ask,  What  warrant  is  there  for  any  such  limitation  ? 
There  is  no  ground  for  such  an  assumption  which  would  not  in 
the  end  do  away  with  miracles  entirely.  It  is  more  plaus- 
ible when  it  is  declared  that  no  alleged  miracle  can  be  credited, 
if  it  involves  the  doing  of  positive  injury  rather  than  benefit. 
Yet  even  here  great  caution  is  needed.  All  that  we  can  as- 
suredly affirm  is  that  Jesus  could  not  have  belied  himself  in 
doing  his  mighty  works.  A  miracle  which  apparently  indi- 
cates malevolence  or  injustice  in  the  worker  of  it  may  really  in- 
dicate no  such  thing.  The  same  may  be  said  of  miracles  which 
seem  to  have  no  worthy  end,  or  no  recognizable  end  at  all.  To 
be  sure,  it  may  be  said,  with  Mr.  Barnes,  that  splitting  rocks  or 
making  water  run  up  hill,  even  if  it  had  no  other  purpose, 
would  serve  the  purpose  of  authenticating  the  spoken  message 
as  divine.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  such  prodigies  alone  would 
never  have  answered  the  end  of  effectually  authenticating  his 
divine  commission.  While  it  is  true  that  the  miracles  of  Christ 
did  serve  to  authenticate  his  mission,  the  whole  drift  and  tone  of 
the  history,  as  well  as  the  words  of  Christ  himself,  warrant  us 

1  Cf.  on  this,  Prof.  J.  H.  Thayer,  article  "  Saints  "  in  Am.  edition  of  Smith's 
Bible  Dictionary. 


PROOF  OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  225 

in  asserting  that  the  miracles  had  also  a  meaning  and  an  end 
apart  from  the  mere  purpose  of  authenticating  a  revelation. 
Gathering  from  the  history  itself  the  general  characteristics  of 
his  miracles,  we  may  properly  be  suspicious  of  a  particular  al- 
leged miracle,  if  it  plainli/  conflicts  with  those  general  character- 
istics. But  it  may  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  prove  such  a 
conflict  in  the  case  of  any  of  the  New  Testament  miracles. 

IV.  General  conclusion.  The  burden  of  the  foregoing  pages 
has  been  to  the  effect  that  the  supernatural  is  an  indispensable 
and  irremovable  part  and  proof  of  the  divinity  of  the  Christian 
religion.  It  has  not  been  claimed  that  miracles  as  such  are  the 
most  important  thhig  in  Christianity.  Men  are  not  saved  by 
belief  in  miracles,  but  by  belief  in  Christ.  The  great  thing  in 
the  Christian  life  is  not  a  correct  view  of  God's  relation  to  the 
physical  laws  of  the  universe,  but  a  correct  moral  relation  of 
man  towards  God.  The  vital  thing  is  a  readiness  to  welcome 
the  gift  of  salvation.  But  whom  shall  one  welcome  as  the  bearer 
of  the  gift  ?  Not  every  one  who  comes  forward  with  an  offer 
of  help  or  advice.  He  who  would  be  accepted  as  the  world's 
Eedeemer  must  bring  with  him  credentials  which  are  able  to 
convince  men  that  he  is  able  to  do  what  no  one  else  can 
do,  —  that  he  is  sent  by  God  to  accomplish  the  unique  work  of 
bringing  light  and  deliverance  to  a  world  lying  in  darkness 
and  bondage.  Such  an  exceptional  commission  requires  excep- 
tional attestation.  It  can  be  established  only  by  the  exhibi- 
tion of  extraordinary  credentials.  What  the  contemporaries  of 
Jesus  chiefly  needed  was  indeed  spiritual  deliverance  and  light. 
But  that  Jesus  was  the  one  appointed  of  God  to  bring  the 
needed  help  required  to  be  demonstrated,  as  it  was  demon- 
strated, by  his  manifestation  of  supernatural  power  and  super- 
natural gifts. 

And  what  was  true  at  the  outset  is  true  still.  Of  course 
there  is  a  certain  difference  between  the  impression  which  Jesus 
made  on  those  with  whom  he  walked  and  talked,  and  the  im- 
pression which  those  receive  who  learn  about  him  through  the 
medium  of  oral  and  written  tradition.  Still  the  picture  which 
we  receive  in  this  way  is  essentially  the  same  as  the  original, 

15 


226  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

though  seen,  as  it  were,  in  a  mirror.  The  same  proofs  which 
persuaded  the  first  disciples  are  valid  also  for  us,  though  they 
come  mediately.  There  are,  it  is  true,  subjective  proofs,  coming 
from  the  personal  experience  of  Christians,  —  the  witness  of  the 
Spirit ;  but  these  proofs  were  accorded  also  to  the  original  be- 
lievers. Our  assurance  that  these  experiences  are  not  subjec- 
tive illusions  comes  largely  from  the  confirmatory  experience 
of  the  apostles  and  of  the  succession  of  Christians  from  their 
day  to  ours.  What  we  lose  in  the  directness  and  vividness  of 
perception  we  gain  in  this  accumulation  of  Christian  experience. 
But  still  the  general  fact  remains  unchanged :  What  convinces 
us  must  be  the  same  as  what  convinced  Jesus'  immediate  fol- 
lowers. If  they  were  deceived  as  to  the  substance  of  their 
belief,  then  that  deception  runs  necessarily  all  through  the 
Christian  church.  If  they  were  rightly  convinced,  then  the 
grounds  of  their  conviction  are  of  permanent  validity.  And 
there  is  hardly  a  proposition  in  the  world  of  moral  and  his- 
torical truth  more  indisputable  than  that  the  first  Christians 
became  fully  convinced  of  Jesus'  Messiahship  only  as  they 
recognized  him  as  possessed  of  supernatural  qualities  and  su- 
pernatural powers,  and  as  supernaturally  accredited  by  miracu- 
lous works,  and  especially  by  his  miraculous  resurrection  from 
the  dead. 

If,  now,  the  rationalist  pleads  for  the  rights  of  reason,  and 
insists  that  nothing  can  be  believed  which  does  not  stand  the 
test  of  a  rational  investigation,  the  reply  is  that  the  Christian's 
reason  is  convinced  that  Jesus  Christ  was  supernaturally  com- 
missioned and  accredited,  and  that  faith  is  therefore  in  agree- 
ment with  reason  and  not  opposed  to  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  mystic  claims  that  he  has  an  immediate  spiritual  intuition 
of  the  divinity  of  Christ  and  of  his  work,  and  therefore  needs 
no  argument  from  miracles,  the  reply  is  that  a  historical  reve- 
lation cannot  be  detached  from  the  historical  evidence  of  it. 
If  each  individual  has,  or  thinks  he  has,  a  direct  revelation  of 
religious  truth,  then  the  local  and  historical  appearance  and 
work  of  Christ  on  the  earth  are  dwarfed  into  insignificance,  and 
revelation  becomes  practically  the  private  privilege  of  each 
individual. 


PROOF  OF  THE   CHRISTIAN  MIRACLES.  227 

Every  attempt  —  whether  of  the  rationalist  or  of  the  mystic  — 
to  attain  to  a  state  of  religious  assurance  thus  ends  in  a  sort 
of  assurance  which,  just  because  it  rests  primarily  on  a  merely 
individual  judgment  or  impression,  is  necessarily  affected  with 
insecurity.  Just  so  surely  as  religion  is  not  merely  a  matter  of 
individual  preference  or  caprice,  but  is  a  matter  which  produces 
a  social  life,  and  is  conditioned  by  it,  so  surely  must  the  grounds 
on  which  it  rests  be  such  as  can  satisfy  a  community,  and  not 
merely  an  uidividual.  The  evidences  of  Christianity,  then,  are 
the  evidences  which  produced  the  conviction  of  Jesus'  Messiah- 
ship  in  John,  Peter,  and  Paul,  and  all  the  original  disciples,  — 
evidences  handed  down  from  one  generation  to  another  in  the 
Christian  church,  but  confirmed  by  its  self-perpetuating  power, 
and  by  its  salutary  influence  on  the  world. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  this  important  difference 
between  us  and  the  first  Christians,  that  they  were  Jews,  and 
came  to  their  Christian  belief  through  the  medium  of  their 
Jewish  notions  and  expectations  ;  whereas  Gentiles  come  to  an 
acceptance  of  Christianity  by  an  entirely  different  process.  The 
Jews  were  looking  for  a  Messiah  who  should  give  them  national 
independence.  They  had  a  ceremonial  law  which  gave  a  pe- 
culiar shape  to  their  religious  conceptions.  Their  minds,  there- 
fore, must  have  come  to  the  consideration  of  Jesus'  character 
and  claims  otherwise  than  ours  do ;  they  must  have  been  moved 
by  different  arguments  from  those  which  are  decisive  with  us. 

What  shall  be  said  to  this  ?  It  is  certainly  true  that  the 
ordinary  Christian  now  does  not  have  to  go  through  the  process 
of  substituting  Christianity  for  Judaism.  It  is  true  that  the 
first  Gentile  Christians  also  came  into  the  Christian  faith  from 
a  different  environment  from  that  of  the  Jews  ;  they  came  out 
from  a  different  group  of  prepossessions ;  they  were  moved  by 
a  somewhat  different  kind  of  persuasion.  And  accordingly  the 
two  classes  of  Christians  were  at  the  outset  characterized  by 
different  phases.  The  work  of  amalgamating  them  into  one 
homogeneous  Christian  church  was  a  difficult  one.  Even  among 
the  apostles  there  was  at  first  a  diversity  of  view  and  feeling. 
So  much  must  be  conceded.    But  what  then  ?     Our  main  propo- 


228  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

sition  remains  still  unaffected.  The  Gentiles  were  converted 
through  the  preaching  of  the  Jewish  Christians.  Great  as  may 
have  been  the  difference  between  Gentile  and  Jew,  the  Gentile 
was  somehow  persuaded  by  the  Jew.  And  therefore  he  must 
have  been  persuaded  by  considerations  which  were  persuasive 
to  the  Jew.  Moreover,  the  Jewish  Christians  did  not  come  to 
their  faith  by  seeing  all  their  old  Jewish  prejudices  and  expec- 
tations confirmed  iu  Jesus.  On  the  contrary,  they  had  to  sur- 
render many  of  their  hopes  and  alter  many  of  their  conceptions, 
before  they  came  fully  to  recognize  in  him  the  real  IVIessiah. 
That  which  was  one-sidedly  and  narrowly  national  in  their  ex- 
pectations ;  that  which  was  crass  and  outward  in  their  religious 
notions,  —  this  had  to  be  abandoned.  With  the  acceptance  of 
Jesus  as  their  Eedeemer,  they  were  led  to  revise  and  spiritualize 
their  views  of  themselves  and  of  others.  That  which  decisively 
convinced  them  of  Jesus'  Messiahship  was  not  his  fulfilment 
of  exactly  what  they  had  understood  the  Old  Testament  to 
promise  them ;  it  was  rather  the  extraordinary  character  of 
Jesus  himself,  and  the  extraordinary  attestations  that  accom- 
panied his  person  and  work,  —  attestations  which  convinced 
them  of  his  divine  commission  and  authority.  Accordingly 
Peter  at  Jerusalem,  and  Paul  at  Athens,  while  they  adapted 
their  discourses  to  their  respective  audiences,  yet  both  preached 
Jesus'  resurrection  from  the  dead  as  the  decisive  proof  of  his 
being  God's  messenger  of  salvation. 

It  remains,  then,  an  evident  fact  that  the  Christian  world  has 
become  Christian  through  the  preaching  of  the  original  Jewish 
converts.  But  this  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  Judaism  as 
the  precursor  of  Christianity. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO   JUDAISM.  229 


CHAPTER    VIIL 

THE   KELATION   OF   CHRISTIANITY   TO   JUDAISM. 

IF  the  first  disciples  found  it  necessary  to  reconstruct  their 
religious  conceptions  when  they  received  Jesus  as  their 
Eedeemer,  does  it  not  follow  that  Christianity  is  substantially 
independent  of  Judaism,  —  no  more  an  offshoot  from  it  than 
it  is  from  the  nobler  forms  of  heathenism  ?  Christianity  being 
designed  for  all,  professing  to  be  the  fulfilment  of  all  true  reli- 
gious prophecies  and  hopes,  must  not  all  preceding  religions  be 
regarded  as  in  their  way  preparatory  to  it  ?  The  heathen  were 
not  without  much  true  light ;  and  in  their  philosophy,  morality, 
and  religion,  as  well  as  in  their  civilization,  they  produced  much 
that  is  of  abiding  value.^  Accordingly  the  early  Christians  who 
were  converted  from  among  the  Gentiles  were  fond  of  finding 
the  \6yo<i  a-TrepfiariKos  among  the  heathen  of  the  ante-Christian 
world.^ 

When,  however,  one  attempts  to  make  out  that  Christianity 
is  essentially  of  Aryan,  as  distinguished  from  Jewish,  origin,  as 
is  done  by  Emile  Burnouf,  it  is  manifest  that  the  attempt  must 
be  a  failure.  The  hypothesis,  itself  contradictory  to  all  the  pre- 
sumptions and  traditions,  is  fortified  by  another  equally  baseless 
one,  namely,  that  the  most  essential  features  of  Christianity  ex- 

^  Cf.  Dorner,  Christian  Doctrine,  §  65. 

^  Cf.  Jusliu  Martyr,  Apol.  I.  c.  46,  "  Those  who  lived  according  to  reason 
are  Christians,  even  though  accounted  atheists.  Such  among  the  Greeks  were 
Socrates  and  Heraclitus,  and  those  wlio  resembled  them."  So,  Apol.  II.  c  10, 
he  speaks  of  Christ  as  "  known  even  to  Socrates  in  part."  Similar  sentiments 
are  found  in  Clemens  Alexaudrinus ;  e.g.,  Stromata,  Book  I.  chap.  xix. ;  Book 
VI.  chap,  v.,  "  The  same  God  that  furnished  both  the  Covenants  was  the  giver 
of  Greek  philosophy  to  the  Greeks,  by  which  the  Almighty  is  glorified  among  the 
Greeks."  So  chap.  viii.  Cf.  also  Tertullian,  De  testimonio  animae,  and  Ad 
nationes,  chap.  iv.  For  parallels  between  the  writings  of  the  N.  T.  and  those 
of  the  heathen,  see  E.  Spiess,  Loc/os  Spermatikos. 


230  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

isted  at  first  only  as  a  "  secret  doctrine,"  communicated  by  Jesus 
to  Peter,  James,  and  John,  and  by  them  to  a  select  few,  and  so 
on,  till  after  the  conversion  of  Constantine,  when  the  secrecy 
was  fully  removed.^  This  esoteric  doctrine,  it  is  maintained 
with  a  great  array  of  learning,  came  from  the  Veda,  through  the 
Zendavesta,  the  prophet  Daniel,  a  select  few  among  the  Jews 
after  the  Babylonish  captivity,  the  Essenes,  and  the  Therapeu- 
tics, and  finally  was  taught  in  its  completeness  by  Jesus  to 
his  disciples,  but  only  secretly.  The  religion  being  essentially 
Aryan,  it  was  not  acceptable  to  most  of  the  Jews,  and  accord- 
ingly found  most  favor  among  the  Gentiles.  The  proof  of  all 
this  is  found  in  certain  striking  resemblances  existing  between 
the  sacred  books  and  symbols  of  the  Indians  and  Persians,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  those  of  the  Christian  church  on  the  other. 
And  all  through  the  discussion  there  runs  the  assumption  that 
religion  is  a  metaphysical  conception  culminating  in  the  institu- 
tion of  symbolic  rites.'-^ 

Now  that  Greek  philosophy  was  an  important  agent  in 
moulding  the  form  of  early  Christian  theology  need  not  be 
denied.^  And  all  through  the  Middle  Ages  and  up  to  the 
present  time,  doubtless,  may  be  traced  the  influence  of  that 
same  philosophy.  But  the  assertion  that  Christianity  not  only 
is,  in  its  real  essence,  nothing  but  a  metaphysical  speculation, 
but,  as  such,  was  handed  down  secretly  by  a  society  of  the 

^  Science  of  Religions,  cliap.  iv.  There  is  a  sublime  audacity  iu  Burnouf's  as- 
sertions which  would  be  almost  enough  to  carry  conviction,  were  it  not  that 
one  is  soon  puzzled  and  perplexed  by  his  obscurity  and  self-contradictions. 
Thus  at  one  time  he  gives  us  to  understand  that  this  esoteric  doctrine  was  kept 
among  the  initiated  until  the  time  of  Constantine  (p.  51)  ;  immediately  after- 
wards we  are  informed  that  Paul,  having  got  possession  of  the  secret  science, 
"preached  it  in  the  streets  and  on  the  housetops"  (p.  54).  Still  later  (p.  55) 
we  are  told  that  the  rise  of  heretical  doctrines  in  the  church  made  it  necessary 
to  "  divulge  altogether  the  last  concealed  formulas,"  and  this  was  done  by  the 
publication  of  the  Gospel  of  John,  which  appeared  between  160  and  170  a.  d. 
(p.  66).    After  this,  it  is  said,  the  secret  teaching  had  no  longer  a  raison  d'etre. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  168. 

'  A  truth  emphasized,  but  overworked,  by  Harnack  in  his  Bogmengeschichte. 
Hamack's  fundamental  point  of  view  is  quite  the  opposite  of  Burnouf's  ;  it 
is,  that  dogma  is  not  only  not  the  vital  thing  in  Christianity,  but,  properly 
speaking,  is  an  excrescence. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  231 

initiated,  coming  directly  through  Jesus,  not  from  the  Old 
Testament  but  from  the  Zendavesta,  —  this  sounds  almost  more 
like  a  joke  than  like  a  serious  proposition.  The  striking 
resemblances  which  may  be  found  between  the  Buddhistic 
and  the  Eoman  Catholic  ritual,  even  if  it  were  demonstrated 
that  the  latter  was  borrowed  from  the  former,  cannot 
prove  the  essential  dependence  of  Christianity  on  Buddhism, 
except  to  a  mind  which  can  find  in  Christianity  nothing 
more  than  a  metaphysical  theory  and  a  complicated  system 
of  rites. 

Jesus  Christ  was  a  Jew;  his  apostles  were  all  Jews.  He 
declared  himself  to  be  the  fulfilment  of  the  Jewish  prophecies 
and  of  the  hopes  of  pious  Jews.  The  Gentiles,  indeed,  were 
also  to  be  evangelized,  but  they  were  expected  to  accept  Jesus 
as  the  Messiah  promised  to  Israel,  and  to  acknowledge  the 
Mosaic  dispensation  as  the  chief  revelation  previously  made. 
The  Fourth  Gospel,  which  Burnouf  ^  pronounces  to  be  "  filled 
with  Aryan  ideas,"  no  less  than  the  others  represents  Jesus  as 
the  Messiah  of  the  Jews,  and  his  gospel  as  the  fulfilment  of 
Jewish  types  and  prophecies.'-^  The  Christian  Scriptures  recog- 
nize indeed  not  only  the  self-manifestation  of  God  in  nature 
(Kom.  i.  19,  20)  and  in  the  human  conscience  (ii.  14,  15), 
but  also  the  reality  of  earlier  revelations  than  the  Mosaic  and 
the  Abrahamic,  —  which  in  men  like  Melchizedek  and  Job  are 
represented  as  bearing  noble  fruit  among  the  Gentiles.  But 
nowhere  do  Christ  and  his  apostles  put  the  heathen  nations 
on  a  par  with  the  Jewish  race  as  the  recipients  of  divine 
revelations.  It  would  be  superfluous  to  refer  to  the  numerous 
passages  in  which  both  the  Evangelists,  and  Christ  as  reported 
by  them,  represent  the  Christian  revelation  as  the  completion 
of  the  Mosaic,  and  recognize  the  Jews  as  God's  chosen  people, 
and  the  Old  Testament  as  of  peculiar  divine  authority.  And 
if  we  undertake  to  break  the  force  of  these  representations  by 
assuming  that  the  Evangelists  have  misreported  Christ  under 
the   influence   of    their    Jewish    predilections,   then   we   must 

*  Science  of  Religions,  chap.  iv.  p.  55. 

2  John  i.  45,  49;  iv.  25,  26;  v.  39,  45-47;  xii.  13,  41;  xiii.  18;  xix.  24; 
XX.  9,  31. 


232  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

conclude  that  we  know  nothing  certainly  about  him  at  all. 
For  the  Evangelists  are  unanimous  in  giving  us  this  repre- 
sentation, and  there  is  absolutely  no  counter-evidence  by  which 
it  can  be  rectified. 

Stress  is  indeed  sometimes  laid  upon  the  difference  between 
the  Evangelists  and  the  Apostle  Paul,  he  being  regarded  as  less 
under  the  control  of  Jewish  conceptions  and  as  representing 
Christianity  in  its  more  universal  application.  ^  But  the  truth 
is  that  Paul  also,  while  he  does  emphasize  the  universality  of 
the  Christian  revelation,  and  teaches  more  distinctly  than  others 
that  the  Mosaic  law  was  superseded  by  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion, yet  recognizes  Christianity  as  an  offshoot  from  Judaism, 
and  as  a  fulfilment  of  Jewish  prophecy.  Jesus  is  to  him  the 
son  of  David  promised  by  the  prophets  (Eom.  i.  2,  3 ;  ix.  4,  5). 
He  speaks  of  the  Jews  as  especially  entrusted  with  the  oracles 
of  God  (iii.  2 ;  ix.  4),  and  of  Abraham  the  Hebrew  as  the  father 
of  the  faithful  (iv.  1-18 ;  Gal.  iii.  7).  To  the  Gentile  Christians 
he  speaks  of  the  Jews  as  the  good  olive  tree,  and  of  the  Gentile 
converts  as  wild  olive  branches  grafted  in  contrary  to  nature 
(Eom.  xi.  17-24).  To  the  Corinthians  he  speaks  of  the  Mosaic 
history  as  prefiguring  Christ  (1  Cor.  x.  1-4).  The  death  and 
resurrection  of  Christ  are  declared  by  him  to  be  a  fulfilment 
of  the  Jewish  Scriptures  (1  Cor.  xv.  3,  4).  The  Christian  dis- 
pensation is  represented  as  taking  the  place  of  the  IMosaic  (2 
Cor.  iii.  7-11).  The  Mosaic  law  is  recognized  by  him  as  a  tutor 
to  bring  men  to  Christ  (Gal.  iii.  24),  and  the  Abrahamic  covenant 
as  fulfilled  in  Christ  (iii.  14  s(j[q.).  However  true,  now,  it  may  be 
that  Paul,  more  clearly  than  the  other  apostles,  recognized  the 
universality  of  Christianity,  and  that  he  was  more  prompt  than 
they  to  give  up  the  outward  forms  of  Judaism  when  he  saw  the 
inward  spirit  of  it  fulfilled  in  Christ,  yet  none  the  less  true  is  it 
that  he,  like  the  others,  regarded  the  Hebrew  dispensation  as  a 
supernatural  revelation,  and  Christianity  as  organically  con- 
nected with  it  in  a  sense  which  could  not  be  affirmed  of  any 
other  religion.  There  is  essential  agreement  among  them  all. 
Jesus  and  all  his  apostles  looked  on  the  Christian  dispensation 

*  Thus  Pfleiderer,  Religionsphilosophie,  vol.  ii.  p.  197,  represents  it  as 
Paul's  great  work  to  detach  Christianity  from  Judaism. 


THE   EELATION  OF   CHKISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  233 

as  the  fruitage  and  fulfilment  of  the  Jewish,  while  they  also  all 
looked  on  it  as  a  gospel  for  all  men. 

Christianity,  therefore,  is  inextricably  blended  with  Judaism. 
An  assault  on  the  divine  authority  of  the  one  involves  an  assault 
on  that  of  the  other,  —  from  the  Christian  point  of  view  at  least. 
The  Jew  may  doubt  whether  Judaism  points  forward  to  Jesus 
of  Nazareth  and  the  religion  which  he  preached.  But  the 
Christian  cannot  doubt  that  Jesus  of  Nazareth  points  backward 
to  Isaiah,  David,  and  Moses. 

Or  may  it  be  thought  that  possibly  Jesus  was  to  be  trusted 
as  a  teacher  of  morality  and  religion,  but  fallible  in  his  concep- 
tion of  God's  relation  to  the  Jewish  people  ?  May  he  not  be 
implicitly  believed  in  what  he  says  about  himself  and  about 
general  spiritual  truth,  while  yet  he  shared  the  erroneous  notions 
of  his  countrymen  about  God's  special  choice  and  supernatural 
guidance  of  them  ?  But  this  is  a  futile  shift.  For  the  question 
is  not  concerning  certain  incidental  and  external  features  of  a 
revealed  religion ;  not  about  the  correctness  of  transcription,  the 
age  and  genuineness  of  certain  Biblical  books,  the  formation  of 
the  canon,  the  accuracy  of  subordinate  and  unimportant  stories 
in  the  older  records  ;  not  even  about  the  theory  of  types  or  of 
inspiration.  The  question  is  whether  Jesus  could  have  been 
what  he  claimed  to  be  as  the  Light  of  the  world,  and  yet  be 
radically  mistaken  when  he  represented  his  revelation  as  the 
fulfilment  of  the  Mosaic  economy,  when  he  represented  the  Old 
Testament  dispensation  as  possessing  a  divine  sanction,  the 
Jews  as  in  a  peculiar  sense  God's  chosen  people,  and  himself  as 
the  Messiah  prophesied  and  looked  for  by  the  Old  Testament 
saints.  And  the  answer  to  such  a  question  cannot  be  doubtful. 
It  is  simply  impossible  to  believe  that  a  man  could  erroneously 
suppose  God  to  have  supernaturally  revealed  himself  to  Moses 
and  the  prophets,  and  yet  be  himself  chosen  by  God  as  the  one 
authoritative  Eevealer  of  the  divine  will  and  love.  Moral 
superiority  may  indeed  co- exist  with  intellectual  imperfection  ; 
but  whoever  is  to  be  an  authoritative  revealer  of  divine  truth 
needs  some  other  qualification  than  mere  innocence  of  heart. 
If  Jesus  was  wrong  in  calling  Judaism  a  divine  revelation  pre- 
paratory to  his  own,  then  he  was  in  error  in  respect  to  the  very 


234  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

question  concerning  which  he  professed  to  be  able  to  speak  with 
infalhble  authority.  He  who  calls  that  a  revelation  which  is 
not  one,  is  not  the  man  to  communicate  a  true  one. 

This  is  the  general  fact.  Every  one  who  recognizes  the  reli- 
gious authority  of  Jesus  must  acknowledge  the  Mosaic  econ- 
omy to  be  in  some  emphatic  sense  a  divine  revelation,  and 
the  prophets  of  the  Old  Covenant  as  divinely  inspired.  But 
this  general  proposition  leaves  still  some  particular  questions 
open. 

1.  How  far  and  in  what  sense  did  Christ  regard  himself  and 
his  work  as  prophesied  by  Moses,  and  by  the  Hebrew  prophets 
and  psalmists  ?  That  he  represented  himself  as  foretold  or 
prefigured  in  some  sense  and  to  some  extent,  we  have  already 
seen  ;  and  this  lies  so  obviously  on  the  surface  of  the  New 
Testament  record  as  to  need  no  argument.  But  it  does  not 
follow  that  he  understood  the  Jewish  statesmen,  seers,  and  poets 
as  all  predicting  the  Christian  dispensation  with  minuteness,  or 
with  distinct  consciousness  of  the  time  and  exact  nature  of  the 
things  that  were  to  be  in  the  future.  There  is  another  course 
possible,  namely,  that  of  holding  that  in  many,  if  not  in  most, 
cases  the  alleged  prophecy  is  not  direct,  but  indirect ;  that  the 
Old  Testament  passage  is  not  so  much  ?i  foretelling  as  2,  fore- 
shadoiving  of  the  Christian  dispensation  ;  that  the  institutions, 
events,  and  prominent  personages  of  the  older  economy,  and 
likewise,  in  many  cases,  the  language  of  the  Old  Testament 
writers,  were  predictive  of  Christianity  in  the  sense  that  they 
were  tyincal  of  it,  but  not  necessarily  in  the  sense  that  the 
authors  of  the  Old  Testament  consciously  iiitended  any  direct 
reference  to  an  antitype,  or  to  a  fulfilment,  in  a  higher  sense, 
of  their  utterances.^ 

That  much  in  the  Old  Testament  was  typical  of  the  Christian 
dispensation  is  admitted  by  all  who  accept  the  New  Testament 
itself  as  authoritative.     The  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  sets  forth 

^  So  such  writers  as  Tholuck,  Bas  alte  Testament  im  neuen  Testament;  De- 
litzsch.  Commentary  on  the  Psalms  ;  Messianic  Prophecies  ;  P.  Fairbairn,  Typo- 
logy  of  Scripture;  Ladd,  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  pp  63  sqq.;  C.  A. 
Briggs,  Messianic  Prophecy,  \  19;  Riehni,  Messianic  Prophecy  ;  Perowne,  T/te 
Book  of  Psalms. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  235 

this  view  with  such  particularity  and  emphasis  that  no  one 
can  mistake  it.  But  this  does  not  answer  the  question,  how  far 
the  typical  interpretation  of  the  Old  Testament  is  to  be  carried. 
Shall  we,  with  Origen  and  his  followers,  find  an  allegorical  or 
spiritual  meaning,  or  even  numerous  such  meanings,  in  every 
part  of  the  Old  Testament  ?  Shall  there  be  unlimited  license 
given  to  the  imagination  in  searching  out  occult  analogies 
between  Old  Testament  history  and  the  facts  and  truths  of 
Christianity  ?  Or,  if  we  recoil  from  the  lawless  extravagances 
of  such  interpreters,  shall  we  go  to  the  opposite  extreme,  and 
deny  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  a  type  in  the  Old 
Testament,  more  than  in  profane  history  ?  Or,  if  we  do  not 
go  so  far  as  this,  shall  we  say  that  nothing  is  to  be  called 
typical  which  is  not  in  the  New  Testament  thus  designated  ? 
The  latter  view,  advocated  with  great  ability  by  such  men  as 
Bishop  Marsh  ^  and  Moses  Stuart,^  seems  to  be  the  simplest  and 
most  free  from  danger  of  abuse.  The  principle  they  lay  down 
is  very  plausible,  namely,  that  Biblical  language,  like  all  other 
language,  must  be  interpreted  according  to  the  laws  of  language ; 
that  what  a  man  says  or  writes  means  but  one  thing,  and  that 
that  thing  is  what  the  author  meant,  not  what  any  one  else 
may  arbitrarily  make  it  mean ;  that  if  we  admit  a  "  double 
sense "  as  characterizing  Scriptural  language,  we  may  as  well 
admit  a  hundred  senses,  and  are  amenable  to  no  law  of  interpre- 
tation but  our  own  will  and  caprice.  These  writers,  moreover, 
exclude  absolutely  all  language  from  the  domain  of  typology. 
"  Type,"  says  Professor  Stuart,  "  means  a  resemblance  of  two 
things,  not  an  occult  sense  of  words."  ^  Consequently,  every 
utterance  of  the  Old  Testament  writers  is  declared  to  be  either 
wholly  and  exclusively  prophetic,  or  not  prophetic  in  any  proper 
sense  at  all.  When  the  New  Testament  writers  quote,  as  if 
"referring  to  Christian  truths,  language  from  the  Old  Testament, 
which  evidently  was  not  meant  by  the  writer  as  prophetic  of 
Christianity,  then  this  is  called  a  mere  accommodation  or 
illustration.     The  Old    Testament  is  supposed  to  be  used  in 

*  Lectures  on  the  Criticism  and  Interpretation  of  the  Bible,  Cambridge,  1828. 
^  Hints  on  the  Interpretation  of  Propheci/,  2d  ed.,  New  York,  1851. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  33. 


236  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

such  a  case  merely  as  an  object  or  event  in  nature  or  secular 
history  might  be  used. 

It  is  just  here  that  the  weakness  of  this  view,  otherwise  so 
simple  and  plausible,  begins  to  appear.  The  New  Testament 
refers  in  precisely  the  same  way  to  different  parts  of  the  Old 
Testament  as  being  fulfilled.  For  example,  Christ  is  said  in 
John  xix.  28,  to  have  said,  "I  thirst,"  in  order  "that  the 
Scripture  might  be  fulfilled."  The  passage  referred  to  is  Ps. 
Ixix.  21.  On  the  other  hand,  Paul  says  (Acts  xiii.  33)  that  in 
Christ's  resurrection  "  God  hath  fulfilled  "  Ps.  ii.  7.  Now  any 
one  reading  these  two  New  Testament  passages  finds  no  dis- 
tinction indicated  as  to  the  sense  in  which  fulfilment  is  used 
in  the  two  cases.  Or  if  there  is  any,  it  would  seem  to  be  that 
greater  emphasis  lies  on  it  in  the  first  case ;  for  there  the  event 
narrated  is  said  to  have  taken  place  for  the  purpose  of  fulfilling 
the  prophetic  passage,  whereas  in  the  second  case  it  is  simply 
said  that  the  prophecy  was  fulfilled.  Nevertheless,  Professor 
Stuart  will  have  it  that  Ps.  ii.  is  a  purely  prophetic  psalm, 
meant  by  the  writer  to  refer  to  Christ  and  nothing  else; 
whereas  Ps.  Ixix.  he  declares  to  be  not  prophetic  in  any 
sense  and  not  meant  to  be  such  by  the  author.  Why  so  sharp  a 
distinction  ?  Simply  because  in  Ps.  Ixix.  5  the  author  confesses 
his  sins,  whereas  Christ  was  sinless  ;  consequently,  that  verse 
being  inapplicable  to  Christ,  none  of  the  psalm  can  refer  to 
him.  On  the  other  hand.  Psalms  ii.,  xvi.,  xxii.,  xlv.,  and  ex.  are 
pronounced  to  be  directly  Messianic,  because  of  certain  things 
in  them  which  are  regarded  as  not  applicable  to  the  author  or 
subject  of  the  psalm.  But  what  becomes  now  of  the  great 
hermeneutical  principle  with  which  he  starts  out?  That 
principle  is  that  the  Bible  must  be  interpreted  according  to 
the  usual  laws  of  language.  Now  no  application  of  that 
principle  can  be  more  obvious  than  that  when  a  man  says,  "  I 
do,  feel,  think,  hope,"  etc.,  he  means  himself,  unless  he  clearly 
indicates  that  he  is  putting  the  language  into  the  mouth  of 
another.  But  Ps.  xvi.  gives  no  such  indication  whatever.  It 
is  throughout,  to  all  appearance,  an  utterance  of  David's  per- 
sonal feelings  towards  God :  "  In  thee  do  /  put  my  trust.  .  .  • 
The  lines  are  fallen  unto  me  in  pleasant  places.  .  .  .     Therefore 


THE  RELATION  OF  CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  287 

my  heart  is  glad.  ...     For  thou  wilt  not  leave  my  soul  to 
Sheol,  neither  wilt  thou  suffer  thine  holy  one  to  see  corruption 
Now  hy  what  authority  does  Professor  Stuart,  m  defiance  of  all 
the  laws  of   language,  declare  that  David  here  is  not  g.vmg 
Utterance  to  his  own  feeliugs  at  all,  but  is  wntmg  prophetically 
whit  a  thousand  years  later  is  going  to  be  the  ht  expression  o 
the  feelings  of  Jesus  Christ?     It  is  true,  Peter  (Acts  „,2o-32 
and  Paul  (Acts  xiii.  34-37)  speak  of  a  part  of  this  psalu   as 
"ifilled  in  Christ's  resurrection.'     But  so  they  speak  o    other 
passages  as  fulfilled  which  Professor  Stuart  will  not  allow  to 
be  prophetic  at  all.     If   the   New  Testament,  assumed  to  be 
infallibly  inspired,  gave  us  some  criterion  by  -»-h  ^  -"'^ 
infallibly  tell  when  it  is  quoting  a  strict  prophecy  and  when 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  only  quoting  illustratively,  the  case 
would  be  comparatively  clear.     But  no  rule  is  laid  down  or  even 
su^oested.    The  reader  is  obliged  to  exercise  his  own  judgment. 

°Now  that  there  is  a  distinction  to  be  made  between  passages 
that  are  directly  prophetic  of  the  Messiah  and  those  which  are 
only  indirectly  prophetic  of  him,  cannot  be  denied.  In  luterpret- 
m<,  the  Old  Testament  we  must  use  our  common  sense,  and  do  no 
violence  to  the  laws  of  language.  So  far  we  go  witlr  Marsh 
and  Stuart.  But  just  because  we  do  so,  we  insist  that  when 
the  New  Testament  writers  speak  about  fulfilment,  they  mean 
fulfilment,  if  not  always  in  precisely  the  same  sense,  yet  m  a 

1  It  ischiefiy  0,1  the  ground  of  these  passages,  that  Stuart,  in  a  speeial  Uler- 

prelaL  of  pLn.  («<^K»'  R^fontor,,  vol.  i.),  declares  that  .,e  whole  psaln, 

'„:    be  treated  as  referring  exclnsivel,  to  Chris,;  for  Peter  and  P.u  no     n  , 

speak  of  the  psalm  as  fuWlled  in  Christ,  bnt  seem  to  afBrm    hat  it  does  not  hold 

rue  of  Davil  beeausehe  had  died  and  seen  corrnption.    Tins  soun  s  pl.usd,^; 

but  Paul  (1  Cor.  ix.  9, 10).  in  quoting  Dent.  x.v.  i,  even  more  empta,e.all,  de- 

nte  the  primary  and  obvious  sense  of  the  eommand,  not  to  murfe   he  ox  when 

he  stJ^-es^f  "Is  ittorthe  oxen  that  God  eareth.orsaith  he  it  altogether  for 

n    s*  e»    Yea,  for  our  sake  it  was  written."     Bui  must  we  real,  eonelnde 

h^  God  does  ;ot  care  for  oxen  >  or  that  the  Mosaic  contmand     »d  no      , 

enee  to  oxen?    The  truth  is  that  Ps.  xvi.,  risnig  above  the  ordmary  U.  1. 

"eiors  pictures  the  author  as  being  delivered  from  ^ea.h,  as  not  b«ng 

given  over  to  Sheol,  but  as  enjoying  in  God's  presence  P'--^  ^  "«•    JJ  ' 

deliverance  from  the  power  of  death  in  the  strictest  sense  ,stu  filled  m  Jesus 

butwas  true  of  the  Psalmist  iu  the  same  sense  that  Jesus'  declaration  m  John 

xi.  26  is  true  of  tlie  believer. 


238  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

real  and  honest  sense.  If  thej  treat  as  Messianic  Ps.  xl., 
which  seems  to  refer  directly  only  to  the  writer,  so  also  do  they 
treat  as  Messianic  Ps.  xvi.,  which  also  seems  to  refer  only  to  the 
writer.  According  to  the  laws  of  language,  we  naturally  should 
treat  the  two  cases  alike,  and  declare  that  in  either  case  the  pri- 
mary reference  was  really  to  the  author.  No  one  would  think 
of  any  other  reference  but  for  the  use  which  the  New  Testament 
makes  of  these  psalms. 

If  now,  in  deference  to  this  New  Testament  application  of 
such  Old  Testament  passages,  we  modify  what  would  be  other- 
wise our  understanding  of  these  passages,  then  our  only  rule  of 
interpretation  must  be  one  which,  while  not  conflicting  with  a 
sensible  view  of  the  Old  Testament,  is  in  harmony  with  the 
general  drift  of  the  New  Testament.  A  blind  and  narrow  fol- 
lowing of  the  New  Testament  might  lead  to  the  extreme  of 
calling  only  such  Old  Testament  passages  Messianic  as  are 
quoted  as  Messianic  in  the  New  Testament,  even  though  the 
immediate  context  of  the  quoted  passages  is  manifestly  not  Mes- 
sianic. To  this  extreme  William  Whiston  had  the  hardihood  to 
go,  when  ^  he  said  respecting  Hos.  xi.  1  as  used  by  Matthew 
(ii.  15)  that  this  passage  "is  not  only  most  exactly  suitable  in 
every  word  and  expression  to  the  Messias  in  particular,  more 
properly  than  to  the  people  of  Israel  in  general  of  old  time,  but 
is  also  a  prediction  by  itself,  having  no  visible  connection  or 
coherence  either  with  what  went  before,  or  what  follows  after 
in  that  book,  and  so  was,  I  believe,  a  distinct  prophecy  con- 
cerning the  Messias  inserted  into  this  coherence  of  the  prophet, 
though  it  did  not  properly  belong  at  all  to  it."  But  to  this  ex- 
treme no  one  can  go  without  abandoning  all  common  sense; 
and  Stuart  well  observes  that  "  but  little  danger  to  the  churches 

1  In  his  Acromplishme?tf,  of  Scripture  Prophecies,  p.  52  (170S).  So  Wliiston 
regards  Ps.  Ixxviii.  2,  quoted  in  Matt.  xiii.  35,  as  out  of  place  in  the  psahn, 
and  as  directly  applicable  to  Christ.  In  other  cases,  however,  he  loses 
courage,  and  resorts  to  the  view  that  the  Old  Testament  passage  is  no  proph- 
ecy at  all,  but  1%  fulfilled  as  any  poetic  description  may  be  said  to  be  fuKillcd 
when  sometliiiig  analogous  occurs.  So  he  treats  Jer.  xxxi.  15,  as  referred  to 
in  Matt.  ii.  17,  18.  Dean  Burgon  {Inspiration  mtd  Interpretation,  pp.  191  s(j.) 
almost  rivals  Whiston,  in  what  he  says  of  Paul's  use  (Rom.  x.  6-9)  of  Deut. 
XXX.  11-14. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO   JUDAISM.  239 

can  ever  arise  from  such  an  error."  ^  But  it  is  only  one  step 
short  of  this  extreme  when  Stuart  himself  lays  down  the 
principle  that  only  just  those  passages  which  are  quoted  as 
typical  or  prophetic  of  Christ  must  he  treated  as  such,  and  even 
with  regard  to  these  exercises  the  right  of  making  a  broad  dis- 
tinction between  the  different  Old  Testament  passages  such  as 
the  New  Testament  neither  warrants  nor  hints  at. 

What  then  are  the  decisive  objections  to  this  hermeneutical 
principle  of  JNIarsh  and  Stuart  ?  They  are  these :  (1)  It  requires 
us  to  adopt  a  most  mechanical  rule  in  deciding  what  is  typical 
in  the  Old  Testament.  It  assumes  that  the  New  Testament 
authors  have  given  an  exhaustive  catalogue  of  the  types,  when 
nothing  can  be  clearer  than  that  they  undertook  to  do  no  such 
thing.  Incidentally  Christ  and  his  apostles  have  referred  to 
certain  persons  and  events  as  signs  or  foretokens  of  the  Messiah 
or  of  the  Messianic  dispensation.  Jonah,  David,  Melchizedek, 
Sarah,  and  Hagar  ;  the  exodus  from  Egypt  and  the  passover,  the 
serpent  lifted  up  in  the  wilderness,  the  preservation  of  Noah,  — 
these  2  and  a  few  other  events  and  persons  are  spoken  of  as  if 
they  in  some  way  foreshadowed  corresponding  events  and  per- 
sons in  the  Messianic  dispensation.  No  man  can  understand 
why  just  these  and  no  other  objects  sliould  be  pronounced  typi- 
cal, —  why  Jonah,  Sarah,  and  Hagar  should  be  found  so  much 
more  significant  than  Joseph,  Joshua,  Gideon,  and  Samuel.^ 
We  might  indeed,  if  necessary,  be  content  to  accept  the  types 
specified  in  the  New  Testament  as  absolutely  the  only  ones ; 
but  why  is  it  necessary  ?  In  speaking  of  certain  things  as  typi- 
cal, do  the  New  Testament  writers  affirm  that  other  things  not 
spoken  of  are  not  typical  ?  Do  they  profess  to  give  an  exact 
and  complete  list  of  the  types  and  symbols  of  the  Mosaic  econ- 
omy ?  Certainly  not.  Well  then,  the  natural  inference  would 
seem  to  be  that  there  are  other  types  than  those  that  are  men- 
tioned, rather  than  that  there  are  not.  But  more  than  this,  (2) 
there  are  certain  general  statements  respecting  the  Old  Testament 

1  Hints,  etc.,  p.  13. 

2  Cf.  Matt.  xii.  40 ;  Luke  i.  32  ;  Heb.  vii.;  Gal.  iv.  22-25  ;  Matt.  ii.  15 ;  1 
Cor.  V.  7;  John  iii.  14. 

8  Cf.  Tairbairn,  Typology,  etc.,  p.  42. 


240  SUPERNATUR^VL   REVELATION, 

whicli  directly  assert  that  its  typical  significance  is  not  limited 
to  some  few  isolated  things.  They  are  such  as  these  :  Christ 
says  (John  v.  39)  of  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures,  "  These  are 
they  which  bear  witness  of  me."  And  to  the  two  disciples  at 
Emmaus  he  "  expounded  in  all  the  Scriptures  the  things  con- 
cerning himself ; "  and  to  the  apostles  he  said :  "  These  are  my 
words  which  I  spake  unto  you,  while  I  was  yet  with  you,  how 
that  all  things  must  needs  be  fullfiled,  which  are  written  in 
the  law  of  Moses,  and  the  prophets,  and  the  psalms  concerning 
me  "  (Luke  xxiv.  27,  44).^  When  we  compare  with  this  his 
statement  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  (Matt.  v.  17)  :  "  Think 
not  that  I  am  come  to  destroy  the  law  or  the  prophets ;  I  am 
not  come  to  destroy,  but  to  fulfil,"  it  is  obvious  that  he  con- 
ceived of  the  Old  Testament  in  general  as  prophetic  of  him,  — 
as  something  which  it  was  his  mission  to  fulfil.  In  perfect  ac- 
cordance with  this  are  general  statements  like  these :  In  Col. 
ii.  16,  Paul  speaks  of  the  ceremonial  ordinances  in  general  as 
"a  shadow  of  the  things  to  come."  So  in  Heb.  x.  1,  the  law  in 
general  is  said  to  have  "a  shadow  of  the  good  things  to  come, 
not  the  very  image  of  the  things."  In  viii.  5,  the  priests  are 
said  to  "  serve  that  which  is  a  copy  and  shadow  of  the  heavenly 
things."  Now  these  general  and  sweeping  declarations  not 
only  allow,  but  require,  us  to  understand  more  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament as  prophetic  of  Christ  than  the  comparatively  few  pas- 
sages which  happen  to  be  referred  to  by  the  New  Testament 
writers.  Moreover,  these  declarations  show  that  Christ  and 
his  apostles  regard  the  Mosaic  dispensation  as  having  a  real  and 
designed  reference  to  the  Christian  dispensation,  so  that  the 
former  is  "  fulfilled  "  in  no  such  loose  sense  as  may  be  applied  to 
any  observed  resemblance  between  any  event  and  any  preceding 
one;  but  that  the  connection  is  organic  and  divinely  consti- 
tuted. Not  otherwise  can  we  understand  the  frequent  state- 
ments respecting  the  necessity  of  the  fulfilment.^ 

But  still  it  may  be  urged  that  all  this  can  properly  be  ap- 
plied only  to  institutions,  to  things,  or  at  the  most  to  persons, 

1  Cf.  Acts  iii.  24. 

2  Matt.  xxvi.  54-56;  Mark  xiv.  49;  Luke  xxi.  22;  Jolm  xix.  28;  Acts  i. 
16,  xvii.  3. 


THE   RELATION   OF  CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  241 

but  cannot  be  applied  to  language.  But  why  not?  Certain 
persons  are  unquestionably  treated  as  types.  Adam  (Rom.  v. 
14),  Melchizedek  (Heb.  vii.),  Jonah  (Matt.  xii.  40),  and  David 
(Acts  xiii.  34-36)  are  certainly  called  types  of  Christ.  Elijah 
(Mark  ix.  13)  is  called  a  type  of  John  the  Baptist.  But  what 
is  a  person  ?  Not  the  material  body  merely.  If  David  pre- 
figured Christ,  it  must  have  been  by  virtue  of  his  mind  and 
character.  The  type  consisted  in  part,  no  doubt,  in  the  resem- 
blance as  to  office.  King  David  typified  the  Head  of  the  King- 
dom of  heaven.  But  David,  rather  than  another  king,  was  a 
type  of  Christ  because  he  was  such  a  king,  —  a  man  after  God's 
own  heart.  If  so,  if  David  prefigured  Christ  by  virtue  of  what 
was  ideal  in  his  kingly  character,  then  it  follows  necessarily 
that  David's  utterances  are  typical  also ;  for  words  are  the 
expression  of  the  inmost  nature. 

We  need,  therefore,  not  be  troubled  by  the  bugbear  of  a 
"double  sense."  What  David  wrote  about  himself,  he  wrote 
about  himself ;  and  he  had  no  second  sense  in  mind,  as  an 
occult  meaning  different  from  the  primary  and  obvious  mean- 
ing. But  in  so  far  as  he  himself  foreshadowed  his  "  greater 
Son,"  those  psalms  which  were  the  outgush  of  his  deepest 
thoughts  and  feelings  were  also  a  shadow  of  the  inward  ex- 
periences of  Jesus  Christ.  When  the  psalmist  ^  uttered  the 
cry,  "  My  God,  my  God,  why  hast  thou  forsaken  me  ? "  he  gave 
utterance,  doubtless,  to  his  own  feelings  alone.  There  was  no 
double  sense  in  which  he  palters  with  us.  But  when  Christ 
used  the  same  language  on  the  cross,  he  appropriated  it  to  the 
expression  of  his  own  feeling.  There  is  no  double  sense  in  the 
words  any  more  than  when  any  pious  Christian  appropriates  to 
himself  the  language  of  a  hymn  which  may  in  like  manner 
have  served  as  the  medium  for  the  outpouring  of  the  senti- 
ments  of   ten  thousand   others  before  him.^      The    shades  of 

^  Ps.  xxii.  1.  We  do  not  need  to  assume  the  correctness  of  the  ascription 
of  the  psalm  to  David,  in  order  to  the  validity  of  our  argument.  It  is  equally 
valid,  if  some  other  pious  sufferer  was  a  type  of  Christ,  even  though  unknown 
by  name. 

*  Not  that  we  mean  that  in  the  latter  case  there  is  a  topical  relation,  as  in 
the  other. 

IG 


242  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

experience  and  conception  may  be  extremely  various  which  are 
yet  voiced  by  the  one  product  of  a  poet's  inspiration. 

We  do  not  need  here  to  consider  in  detail  the  question,  how- 
far  divine  inspiration  may  in  some  cases  have  carried  the  writer 
beyond  himself,  as  it  were,  so  that  his  language  most  appro- 
priately describes  something  higher  than  himself.  This  would 
give  us  what  Delitzsch^  calls  a  typico-prophetical  utterance. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  to  decide  the  cases  in  which  it  is  disputed 
whether  the  psalmist  or  prophet  is  uttering  a  directly  Mes- 
sianic prophecy.  In  general,  this  is  a  question  of  exegesis,  to 
be  decided  according  to  the  preponderance  of  evidence. 

When  we  have  once  found  that  the  typical  interpretation  of 
many  passages  is  allowable,  and  that  such  passages  are  quoted 
as  genuinely  prophetic  of  the  IMessiah,  we  are  relieved  of  all 
temptation  to  strain  the  natural  and  obvious  meaning  of  the 
original.  Many  passages  are  directly  prophetic  of  the  Messiah 
to  come,  as,  for  example,  Isa.  ix.  1-7,  Joel  ii.  28-32,  Micah  v. 
2-5,  Zech.  ix.  9,  10,  and  probably  such  Psalms  as  Ps.  ii.,  Ixxii., 
cx.'-^  But  with  reference  to  these  it  may  be  a  question  how  far 
the  writers  in  their  conception  of  the  Messianic  times  and  per- 
sons were  influenced  by  local  and  Jewish  prepossessions,  which 
have  left  their  trace  on  the  form  of  the  prophetic  forecast. 
These  and  other  kindred  questions  must  be  left  to  the  exegete, 
who  has  to  judge,  according  to  the  best  light  he  can  gain  from 
all  sources,  what  was  in  the  mind  of  the  writer. 

The  general  truth  then  remains,  with  which  we  set  out,  that, 
according  to  Christ  (and  in  this  we  may  fairly  regard  his  dis- 
ciples as  substantially  at  one  with  him),  the  Old  Testament  in 
general  is  prophetic  of  him  and  his  work.  Whether  prophets 
were  moved  to  anticipate  and  describe  a  future  King  who 
should  bring  deliverance,  peace,  prosperity,  and  piety  to  his 
people ;  or  whether  the  pious,  unconsciously  to  themselves,  but 

1  Comm.  on  the  Psalms,  Clark's  Eoreign  Theol.  Library,  p.  69. 

2  111  the  looser  sense  of  "  Messianic  "  those  Psalms  may  also  be  so  desig- 
nated which  picture  a  future  triumph  of  God's  kingdom.  So,  e.  g.,  Ps.  xviii., 
xxiv.,  Ixvii.,  Ixviii.,  Ixxvi.,  Ixxxiii.  The  case  of  Ps.  Ixxii.  is  particularly  in- 
structive. Scarcely  any  of  the  Psalms  bears  more  decided  internal  marks  of 
being  genuinely  Messianic,  and  has  been  more  uniformly  treated  as  such ;  yet 
it  is  nowhere  quoted  in  the  New  Testament  at  all. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO   JUDAISM.  243 

really  in  the  divine  intention,  prefigured  in  their  lives  and 
utterances  the  person  and  experience  of  the  Messiah  to 
come,  —  in  either  case  the  Old  Testament  has  upon  it  the 
seal  of  divinity ;  it  is  authoritatively  declared  to  be  a  divine 
revelation. 

2.  Another  question  is :  How  far  can  Old  Testament  prophecy 
be  used  as  an  argument  for  the  divinity  of  the  Mosaic  and  the 
Christian  dispensations  ?  By  many  this  argument  is  regarded 
as  of  the  first  importance.  The  Old  Testament  prophecies  may 
be  divided  into  three  general  classes :  those  which  indirectly 
or  typically  prophesy  the  Messiah  ;  those  which  directly  pre- 
announce  the  coming  of  the  Messiah ;  and  those  which  relate 
to  other  topics.  The  latter  are  of  various  sorts.  A  large  num- 
ber of  them  consist  of  predictions  respecting  the  heathen  na- 
tions. Others  concern  individuals  among  the  Jews,  or  relate 
to  the  Jews  in  general. 

Now  it  is  manifest  that  the  first  class,  the  typical  prophe- 
cies, can  of  themselves  furnish  little  or  no  proof  of  a  divine 
revelation.  A  type  is  something  having  a  designed  resemblance 
to  something  else;  but  resemblances  real  or  imaginary  are  so 
numerous  and  so  easy  to  find  in  the  world  that  they  prove  no 
supernatural  agency.  It  is  only  as  we  assume  the  fact  of  the 
New  Testament  revelation  that  we  come  to  believe  in  the 
typology  of  the  Old  Testament.  We  believe  that  such  and 
such  institutions  or  features  of  the  Mosaic  economy  typify 
something  corresponding  in  the  Christian  economy,  simply 
because  we  already  regard  Christianity  as  a  divine  revelation, 
and  therefore  believe  the  Christian  Scriptures  when  they  affirm 
the  typical  character  of  certain  things.  The  types  and  typical 
prophecies  can  at  the  best  serve  an  apolegetic  purpose  only  by 
confirming  what  is  already  regarded  as  established. 

But  when  we  come  to  consider  the  other  two  classes  of 
prophecies,  the  case  is  different.  If  future  events  have  been 
minutely  foretold  hundreds  or  even  thousands  of  years  before 
they  took  place,  then  such  a  fact  seems  to  be  a  demonstration 
of  divine  inspiration  such  as  cannot  be  gainsaid.  No  one  but 
God  can  surely  predict  the  future.  ]\Ien  may  sometimes 
shrewdly  conjecture,  from  what  is  and  has  been,  what  is  about 


244  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

to  be.  Where  a  known  series  of  causes  is  in  operation,  one 
can  to  some  extent  anticipate  future  developments.  As  an  as- 
tronomer can  foretell  eclipses,  assuming  the  continuance  of 
astronomic  forces,  so  an  acute  observer  of  social  and  political 
life,  in  so  far  as  he  perceives  the  forces  that  are  operating 
among  men,  may  make  forecasts  concerning  the  future  which 
may  often  have  almost  the  appearance  of  supernatural  knowl- 
edge. There  are  also  instances  of  clairvoyance  —  a  faculty  quite 
unlike  the  reflective  judgment  just  spoken  of  —  by  which  some 
persons  appear  to  be  able  to  foresee,  by  a  sort  of  direct  vision, 
things  that  are  yet  future  and  quite  beyond  the  apprehension 
of  others.^  But  anything  like  an  accurate  and  detailed  por- 
traiture of  historical  events  and  personages  given  centuries  be- 
fore their  appearance  would  universally  be  regarded  as  beyond' 
the  power  of  man,  and,  if  correct,  would  be  held  by  all  to  be 
a  supernatural  feat.  Accordingly,  the  prophecies  of  Scripture 
are  by  many  regarded  as  a  more  effective  weapon  than  miracles 
to  use  against  unbelief.  And  undoubtedly  they  would  be  such, 
were  they  really  so  minute  and  accurate  a  history  of  the  future 
as  they  are  sometimes  represented.  A  miracle  is  an  event  the 
evidence  of  which  grows  weaker  according  to  the  distance  of 
time  and  the  number  of  witnesses  through  whom  the  report  of 
it  comes.  A  prophecy  is  a  standing  miracle,  whose  voice  grows 
more  distinct  and  expressive  with  the  lapse  of  time.  It  proves 
nothing  at  the  time  of  its  utterance,  but  its  fulfilment  stamps  it 
as  divine. 

But  when  we  come  to  examine  the  Hebrew  prophecies,  we 
find  that  the  argument  is  not  so  clear  and  cogent  as  might  seem 
desirable,  and  as  has  often  been  asserted.  If  many  prophecies 
of  future  events  appear  to  have  been  wonderfully  fulfilled,  many 
others,  it  may  be  objected,  have  not  been  fulfilled  at  all.  One 
man,2  speaking  of  the  Messianic  prophecies,  uses  this  strong 
language :  "  We  sometimes  hear  preachers  cry  out,  '  Let  one 
show  us  a  single  prophecy  not  fulfilled,  and  we  will  descend 
from  this  pulpit.'  I  should  be  tempted  to  say  to  them,  '  I  will 
mount  up  into  your  place,  if  you  will  show  me  a  single  pre- 

^  For  illustrations  see  G.  C.  Horst,  Dmieroskopie. 
2  Pecaut,  Le  Christ  et  la  Conscience,  ]).  42. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY   TO  JUDAISM.  245 

diction  accomplished.' "  And  Kuenen,  in  a  book  ^  replete  with 
learning,  elaborately  argues  that  the  larger  part  of  the  Jewish 
prophecies  were  never  fulfilled,  and  that  those  which  seem  to 
have  been  fulfilled  exhibit  no  marks  of  supernatural  inspiration. 
The  fact  that  such  a  position  can  be  taken  and  maintained  with 
ability  and  plausibility,  shows  that  at  the  best  the  argument 
from  prophecy  cannot  be  relied  on  as  irresistible. 

What  shall  we  say  then  ?  If  by  means  of  the  prophecies  we 
cannot  convince  the  skeptic  ;  if  even  professed  Christians  (like 
Kuenen)  find  the  argument  fallacious,  shall  we  drop  it  alto- 
gether ?  Ancf  since,  nevertheless,  the  Hebrew  prophets  did  utter 
manifold  predictions  concerning  the  course  of  future  events,  and 
professed  to  speak  under  the  inspiration  of  Jehovah,  shall  we 
even  have  to  conclude  that  the  non-fulfilment  of  their  prophe- 
cies becomes  a  proof  not  only  that  they  were  not  inspired,  but 
that  they  were  arrant  deceivers  ?  For  in  the  most  authoritative 
declaration  respecting  prophets  and  their  credentials  (Deut.  xviii. 
22)  we  are  told,  "  When  a  prophet  speaketh  in  the  name  of  the 
Lord,  if  the  thing  follow  not,  nor  come  to  pass,  that  is  the  thing 
which  the  Lord  hath  not  spoken :  the  prophet  hath  spoken  it 
presumptuously;  thou  shalt  not  be  afraid  of  him." 

These  apparent  drawbacks  in  the  argument  from  prophecy 
are,  when  the  matter  is  rightly  considered,  transformed  into 
confirmations  of  the  genuineness  of  prophecy.  jMinute  exact- 
ness in  foretelling  the  future  ought  not  to  be  looked  for  in  the 
Old  Testament  prophecies.     For  — 

a.  The  direct  and  main  work  of  the  prophets  was  preaching, 
not  prediction.  This  is  a  truth  which  has  become  more  and 
more  recognized  by  men  of  all  shades  of  theological  belief.^ 

*  The  Prophets  and  Prophecy  in  Israel. 

2  See,  e.  g.,  G.  F.  Oehler,  Theologie  des  alten  Testaments  (also  in  English, 
Theology  of  the  Old  Testament),  §  213;  Rielim,  Messianic  Prophecy,  p.  26; 
P.  Fairbairn,  Prophecy,  pp.  6  sq. ;  Davison,  Discourses  on  Prophecy,  p.  42 ; 
Ewald,  Die  Propheten  des  alten  Bundes,  vol.  i.  p.  25  ;  Hitzig,  Biblische  The- 
ologie, §  22 ;  Orelli,  Die  alttestamentliche  Weissagung,  p.  10  ;  W.  R.  Smith, 
The  Prophets  of  Israel,  p.  82  ;  Ladd,  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p. 
139;  Briggs,  Messianic  Prophecy,  §  14  ;  R.  P.  Smith,  Prophecy  a  Preparation 
for  Christ,  Lect.  I.;  H.  Schultz,  Alttestamentliche  Theologie,  vol.  i.  p.  171; 
Kiiper,  Das  Prophetenthum  des  alten  Bundes,  p.  32 ;  Kleinert,  Art.  Propfiet, 


246  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

The  office  of  the  prophets  was  to  enforce  the  commands  of  the 
law,  to  warn  the  perverse,  to  comfort  the  afflicted,  and  in  gen- 
eral to  awaken  the  national  conscience.     They  dwelt  on  the 
power,  omnipresence,  and  holiness  of  Jehovah.     They  empha- 
sized the  doctrine  of  his  intimate  relation  to  his  people.     They 
aimed  to  keep  before  their  hearers  the  obligations  which,  as  a 
nation  and  as  individuals,  they  owed  to  Jehovah.     In  short, 
they  were  preachers  of  righteousness,  —  not,  however,  as  an  ab- 
stract duty  evolved  out  of  their  consciousness,  but  as  a  duty  to 
an  ever  present  personal  God.    The  larger  part  of  the  prophecies 
is  of  this  purely  ethical  sort,  without  any  predictive  element. 
But  where  they  introduce  intimations  concerning  the  future, 
it  is  still  for  the  purpose  of   warning  or  of   encouragement. 
Threats  of   national  or  individual   punishment   were   uttered, 
but  not  for  the  purpose  of   serving  to  later  generations  as  a 
monument  of  their  powers  of  vaticination ;  they  were  uttered 
for  the  purpose  of  producing  an  immediate  wholesome  moral  im- 
pression.    Even  the  denunciation  of  judgment  on  the  surround- 
ing heathen  nations  was  for  the  same  purpose.     The  idolatries 
and  vices  of  those  nations  were  pictured,  and  the  necessary  pun- 
ishment was  set  forth ;  but  all  this,  in  order  to  impress  on  the 
Jews   the   superiority  of    Jehovah   to   the   false   gods   of  the 
heathen,  and  the  iniquity  and  danger  of  yielding,  as  they  were 
only  too  ready  to  yield,  to  the  seductive  influences  of  their 
neighbors.      When,   on   the   contrary,  they   foretold  a   future 
period  of  prosperity  and  peace,  this  was  still  designed  to  have 
a  present  effect,  namely,  to  impress  on  the  people  the  truth  of 
the  Divine  guardianship,  and  the  certainty  that  sooner  or  later 
faith  in  Jehovah  and  patient  waiting  for  him  would  be  re- 
warded.    The  Messianic  prophecies  occur  almost  uniformly  in 
immediate  connection  with  appeals  or  reproaches  concerning 
the  national  sins,  or  else  as  a  consolation  to  the  people  when 
suffering   under   distress   and    captivity.^      The    olflce   of    the 
prophet  is  expressly  declared  to  be  that  of  conveying  to  the 

in  Riehm's  Handworterbuch  des  biblischen  AUerthums  ;  Tholuck,  Die  Fropheten 
und  ihre  Weissagungen,  \  5. 

1  Cf.  Isa.  viii.  16-ix.  7.  x.  24-xi.  16,  li.  17-liii.  12  ;  Jer.  iii.  1-18 ;  Ezck. 
xxxvi.  16-36;  Joel  ii.  15-32;  Amos  ix.  7-15  ;  Micali  iii.  1-iv.  5,  etc. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  247 

people  Jehovah's  messages  of  instruction  and  warning.^  The 
accounts,  in  the  historical  books,  of  the  appearance  and  inter- 
vention of  prophets  is  to  the  same  effect.  They  came,  not  for 
the  purpose  of  predicting  some  distant  future  event,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  producing  a  present  effect  on  the  conduct  of  rulers 
or  people.2  They  were  raised  up  in  order  to  check  the  ten- 
dency to  formalism,  and  to  keep  alive  the  sense  of  the  pres- 
ence of  the  living  God. 

Now  for  the  accomplishment  of  this  purpose  minute  predic- 
tions of  what  was  to  take  place  centuries  after  their  time  would 
manifestly  have  been  of  no  use.  It  being  impossible  to  verify 
the  correctness  of  the  predictions  till  long  after  the  prophet  and 
all  those  to  whom  he  was  sent  were  dead,  the  utterance  of  them 
would  have  been  to  the  prophet's  contemporaries  no  proof  of 
his  divine  commission.  If  they  believed  the  predictions,  it  must 
have  been  for  other  reasons  than  the  evidence  contained  in  the 
predictions  themselves. 

Nevertheless  the  prophets  did  utter  predictions.  And  we  live 
at  a  time  when  it  can  for  the  most  part  be  determined  whether 
the  predictions  have  been  fulfilled  or  not.  But  in  examining  the 
question,  we  are  to  keep  in  mind  what  the  main  and  direct 
mission  of  the  prophets  was.  We  must  remember  that  their 
prophecies  had,  before  all  things  else,  a  moral  and  religious  end. 
We  must  also  consider  the  oriental  style  in  which  the  prophecies 
are  clothed,  and  not  press  figurative  and  graphic  language,  as  if 
the  substantial  truth  of  the  prophetic  utterance  depended  on  an 
exact  and  literal  fulfilment  of  such  incidental  features  of  the 
description.^  Take  such  a  prophecy  as  that  of  Joel  ii.  28-32. 
It  is  quoted  by  Peter  (Acts  ii.  14-21)  as  being  fulfilled  on  the 
day  of  Pentecost.  Nor  does  Peter  hesitate  to  include  in  the 
quotation  all  that  Joel  has  to  say  about  the  wonders  in  heaven, 
and  signs  on  the  earth,  —  blood,  and  fire,  and  vapor  of  smoke, 
the  sun  darkened,  and  the  moon  turned  into  blood ;  although 

1  Cf.  Jer.  vii.  25,  26,  xxv.  4-7,  xxix.  19,  xxxv.  15  ;  Ezek.  ii.  3-5 ;  Dau. 
ix.  6  ;  Mic.  iii.  8  ;  Zech.  vii.  12. 

^  See  Judg.  iv.  4  sqq.,  vi.  7-10 ;  2  Sam.  vii.  2  sqq.,  xii.  1-15,  xxiv.  11-14, 
and  notably  the  liistory  of  Elijah  and  Elisha. 

'  Fide  Tholuck,  Die  Prophe/eu,  etc.,  p.  134. 


248  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

there  is  not  the  slightest  intimation  that  any  of  these  signs  had 
come  to  pass.  The  rushing  mighty  wind  and  the  cloven  tongues 
of  fire  certainly  correspond  very  imperfectly  to  the  prophet's 
description.  It  is  manifest  that  Peter  regarded  these  signs  as 
figuratively  meant,  and  laid  all  the  stress  on  the  essential  thing, 
—  the  outpouring  of  the  Spirit.  Or,  if  he  understood  that  the 
prophecy  was  to  be  fulfilled  also  in  this  more  external  way,  he 
must  have  regarded  the  fulfilment  as  still  to  come.  So  when 
the  prophets  portray  the  destruction  of  heathen  cities,  specifying 
the  kinds  of  birds  and  beasts  that  shall  eventually  dwell  in 
their  ruins,^  the  object  is  to  picture,  in  this  graphic  way,  the 
thoroughness  of  the  destruction ;  and  it  would  be  a  petty  tri- 
umph of  the  skeptic  to  be  able  to  show  that  in  some  of  these 
details,  which  are  only  the  dress  of  the  description,  the  event 
has  failed  to  correspond  exactly  to  the  prediction.  Accordingly 
even  in  instances  in  which  the  prophecy  seems  to  have  been 
remarkably  fulfilled  in  just  these  very  non-essential  particulars, 
we  cannot  regard  this  outward  correspondence  as  the  vital  thing. 
When,  for  example,  Christ's  riding  into  Jerusalem  on  an  ass 
is  declared  to  be  the  fulfilment  of  Zech.  ix.  9,^  if  one  looks 
merely  on  this  circumstance,  one  misses  the  real  substance  of 
the  prophecy.  It  is  manifest  that  Zechariah,  in  this  specification 
of  the  animal  on  which  the  Messianic  King  would  ride,  meant 
to  indicate  the  peaceful  character  of  his  reign.  He  is  therefore 
pictured  as  riding  on  an  ass,  the  beast  used  in  the  peaceful  pur- 
suits of  a  nation,  whereas  the  horse  was  then  associated  with 
war ;  and  accordingly  in  the  next  verse  (ix.  10)  we  read,  "  I 
will  cut  off  the  chariot  from  Ephraim,  and  the  horse  from  Jeru- 
salem, and  the  battle  bow  shall  be  cut  off;  and  he  shall  speak 
peace  unto  the  nations."  Similarly  Micah  (v.  2-10)  and  Isaiah 
(ix.  1-7)  portray  the  Messiah  as  the  Prince  of  Peace,  whose 
reign  is  to  be  signalized  by  the  destruction  of  warlike  weapons, 
chariots  and  horses,  fortified  cities  and  strongholds.  Now  sup- 
pose that  at  the  time  of  Christ  asses  had  ceased  to  be  used,  and 
horses  had  taken  their  place  as  the  beasts  of  burden  and  of 
labor.     Suppose  then  that  Jesus  had  ridden  into  Jerusalem  on 

1  E.g.,  Isa  xxxiv.  11-16;  Zepli.  ii.  14. 
*  See  Matt.  xxi.  4,  5 ;  John  xii.  14,  15. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY   TO   JUDAISM.  249 

a  horse ;  would  the  prophecy  for  that  reason  have  been  unful- 
filled ?  Or  even  if  he  had  not  ridden  in  at  all,  the  essence  of 
the  prophecy  would  still  none  the  less  have  been  accomplished. 
We  cannot  limit  the  fulfilment  to  that  one  occasion  even.  The 
whole  ministry  of  Christ  was  a  fulfilment  of  the  prophecy ;  and 
the  Evangelist  merely  calls  attention  to  this  one  occasion  on 
which  not  merely  the  prediction  in  its  more  vital  features,  but 
even  the  pictorial  clothing  of  it,  had  been  fulfilled. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  just  these  prophecies  which  most  directly, 
and  not  in  a  merely  typical  sense,  foretell  the  coming  of  a 
Messiah  contain  elements  which  make  it  certain  that  the 
prophets  themselves  could  not  have  had  such  a  person  in  mind 
as  Jesus  of  Nazareth  was.  The  prophets  evidently  regarded 
him  as  one  who  was  to  deliver  the  Jews  from  the  hostile  As- 
syrians (Mic.  v.  5),  and  to  conquer  the  Philistines,  Edomites, 
Moabites,  and  Ammonites  (Isa.  xi.  14).  He  was  expected  to 
sit  on  the  throne  of  David  and  restore  the  glory  of  the  Davidic 
reign  (Isa.  ix.  7;  Jer.  xxiii.  5,  xxx.  9,  xxxiii.  15, 17  ;  Ezek.  xxxiv. 
23,  24 ;  Hos.  iii.  5 ;  Amos  ix.  11).  It  was  assumed  that  Jerusalem 
and  the  temple  would  be  the  centre  of  the  Messianic  king- 
dom, and  that  the  Mosaic  law,  with  its  ritual,  would  be  perpet- 
ually observed  (Jer.  xxxiii.  18-22 ;  Isa.  ii.  2-4,  Ixvi.  20-23 ; 
Zech.  xiv.  16-21).  In  short,  the  prophets,  even  in  their  loftiest 
anticipations  of  the  Messianic  period,  seem  to  have  been  unable 
to  divest  themselves  of  their  national,  local,  and  religious  asso- 
ciations, and  fail  to  give  an  accurate  description  of  him  who 
professed  to  fulfil  those  prophecies. 

Now,  one  might  say  that  all  this  too  belonged  to  the  mere 
drapery  of  the  prophetic  delineation ;  that  the  Messianic  reign 
was  really  not  conceived  by  the  prophets  as  a  mere  continua- 
tion, on  a  grander  scale,  of  the  Jewish  monarchy  and  law.  And 
other  passages  in  the  same  prophets  may  be  referred  to  as 
evidence  that  they  had  a  more  correct  conception  of  what  the 
real  Messiah  was  to  be  and  to  do.  Thus  Jeremiah  (iii.  16) 
represents  it  as  a  feature  of  the  Messianic  time  that  the  ark  of 
the  covenant  would  be  forgotten,  and  (xxxi.  31-34)  that  the 
old  covenant  would  be  replaced  by  a  new  and  more  spiritual 
one.     Still  the  fact  is  that  the  ]\Iessianic  prophecies  have  pre- 


250  SUPERNATURAI.   REVELATION. 

dominantly  the  Jewish  cast ;  aud  if  one  is  essaying  to  convince 
a  doubter  that  the  prophecies  have  been  literally  fulfilled,  and 
are  therefore  proved  to  be  of  supernatural  origin,  he  must  first 
prove  that  the  prophets  did  not  mean  what  they  seem  to  mean. 
The  appearance  and  the  presumption  are  that  the  Messiah  was 
expected  to  come  sooner  and  to  be  another  sort  of  man  than 
Jesus  of  Nazareth.  If,  however,  one  argues  from  the  New  Tes- 
tament itself,  that  the  prophets  really  conceived  the  Messiah 
and  his  kingdom  correctly,  and  only  used  the  Jewish  coloring 
in  a  consciously  symbolic  way,  then  we  must  reply  that  in  the 
same  way  we  can  prove  with  equal  cogency  that  Hosea  really 
had  the  infant  Jesus  in  mind  when  he  wrote,  "  Out  of  Egypt 
have  I  called  my  son ;  "  or  that  Jeremiah,  when  he  wrote  about 
the  lamentation  in  Eamah,  distinctly  and  consciously  referred 
to  Herod's  massacre  of  the  innocents.^  If  in  the  case  of  the 
indirect  or  typical  prophecies  we  assume  that  the  prophet  had 
no  double  sense  in  mind,  but  referred  only  to  what  seems  to  be 
meant  by  his  language,  then  equally  may  we  assume  that  in  the 
case  of  the  direct  prophecies  he  meant  what  he  seems  to  have 
meant.  At  all  events,  whoever  doubts  the  divinity  of  Jesus' 
person  and  commission  cannot  be  convinced  by  the  argument 
from  prophecy,  if  its  cogency  depends  upon  an  exact  and  literal 
fulfilment  of  all  the  predictions  concerning  him  found  in  the 
Old  Testament ;  for  such  a  literal  fulfilment  cannot  be  made 
out. 

The  same  may  be  said  respecting  the  prophecies  concerning 
the  future  of  the  Jewish  people.  As  compared  with  the  pre- 
dictions respecting  other  nations,  there  is  this  difference :  that, 
whereas  in  both  cases  desolation  and  destruction  were  denounced 
as  a  punishment  for  national  ungodliness,  yet  in  the  case  of  the 
Jews  these  denunciations  are  accompanied  with  promises  of  ulti- 
mate restoration.  They  were  to  be  scattered  among  all  nations,^ 
but  not  to  be  annihilated  as  a  people.^  But  besides  this,  they 
were  finally  to  be  restored  to  their  own  land,  and  there  to  enjoy 

1  Matt.  ii.  15,  cf.  Hos.  xi.  1 ;  Matt.  ii.  17,  18,  cf.  Jerem.  xxxi.  15. 

2  Deut.  iv.  27,  xxviii.  25  ;  Jer.  ix.  16,  xv.  4,  xxiv.  9,  xxix.  18 ;  Ezek.  v.  10, 
xii.  15,  XX.  23;  Hos.  ix.  17. 

8  Ezek.  xi.  16 ;  Amos  ix.  8,  9 ;  Zecli.  xiii.  8,  9. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO   JUDAISM.  251 

the  favor  of  Jehovah.^  Some  of  these  prophecies  may  indeed  be 
regarded  as  fulfilled  in  the  return  from  the  Babylonish  captivity ; 
but  others  of  them  certainly  refer  to  something  else,  and  describe 
a  final  and  abiding  condition  of  peace  and  righteousness  in  the 
land  of  Judea.  Now  this  certainly  has  not  yet  been  fulfilled ; 
and  although,  on  account  of  the  remarkable  fulfilment  of  the 
others,  many  have  the  confident  expectation  that  the  Jews,  as  a 
distinct  race,  are  at  some  time  to  reoccupy  Palestine,  yet  the 
exiiectation  of  a  fulfilment  cannot  be  made  to  serve  as  a  fulfil- 
ment, esjoecially  to  one  who  doubts  the  reality  of  any  strictly 
supernatural  prophecy. 

&.  This  leads  us  to  a  second  consideration.  Minute  particular- 
ity of  detail  in  a  prophecy  is  liable  to  excite  suspicions  concerning 
its  genuineness.  A  prediction  may  indeed  appear  to  be  most 
remarkable,  when  it  gives  minute  particulars  of  time,  place, 
names,  and  accidental  circumstances.  But  the  Old  Testament 
prophecies  do  not  abound  in  such  details ;  and  when  we  find 
them,  they  do  not  prove  to  be  the  most  effective  evidence  of  the 
prophet's  miraculous  foreknowledge.  For  just  because  the  pro- 
phetic descriptions  are  usually  of  an  ideal  sort,  consisting  of  gen- 
eral pictures  rather  than  of  a  delineation  of  incidental  features, 
such  minute  features,  when  they  are  found,  excite  suspicion,  and 
are  conjectured  to  be  a  later  interpolation.  Thus,  when  a  pro- 
phet (1  Kings  xiii.  2)  is  said  to  have  predicted  the  birth  of 
King  Josiah,  even  so  conservative  scholars  as  Tholuck  ^  regard 
the  name  as  here  interpolated.  When  Micah  (iv.  10)  predicts 
that  the  Jews  shall  go  to  Babylon,  this  also  is  thought  by  many 
to  be  an  interpolation  ;  ^  or  if  not,  it  is  maintained  that,  as  Micah 
elsewhere  threatens  an  Assyrian,  not  a  Babylonian,  captivity,  he 
can  here  think  of  Babylon  only  as  a  province  of  Assyria,  and 
not  as  the  capital  of  the  conquering  kingdom.  So  Micah's  spe- 
cification of  Bethlehem  as  the  birthplace  of  the  Messiah  is  re- 
garded as  being  only  another  way  of  indicating  that  the  Messiah 

1  Ezek.  xi.  17;  Jer.  iii.  18,  xxxi.  10-14,  xlvi.  27;  Hos.  xi.  11;  Zech.  x. 
10;  Isa.  xi.  10-16,  xi7.  1-3,  xxvii.  12,  13;  Mic.  iv.  10,  v.  2-9;  Joel  iii.  1-8; 
Obad.  vers.  17-21;  Zepli.  iii.  8-20;  Amos  ix.  14,  15. 

^  Die  Fropheten,  etc.,  p.  111. 

8  Kuenea,  The  Prophets,  etc.,  p  164. 


252  SUPEENATrRAL   REVELATION. 

was  to  come  from  the  house  of  David.^  And  the  particularity  of 
many  of  Daniel's  prophecies  is  thought  to  be  one  reason  for  re- 
garding them  as  written  after  the  event.  Now  whatever  judg- 
ment one  may  have  on  these  points,  it  is  very  certain  that  the 
more  curiously  exact  and  detailed  a  prophecy  should  be,  as 
compared  with  the  event  predicted,  the  more  strongly  would 
every  one  be  tempted  to  conjecture  that  the  prophecy,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  had  been  composed  after  the  alleged  fulfilment. 
Suppose  a  prophecy  should  be  produced,  foretelling  all  the 
details  of  Jesus'  life,  —  the  date  and  circumstances  of  his  birth, 
the  names  of  his  parents,  his  going  to  the  temple  at  the  age  of 
twelve,  his  baptism  in  the  Jordan,  his  temptation,  the  number 
and  names  of  his  twelve  apostles,  the  course  and  order  of  his 
journeys,  his  miracles,  his  place  of  abode,  etc.,  —  would  not 
every  one  be  instinctively  inclined  to  doubt  its  genuineness? 
Why  ?  Not  because  it  is  impossible  for  God  to  inspire  a  man  to 
write  such  a  prophecy,  but  because  it  would  be  out  of  harmony 
with  the  divine  method  and  wisdom  to  do  such  a  thing.  Since 
the  prophet's  vocation  is  an  ethical  one,  it  would  be  inconsistent 
with  its  serious  and  practical  character  for  him  to  tickle  the  cu- 
riosity of  his  hearers  with  such  a  multitude  of  minute  outward 
details  respecting  the  future.  It  is,  in  great  part,  the  presence 
of  such  details  in  the  Sibylline  Oracles  which  has  led  to  the 
assurance  that  they  are  largely  spurious.^    Such  predictions  can 

1  Schultz,  Alttestamentliche  Theologie,  vol.  ii.  p.  250. 

2  The  Eighth  Book  of  tliese  Oracles  (Friedlieb's  edition)  gives,  among  other 
things,  a  prophecy  of  the  incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God,  and  of  his  works. 
Such  descriptions  are  found  as  the  following :  — 

"  By  his  word  he  will  still  the  winds,  and  quiet  the  billows 
When  they  are  raging,  and  walk  on  their  surface,  peaceful  and  trustful. 
With  five  loaves  and  a  fish  from  the  Lake  of  Gennesaret's  waters 
He  will  appease  the  hunger  of  five  thousand  men  in  the  desert ; 
And  when  he  takes  up  all  of  the  fragments  that  are  left  over, 
He  will  fill  twelve  baskets  therewith,  a  hope  of  the  nations,     (vers.  223-278.) 


And  at  last  to  the  faithless  and  godless  he  will  be  delivered. 
Who  with  unhallowed  hands  will  blows  inflict  on  the  Godhead, 
And  from  polluted  mouths  will  cast  on  him  poisonous  spittle. 
But  he  will  simply  yield  his  sacred  back  to  the  scourges. 
And  will  be  silent  when  smitten,  in  order  that  none  may  discover 
Who  and  whence  he  is,  that  he  may  speak  to  the  dead  ones. 


THE   RELATION   OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO   JUDAISM.  253 

be  of  no  use  to  the  prophet's  contemporaries,  who  have  no  means 
of  verifying  the  accuracy  of  the  predictions,  and  would  serve  to 
dissipate,  rather  than  intensify,  any  moral  impression  that  he 
might  be  aiming  to  produce. 

But  would  not  such  minuteness  in  the  prophecy  be  of  great 
value  to  those  who  live  when  or  after  the  prophecy  is  fulfilled  ? 
Hardly ;  for  such  preternatural  foreseeing  of  the  accidental 
details  of  future  history  would  resemble  rather  the  mysterious 
phenomena  of  clairvoyance  than  the  product  of  a  divine  in- 
spiration, even  if  proved  to  be  genuine.  It  would  be  exposed  to 
the  suspicion,  however,  of  not  being  genuine,  for  the  very  reason 
that  it  is  intrinsically  unlikely  that  God  would  supernaturally 
communicate  such  details.     But  there  is  another  objection. 

c.  Such  minuteness  of  prediction  would  interfere  with  the  free 
and  natural  course  of  things.  It  would  tempt  some  to  try  to 
fulfil  it,  and  tempt  others  to  try  to  frustrate  it.  As  Nitzsch  ^ 
says,  such  predictions  must  be  "  rare  and  moderate,  in  order  not 
to  destroy  all  human  relation  to  history."  It  is  sometimes  said 
that  predictions  often  fulfil  themselves ;  that  is,  men  set  them- 
selves to  the  work  of  doing  something  for  the  very  purpose  of 
making  a  known  prediction  come  true.  If  the  terms  of  the 
prediction  are  very  specific  and  unambiguous,  and  if  one  has 
any  special  reason  for  desiring  to  have  it  come  to  pass,  one  can 
often  gain  this  end  by  directly  working  to  bring  about  the 
accomplishment  of  the  thing  predicted.  Or  the  opposite  may 
be  the  case.  The  Bible  furnishes  some  illustrations  of  this. 
When  Ahijah  met  Jeroboam  and  predicted  that  he  would  be- 
come king  of  Israel  (1  Kings  xi.  29-35),  while  he  may  not  have 

And  he  will  wear  a  crown  of  thorns,    .    .    .     (vers.  287-294.) 
But  he  will  spread  out  his  hands,  and  the  whole  world's  breadth  he  will  measure. 
Gall  they  gave  him  to  eat,  and  vinegar  when  he  was  thirsty. 
Such  unkindness  shall  bring  upon  them  merited  vengeance. 
And  the  veil  of  the  temple  was  rent  in  twain,  and  at  midday- 
Three  hours  long  will  night  prevail  with  terrible  darkness."     (vers.  302-306.) 
The  translation  we  have  given  is  as  close  as  adherence  to  the  meter  would 
allow      Only  in  one  particular  is  the  description  made  more  minute  than  in  the 
original  Greek :  instead  of  "  Lake  of  Gennesaret's  waters "  it  reads  simply 
"water  of  the  lake." 

^  Si/stem  der  christ lichen  Lehre,  §  35. 


254  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

suggested  an  altogether  new  thought  to  Jeroboam's  mind,  yet 
it  is  natural  to  assume  that  the  encouragement  afforded  by  the 
prophecy  must  have  strengthened,  if  it  did  not  produce,  Jero- 
boam's resolution  to  make  the  prediction  good,  —  just  as  Mac- 
beth was  fired  by  what  the  witches  foretold  him  to  bring  about 
the  fulfilment  of  his  predicted  elevation.  On  the  other  hand, 
Solomon  tried  to  frustrate  Ahijah's  prophecy  by  seeking  to  put 
Jeroboam  to  death.  So  Herod,  after  he  had  learned  that  it  had 
been  prophesied  that  the  Messiah  should  be  born  in  Bethlehem, 
attempted  to  frustrate  the  prophecy  by  killing  all  the  children 
in  the  place.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  of  Messianic  prophe- 
cies in  general,  although  they  are  wanting  in  details  of  time  and 
place  and  circumstance,  undoubtedly  furnished  a  stimulus  to 
Theudas  and  Bar-cochebas,  and  the  other  pretended  Messiahs. 
Unless  all  prophecies  are  to  be  as  vague  and  ambiguous  as  the 
Delphic  oracles  often  were,  it  could  hardly  be  otherwise  than 
that  there  should  be  efforts  made  to  fulfil  them  of  set  purpose. 
But  if  they  were  all  perfectly  unambiguous  and  specific,  it  is 
manifest  that  they  would  tend  to  interfere  with  the  natural 
operation  of  motives.  The  prophecies  would  become  something 
else  than  prophecies ;  they  would  become  a  power  directly 
operating  to  produce  the  result  predicted.  Prophets  would  be, 
to  a  great  extent,  what  the  more  superstitious  among  the  Jews, 
as  well  as  other  peoples,  regarded  them  as  being,  namely,  the 
efficient  causes  of  the  events  foretold  by  them.  This  was  evi- 
dently Ahab's  conception  of  a  prophet's  power,  when  he  entreated 
Micaiah  to  utter  a  favorable  prophecy  respecting  his  proposed 
expedition  against  Eamoth-gilead  (1  Kings  xxii.  13),  and  when, 
after  the  three  years'  drought  predicted  by  Elijah,  he  met  the 
prophet,  and  said,  "Is  it  thou,  thou  troubler  of  Israel?" 
(1  Kings  xviii.  17). 

d.  But  we  have  not  only  these  reasons  for  not  expecting  in 
prophecies  a  detailed  and  exact  forecasting  of  future  events.  It 
being  the  prophet's  function  to  preach  to  his  own  contemporaries, 
his  language,  and  the  whole  cast  of  his  address,  need  to  be 
intelligible  to  his  hearers.  But  this  would  not  be  the  case,  if  he 
dealt  with  themes  entirely  unfamiliar  to  them,  and  if  his  pic- 
ture of  the  future  had  a  coloring  which  they  could  not  under- 


THE   EELATION   OF   CHRISTIANITY   TO   JUDAISM.  255 

stand.  Of  what  use  could  it  have  been  to  the  Jews  of  Isaiah's 
time  to  be  told  in  detail  about  the  history  of  the  Eoman  Empire, 
a  power  as  yet  hardly  in  its  infancy  ?  Why  should  tlie  prophet 
have  been  inspired  to  specify  how  many  years  would  elapse 
before  the  Messiah  would  be  born,  and  to  tell  particularly  under 
what  kind  of  government  the  Jews  then  would  be  ?  Even  if 
he  could  himself  have  had  a  complete  vision  of  that  future,  all 
strange  to  him  in  its  outward  features,  it  would  have  been 
almost  impossible  for  him  to  make  the  vision  mean  anything 
to  his  hearers.  It  was,  we  may  say,  practically  necessary  that 
the  promises  of  Messianic  help  should  wear  the  color  of  the 
prophet's  own  time.  This  may  involve  an  inaccuracy  in  outward 
circumstance,  but  that  is  nothing  else  than  what  we  should 
look  for,  so  long  as  we  regard  the  prophet's  direct  aim  to  have 
been  to  produce  a  religious  impression  on  those  around  him. 
The  Jews  at  that  time  could  not  have  been  made  to  apprehend 
the  idea  of  a  purely  spiritual  kingdom.  Surrounded  as  they 
were  by  mighty  heathen  nations  by  which  they  were  in  immi- 
nent danger  of  being  overpowered,  their  hope  of  a  great  King 
able  to  give  them  security  and  salvation  could  not  well  have 
been  dissociated  from  protection  against  these  threatening 
powers.  Nor  do  we  need  to  suppose  that  the  prophets  them- 
selves were  wholly  lifted  above  these  associations.  It  is  there- 
fore quite  what  might  be  expected  when  the  earlier  prophets, 
especially  Isaiah  and  his  contemporaries,  seem  to  connect  the 
Messianic  deliverance  with  the  Assyrian  invasions,  while  the 
following  ones  are  more  occupied  with  the  Babylonian  and 
Medo-Persian  empires,  and  only  the  latest  make  mention  of 
Greece,^  and  none  of  them  distinctly  of  Eome.     The  prophetic 

^  The  references  to  Greece  (Javan),  liowever,  occur  mostly  in  books  the 
date  of  which  is  disputed.  They  are  found  in  Joel  iii.  6 ;  Dan.  viii.  21,  x.  20, 
xi.  2;  Ezek.  xxvii.  13,  19  (where  the  second  is  supposed  to  be  an  Arabian 
country,  not  Greece)  ;  Isa.  Ixvi.  19,  and  Zech.  ix.  13.  Only  the  passages  in 
Daniel  and  Zechariah  speak  of  Greece  as  a  formidable  military  power.  Our 
general  purpose  does  not  require  a  discussion  of  tlie  critical  questions  here 
involved.  As  to  Isa.  xl.-lxvi.,  whatever  one's  judgment  may  be,  there  can 
be  no  question  that  the  weightiest  argument — one  may  say  almost  the  only 
weighty  argument  —  for  the  exilic  date  is  the  obvious  fact  that  the  writer  all 
through  the  book  writes  as  if  the  captivity  were  present,  not  future. 


256  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

descriptions  of  the  future  bear  the  impress  of  the  time  in  which 
they  are  written.  As  Fairbairn^  well  expresses  it,  "  the  prophets 
necessarily  thought  and  spoke  of  the  future  under  the  condi- 
tions of  their  own  historical  position  ;  so  that  it  was  not  the 
image  of  the  future  which  threw  itself  back  upon  the  past, 
but  rather  the  image  of  the  past  which  threw  itself  forward 
into  the  future,  —  the  things  which  were,  and  had  been,  gave 
their  form  to  the  things  which  were  yet  to  be." 

The  foregoing  considerations,  while  they  imply  that  there  are 
in  the  prophecies  what  may  be  called  inaccuracies,  yet  indicate 
that  the  argument  from  prophecy  is  for  that  very  reason  of 
peculiar  weight.  There  is  so  much  prediction  of  a  Messianic 
kingdom,  and  such  a  wonderful  anticipation  of  many  of  its 
features,  that  the  theory  of  supernatural  illumination  is  the  only 
satisfactory  one  ;  while  yet  the  prophetic  conception  remains 
on  that  plane  on  which  alone  it  could  have  been  instructive 
and  helpful  to  the  prophet's  own  contemporaries.  The  signifi- 
cance of  the  Messianic  prophecies  in  particular  does  not  consist 
so  much  in  the  exact  correspondence  of  any  one  of  them  with 
the  details  of  the  historic  fulfilment,  as  in  the  very  fact  of  the 
existence  of  so  great  a  variety  of  Messianic  prophecies,  differ- 
ing sometimes  almost  irreconcilably  from  one  another,  yet 
each  suggesting  or  directly  foretelling  some  one  or  more  of 
the  characteristics  of  the  actual  Messiah  and  his  work.  It 
is  this  convergence  of  so  many  different  prophecies  towards 
Christ  and  the  Christian  Church  which  constitutes  the  real 
strength  of  the  argument  from  prophecy.  The  so-called  Prot- 
evangelium  (Gen.  iii.  15)  would,  by  itself,  amount  to  very  little  as 
an  evidence  of  a  prophetic  anticipation  of  Jesus  Christ.  The  same 
may  be  said  of  Jacob's  oracle  (Gen.  xlix.  10)  respecting  Judah, 
and  of  Balaam's  vision  (Num.  xxiv.  17)  of  the  star  and  the 
sceptre,  and  indeed  of  any  one  of  the  later  more  specific  predic- 
tions that  are  found  in  the  Old  Testament.  But  it  is  just  be- 
cause there  runs  all  through  the  Hebrew  history  this  remarkable 
anticipation,  growing  more  and  more  definite  and  decided  with 
the  lapse  of  time,  assuming  many  forms  and  pictured  in  most  di- 
verse ways,  and  because  these  various  prophecies  are  so  remark- 
^  Prophecy,  p.  155. 


THE   RELATION   OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  257 

ably  fulfilled  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  that  one  becomes  impressed 
with  the  conviction  that  a  more  than  human  intelligence  gov- 
erned the  utterances  of  the  prophets  when  they  predicted  the 
Messianic  kingdom.  The  more  probable  it  can  be  made  to  ap- 
pear that  the  prophets  themselves  did  not  expect  just  such  a 
Messiah  as  Jesus  proved  to  be,  the  more  indubitable  does  it  be- 
come that  the  hand  of  Jehovah  was  upon  them,  and  that  they 
were  inspired  to  utter  words  which  foreshadowed  more  than 
the  prophets  were  conscious  of  meaning.  When  one  and  the 
same  person  is  seen  to  unite  in  himself,  and  to  fulfil,  the  diverse 
prophecies  which  have  pictured  the  expected  Messiah  now  as 
Prophet,^  now  as  King,^  now  as  Priest,^  now  as  a  sufferer  *  in 

1  Deut.  xviii.  15,  18 ;  Isa.  xlii.  1-7,  xlix.  1-6,  Hi.  13-liii.  12. 

2  Isa.  ix.  1-7,  xi.  1-9 ;  Micah  v.  1-5  ;  Zecli.  ix.  9,  etc. 
8  Ps.  ex.  4;  Zech.  iii.  8,  vi.  13. 

*  Zecli.  xii.  10,  xiii.  7 ;  Dan.  ix.  26 ;  Isa.  liii.  As  to  this  last-mentioned 
chapter,  it  is  Messianic,  whatever  theory  one  may  adopt  as  to  its  primary 
meaning.  Among  the  various  interpretations  tlie  most  groundless  is  that 
■which  makes  the  "  servant "  some  king,  as  Hezekiah,  Uzziah,  or  Josiah.  There 
is  scarcely  anything  to  favor  the  hypothesis.  But  little  more  plausible  is  the 
supposition  that  tlie  passage  refers  to  some  individual  prophet,  perhaps  Jere- 
miah, who  has  undergone  peculiar  persecution.  It  is  almost  grotesque  to  think 
of  any  ordinary  prophet  described  as  sustaining  such  a  unique  relation  to  the 
people.  There  is  nothing  whatever  to  suggest  it;  the  "  servant  of  Jehovah  " 
in  this  section  (xl.-lxvi.)  is  nowhere  distinctly  applied  to  an  individual  prophet. 
This  fact  bears  equally  against  the  view  that  the  "  servant "  is  here  collec- 
tively used  of  the  prophets  in  general.  The  term  is  doubtless  used  collec- 
tively for  the  most  part,  but  is  applied  not  to  the  prophets,  but  to  the  people  as 
a  whole  (xli.  8,  xlii.  19,  xliii.  10,  xliv.  1,  21,  etc.).  Sometimes,  however,  the 
servant  is  distinguished  from  the  people  (as  in  xlii.  1-7,  xlix.  1-6,  1.  10). 
The  exegetical  question  is,  whether  in  this  latter  case  the  servant  is  conceived 
of  as  an  individual,  or  as  the  piotis  part  of  the  people.  Apparently  it  must  be 
one  or  the  other.  The  prevalent  collective  sense  in  other  cases  favors  assum- 
ing a  collective  sense  in  these  cases ;  but  this  is  not  decisive.  Where  the 
singular  number  is  used  continuously,  and  the  general  impression  produced  is 
that  of  an  individual  rather  than  of  a  collection  —  as  in  xlix.  1-6,  and  es- 
pecially in  Iii.  13-liii.  12  —  there  is  not  the  slightest  exegetical  difficulty  in  sup- 
posing that  the  prophet  really  had  an  individual  in  mind.  If  he  confessedly 
uses  the  term  now  in  a  comprehensive,  and  now  in  a  restricted,  sense,  —  so 
restricted  that  in  xlix,  6  it  is  represented  as  the  mission  of  the  "  servant " 
to  "raise  up  the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  restore  the  preserved  of  Israel,"  as 
well  as  to  be  "a  light  to  the  Gentiles,"  —  there  is  no  exegetical  objection  to 
17 


258  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

the  power  of  his  enemies,  now  as  a  victorious  and  invincible 
warrior;  —  when  one  comes  to  see  this,  then  the  conviction  be- 
comes irresistible  that  no  mere  presentiment,  no  magical  arts, 
no  shrewd  prognostications,  and  no  cunning  deceit  could  have 
so  constructed  the  prophecy  and  so  brought  about  the  ful- 
filment. 

This  is  a  line  of  argument  which  will  of  course  not  be  strin- 
gent to  one  who  recognizes  in  Christ  himself  no  divine  illumi- 
nation and  authority.  Such  a  one  may  speciously  urge  that  the 
Messianic  anticipations  of  the  Jewish  prophets  have  failed  of 
fulfilment  in  respect  to  their  predominant  feature,  namely,  the 
kingly  character  of  the  Messiah.     Jesus,  it  may  be  said,  was 

our  supposing  that  the  restriction  goes  so  far  as  to  limit  the  term  sometimes 
to  an  individual,  who  in  a  unique  manner  realizes  the  divine  ideal  of  a  servant. 
And  in  chap.  liii.  everything  favors  this  hypothesis.  So  sharply  is  the  servant 
individualized  and  contrasted  with  the  people  in  general,  that  some  (<?.  g., 
Hitzig,  following  the  later  Rabbins)  conceive  verses  2-10  to  be  the  language 
of  the  heathen,  amongst  whom  the  Jews  were  dispersed,  —  a  view,  however,  so 
groundless  that  it  hardly  needs  refutation.  Now  it  is  a  simple  rhetorical 
principle  that,  if  the  singular  noun  or  pronoun  is  used  collectively,  the  con- 
text must  make  this  fact  evident.  In  xli.  8-14,  e.  g.,  no  one  can  doubt  that 
the  people  as  a  whole  are  meant,  even  apart  from  the  phrase  "  men  of  Israel " 
in  verse  14.  But  in  lii.  13-liii.  the  case  is  reversed.  We  there  have  not 
merely  the  singular  number  uniformly  used ;  but  the  marks  of  individuality 
are  so  various  and  pointed  that  it  becomes  difficult  to  adjust  the  section  to  the 
theory  of  a  collective  signification.  E.  g.,  when  the  servant  is  called  "  a  man 
of  sorrows,"  one  who  "  opened  not  his  mouth,"  was  "  cut  off  from  the  land 
of  the  living,"  etc.,  it  requires  a  straining  of  "  the  exegetical  conscience " 
to  understand  the  prophet  as  meaning  the  whole  people,  or  even  a  collection 
of  persons.  The  presumption  here  is  that  a  single  person  is  in  the  prophet's 
mind,  and  that  this  individual  is  the  expected  Messiah.  This  view,  favored 
by  the  internal  evidence,  and  adopted  by  the  earlier  Jews  and  the  great 
majority  of  Christian  interpreters,  is  not  likely  to  be  abandoned.  It  is  sur- 
prising that  Professor  Ladd  should  say  that  "no  other  answer  has  greater  dif- 
ficulties than  the  one  which  makes  the  passage  .  .  .  directly  and  solely 
Messianic  "  {Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  55).  Professor  Ladd  strongly  asserts 
indeed  the  Messianic  character  of  the  passage,  but  regards  it  as  only  typically 
Messianic.  This  is  of  course  possibly  correct ;  but  few  will  be  likely  to  come 
to  that  conclusion  on  account  of  such  a  subtle  exegesis  of  Luke  xxii.  37  as  he 
adopts  (p.  54),  following  Meyer,  against  nearly  everybody  else.  See  on  this 
subject,  Urwick,  The  Servant  of  Jehovah,  and  V.  F.  Oehler,  Ber  Knecht 
Jehova's. 


THE   RELATION   OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  259 

anything  but  a  king.  He  expressly  refused  to  be  made  a  king. 
He  was  simply  a  wise  and  good  man  who  tried  to  get  men  to 
follow  his  precepts.  With  such  objectors  we  are  not  disposed 
to  contend.  The  true  force  of  the  argument  from  prophecy  can 
be  felt  only  by  one  who  recognizes  in  Jesus  something  higher 
than  a  distinguished  moralist  or  philosopher ;  who  sees  in  him 
the  realization  of  the  highest  ideal  of  true  Kingship ;  who  ac- 
knowledges him  to  be  the  Head  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  the 
Lord  to  whom  the  members  of  the  community  of  believers 
owe  homage  and  allegiance.  He  who  sees  in  him  the  real 
Anointed  of  God  has  no  difficulty  in  seeing  how  he  fulfils 
the  types  and  predictions  of  the  Old  Testament;  Christ  is 
rather  the  one  fact  that  gives  unity  and  consistency  and  signifi- 
cance to  what  otherwise  is  obscure  and  confused.  This  faith  in 
Christ,  it  is  true,  is  not  ordinarily  the  product  of  a  study  of  the 
prophecies.  The  evidences  of  Christianity  which  are  most  con- 
vincing are  doubtless  those  which  are  found  in  the  history  and 
inherent  character  of  Christianity  itself.  But  provided  the 
faith  exists,  it  receives  an  additional  support,  when  it  appre- 
hends the  relation  of  Christ  to  the  law  and  prophecies  of  the 
Old  Covenant,  and  sees  in  him  the  focus  towards  which  the 
various  and  seemingly  scattered  rays  of  previous  revelations 
all  converged. 

3.  Another  question  is :  How  far  do  Christ  and  his  apostles 
authenticate  the  miracles  of  the  Old  Testament  ?  Even  though 
on  account  of  their  testimony  we  believe  that  Moses  and  the 
prophets  received  supernatural  revelations,  does  this  require  us 
to  give  full  credence  to  every  story  of  the  Old  Testament  which 
reports  the  occurrence  of  a  miracle  ? 

The  miracles  of  the  Old  Testament,  as  compared  with  those 
of  the  New,  have  always  been  the  first  to  receive  the  assaults  of 
skeptics.  Being  more  remote  from  us,  they  are  not  so  directly 
attested,  and  in  many  cases  they  seem  to  have  less  intrinsic 
probability  and  less  apparent  justification.  Some  of  them  are 
favorite  butts  of  ridicule.  Is  there  reason  for  any  distinction 
between  these  and  the  Christian  miracles  ? 

In  general,  it  must  be  obvious  that  no  radical  distinction  can 
be  drawn  between  the  two  classes.     If  miracles  are  needed  as 


260  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

vouchers  for  the  genuineness  of  any  special  revelation  of  the 
divine  purpose  and  character,  then  they  were  needed  when  a 
revelation  was  made  through  Abraham,  Moses,  and  the  prophets, 
as  well  as  when  one  was  made  through  Christ  and  the  apostles. 
In  so  far,  therefore,  as  Jesus  recognized  the  Old  Testament  dis- 
pensation as  of  divine  origin,  he  implicitly  recognized  the  mira- 
cles which  served  to  attest  this  origin. 

But  if  even  with  regard  to  the  New  Testament  miracles  we 
adopt  certain  criteria  of  genuineness,  assuming  at  least  the  jpos- 
sihility  that  apocryphal  stories  may  have  got  entrance  into  the 
canonical  books,  then  of  course  we  may  equally,  or  even  to  a 
greater  degree,  exercise  the  same  right  of  discrimination  with 
regard  to  the  Old  Testament.  But  the  same  caution  in  exercis- 
ing the  right  is  needed  in  the  latter  case  as  in  the  former.  The 
necessity  and  the  fact  of  miracles  as  accompaniments  of  the 
divine  revelation  being  once  assumed,  it  is  not  an  easy  matter 
to  draw  the  line  between  those  which  shall  be  acknowledged  as 
fit  and  appropriate,  and  those  which  shall  be  discarded  as  un- 
worthy of  God,  and  as  legendary.  If  a  reported  miracle  were 
palpably  at  war  with  the  known  character  of  God,  that  would 
be  sufficient  reason  for  questioning  the  authenticity  of  the  story. 
But  in  applying  this  criterion  different  persons  will  come  to  dif- 
ferent conclusions.  For  example,  to  some  the  accounts  of  the  de- 
struction of  the  Egyptian  first-born,  or  of  the  messengers  sent  to 
Elijah  (2  Kings  i.  9-12),  will  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
character  of  a  God  who  is  represented,  even  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, as  a  God  of  infinite  compassion  and  forbearance  (Ex. 
xxxiv.  6;  Jonah  iv.  2,  etc.);  whereas  others,  who  lay  more 
stress  on  the  attribute  of  righteousness  in  God,  and  on  the  need 
of  its  being  made  impressively  manifest,  will  find  no  serious 
difficulty  in  such  narratives.  Or  again,  some  may  be  inclined  to 
object  to  some  miracles  as  trivial,  undignified,  or  purposeless,  as 
for  example,  the  speaking  of  Balaam's  ass  (Num.  xxii.  28),  the 
resurrection  of  the  man  who  was  buried  in  the  tomb  of  Elisha 
(2  Kings  xiii.  21),  the  story  of  Samson's  exploits,  or  of  Jonah's 
preservation ;  while  others  are  not  scandalized  by  such  things, 
and  are  able  to  discern  a  meaning  worthy  of  God  in  them.^ 

^  Cliristlieb  {Modertie  Ziceifel  am  christlichen  Glaiiben,  pp.  367-391)  de- 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHllISTIANITY   TO  JUDAISM.  261 

In  many  cases  it  may  be  a  question  whether  the  event  re- 
corded is,  strictly  speaking,  a  miracle  at  all.  The  Old  Testa- 
ment writers  are  so  much  accustomed  to  ascribe  all  events, 
especially  striking  and  important  ones,  directly  to  divine  agency, 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  call  everything  miraculous  that  at  first 
glance  may  seem  to  be  described  as  such.  For  example,  when  it 
is  said  (Josh.  x.  11)  that  Jehovah  cast  down  great  stones  from 
heaven  upon  the  Gibeonites,  the  hail-storm  which  is  reported 
need  not  be  regarded  as  a  miracle.  And  likewise  in  the  numer- 
ous instances  in  which  God  is  said  to  have  spoken  to  individuals, 
or  to  have  moved  them  to  do  this  or  that,  it  would  be  a  mis- 
conception of  the  Biblical  style  and  meaning  to  assume  in  all 
such  cases  a  strictly  supernatural  intervention. 

But  the  question  immediately  before  us  is.  How  far  the  New 
Testament  sanctions  the  miracles  reported  in  the  Old  ?  We 
should  not  expect  a  particular  and  detailed  reference  to  each 
separate  miraculous  event.  The  Old  Testament  history  is  re- 
ferred to  in  general  as  one  under  especial  divine  direction,  and 
certaiTi  of  the  recorded  miracles  are  alluded  to  as  facts.  The  fol- 
lowing are  tlius  referred  to :  Jonah's  preservation  (Matt.  xii.  40), 
the  deluge  (Matt.  xxiv.  39  ;  Luke  xvii.  27 ;  Heb.  xi.  7  ;  1  Pet. 
iii.  20),  Jehovah  in  the  burning  bush  (Mark  xii.  26;  Luke  xx. 
37  ;  Acts  vii.  30),  Elijah  and  the  widow  (Luke  iv.  25,  26),  Elisha's 
healing  Naaraan  (iv.  27),  Moses'  brazen  serpent  (John  iii.  14),  the 
gift  of  manna  (vi.  31,  32,  49).  The  foregoing  are  referred  to  by 
Jesus  himself,  as  reported  in  the  Gospels.  In  the  following  books 
we  find  reference  to  still  others,  viz. :  the  call  of  Abraham  (Acts 
vii.  2,  3,  Heb.  xi.  8),  the  deliverance  of  the  Israelites  from 
Egypt  (Acts  vii.  36,  xiii.  17 ;  Heb.  xi.  29),  the  birth  of  Isaac 
(Eom.  iv.  19-21  ;  Heb.  xi.  11),  the  shining  of  Moses'  face 
(2  Cor.  iii.  7),  the  offering  of  Isaac  (Heb.  xi.  17-19 ;  Jas.  ii.  21), 
the  destruction  of  the  Egyptian  first-born  (Heb.  xi.  28),  the 
fall  of  Jericho  (xi.  30),  the  demonstrations  on  Mount  Sinai 
(xii.  18-21),  Elijah's  prophecy  of  drought  (James  v.  17),  Ba- 
laam's ass  speaking  (2  Pet.  ii.  16).     These  are  only  a  part  of 

votes  a  section  (omitted  in  the  English  translation)  to  a  few  of  the  miracles 
that  have  been  especially  assailed,  viz.  those  concerning  Balaam's  ass,  Joshua's 
stopping  the  sun,  Elijah's  translation,  and  Jonah  in  tlie  fish's  belly. 


262  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

the  miraculous  events  narrated  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  in 
many  of  these  cases  the  event  is  merely  alluded  to  incidentally. 
But  this  is  just  what  might  have  been  expected.  The  miracles 
of  the  Old  Testament  are  endorsed,  or  vouched  for,  by  the  New- 
Testament  implicitly  rather  than  explicitly.  That  is,  the 
whole  Old  Testament  history  and  economy  being  treated  as 
under  divine  direction,  the  several  incidents  recorded  in  the 
Old  Testament,  whether  miraculous  or  not,  are  presumptively 
included  in  this  general  endorsement.  It  would  therefore  be 
very  unreasonable  to  pronounce  the  unmentioned  miracles  less 
credible  than  the  others  simply  because  they  are  not  mentioned 
in  the  New  Testament,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  general  en- 
dorsement which  the  New  Testament  gives  to  the  supernatural 
character  of  the  Mosaic  dispensation  does  not  of  itself  preclude 
the  possibility  that  certain  of  the  narratives  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment may  be  regarded  as  more  or  less  inaccurate. 

But  the  question  may  be  asked,  whether  even  all  of  the  Old 
Testament  narratives  of  miracles  which  are  referred  to  in  the 
New  Testament  are  necessarily  for  that  reason  to  be  regarded 
as  authoritatively  vouched  for.  Or,  to  put  the  question  in 
another  form,  Does  faith  in  the  divine  authority  of  Christ  com- 
pel us  to  hold  that  the  Old  Testament  miracles  which  he  is  re- 
ported to  have  referred  to  really  occurred  as  they  are  described 
in  the  Old  Testament? 

"We  should  be  obliged  to  answer  this  question  with  an  un- 
qualified affirmative,  were  it  not  possible  to  take  a  middle 
course  between  this  and  a  disbelief  in  Christ's  trustworthiness. 
It  may  be  held  that,  though  Christ  is  to  be  absolutely  trusted, 
yet  the  evangelical  accounts  of  him  are  not  to  be  absohitely 
trusted.  Accordingly  one  may  entertain  the  opinion  that  in 
certain  instances  in  which  Jesus  is  said  to  have  referred  to  an 
Old  Testament  miracle  as  a  fact,  he  has  perhaps  been  misre- 
ported  by  the  historian.  Such  a  conjecture  may  be  without 
any  solid  foundation ;  but  it  is  certainly  possible  to  cherish  it, 
and  yet  retain  implicit  faith  in  Christ. 

Or  one  may  hold  that  Christ,  in  his  references  to  the  stories 
of  the  Old  Testament,  had  no  intention  of  pronouncing  them 
historically  true,  but  used   them   only  as   illustrations  of  the 


THE   RELATION   OF   CHRISTIANITY   TO   JUDAISM.  263 

truths  which  he  himself  wished  to  impress  on  his  hearers ;  just 
as  the  incidents  of  mythological  tales  are  often  referred  to  by- 
Christian  speakers  and  writers  as  if  they  were  facts,  though 
neither  the  speaker  nor  the  hearer  so  regards  them.  Here, 
too,  it  may  be  argued  in  reply  that  there  is  no  good  reason 
for  regarding  Jesus  as  making  such  a  use  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment as  the  one  alleged ;  but  still  it  is  possible  for  one  to  hold 
such  a  theory  without  impugning  the  trustworthiness  of  Christ 
himself. 

How,  then,  shall  we  answer  the  question  ?  It  can  be  fully 
answered  only  by  a  complete  exegetical  and  critical  examination 
of  the  New  Testament  records.  If  such  an  examination  should 
result  in  showing  conclusively  that  Jesus  is  inaccurately  reported 
when  he  is  said  to  refer  to  the  miracles  of  the  Old  Testament, 
and  that  the  authentic  accounts  of  him  show  him  to  have  been 
no  believer  in  the  genuineness  of  the  recorded  miracles,  or  that 
at  least  he  nowhere  plainly  avowed  or  implied  a  belief  in  their 
genuineness,  then  the  case  is  clear :  One  can  hold  what  views 
he  pleases  concerning  the  Old  Testament  miracles,  and  still 
remain  fully  loyal  to  Jesus  Christ. 

But  it  requires  no  elaborate  investigation  to  make  it  clear 
that  such  a  conception  of  the  New  Testament  records  cannot 
be  made  reasonably  plausible.  One  can  arbitrarily  maintain  it ; 
one  can  adopt  an  a  'priori  assumption  that  Jesus  never  could 
have  endorsed  as  genuine  the  miracles  to  which  he  is  reported 
to  have  referred.  But  such  a  view  must  always  be  a  pure 
assumption,  un sustained  by  any  candid  examination  of  the 
records  before  us.  Everywhere  Jesus  is  described  as  speaking 
with  the  utmost  reverence  of  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures ; 
everywhere  he  speaks  of  the  Jewish  people  as  the  recipient  of 
a  divine  revelation ;  everywhere  he  treats  the  events  of  Jewish 
history  as  facts,  and  as  instructive  facts.  There  is  not  the 
slightest  indication  that  he  represents  the  reputed  miracles  as 
any  less  authentic  or  less  instructive  than  the  other  events  of 
the  past.  jVIoreover,  he  is  everywhere  represented  as  himself 
working  miracles  and  as  appealing  to  them  as  a  divine  authenti- 
cation of  his  mission.  It  is,  therefore,  not  a  critical  exegesis, 
but   dogmatic   caprice,  which  can  find  in  the  sources  of    our 


264  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

information  any  indication  that  Jesus  did  not  hold  to  the  genu- 
ineness of  the  Old  Testament  miracles.  There  is,  therefore, 
no  ground,  except  that  of  subjective  caprice,  for  the  notion  that 
Jesus  referred  to  the  miracles  merely  by  way  of  illustration, 
without  meaning  to  imply  whether  he  regarded  them  as  fact 
or  fiction.  His  auditors  certainly  regarded  the  Old  Testament 
as  a  record  of  veritable  history,  miracles  and  all.  There  is 
no  indication  that  Jesus  had  any  different  conception.  And 
if  he  did,  there  is  as  much  reason  for  supposing  that  he  held 
the  ivliole  of  Jewish  history  to  be  legendary,  as  for  supposing 
that  he  held  the  miraculous  part  of  it  to  be  legendary. 

While,  therefore,  one  may  resort  to  either  of  these  methods 
of  invalidating  Christ's  endorsement  of  the  Old  Testament 
miracles,  one  cannot  do  so  reasonably.  There  remains  to  the 
skeptic  only  to  assume  that  Christ  himself,  though  he  believed 
in  the  reality  of  the  Old  Testament  miracles,  was  mistaken 
in  so  believing.  But  this,  as  we  have  before  seen,  is  equivalent 
to  a  rejection  of  the  authority  of  Christ  as  an  inspired  bearer 
of  a  divine  revelation. 

In  general,  therefore,  the  fact  of  miracles  under  the  Old 
Testament  dispensation  must  be  regarded  as  affirmed  by  Christ 
and  the  authors  of  the  New  Testament.  If  there  still  remain 
any  question,  it  must  have  reference  to  matters  of  detail.  It 
may  sometimes  be  doubted  whether  the  original  narrative  is  to 
be  understood  as  that  of  a  miracle.  It  is  possible  to  suppose,  for 
example,  in  the  case  of  the  history  of  Jonah,i  that  what  at  first 
blush  seems  to  be  an  account  of  miraculous  events,  was  in 
reality  quite  otherwise  meant.  But  the  presumption  will 
always  remain  that,  when  the  Old  Testament  presents  narratives 
of  palpably  miraculous  events,  and  these  are  referred  to  in  the 
New  Testament  as  historical,  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  authen- 
ticated by  such  reference. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  in  detail  on  the  several  references 
in  the  New  Testament  to  the  Old  Testament  miracles.  And  as 
to  the  unmentioned  ones,  we  can  only  say  that,  as  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, substantially  at  least  in  the  form  in  which  we  still  have 
it,  was  received  by  Christ  and  his  followers  as  a  trustworthy 

^  See  Excursus  VIII, 


THE   RELATION  OF  CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  265 

history  of  the  earlier  revelation,  the  presumption  is  that  the 
miracles  were  generally  accepted  as  historic  facts.  And  the 
same  answer  is  to  be  made  to  the  question :  — 

4.  How  far  do  Christ  and  his  disciples  authenticate  the  Old 
Testament  history  in  general  ?  On  the  one  hand,  they  cannot 
be  appealed  to  as  directly  vouching  for  all  the  details  of  that 
history,  especially  when  they  are  not  referred  to  ;  on  the  other, 
there  is  a  presumption  that,  since  they  certainly  accepted  the 
Old  Testament  in  general  as  a  sacred  record  of  God's  dealings 
with  men,  and  particularly  with  the  Jewish  race,  they  regarded 
the  book  as  trustworthy  in  its  details. 

The  use  made  of  the  Old  Testament  by  Christ  and  his  apos- 
tles is  mostly  or  wholly  a  practical  use.  Moral  and  religious 
lessons  are  enforced  not  only  by  appeal  to  psalmists  and 
prophets,  but  by  reference  also  to  historical  events.  That  the 
reference  is  made  for  such  a  purpose,  does  not  indicate  that  the 
events  referred  to  are  for  that  reason  any  the  less  historic ;  on 
the  contrary,  that  such  a  use  is  made  of  them  is  rather  a  witness 
to  their  superior  importance  as  historic  facts.  But  the  homiletic 
or  religious  use  made  of  Biblical  incidents  carries  with  it  that 
the  reference  is  generally  to  the  salient  and  suggestive  features 
of  the  events,  rather  than  to  the  subordinate  details.  Thus  Paul 
refers  to  the  original  sin  of  Adam  in  order  to  set  forth  the  scope 
of  the  atonement  of  Christ  (Eom.  v.  12-21) ;  he  does  not  here 
even  mention  Adam  by  name ;  but  he  does  in  1  Cor.  xv.  22,  45, 
where  a  similar  general  reference  is  made  to  Adam  as  bringing 
death  into  the  world,  as  contrasted  with  Christ,  the  life-giver. 
Now  Paul  here  does  not  specifically  refer  to  the  Book  of  Genesis, 
nor  even  to  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures  in  general.  No  one 
could  prove  from  these  passages  that  he  accepted  the  story  of 
the  fall  as  it  is  given  in  detail  in  Gen.  iii.  Yet  no  one  can 
doubt  that  he  really  alludes  to  the  familiar  history,  —  an  assur- 
ance which  is  confirmed  when  we  find  him  elsewhere  (2  Cor. 
xi.  3)  speaking  of  Eve's  being  tempted  by  the  serpent,  and 
again  (without  mention  of  the  serpent)  in  1  Tim.  ii.  13,  14. 
A  general  reference  to  the  creation  of  man  and  woman  is  made 
in  1  Cor.  xi.  8,  9,  and  in  1  Tim.  ii.  13,  but  without  allusion  to 
details.     But  no  one  can  doubt  that  he  w^as  familiar  with  the 


266  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Book  of  Genesis,  that  he  here  refers  to  it,  and  that  he  implicitly 
attests  the  history  which  is  there  given.  The  question  of  special 
interest,  however,  is  whether  Paul's  use  of  the  narrative  com- 
mits us  to  any  particular  interpretation  of  it.  Must  we,  on 
account  of  his  allusions  to  the  story,  understand  it  in  the  most 
literal  way  ?  Need  we  understand  it  as  real  history  at  all  ? 
May  it  not  be  a  mystical,  symbolical,  or  allegorical  representa- 
tion of  man's  primeval  history,  or  even  of  the  moral  development 
of  the  human  race  in  general  ?  This  view  of  the  narrative  of 
Gen.  ii.-iii.,  as  old  at  least  as  Philo,^  has  been  held  by  many 
interpreters  in  all  periods  of  the  Christian  Church.^  It  cannot 
be  called  an  inadmissible  or  heterodox  view,  provided  it  can  be 
made  clear  that  the  author  intended  the  story  to  be  understood  in 
this  manner.  Even  if  it  could  be  plausibly  made  out  that  such 
was  the  author's  intention,  it  would  still  be  possible  that  Paul 
understood  it  literally.  In  that  case  we  should  have  to  admit 
a  hermeneutical  error  on  the  apostle's  part.  It  seems  pretty 
certain  that  Paul  looked  on  the  history  of  the  first  pair  as  in 
part  at  least  historical.  The  comparison  of  Adam  with  Christ 
would  be  utterly  pointless  if  Adam  were  not  conceived  of  as  an 
individual,  and  as  a  historical  individual.  So  the  assertion  that 
Adam  was  first  formed,  then  Eve,  and  that  the  woman,  not  the 
man,  was  deceived  (1  Cor.  xi.  8,  9 ;  1  Tim.  ii.  13, 14),  must  imply 
that  Paul  regarded  those  two  features  of  the  story,  at  least,  as 
facts.  He  argues  from  the  facts,  and  draws  practical  inferences 
from  them,  —  all  which  would  be  absurd,  if  he  had  supposed 
the  story  to  be  a  purely  allegorical  representation  of  the  human 
race. 

If  we  look  further  in  the  New  Testament  for  references  to 
this  section  of  Genesis,  we  find  one  in  Matt.  xix.  4—6  (cf.  Mark 
X.  6-9),  where  Christ  distinctly  refers  to  the  creation  of  man, 
the  original  distinction  of  sex,  and  the  institution  of  marriage, 
as  recorded  in  Gen.  i.  27,  ii.  24.  We  must  believe  that,  so  far 
at  least  as  this  point  is  concerned,  he  speaks  of  the  narrative  as 

^  On  the  Creation  of  the  World,  \\  55-61.  He  makes  the  serpent  symbolic 
of  pleasure. 

'^  See  Quarry,  Genesis  and  its  Authorship,  pp.  29  sqq.,  for  illustratioas  of  this 
statement. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  267 

historical.  When  he  contrasted  the  Mosaic  law  of  divorce  with 
what  God  instituted  "  from  the  beginning,"  there  would  have 
been  no  meaning  in  his  reply  to  the  Jews'  question,  unless  he 
had  assumed  it  to  be  a  fact,  as  recorded  in  Genesis,  that  there 
was  one  original  human  pair  united  together  in  marriage. 
Further,  we  lind  in  Eev.  ii.  7,  xxii.  2,  a  "tree  of  life "  given  as  the 
conspicuous  feature  of  the  heavenly  Paradise.  This,  however, 
though  undoubtedly  an  allusion  to  Gen.  ii.  9,  iii.  22,  is  not  such 
a  reference  as  necessarily  involves  any  opinion  as  to  the  historical 
character  of  the  original  tree  of  life.  Indeed  it  has  been  argued 
that,  this  heavenly  tree  of  life  being  evidently  allegorical,  we 
may  reason  back  to  the  conclusion  that  the  first  one  was  no  less 
so.^  But  this  is  manifestly  fallacious.  As  well  might  it  be 
inferred  from  Eev.  xxi.  2,  where  the  new  Jerusalem  is  described 
as  seen  coming  down  out  of  heaven,  that,  the  language  being 
plainly  allegorical,  the  old  Jerusalem  of  Palestine,  to  which 
allusion  is  made,  was  allegorical  also.  On  the  contrary,  since 
facts  furnish  the  basis  of  figures,  the  figurative  language  of 
the  Apocalypse  would  seem  to  point  to  a  historic  fact  as  its 
foundation. 

If  we  examine  the  original  history  itself,  the  first  observa- 
tion to  be  made  is,  that  the  narrative  of  Gen.  i.-iii.  is  indissolvibly 
connected  with  what  follows.  The  same  Adam  and  Eve  there 
described  as  created  and  tempted  are  afterwards  described  as 
having  children,  who  in  turn  also  have  children.  The  human 
race  is  represented  as  proceeding  from  this  pair,  and  human 
history  as  beginning  with  them.  If  Gen.  i.-iii.  are  allegorical 
throughout,  we  have  no  right  to  make  the  allegory  end  with 
iii.  24.  Allegorical  characters  cannot  be  transformed  into  real 
characters.  If  Adam  and  Eve  were  unreal  personages  at 
the  outset,  they  must  have  remained  so  to  the  end.  And 
their  children  and  children's  children  must  have  been  equally 
allegorical. 

A  certain  historical  element  must,  then,  be  assumed  to  be- 
long to  these  chapters,  at  least  in  the  intention  of  the  writer.     A 
modification   of   the   allegorical    hypothesis,  however,  may  be 
adopted,  to  the  effect  that  on  a  basis  of  historic  fact  the  author 
^  So  Quarry,  Genesis,  etc.,  p.  113. 


268  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

has  constructed  a  description  which  largely  abounds  in  alle- 
goric or  symbolic  features.  This  hypothesis  may  be  that 
these  features  are  mythical,  or  that  they  are  the  inventions  of 
the  writer  himself ;  in  either  case  they  are  supposed  to  embody 
certain  moral  and  religious  ideas.  In  favor  of  this  view  it  is 
urged  that  the  narrative  abounds  in  representations  which  are 
so  improbable  in  themselves,  and  so  unlike  anything  else  in 
sacred  history,  that  the  writer  must  have  intended  to  be  un- 
derstood as  veiling  his  meaning  under  a  mystical  garb.  The 
making  of  a  human  body  first,  and  putting  life  into  it  after- 
wards ;  a  tree  whose  fruit  could  confer  immortality,  and  an- 
other whose  fruit  bestowed  the  power  of  moral  distinctions  ; 
the  construction  of  a  woman  out  of  a  man's  rib ;  a  serpent  en- 
dowed with  the  faculty  of  speech,  and  with  intellectual  cunning 
sufficient  to  tempt  the  woman  to  disobedience ;  Jehovah  walking 
in  the  garden,  and  the  guilty  pair  hiding  from  him ;  the  cursing 
of  the  serpent  and  condemning  him  to  go  on  his  belly  (as  he 
must  have  done  already  before),  —  all  these  are  certainly  traits 
which  do  not  characterize  history  in  general,  whether  sacred  or 
profane.  They  resemble  the  fabulous  or  the  mythical.  Did 
the  writer  mean  to  be  understood  literally  ? 

The  question  is  not  altogether  easy  to  answer.  Even  though 
one  should  find  himself  unable  to  believe  that  the  facts  ever 
literally  corresponded  to  the  description,  it  would  not  follow  but 
that  the  writer  meant  it  all  literally.  It  is  impossible  to  de- 
termine at  what  point  a  narrative  becomes  so  improbable  that 
we  cannot  suppose  the  writer  to  believe  in  the  truth  of  what  he 
writes.  It  is  certain  that  many  of  the  readers  of  the  story  — 
perhaps  the  larger  part  of  them  —  have  believed  in  the  literal 
truth  of  it.  If  so,  it  is  certainly  possible  that  the  writer  did  the 
same.  Still  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  to  argue,  from  the  internal 
evidence,  that  the  writer  must  have  meant  to  be  understood 
allegorically.  Can  it  be  that  a  Hebrew  theist  could  represent 
Jehovah  as  jealous  of  man's  advance  in  knowledge,  and  as 
afraid  lest  he  might  attain  immortality  through  the  eating  of 
a  certain  fruit  (Gen.  iii.  22)  ?  Can  it  be  that  he  really  regarded 
human  sin  as  first  introduced  into  the  world  through  the  cun- 
ning persuasions  of  a  talking  snake  ?     Can  it  be  that  he  could 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  269 

have  thought  the  tree  of  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  capable 
of  producing  such  a  marvellous  physical,  mental,  and  moral 
effect  on  human  beings  ?  Can  it  be  that  he  conceived  of  a  rib 
as  transmogrified  into  a  woman  ?  Does  not  the  very  crowding 
together  of  so  many  singular  things  argue  a  very  peculiar  style 
of  composition  ?  Is  it  not  warrantable  in  itself,  as  well  as  con- 
sonant with  sound  religious  sense,  to  suppose  that  these  feat- 
ures in  the  story  are  figures  and  symbols  of  truths  which  the 
writer  could  in  no  other  way  so  well  convey  ?  A  substratum 
of  historic  fact  may  be  assumed ;  but  may  not  the  clothing 
be  deemed  allegoric  ? 

This  is  certainly  plausible ;  and  it  will  hardly  be  possible 
absolutely  to  disprove  the  correctness  of  this  hypothesis.  There 
are  many  sporadic  specimens  of  parables,  and  even  of  fables,  in 
the  Bible ;  may  not  this  be  a  historico-parabolic  tale  ?  The 
supposition  is  all  the  more  plausible,  inasmuch  as  the  topics 
treated  of  belong  to  a  time  and  a  sphere  so  entirely  strange  to 
human  experience.  It  seems  not  improbable  that  a  vivid  im- 
pression of  the  primeval  history  and  its  moral  significance 
could  be  best  given  in  certain  graphic  pictures  and  symbolic 
representations,  which  may  not  literally  correspond  to  the  ac- 
tual facts.  The  common  interpretation  of  the  temptation  con- 
firms to  some  extent  this  conception.  It  is  usually  assumed 
that  the  real  tempter  was  not  the  serpent,  but  the  devil.  The 
devil  is  called  "  that  old  serpent "  in  Eev.  xx.  2.  The  serpent 
has  generally  been  made  a  type  of  malicious  cunning.  If  Eve 
was  in  fact  tempted  by  Satan,  may  it  not  be  that  this  intro- 
duction of  the  serpent  in  the  narrative  is  merely  a  parabolic 
way  of  stating  the  truth  ?  As  soon  as  we  assume  Satan  to 
have  been  at  work,  merely  using  the  serpent  as  his  tool,  we  de- 
part from  the  literal  sense  of  the  account ;  for  this  says  ex- 
plicitly that  the  serpent  did  the  tempting,  being  more  subtile 
than  the  other  beasts.  It  would  be  only  departing  one  step 
further  from  the  literal  sense  to  assume  that  there  was  no 
literal  serpent  concerned  in  the  temptation,  but  that  the  writer 
describes  the  Satanic  work  under  the  guise  of  a  temptation 
effected  through  a  serpent,  leaving  it  undetermined  just  what 
the  actual  process  of  the  temptation  was. 


270  SUPERNATURAL  RE\T:LATI0N. 

So  as  regards  certain  other  features  of  Gen.  ii.  and  iii.  To 
some  minds  the  story  of  the  rib  is  the  most  difficult  to  believe, 
if  taken  in  all  literalness.  To  represent  God  as  like  a  surgeon 
putting  Adam  into  a  state  of  insensibility,  cutting  out  a  rib, 
and  then  closing  up  the  wound,  is  certainly  not  in  harmony 
with  ordinary  conceptions  of  the  divine  working.  To  other 
minds  the  statements  about  the  two  trees  are  especially  offen- 
sive. To  others  again  it  seems  strange  that  the  effect  of  dis- 
obedience should  be  described  as  simply  shame  on  account  of 
physical  nakedness.  In  all  these  things  we  may  find  symbolic 
suggestions  of  deep  spiritual  truths ;  ^  but  if  the  literal  sense  is 
the  whole  sense,  the  story  seems  crass,  if  not  even  fantastic 
and  grotesque. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume 
that  the  literal  sense  is  the  whole  sense.  If  a  fictitious  repre- 
sentation can  be  symbolic  of  spiritual  truth,  equally  well,  or 
better  still,  may  facts  convey  such  instruction.  And  when  we 
bear  in  mind  that  ordinary  human  experience  can  furnish  no 
parallel  to  the  conditions  of  creation  and  of  man's  primeval 
history,  we  see  reason  for  not  being  too  positive  as  to  what  may 
or  may  not  have  been  the  exact  truth  relative  to  that  distant 
and  unique  period  with  which  the  first  chapters  of  Genesis  have 
to  do.  It  has  often  been  remarked  of  late  years  that  that  narra- 
tive is  much  more  true  to  intrinsic  probability,  in  picturing  the 
primitive  man,  as  a  being  of  childlike  simplicity  and  artlessness, 
than  the  older  theological  conceptions  of  him,  according  to 
which  he  was  from  the  very  first  of  super-angelic  capacities 
and  knowledge.  The  statements  about  the  two  trees  are  the 
most  characteristic  and  suggestive  in  the  whole  section.  To 
many  minds  these  trees  are  unmistakably  symbolic,  —  not  real 
trees,  but  poetic  representations  of  the  motives  and  aims  of 
human  action.  But  to  others  not  only  is  there  nothing  incredi- 
ble in  supposing  that  the  trees  were  real,  but  this  supposition 
seems  the  most  in  accordance  with  what  must  have  been  the 
original  mental  and  moral  condition  of  the  primeval  man.  As 
with  young  children  the  first  great  moral  struggle  has  generally 
to  do  with  some  command  concerning  an  outward  palpable 
^  Cf.  Delitzscli,  Commenlar  iiber  die  Genesis. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  271 

object,  —  a  command  not  to  touch  this  or  that,  or  to  go  here  or 
there,  —  and  not  one  relating  to  the  general  duty  of  benevolence  ; 
so  the  question  whether  the  first  man,  in  the  incipiency  of  his 
moral  development,  was  to  remain  loyal  to  God  could  be  better 
tested  by  a  command  respecting  the  enjoyment  of  certain  fruits 
than  by  abstract  precepts  which  as  yet  must  have  been  unin- 
telligible to  him.  As  to  any  poisonous  properties  in  the  tree 
of  knowledge,  such  as  many  commentators  have  told  about, 
the  narrative  itself  says  nothing.^  In  what  sense  it  conferred 
knowledge  the  sequel  of  the  eating  indicates.  The  disobedience 
in  the  eating  produced  the  moral  effect  of  developing  an  evil 
conscience  ;  the  guilty  pair  fled  from  the  presence  of  Jehovah. 
There  is  more  appearance  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the 
writer  to  ascribe  a  peculiar  physical  power  to  the  other  tree. 
Its  name,  and  especially  the  language  which  Jehovah  is  repre- 
sented as  using  in  iii.  22,  seem  to  imply  that  its  fruit  was  con- 
ceived as  capable  of  conferring  physical  immortality.  But  it  is 
in  accordance  with  the  analogy  of  the  name  and  function  of  the 
other  tree,  and  involves  a  very  slight  straining  of  the  apparent 
literal  sense  of  the  description,  if  we  regard  the  tree  of  life  as 
symbolizing  the  reward  of  obedience.  It  was  the  palpable 
pledge  of  the  divine  favor.  It  represented,  but  did  not  confer, 
the  "  life  "  which  was  the  real  reward.  And  as  a  child,  whose 
disobedience  has  caused  him  to  forfeit  a  promised  reward,  is 
made  to  feel  his  guilt  most  keenly  by  being  removed  from  all 
sight  and  reach  of  the  expected  gift,  especially  since  by  a 
natural  confusion  of  thought  he  is  apt  to  imagine  that  if  he 
can  only  by  any  means  get  hold  of  the  coveted  object  he  in 
some  sense  neutralizes  the  effect  of  his  disobedience ;  so  it  was 
necessary  for  Jehovah  to  drive  Adam  and  Eve  away  from  the  tree 
whose  fruit  they  might  look  on  as  somehow  able  to  repair  the 
damage  which  their  sin  had  wrought.  The  language  of  iii.  22 
admits  this  construction  with  certainly  less  forcing  of  its  strict 
sense  than  is  used  when  in  the  account  of  the  temptation  we 
understand  the  real  tempter  to  be,  not  the  serpent,  but  Satan. 
This  illustrates  what  is  most  probably  the  correct  exegesis 

^  Even  Delitzsch,  however  {Comment ar  iiber  die  Genesis  on  ii.  9),  assumes 
that  the  tree  had  in  it  such  a  quality  for  one  who  disobediently  ate  of  it. 


272  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

of  this  unique  section.  Just  how  far  the  literal  meaning  must 
be  pressed,  it  may  be  difficult  to  determine.  But  there  is  no 
sufficient  ground  for  thinking  that  the  writer  did  not  mean  to 
be  understood  as  narrating  substantial  history.  And  the  ref- 
erence which  Paul  makes  to  the  story  of  the  temptation  cannot 
naturally  be  understood  otherwise  than  as  implying  that  he 
believed  in  its  essential  truthfulness. 

The  case  is  somewhat  similar  with  regard  to  the  narrative  of 
the  creation  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis.  Here,  however,  the 
direct  references  in  the  New  Testament  are  more  scanty,  and 
the  chief  interest  gathers  around  the  relation  of  the  narrative 
to  the  results  of  geological  research.  If  we  except  general 
statements  about  God  as  Creator,  the  New  Testament  nowhere 
makes  reference  to  this  chapter  except  in  Matt.  xix.  4  (cf.  Mark 
X.  6),  where  Christ  quotes  Gen.  i.  27,  and  in  2  Cor.  iv.  6,  where 
Paul  alludes  to  Gen.  i.  3.  Incidentally  the  first  and  the  last  of 
the  works  of  the  six  days  are  thus  referred  to,  and  by  implica- 
tion endorsed  as  facts. 

There  is  not  the  same  temptation  to  resort  to  the  allegorical 
interpretation  with  reference  to  chapter  i.  as  with  reference  to 
chapters  ii.  and  iii.  But  those  who  despair  of  seeing  any  recon- 
ciliation effected  between  the  testimony  of  Genesis  and  that  of 
geology  are  often  disposed  to  find  relief  in  the  hypothesis 
that  the  author  of  Gen.  i.  really  did  not  design  to  narrate  his- 
toric or  geologic  facts  at  all,  but  only  to  set  forth  the  truth  that 
one  personal  God  is  the  Sovereign  of  the  universe.  There  is  an 
important  truth  in  this  view ;  but  it  is  easy  to  overwork  it. 
Thus,  it  is  observed  that  the  plan  of  the  chapter  is  highly 
artistic,  especially  in  that  there  is  a  manifest  correspondence 
between  each  of  the  first  three  days  and  the  corresponding  days 
in  the  second  triad.  That  is,  the  first  day  describes  the  cre- 
ation of  light,  and  the  fourth,  that  of  the  luminaries  ;  the  second, 
the  formation  of  the  realms  of  air  and  water,  and  the  fifth,  that 
of  the  fowls  and  fishes  which  inhabit  those  elements ;  the  third, 
the  preparation  of  the  dry  land,  and  the  sixth,  that  of  land 
animals  and  man,  the  inhabitants  of  the  dry  land.  From  this 
it  is  inferred  that  the  description  is  purely  ideal,  not  historical, 
that  the  author  had  no  thought  of  portraying  the  literal  order  of 


THE   RELATION  OF  CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  273 

geologic  events,  that  his  point  of  view  was  purely  theological,  and 
that  therefore  it  is  idle  to  talk  of  a  real  or  possible  contradiction 
between  this  description  and  the  conclusions  of  geologists.^ 

This,  however,  is  a  somewhat  too  easy  way  of  getting  over  a 
difficulty.  No  doubt  the  narrative  has  a  monotheistic  and  re- 
ligious aim ;  no  doubt  also  the  arrangement  is  ideal  and  artis- 
tic. But  from  this  it  does  not  follow  that  the  writer  did  not 
mean  to  be  understood  as  narrating  facts.  Facts  may  be  both 
real  and  ideal.  If  the  author  wished  only  to  set  forth  the  fact 
that  God  is  the  Maker  and  Euler  of  all  things,  he  could  have 
done  so  in  two  or  three  sentences,  summarily  stating  the  grand 
truth,  without  going  into  a  detailed  account  of  a  creative  process. 
He  would  thus  never  have  given  rise  to  the  vexed  questions 
about  the  harmony  or  disharmony  between  his  narrative  and 
the  truths  of  geology.  The  very  fact  that,  instead  of  confining 
himself  to  such  a  general  statement,  he  undertook  to  give  a 
particular  history  of  the  process  of  creation,  would  seem  to 
indicate  that  he  thought  there  really  was  such  a  process.  Other- 
wise it  is  hard  to  see  why  he  invented  it.  It  was  not  necessary 
in  order  to  the  enunciation  of  the  theological  and  religious  truth 
which  alone  he  is  supposed  to  have  aimed  to  impress  on  his 
readers.  By  introducing  it  he  has  in  fact  made  the  impression 
that  he  meant  to  describe  a  real  process,  though  the  ideality  and 
beauty  of  the  form  of  his  description  was  long  ago  recognized. 

On  the  whole,  then,  we  can  hardly  do  better  than  to  regard 
the  question  as  still  awaiting  a  full  solution.  In  general,  it  is  a 
fixed  and  remarkable  fact  that  in  its  grand  features  the  Mosaic 
account  strikingly  corresponds  with  the  conclusions  of  geologists, 
however  difficult  or  impossible  it  may  be  to  bring  the  details 
into  complete  harmony. 

The  other  references  in  the  New  Testament  to  the  historical 
parts  of  the  Old  can  be  dealt  with  more  briefly.  In  general, 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  question  that,  when  such  a  reference 
is  made,  it  implies  on  the  part  of  the  author  a  belief  in  the 
authenticity  of  the  record  referred  to.    For  example,  when  Jesus 

1  So,  e.  ff.,  Prof.  W.  G.  Elmslie  on  The  First  Chapter  of  Genesis  in  Con. 
temporary  Review,  December,  1887,  where  this  view  is  forcibly  and  eloquently 
set  forth, 

18 


274  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

quoted  in  his  -own  defense  the  conduct  of  David  in  eating  the 
shew-bread  (Matt.  xii.  3,  4),  it  is  clear  that  he  regarded  the 
incident  as  a  historic  fact.     And  so  with  all  similar  cases. 

There  is  one  class  of  references,  however,  respecting  which 
there  is  more  doubt  how  far  their  testimony  goes ;  we  mean 
those  references  which  touch  on  a  question  of  authorship. 
When  Christ  speaks  of  Moses  and  the  law  of  Moses,  we  must 
distinguish  between  an  allegation  that  Moses  commanded  this 
or  that,  and  an  allegation  that  he  ivrote  this  or  that.  The  ex- 
plicit statement  that  Moses  wrote  anything  is  made  by  Christ 
only  twice,  viz.,  in  Mark  x.  5,  and  in  John  v.  45-47.^  But  in 
either  case  the  reference  is  only  to  a  specific  thing,  and  cannot 
be  adduced  as  evidence  concerning  the  composition  of  the  Pen- 
tateuch in  general.  Where  we  read  about  the  "  law  of  Moses  " 
(Luke  xxiv.  44 ;  John  vii.  23),  or  the  "  book  of  Moses  "  (Mark 
xii.  26),  or  about  Moses  in  general  as  a  legislator  (Mark  i.  44, 
vii.  10 ;  Luke  xvi.  29 ;  John  v.  45,  vii.  19),  we  can  infer  no  more 
than  that  Moses  was  regarded  as  the  promulgator,  under  divine 
direction,  of  the  legal  part  of  the  Pentateuch ;  whether  he  himself 
wrote  down  the  whole  code,  or  delivered  it  in  part  orally,  to  be  re- 
corded afterwards  by  others,  is  left  undecided  by  such  references. 

But  even  if  it  should  be  admitted  that  in  Jesus'  time  the  Pen- 
tateuch was  popularly  ascribed  to  Moses  in  the  sense  that  he 
wrote  the  whole  of  it,  yet  a  general  reference  to  the  book,  or  a 
particular  quotation  from  it  as  the  book  of  Moses,  does  not 
necessarily  commit  Christ  or  an  apostle  to  a  positive  endorse- 
ment of  this  popular  opinion. ^  Such  quotations  and  references 
concern  the  matter,  not  the  autJwr,  of  the  book.  The  book  would 
most  naturally  be  designated  according  to  the  current  title  of  it. 
If  Moses  was  regarded  as  the  promulgator  of  the  Pentateuchal 
laws,  the  Pentateuch  would  almost  of  necessity  be  called  the 
book  of  Moses,  even  though  parts  of  it  may  have  been  written 
by  other  men.     Paul,   therefore,  in  speaking  of  the  reading  of 

^  The  Saddupeps  sppak  of  the  Levirate  law  as  having  been  written  by  Moses, 
Mark  xii.  19  ;  Luke  xx.  28. 

^  So  one  may  quote  a  passage  as  from  "ITomer,"  without  meaning  to  com- 
mit himself  necessarily  to  the  theory  of  the  Ilonicric  authorship  of  all  the  so- 
called  Homeric  books. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  275 

the  Scripture  in  the  synagogues,  could  say,  "  Whensoever  Moses 
is  read"  (2  Cor.  iii.  15),  without  necessarily  meaning  to  be  under- 
stood as  affirming  that  Moses  himself  wrote  all  of  the  books 
which  went  by  his  name.  Or  when  he  quotes  a  particular 
passage,  and  prefaces  it  by  saying,  "  Moses  describeth  "  (Eom.  x. 
5),  or  "Moses  saith"  (x.  19),  the  stress  is  laid  on  the  thing  said, 
not  on  the  person  saying  it,  and  does  not  necessarily  mean  more 
than  that  we  read  in  the  book  of  Moses  this  or  that.^ 

The  case  is  similar  as  regards  references  to  the  Psalter.  The 
phrase  "  in  David,"  as  used  in  Heb.  iv.  7,  most  naturally  means, 
"in  the  book  commonly  called  the  Psalms  of  David."  The  pas- 
sage referred  to  (Ps.  xcv.  7,  8)  is  in  a  psalm  not  ascribed  to 
David  or  any  one  else.  It  would  be  unwarrantable  to  try  to 
find  in  this  reference  to  the  passage  authentic  information  as  to 
the  authorship,  when  in  the  original  Hebrew  the  psalm  is  anony- 
mous. And  even  when  Paul  uses  the  expression,  "  David  saith  " 
(as  in  Rom.  iv.  6,  xi.  9),  inasmuch  as  the  point  of  the  quotation 
lies  in  the  thing  said,  not  in  the  person  who  said  it,  the  formula 
of  quotation  is  not  necessarily  to  be  understood  as  meaning  any- 
thing more  than  that  the  words  quoted  are  found  in  the  book 
commonly  called  the  Psalms  of  David.  The  case  is  somewhat 
different  with  the  references  to  David  in  Matt.  xxii.  43-45 
(Mark  xii.  35-37 ;  Luke  xx.  41-44),  where  the  point  of  the  re- 
ference depends  on  the  Davidic  authorship  of  Ps.  ex. ;  and  also 
with  the  use  which  Peter  (Acts  ii.  25-33)  and  Paul  (Acts  xiii. 
35-37)  make  of  Ps.  xvi. 

The  general  attestation  which  Christ  and  his  disciples  give 
to  the  Old  Testament  history  is  not  impaired  by  the  fact  that 
they  also,  in  some  cases,  make  statements  that  appear  to  rest 
on  Jewish  tradition,  as  distinct  from  the  Old  Testament 
writings,  unless  the  tradition  is  contrary  to  the  Scriptures. 
And  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  any  such  contradiction  can 
be  found.  Where  a  tradition  is  followed,  we  can  only  say  that 
this  is  something  additional  to  the  Scriptural  history.  The 
following  are  instances :  In  2  Tim.  iii.  8,  Jannes  and  Jambres 
are  given  as  the  names  of  the  magicians  who  withstood  Moses ; 

^  Fide,  on  the  general  subject  of  the  witness  of  the  New  Testament  to  the 
Old,  F.  Watson,  The  Law  and  the  Prophets,  Excursus,  pp.  25  sqq. 


276  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

whereas  in  Exodus  no  names  are  mentioned.  A  Jewish  tra- 
dition, found  in  the  Talmud,  had  given  these  as  the  names 
of  the  magicians,  together  with  other  particulars  about  them.i 
Whether  the  names  are  genuine  or  not,  is  of  little  account. 
Paul  used  them  as  those  familiarly  known  to  his  readers ;  and 
nothing  depended  on  the  accuracy  of  the  tradition.  Even  if 
we  had  to  assume,  with  Schottgen,  that  Paul  was  divinely 
inspired  to  confirm  the  Jewish  tradition  as  to  the  names, 
still  his  using  them  in  no  way  brings  the  passage  into  any 
disagreement  with  the  history  as  given  in  Exodus.  A  still 
more  striking  instance  of  Jewish  tradition  in  the  New  Tes- 
tament is  found  in  1  Cor.  x.  4.  Paul  here  alludes  to  a 
notion  current  among  the  Jews,  that  a  rock  flowing  with 
water  followed  the  Israelites  in  their  wanderings.  It  is 
only  an  allusion,  however.  Paul  does  not  endorse  the  story, 
but  spiritualizes  it.  He  says  there  was  a  spiritual  rock 
that  followed  the  Jews ;  he  does  not  imply  that  he  adopted 
the  notion  that  a  literal  rock  followed  them.  In  Jude  9,  where 
reference  is  made  to  a  contention  between  Michael  and  Satan, 
use  is  made  of  a  Jewish  legend  concerning  the  burial  of  Moses. 
And  in  verses  14,  15,  a  quotation  is  made  from  the  apocryphal 
Book  of  Enoch.  Here  the  writer  appears  to  accept  the  tra- 
ditions. But  whatever  may  be  made  out  of  these  references 
(and  being  in  a  deutero-canonical  book  they  are  of  less  sig- 
nificance than  otherwise),  they  do  not  at  all  affect  the  general 
question  of  New  Testament  references  to  the  Old. 

In  some  other  cases  also  there  are  found  modifications  of  Old 
Testament  incidents,  or  additions  to  them,  which  may  rest  on 
oral  tradition.  In  the  description,  given  in  Heb.  xi.  33-38,  of 
the  doings  and  sufferings  of  the  Hebrew  saints  and  heroes, 
there  are  features  which  cannot  be  traced  directly  to  any  record 
in  the  Old  Testament.  Some  of  them  (especially  in  verses  35- 
37)  can  be  illustrated  only  by  the  Books  of  the  Maccabees ; 
and  one  of  them  —  the  being  sawn  asunder  —  undoubtedly 
refers  to  a  current  tradition  that  the  prophet  Isaiah  was  thus 
put  to  death.  In  Acts  vii.  53,  Gal.  iii.  19,  and  Heb.  ii.  2,  the 
law  is  said  to  have  been  ordained  through  angels,  —  a  statement 
^  For  which  cf.  Schottgen,  Horae  Hebraicae,  in  loc. 


THE   RELATION  OF   CHRISTIANITY  TO  JUDAISM.  277 

which  agrees  with  one  found  in  Josephus  (Ant.  xv.  5,  3),  and 
with  the  Kabbinical  notion,  but  nowhere  distinctly  intimated 
in  the  Old  Testament.  The  poetic  passage  in  Deut.  xxxiii.  2, 
where  Jehovah  is  said  to  have  come  "  from  the  ten  thousands 
of  holy  ones,"  especially  in  the  LXX.  version,  where  the  last 
clause  of  the  verse  reads,  "on  his  right  hand  angels  with  him," 
is  the  only  one  in  the  Old  Testament  which  could  suggest  the 
conception.  In  Luke  iv.  25,  and  James  v,  17,  the  length  of 
the  drought  foretold  by  Elijah  is  definitely  given  as  three  years 
and  a  half,  though  in  the  Old  Testament  the  length  is  not 
given.  The  "third  year "  of  1  Kings  xviii.  1,  leaves  us  un- 
certain from  what  point  the  reckoning  was  made.  The  definite 
period  of  three  years  and  a  half  may  very  probably  have  been 
adopted  from  a  common  tradition.  It  does  not  contradict  the 
narrative  in  the  Book  of  Kings;  it  is  simply  an  exact  figure 
which  can  easily  enough  be  made  to  harmonize  with  that 
narrative,  though  not  directly  suggested  by  it.^ 

^  Professor  Ladd  (^Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  69)  finds  this  tradi- 
tion "  divergent"  from  the  Old  Testament  account,  and  discovers  in  the  phrase 
im  r.acrav  ttjv  yrjv  "  a  popular  hyperbole  which  spoke  of  the  drought  as  extend- 
ing over  the  whole  earth."  This,  however,  hardly  seems  to  be  pertinent  as  an 
instance  of  Christ's  "  uncritical  attitude  "  towards  details ;  for  y^  surely  means 
"  land  "  as  well  as  "  earth"  (vide  Thayer's  Grimm's  Lexicon,  su6  voc);  and  as  the 
same  double  meaning  belongs  to  ^97^*  one  might  find  the  same  hyperbole  in 
1  Kings  xviii.  1.  Professor  Ladd  finds  also  in  Luke  xvii.  27,  and  Matt.  xxiv. 
38,  "  features  added  to  the  narrative  of  Genesis,"  viz.,  the  eating,  drinking,  and 
marrying,  and  infers  from  them  that  Christ  here  was  following  "  a  tradition  of 
the  Flood  which  differed  in  some  particulars  from  that  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures." 
But  surely  it  hardly  required  a  special  tradition  to  suggest  to  Christ  that  the 
antediluvians  were  in  the  habit  of  eating,  drinking,  and  marrying !  Not  more 
reason  is  there  for  the  opinion  that  the  drinking  is  "  in  apparent  contradiction  of 
the  narrative  of  Gen.  ix.  20."  Professor  Wright's  reply  {Divine  Authority  of  the 
Bible,  p.  185),  that  it  is  not  implied  in  this  narrative  that  no  wine  was  made 
before  the  Flood,  may  be  sufficient ;  but  a  more  obvious  one  is  that  Christ  says 
nothing  about  wine  at  all.  Could  not  the  antediluvians  drink  water?  A 
German  comic  song  represents  Noah  as  praying  for  a  new  kind  of  beverage 
after  the  Flood,  on  the  ground  that  he  has  lost  his  relish  for  water, 

"  For  that  therein  have  drowned  been 
All  sinful  beasts  and  sons  of  men." 

But  before  that  calamity  what  good  reason  for  abstaining  from  water-drinking 
could  there  have  been? 


278  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

Whatever  in  the  New  Testament  writings  may  have  been 
derived  from  tradition,  as  distinct  from  the  Old  Testament 
history,  is,  then,  at  the  most  very  slight,  and  in  no  case  in 
conflict  with  that  history.  At  the  same  time  in  their  use  of 
the  history  there  is  no  painful  following  of  minute  details. 
As  in  quoting  from  the  Old  Testament  Christ  and  his  apostles 
are  not  careful  about  literal  exactness,  so  in  referring  to  Old 
Testament  history  they  are  more  concerned  about  the  substance 
than  about  the  form.  It  is  manifest  that  they  looked  upon  that 
history  as  in  a  very  peculiar  sense  the  arena  on  which  God 
had  displayed  his  power  and  grace.  They  found  intimations, 
lessons,  and  types  such  as  no  other  history  contained.  It  was 
to  them  a  sacred  history. 

The  foregoing  has  in  part  anticipated  what  needs  to  be  more 
particularly  considered  under  the  head  of  the  record  of  divine 
revelation. 


THE   RECOKD  OF   REVELATION.  —  LNSPIRATION.  279 


CHAPTEE   IX. 

THE    RECORD    OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION. 

THE  distinction  between  revelation  and  the  record  of 
revelation  is  one  which,  though  often  overlooked,  is 
legitimate  and  important.  Jesus  left  no  written  record  of  his 
work  and  words ;  but  he  revealed  the  divine  character  and  will ; 
and  even  if  no  one  else  had  ever  prepared  a  written  account 
of  his  mission,  what  he  said  and  did  would  none  the  less  have 
been  a  divine  revelation  which  would  have  left  its  impress 
not  only  on  his  associates  and  contemporaries,  but  through 
tradition  on  succeeding  generations.  More  particularly  we 
may  observe :  — 

1.  Revelation  is  prior  and  superior  to  the  record  of  it.  The 
discovery  of  America  was  more  important  than  the  history  of 
the  discovery;  the  invention  of  the  telegraph,  of  more  conse- 
quence than  written  descriptions  of  the  invention.  It  is  equally 
clear  that  God's  original  manifestation  of  himself  was  a  weigh- 
tier matter  than  the  Scriptural  records  of  it.  The  records  are 
important  only  because  the  revelation  was  important.  In  a 
certain  sense  it  was  an  accidental  circumstance  that  the  revela- 
tion became  a  subject  of  written  record.  This  method  of  trans- 
mitting the  divine  message  may  be  the  best  available  method ; 
but  it  is  still  only  the  mode  of  transmission ;  it  is  not  the 
message  itself.  Oral  tradition  may  serve  the  same  purpose ;  in 
some  instances  it  has  been  the  actual  and  even  the  only  possible 
means  of  communicating  the  message.  The  primeval  revelation, 
if  there  was  one,  must  have  been  handed  down  at  first  without 
a  written  record.  The  gospel  itself  did  its  first  work,  and  left 
its  ineradicable  impress  on  the  world,  before  the  narrative  of 
Christ's  work  became  committed  to  writing.  If  the  art  of 
writing  had  never  been  known,  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  a 
divine   revelation  would   have  been  impossible  or  ineffective. 


280  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

Aud  in  any  case  the  revelation  —  the  message  of  salvation  — 
is  of  more  account  than  the  means  by  which  it  is  recorded. 

2.  It  is  likewise  obvious  that  the  divine  revelation  is  of  more 
account  than  the  state  of  mind  of  those  who  wrote  the  record 
of  it.  In  other  words,  revelation  outranks  in  importance  the 
inspiration  of  the  sacred  writers.  If  it  was  in  a  certain  sense 
non-essential  that  the  revelation  should  be  scripturally  recorded 
at  all,  still  more  non-essential  must  it  be  that  the  writers  should 
have  been  in  such  and  such  a  state  of  mind  when  they  wrote. 
If  the  revelation  was  to  be  put  into  a  written  form,  the  most 
urgent  requisite  was  that  it  should  be  accurately  recorded. 
Provided  this  could  be  done  without  any  miraculous  or  special 
influence  exerted  on  the  penmen,  such  a  special  inspiration  can- 
not be  pronounced  indispensable.  In  many  cases  certainly  it  is 
conceivable  that  an  accurate  and  trustworthy  account  of  reve- 
latory facts  might  have  been  written  without  any  other  than  the 
ordinary  faculties  of  mind  and  facilities  of  obtaining  knowledge. 
In  so  far  as  the  Biblical  writers  told  the  truth,  it  is  quite  im- 
material whether  in  telling  it  they  were  worked  on  by  an 
extraordinary  divine  influence  or  not.  Inspiration,  as  working 
on  the  original  recipient  of  the  divine  message,  cannot  of  course 
be  regarded  as  unimportant ;  it  is  involved  in  the  very  idea  of 
special  revelation  that  the  organ  of  it  should  be  supernaturally 
inspired  to  receive  it.  But  when  it  has  once  been  received, 
there  is  no  obvious  and  intrinsic  reason  why  others  may  not 
learn  and  communicate  the  message  without  such  supernatural 
inspiration.  Certainly  the  masses  of  those  to  whom  the  word 
of  revelation  comes  receive  it  and  transmit  it  without  such 
special  inspiration.  So  those  who  made  the  written  record 
which  has  come  down  to  us  may  possibly  have  made  it  with 
the  exercise  of  onlyordinary  powers  of  observation  and  acquisi- 
tion. Conscientious  and  pains-taking  effort  to  tell  the  truth 
might  have  given  us  all  that  is  essential  in  the  message  re- 
vealed. At  the  best,  special  inspiration  could  have  been  only  a 
means  of  securing  a  more  perfect  record  of  what  without  it 
might  have  been  recorded  with  substantial  faithfulness.^ 

^  See  Alex.  Mair,  Studies  in  the  Christian  Evidences,  chap.  iii.  "  It  is  quite 
certain  that  we  are  not  shut  up  by  any  stern  necessity  of  an  a  priori  kind  to 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  281 

3.  The  proof  of  the  fact  of  a  revelation  does  not  depend  on 
the  assumption  of  the  special  inspiration  of  the  Biblical  writers. 
This  is,  if  possible,  still  more  evident  than  the  preceding  propo- 
sitions. We  are  not  convinced  that  the  patriarchs,  apostles, 
and  the  Eedeemer  were  inspired  to  receive  a  revelation,  because 
we  are  first  convinced  that  some  persons,  whose  very  names  may 
be  unknown  to  us,  were  specially  inspired  to  write  down  the 
account  of  the  supernatural  revelation.  There  would  be  no 
occasion  for  asserting,  and  no  ground  for  believing,  that  the 
Biblical  writers  were  divinely  inspired,  unless  there  were  ante- 
cedently an  assumption  that  it  was  a  divine  revelation  which 
they  were  specially  commissioned  to  describe.  The  writers  are 
believed  to  have  been  inspired,  because  there  is  believed  to  have 
been  an  all-important  revelation  which  needed  to  be  carefully 
recorded.  If  there  is  no  antecedent  faith  in  the  fact  of  a  divine 
revelation,  there  is  no  proof  of  the  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures 
which  can  carry  conviction  to  any  thinking  mind.  The  mere 
assertions  of  the  writers  that  they  were  inspired,  even  if  we 
had  many  more  of  them,  would  prove  nothing,  unless  their 
general  veracity  were  on  independent  grounds  very  firmly  estab- 
lished; for  such  peculiar  claims  would  themselves  provoke 
distrust,  unless  the  claimants  are  shown  to  be  peculiarly  trust- 
worthy. And  when  the  contents  of  the  Bible  are  appealed  to 
as  proof  of  the  sincerity  and  truthfulness  of  the  claims  of  in- 
spiration on  the  part  of  the  writers,  the  argument  assumes  the 
truth  of  the  things  narrated.^  That  is  to  say,  a  revelation, 
about  which  the  Scriptures  treat,  is  assumed  to  be  a  fact  before 
the  inspiration  of  the  writers  is  regarded  as  proved ;  otherwise 
the  nature  of  the  contents  of  the  Bible  would  be  no  proof  of 

one  or  other  of  the  two  extremes  :  to  verbal  inspiration,  or  absolute  skepticism  ; 
we  may  reasonably  hold  the  middle  way  of  practical  common-sense  certainty." 
*  This  is  implied  also  by  Dr.  Lee  {Inspiration  of  Holy  Scripture,  p.  94, 
4th  ed.,  1865),  where  he  argues  that  it  is  no  petitio  principii  to  adduce  proofs 
from  Scripture  of  its  own  inspiration.  The  credibility,  he  says,  of  the  sacred 
writers  is  established  by  independent  proofs.  "  Having  convinced  ourselves  of 
the  authority  of  the  Bible,  that  its  doctrines  are  revealed,  that  its  facts  are 
true,  we  can  feel  no  scruple  in  admitting  as  accurate  the  character  which  its 
own  writers  ascribe  to  it."  We  cannot  believe  the  Biblical  writers  to  be  truth- 
ful, unless  we  believe  what  they  say  about  divine  revelations. 


282  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

its  inspiration.  Manifestly,  therefore,  we  cannot  reverse  the 
order  of  argumentation,  and  prove  the  fact  of  a  revelation  by 
the  fact  of  the  inspiration  of  the  Biblical  writers. 

What  is  thus  clear  as  a  general  proposition  is,  if  possible, 
clearer  still,  when  the  argument  for  the  inspiration  of  the  New 
Testament  in  particular  is  considered.  That  argument,  as  ordi- 
narily conducted,  is  substantially  this :  The  apostles'  claim  of 
special  inspu'atiou  is  to  be  credited  because  Christ  promised 
them  such  inspiration.  And  Christ's  promise  is  to  be  credited 
because  he  was  the  Son  of  God  sent  to  bring  salvation  to  men. 
Obviously  the  fact  of  the  divine  revelation  mediated  by  Jesus 
Christ  is  here  assumed  in  the  argument  for  the  inspiration  of 
the  New  Testament ;  and  of  course,  therefore,  the  genuineness 
of  the  revelation  cannot  conversely  be  inferred  from  the  inspira- 
tion. The  revelation  is  first  credited  on  other  grounds.  The 
testimony  of  the  apostles  concerning  Christ  is  credited,  as  it 
was  credited  before  they  had  written  anything,  on  the  ground 
of  their  general  credibility,  and  the  special  evidences  of  their 
sincerity.  Their  particular  testimony  about  Christ's  promise  of 
the  Holy  Ghost  would  not  be  accepted,  unless  their  general 
testimony  concerning  Christ's  character  and  mission  were  first 
accepted.  In  other  words,  the  general  fact  and  the  general  con- 
tents of  the  Christian  revelation  are  assumed  as  the  foundation 
of  the  argument  for  a  special  inspiration  of  the  New  Testament 
writers.  Clearly,  then,  it  would  be  preposterous  to  make  the 
truth  of  the  alleged  revelation  rest  on  the  reality  of  a  special 
apostolic  inspiration. 

The  foregoing  considerations,  while  they  may  seem  to  degrade 
the  importance  of  the  doctrine  of  inspiration,  or  even  to  make 
the  fact  of  it  questionable,  serve  to  guard  what  is  more  import- 
ant than  this  doctrine  from  resting  on  an  insecure  foundation. 
They  tend  to  assure  us  that  the  essential  facts  and  truths  of 
supernatural  revelation  are  secure,  even  though  the  Scriptural 
witnesses  can  adduce  for  themselves  no  supernatural  attestation 
of  their  credibility.  They  serve  to  show  that  doubts  or  cavils 
about  the  alleged  inspiration  of  the  recorders  of  the  revelation 
do  not  need  to  unsettle  the  foundation  of  one's  faith  in  the 
revelation  itself. 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  283 

But  if  the  case  is  as  above  stated,  is  not  the  doctrine  of 
inspiration  shown  to  be  without  any  solid  foundation?  Shall 
we  not  abandon  the  theory  of  the  special  inspiration  of  the 
Biblical  writers  ?  By  such  an  abandonment  we  do  not  neces- 
sarily lose  any  of  the  truths  of  revelation ;  and  we  gain  the 
advantage  of  being  relieved  of  the  difficulties  which  encumber 
the  theory  of  Biblical  inspiration.  We  are  relieved  of  the 
obligation  to  determine  how  this  inspiration  differed  from  the 
inspiration  which  is  enjoyed  by  all  pious  men.  We  are  freed 
from  many  of  the  embarrassments  which  beset  the  question  of 
canonicity. 

It  certainly  does  follow  from  what  we  have  here  conceded 
concerning  inspiration,  that  it  is  not  of  the  central  importance 
which  it  has  often  been  made  to  assume.  One  may  hold  to  all 
the  essential  doctrines  of  revealed  religion ;  one  may  exercise 
the  most  perfect  faith  in  Jesus  Christ ;  one  may  insist  on  the 
unique  value  of  the  Bible,  and  yet  see  no  sufficient  reason  to 
believe  that  any  exceptional  supernatural  influence  was  exerted 
on  its  authors  when  they  were  writing  it.  Still  it  does  not 
follow  that  the  doctrine  of  Biblical  inspiration  is  unfounded  or 
unimportant.     We  remark  therefore :  — 

4.  That  there  is  substantial  ground  for  holding  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  special  inspiration  of  the  Bible.  But  before  presenting 
any  positive  arguments  for  this  proposition,  we  need  to  make 
certain  preliminary  observations. 

a.  In  the  strict  and  proper  sense,  not  the  Scriptures,  but 
only  the  Scriptural  writers,  can  be  said  to  be  inspired.  A  writ- 
ing is  a  merely  material  thing,  having  no  meaning  or  use 
except  as  it  is  the  product  of  a  mind.  A  book,  as  a  mere  book, 
can  no  more  be  inspired  than  a  rock.  The  inspiration  can  have 
to  do  only  with  the  production  of  the  book,  and  must  operate 
on  the  conscious  author.  When  we  speak,  as  for  convenience 
every  one  does,  of  an  inspired  book,  we  make  use  of  a  trope 
quite  similar  to  that  which  is  found  in  the  phrase  "  a  learned 
book,"  in  which  case  of  course  no  one  means  that  the  book  is 
learned,  but  that  the  author  is.  Whatever  may  be  one's  theory 
of  inspiration,  the  inspiration  must  be  conceived  as  imparted 
to  the  writer,  unless  one  goes  so  far  as  to  make  the  writer  a 


284  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION, 

mere  tool,  as  passive  and  irresponsible  as  a  pen  in  the  divine 
hand.  But  in  that  case  there  would,  properly  speaking,  be  no 
inspiration  at  all.  The  case  would  simply  be  that  God  had 
written  a  book ;  we  could  not  say  that  he  had  inspired  it.  But 
it  is  hardly  necessary  to  consider  this  view.     For  — 

h.  It  is  now  generally  conceded  that  the  Biblical  writers 
were  conscious  and  responsible  in  the  act  of  writing.  They  did 
not  act  as  mere  machines,  the  merely  passive  agents  of  another 
power.  When  Luke  speaks  of  having  "  traced  the  course  of  all 
things  accurately  from  the  first  "  (i.  3) ;  when  Paul  (1  Cor.  i.  16) 
appeals  to  his  memory  in  reference  to  what  he  writes ;  when 
Biblical  writers  generally  (especially  Paul)  discourse  about  their 
personal  history  and  inward  experience, —  it  is  impossible  not  to 
assume  that  such  writers  were  intensely  conscious  of  what  they 
were  doing.  Even  the  peculiar  ecstasy  which  was  often  ex- 
perienced by  the  Hebrew  prophets,  and  sometimes  by  the 
apostles  (Acts  x.  10,  xxii.  17;  2  Cor.  xii.  1-4),  cannot  be  shown 
to  have  suspended  the  self-consciousness  of  the  subject  of  those 
experiences.  But  even  if  the  extremest  Montanistic  view 
respecting  this  matter  were  to  be  adopted,  this  would  still  prove 
nothing  as  to  the  mental  condition  of  those  who  wrote  the 
Biblical  books.  Without  explicit  testimony  to  the  effect  that 
these  men,  when  writing,  were  in  an  ecstatic  or  even  uncon- 
scious state,  the  presumption  must  be  that  they  were  in  their 
normal  self-conscious  state,  and  used  their  faculties  in  the  act 
of  writing. 

c.  It  follows  from  the  foregoing  that  the  product  of  the  Biblical 
inspiration,  as  of  that  of  the  ordinary  Christian,  is  not  a  purely 
divine  product,  but  is  also  a  human  product.  The  inspired  man 
is  not  only  conscious,  but  he  consciously  produces.  There  is  a 
human  element  in  the  product.  Even  the  so-called  mechanical 
theory  of  inspiration,  —  the  theory  which  conceives  God  to  use 
inspired  men  as  the  passive  vehicles  of  his  communications, — 
even  this  cannot  wholly  dispense  with  a  human  side.  The 
language  which  serves  as  the  medium  of  communication  is  a 
human  language,  the  product  of  human  intercourse,  expressive 
of  human  conceptions,  limited  in  the  range  of  its  expressive- 
ness  by   human   limitations.     So   that,   even   if   the   Biblical 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  — INSPIRATION.  285 

writers  are  conceived  of  as  ever  so  purely  mechanical  in  their 
agency ;  even  if  the  writers  were  nothing  more  than  mere  tools, 
as  passive  in  the  power  of  the  Spirit  as  a  pen  in  the  hand  of  a 
scribe,  —  still  even  then  the  Spirit  would  be  using  an  instru- 
ment affected  with  human  characteristics  and  human  imperfec- 
tions, —  an  instrument  which  is  often  found  unequal  to  the 
work  of  expressing  our  own  human  thoughts  and  feelings,  and 
which  therefore  must  be  inadequate  to  the  revelation  of  the 
wealth  of  divine  truth. 

But  this  theory  of  inspiration  is  in  its  strictness  not  now 
defended  by  any  school.  It  was  an  innovation  when  first 
propounded,  growing  out  of  antagonism  to  the  Papal  doctrine 
of  tradition,  and  could  not  perpetuate  itself  as  the  general 
doctrine  of  the  Church.  We  have  hardly  more  than  a  sort  of 
antiquarian  interest  in  the  doctrines  propounded  by  such  men 
as  Quenstedt,^  Baier,^  Calovius,^  Hollaz,*  and  others  of  the  Post- 
Eeformation  time.  The  marks  of  human  individuality  are  too 
clearly  traceable  in  the  different  parts  of  the  sacred  record  to 
leave  it  possible  for  any  reasonable  man  to  regard  the  inspired 
writer  as  a  mere  tool  or  amanuensis.  The  desperate  shift  of 
the  advocates  of  verbal  inspiration,  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
adapted  his  style  to  the  personal  peculiarities  of  the  several 
amanuenses,^  even  if  there  were  any  proof  to  be  adduced  for 

*  "Omnia  enim,  quae  scribenda  erant  a  Spiritu  S.  sacris  Scriptoribus  in 
actu  isto  inscribendi  suggesta  et  intellectu  eoruin  quasi  in  calamum  dictitata 
sunt."     Theologia  didactico-polemica,  Wittenberg,  1696,  vol.  i.  p.  68. 

2  "  Prout  amanuensi  in  calamum  dictantur,  quae  is  scribere  debeat."  Com- 
pendium theologiae  positivae,  ed.  Preuss,  Berlin,  1864,  p.  46. 

'  "  Nihil  eorum  [quae  loquuti  sunt]  ac  ne  verbulum  quidem  humana  volun- 
te^i?  protulere."  Systema  locorum  theologicorum,  vol.  i.  p.  563,  Wittenberg,  1655, 

*  "S.  Scriptura  ...  est  verbum  Dei  scriptum,  i.  e.,  sensus  divinus  Uteris 
a  Spiritu  S.  amanuensibus  sacris  in  calamum  dictatis  expressus."  Scrutinium 
veritatis,  Wittenberg,  1711,  p.  34. 

^  Baier,  ibid.,  p.  51.  "Fatendum  est  Spiritum  S.  ipsum  in  suggerendis 
verborum  conceptibus  accommodasse  se  ad  indolem  et  conditionem  amanu- 
ensium."  In  more  modern  times  Gaussen  {Theopneustia)  propounds  essen- 
tially the  same  doctrine.  Though  he  says  (p.  31,  Edinburgh  ed.,  1854), 
"  Every  verse  without  exception  is  man's  ;  and  every  verse  without  exception 
is  God's,"  thus  apparently  recognizing  a  human  as  well  as  a  divine  element  in 
the  Bible,  yet  he  afterwards  (p.  50)  explains  himself  after  this  fashion :     "  If 


286  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

it,  would  be  a  burdensome  doctrine  to  maintain ;  for  such  an 
adaptation  of  himself  to  human  peculiarities  on  the  part  of 
God  would  be  useless  in  itself,  and  would  involve  all  the 
elements  of  intentional  deception.  If  the  Holy  Ghost  merely 
wrote  in  the  style  of  Moses  and  Peter,  while  yet  Moses  and 
Peter  contributed  absolutely  nothing  to  the  final  production,  it 
becomes  a  puzzling  question  why  such  an  accommodation  was 
made  at  all,  unless  it  was  to  make  the  inij^ression  that  these 
men  really  were  consciously  and  actively  productive  in  what 
they  wrote,  when  in  fact  they  were  not.  Nothing  is  gained 
in  the  matter  of  the  communication  of  truth  by  such  an 
adaptation  of  style  ;  nothing  appears  to  be  accomplished  by  it  at 
all,  except  that  the  Divine  author  studiously  conceals  himself, 
while  professedly  revealing  himself,  and  tries  to  make  the  im- 
pression that  forty  different  men  are  writing,  each  in  his  own 
way  and  in  accordance  with  his  own  mind  and  will,  whereas, 
in  fact,  they  are  mere  tools  of  a  compelling  power,  made  to 
write  in  spite  of  themselves  just  as  they  would  write  if  they 
did  not  write  in  spite  of  themselves. 

But  we  need  not  dwell  on  this  practically  exploded  hypothesis. 
It  is  true  that  in  inspiring  men  God  must  in  a  sense  adapt  him- 
self to  human  conditions,  and  in  particular  to  the  individuals 

he  [God]  behooved  on  this  earth  to  substitute  for  the  syntax  of  heaven  and 
the  vocabulary  of  the  archangels  the  words  and  the  constructions  of  the  He- 
brews or  the  Greeks,  why  not  equally  have  borrowed  their  manners,  style,  and 
personality  ?  "  And  he  repeatedly  insists  that  it  is  not  the  man,  but  the  book, 
that  is  inspired.  God  "dictated  the  whole  Scriptures"  (p.  47).  Dean  Bur- 
gon  {Inspiration  and  Interpretation)  scarcely  falls  short  of  this,  when  lie  says 
(p.  76),  "  The  Bible,  from  the  Alplia  to  the  Omega  of  it,  is  filled  to  overflow- 
iug  with  the  Holy  Spirit  of  God:  the  Books  of  it,  and  the  sentences  of  it,  and 
the  words  of  it,  and  the  syllables  of  it,  —  aye,  and  the  very  letters  of  it."  To 
be  sure,  he  says  (p.  11)^  "  Least  of  all  do  we  overlook  the  personality  of  the 
human  writers."  But  he  compares  them  to  musical  instruments,  each 
of  which  gives  forth  its  own  music,  but  all  of  which  were  made  by  one 
artificer;  quoting  the  illustration  from  Hooker,  who  makes  the  BibHcal 
writers  differ  from  the  pipe  or  harp  only  in  that  they  "  felt  the  power  and 
strength  of  their  own  words."  The  comparison  is  as  old  as  the  early  church- 
fathers  Justin  (^ad  Oraecos  cohortatio,  chap,  viii.)  and  Athenagoras  (legatis  pro 
Chrixtianis,  cliap.  ix.).  Vide  Rudelbach  {Zeitschrift  far  die  gesammte  Lu- 
therische  Theologie,  1840,  p.  27). 


THE   RECORD   OF  REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  287 

who  record  the  revelation.  But  he  uses  the  men,  and  does  not 
merely  imitate  them.  Not  only  human  language  is  used,  but  the 
human  language  of  those  who  act  as  God's  agents.  And  not 
only  their  language,  but  antecedently  to  this  their  minds  and 
hearts.^  For  language  cannot  be  detached  from  the  mind 
whose  expression  it  is.  Language  is  the  product  and  repre- 
sentative of  mental  states.  God,  therefore,  in  using  human 
language  uses  human  minds  as  the  medium  of  the  communi- 
cation of  his  messages.^  But  if  this  is  so,  then  in  some  sense 
the  divine  inspiration  is  shaped  by  the  human  subject  of  it. 
The  inspired  man,  though  inspired,  yet  speaks  out  of  his  own 
mind  and  heart,  and  speaks  like  himself,  and  not  as  a  mere 
irresponsible  reporter  of  another's  words. 

d.  There  is  no  warrant  for  regarding  the  inspiration  of  the 
Bible  as  superior  to  that  of  the  original  organs  of  revelation. 
If  we  must  compare  the  two  in  point  of  rank,  we  should  rather 
give  the  precedence  to  the  immediate  recipients  of  the  divine 

^  Row  {Nature  and  Extent  of  Divine  Inspiration,  pp.  152  sq.)  forcibly  em- 
phasizes the  fact  that  the  Apostles  call  themselves  witnesses.  But  "  recollec- 
tion forms  the  essence  of  testimony."  Even  though  the  memory  may  be 
supernaturally  quickened,  still  it  must  be  the  writer's  own  memory  to  which 
he  appeals.  He  testifies  what  he  himself  once  saw  or  heard.  A  pure  dictation 
under  which  the  writer  was  passive  must  have  destroyed  the  value  of  the  words 
as  personal  testimony. 

2  Of  course  it  cannot  be  denied  that  God  could,  and  possibly  in  some  cases 
did,  suggest  particular  words  to  those  whom  he  specially  inspired.  It  must, 
however,  be  insisted  that  this  was  not  the  usual  method.  All  the  evidence 
favors  the  view  that  not  only  tlie  Biblical  writers,  but  the  original  recipients 
of  special  revelations,  retained  and  used  their  own  powers  while  moved  upon 
by  the  Spirit,  aud  expressed  each  in  his  own  way  the  thoughts  which  the  in- 
spiration suggested.  But,  inasmuch  as  a  divine  influence,  in  order  to  accom- 
plish anything,  must  have  affected  the  thoughts  of  the  inspired  men,  and  inas- 
much as  thoughts  cannot  be  dissociated  from  words,  it  might  be  argued  that 
the  inspiration  must  after  all  result  practically  in  a  suggestion  of  particular 
words.  And  this  is  true,  if  we  make  a  distinction  between  the  suggestion  of 
mere  words,  as  such,  and  the  suggestion  of  thoughts  which  necessarily  result 
in  the  use  of  words  which  would  otherwise  not  have  been  used  (Philippi's  dis- 
tinction between  Worterinspiration  and  Wortinspiration,  in  his  Kirchliche  Gtau- 
benslekrei  vol.  i.  p.  184,  1st  ed.).  Inspiration  would  be  meaningless  and  fruitless, 
if  it  were  not  verbal  inspiration  in  the  latter  sense.  Warington  {The  Inspira- 
tion of  Scripture,  p.  260)  has  clearly  and  forcibly  set  forth  this  distinction. 


288  SUPERNATUR^U.   REVELATION. 

messages.  These  persons  are  generally  described  as  divinely 
inspired,  whereas  the  Biblical  writers  comparatively  seldom  lay 
claim  to  special  inspiration  as  directing  them  in  the  act  of 
writing.  If  the  Biblical  inspiration  were  to  be  regarded  as 
superior  to  the  other,  we  should  have  to  maintain  that  the  un- 
known writer  who  narrates  the  history  of  Elijah  was  more 
powerfully  moved  by  the  Spirit  than  the  prophet  himself ;  that 
Luke,  in  reporting  Paul's  sermon  on  Mars'  Hill  was  more  thor- 
oughly inspired  than  Paul  was  in  framing  it;  nay,  that  each 
of  the  Evangelists,  in  recording  the  words  and  deeds  of  our 
Lord,  was,  so  far  as  inspiration  is  concerned,  more  favored  than 
He  who  received  the  Spirit  without  measure.  Indeed,  if  the 
highest  kind  and  degree  of  inspiration  was  accorded  to  the 
writers  of  the  Bible,  we  may  even  wonder  why  there  need  have 
been  any  other.  The  inspired  writers  would  seem  in  that  case 
to  have  been  the  most  suitable  media  of  an  original  revelation ; 
and  the  antecedent  revelation,  mediated  by  an  inferior  inspira- 
tion, would  become  superfluous,  or  at  all  events  superseded.  The 
Scriptures  would  become,  not  so  much  the  record  of  a  revelation, 
as  a  new  and  more  perfect  revelation  itself. 

It  should  indeed  not  be  forgotten  that,  with  regard  to  a  large 
part  of  the  Bible,  this  distinction  between  revelation  and  the 
record  of  it  is  slight.  Such  writings  as  the  Psalms,  the  Prophet- 
ical books,  and  the  Apostolic  Epistles,  may  be  regarded  as  prac- 
tically the  direct  utterances  of  the  organs  of  revelation.  The 
organ  of  the  revelation  and  the  historian  of  the  revelation  are 
one  and  the  same  individual.  Yet  even  here  the  distinction  is 
not  annulled.  The  act  of  receiving  a  divine  communication  is 
not  identical  with  that  of  committing  it  to  writing.  In  many 
cases  a  considerable  time  seems  to  have  intervened  between  the 
two  events.  So  far  as  any  distinction  is  to  be  made  in  such  cases 
between  the  receiving  and  the  recording  of  the  revelation,  the 
presumption  would  seem  to  be  that  the  former  requires  the  high- 
est degree  of  inspiration.  The  natural  powers  of  memory  might 
suffice  for  the  recording  of  the  communication ;  but  in  order 
to  the  reception  of  it  a  supernatural  inspiration  is  necessary. 

e.  For  like  reasons  we  must  assume  that  there  is  no  ground 
for  thinking  that  the  organs  of  revelation  were  more  perfectly 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  289 

inspired  when  writing  than  when  speaking  under  the  impulse 
of  the  Spirit,  On  this  point  the  case  of  Paul  is  the  most  in- 
structive. He  often  appeals  to  his  apostolic  authority,  but  not 
particularly  to  his  letters,  as  distinguished  from  his  oral  utter- 
ances. Indeed  in  the  only  passage  (2  Cor.  x.  10)  in  which  the 
two  are  directly  contrasted  with  each  other  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  oral  utterances,  the  comparison  is  represented  as  made 
in  an  unfriendly  spirit ;  and  Paul  takes  pains  to  assure  the 
Corinthians  that  what  he  is  in  word  by  letter  when  absent,  he 
will  be  also  in  deed  when  present.  And  later  (xiii.  10),  he  speaks 
of  his  authority  as  especially  exercised  when  personally  present 
rather  than  through  his  letters.  In  the  Epistle  to  the  Galatians 
the  burden  of  the  apostle's  rebuke  is  that  the  readers  had 
departed  from  the  gospel  which  he  had  orally  preached.  That 
to  which  he  ascribes  especial  divine  authority  is  the  gospel 
which  he  had  preached  by  word  of  mouth  (i.  8,  11).  Nowhere 
is  the  written  word  pronounced  of  superior  authority  to  the 
preaching  of  the  inspired  apostles.  It  was  through  the  oral 
preaching  that  the  Christian  Church  was  planted  and  nurtured. 
The  written  communications  were  comparatively  few.  The 
most  of  the  apostles  wrote  either  nothing,  or  at  least  nothing 
that  has  come  down  to  us.  As  in  all  subsequent  periods,  so  at 
the  first,  the  gospel  became  the  power  of  God  unto  salvation 
cliiefly  through  the  spoken  word  of  life. 

But  notwithstanding  these  concessions  and  qualifications, 
which  seem  to  be  required  by  a  candid  weighing  of  the  facts, 
the  doctrine  of  a  special  inspiration  of  the  Biblical  writers  is  not 
discredited,  but  rests  on  a  strong  foundation.  The  same  Spirit 
who  moved  the  prophets  and  apostles  is  indeed  said  to  be  im- 
parted to  all  Christians  (Eom.  viii.  9 ;  1  John  ii.  20) ;  but  if  in 
the  older  times  God  can  be  said  to  have  spoken  "in  divers 
manners"  (Heb.  i.  1),  and  if  in  apostolic  times  there  were 
"diversities  of  gifts,  but  the  same  Spirit"  (1  Cor.  xii.  4),  it 
certainly  may  be  that  there  is  a  diversity  as  between  the 
ordinary  Christian  and  the  chosen  recorders  of  the  word  of 
salvation. 

The  question,  then,  is :  "Was  the  inspiration  of  the  Biblical 
writers  specifically  different  from  that  which  all  members  of 
19 


290  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

the  believing  community  enjoy  ?  The  answer  to  the  question 
is  encumbered  with  grave  difficulties.  In  the  first  place,  in- 
spiration itself  is  in  general  difficult  of  definition ;  it  is  there- 
fore difficult  to  distinguish  specific  kinds  of  inspiration,  —  to 
determine  whether  the  differences  are  merely  of  kind  or  of  de- 
gree. In  the  next  place,  the  question  is  complicated  with  that 
of  canouicity.  If  it  were  clear  that  special  inspiration  and 
canonicity  had  always  been  synonymous  conceptions ;  and  if 
there  had  never  been  any  wavering  judgment  as  to  the  limits  of 
the  Canon,  the  case  would  be  simpler.  But  the  fact  is  that  for 
a  long  time,  with  regard  to  both  the  Old  and  the  New  Testa- 
ment, doubts  and  divisions  prevailed,  so  that  certain  books 
which  finally  obtained  admission  into  the  Canon  (as,  for  ex- 
ample, Esther  and  Second  Peter),  were  very  extensively,  and  up 
to  a  late  period,  looked  on  with  suspicion  as  not  worthy  of 
being  co-ordinated  with  the  other  sacred  books ;  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  certain  books  which  were  finally  excluded 
from  the  Canon  (such  as  the  Old  Testament  Apocrypha  and 
the  Shepherd  of  Hermas)  were  very  extensively  used  as  of 
equal  authority  with  the  other  sacred  books.^  And  this  fact 
seems  to  indicate  that  canonical  inspiration  was  not  sharply 
distinguished  from  ordinary  inspiration.  The  same  writer  (for 
example,  Origen)  seems  at  one  time  to  reject,  at  another  to 
countenance,  the  canonical  standing  of  certain  books.  Further- 
more, the  reason  why  some  writings  became  preserved  and  col- 
lected into  a  Canon,  as  of  peculiar  authority,  while  others  were 
left  out,  is  obscure,  —  especially  as  regards  the  Old  Testament. 
Why,  for  example,  should  a  book  written  by  the  prophet  Isaiah  ^ 
have  been  excluded,  while  the  anonymous  Book  of  Esther  was 
admitted  ?  What  considerations  finally  prevailed  to  secure  the 
admission  of  the  Song  of  Solomon  ?  As  to  the  New  Testa- 
ment, did  the  distinction  that  was  made  turn  upon  internal  evi- 
dence of  peculiar  inspiration,  or  merely  upon  the  evidence  of 
apostolic  authorship  or  endorsement  ?  Finally,  we  must  take 
cognizance  of  the  fact  that  the  Christian  Church  is  to  this  day 

^  See  a  good  summary  of  the  history  of  the  process  in  Ladd,  Doctrine 
of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  part  ii.  chap.  ix. 

2  The  "acts  of  Uzziah,"  vide  2  Chroa.  xxvi.  22. 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  — INSPIRATION.  291 

divided  as  to  the  recognition  of  certain  of  the  Old  Testament 
Apocrypha,  the  Council  of  Trent  having  formally  co-ordinated 
them  with  the  canonical  books  in  general,  whereas  the  Protestant 
Churches  agree  in  giving  them  a  subordinate  position.  The 
final  fixing  of  the  limits  of  the  Canon  seems,  accordingly,  to 
have  been  determined  by  a  sort  of  chance.  Not  even  the  de- 
crees of  Councils  have  been  universally  respected.  And  to  this 
day,  though  no  formal  change  in  the  Canon  can  now  ever  be 
expected  to  be  generally  agreed  upon,  yet  individual  Christians 
do  not  hesitate  to  exercise  the  same  right  of  recognition  or  re- 
jection of  the  canonical  authority  of  certain  books  which  was 
exercised  by  Clement,  Origen,  Jerome,  and  Augustine. 

It  is,  therefore,  very  plausible  when,  as  the  result  of  a  careful 
discussion  of  the  question,  Professor  Ladd.  ^  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  "  inspiration,  as  the  subjective  condition  of  Biblical 
revelation  and  the  predicate  of  the  Word  of  God,  is  specifically 
the  same  illumining,  quickening,  elevating,  and  purifying  work  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  as  that  which  goes  on  in  the  persons  of  the  entire 
believing  community."  It  is  urged,  in  defense  of  this  position, 
that  "no  theory  of  the  inspiration  of  the  Biblical  authors  has  ever 
succeeded  in  defining  the  characteristics  which  separated  them, 
as  writers  of  Scripture,  from  other  members  of  the  believing 
community."  ^  Further,  it  is  said,  to  require  that  the  truth  of 
revelation  "  shall  prove  itself  by  an  assumption  as  to  a  specific 
kind  of  divine  influence  through  which  the  truth  comes,  is  to 
require  that  it  shall  support  itself  upon  that  which  is  far  weaker 
than  itself."  ^  JNIoreover,  respecting  sacred  history  in  particular, 
it  is  further  urged  that  its  authority  "  cannot  be  enhanced  by 
any  theory  of  the  infallibility  of  the  inspired  authors  of  the 
history;  for  the  evidence  for  the  inspiration  of  the  authors 
can  never  equal  the  evidence  for  the  authenticity  of  their 
history." ^ 

These  propositions  in  themselves  may  be  admitted,  and  indeed 
have  been  substantially  admitted  in  the  foregoing.  But  it  may 
be  questioned  whether  they  prove  that  for  which  they  are  used 
as  proofs.     For  example,  the  impossibility  of  clearly  defining 

^  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture^  vol.  ii.  p.  48S.  "^  Ibid.,  p.  490. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  492.  4  Ibid.,  p.  574. 


292  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

wherein  Biblical  inspiration  differs  from  the  ordinary  work  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  does  not  prove  that  there  is  no  snch  difference. 
It  is  equally  impossible  to  define  the  exact  nature  of  the  in- 
spiration of  the  prophets ;  but  if  we  infer  that  there  was  there- 
fore no  peculiar  inspiration  in  their  case,  then  we  abandon  all 
faith  in  a  special  revelation.^  Again,  as  to  the  second  point,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  truth  of  revelation  cannot  be  proved 
by  the  assumption  of  a  peculiar  kind  of  divine  influence  on  the 
mind  of  the  Biblical  writers. '  But  this  does  not  prove  that 
there  is  no  peculiar  divine  influence  in  the  case.  If  the  theory 
of  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible  were  adopted  simply  as  a  means 
of  establishing  the  fact  of  a  divine  revelation,  and  had  no  other 
ground,  then  the  theory  would  indeed  be  not  only  futile,  but 
foolish.  The  truths  of  revelation  must,  it  is  true,  be  practically 
established  apart  from  any  theory  of  the  special  inspiration  of 
the  Bible  ;  but  for  all  that  there  may  be  valid  reasons  for 
believing  that  there  was  such  inspiration.  Again,  when  it  is 
said  that  the  authority  of  sacred  history  cannot  be  enhanced  by 
any  theory  of  the  infallibility  of  the  inspired  authors,  and  in 
general  that  a  peculiar  kind  of  inspiration  cannot  constitute  a 
ground  of  faith  in  the  Bible  "  apart  from  the  nature  of  the  word 
itself,"  2  we  can  assent  to  the  proposition,  but  with  a  qualification. 
Faith  in  the  Biblical  history  is  not  created  by  an  antecedent 
faith  in  the  peculiar  inspiration  of  the  historians,  but  it  may  be 
enhanced  by  such  faith.  This  faith  in  the  inspiration  of  the 
writers  may  not  rightly  be  said  to  be  produced  "  apart  from  the 
nature  of  the  word ; "  but  it  does  not  follow  but  that  with  the 
word  itself  the  peculiar  inspiration  would  be  an  additional 
ground  of  confidence.  The  case  is  similar  to  that  respecting 
Christ  himself.  His  claim  that  he  was  the  Son  of  God,  and 
that  he  enjoyed  altogether  peculiar  communion  with  the  Father, 
would  not  have  constituted  a  sufficient  ground  of  faith  in  his 
word,  apart  from  the  nature  of  the  word  itself.  But  in  connec- 
tion with  his  word  his  extraordinary  claims  become  an  additional 
ground  of  confidence  in  him  above  and  beyond  what  the  words 

1  Professor  Ladd  distinctly  assumes  such  a  peculiar  inspiration  in  the  case 
of  the  prophets  ;  e.  g.  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  124. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  492. 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  293 

themselves  would  have  commanded.  The  contents  of  the  Bible 
are  certainly  not  first  trusted  after  and  because  the  plenary 
inspiration  of  all  the  Biblical  writers  has  been  proved.  The 
proof  of  this  itself  requires  a  very  large  degree  of  antecedent 
faith  in  those  same  contents.  But  such  faith  once  existing  may 
nevertheless  be  strengthened  by  an  argument  (if  a  sound  one) 
which  goes  to  show  that  the  authors  of  the  BibHcal  books 
enjoyed  a  peculiar  kind  of  divine  inspiration.  A  general  faith 
in  the  authenticity  of  a  Biblical  narrative  may  be  gained  as  one 
gains  faith  in  any  other  historical  narrative.  But  if  one  finds 
reason,  in  addition  to  this,  to  think  that  the  authors  of  the 
Bible  had  exceptional  help  imparted  to  them,  why,  then  the 
faith  in  their  general  veracity  may  properly  become  a  faith  in 
their  special  and  peculiar  veracity. 

What,  then,  are  the  reasons  for  holding  that  the  sacred 
writers  enjoyed  an  inspiration  specifically  different  from  that 
of  ordinary  believers  ? 

i.  The  first  reason  is  an  a  'priori  one.  That  a  peculiar  guid- 
ance was  imparted  to  the  sacred  writers  is  made  probable  by 
the  very  fact  that  it  was  their  part  to  put  into  permanent  form 
the  record  of  a  divine  revelation.  It  would  seem  to  be  in- 
trinsically desirable  that  Scriptures  which  were  to  serve  as  the 
authoritative  record  of  the  divine  communications  should  at  the 
outset  have  been  specially  secured  from  errors  and  follies,  from 
overstatements  aud  understatements,  from  meagreness  and  ex- 
cess,—  in  short,  from  whatever  would  tend  to  give  an  inadequate 
or  misleading  impression  of  the  contents  of  the  divine  word. 
If  there  was  occasion  for  a  supernatural  communication  at  all, 
was  there  not  likewise,  and  for  the  same  reason,  occasion  for 
special  precaution  against  an  erroneous  report  of  the  commu- 
nication ?  ^ 

This  argument  is  just  the  reverse  of  the  one  we  have  above 
rejected.  Not  the  revelation  is  inferred  from  the  inspiration, 
but  vice  versa,  the  inspiration  is  inferred  from  the  revelation. 
The  argument  is  of  course  not  demonstrative.  It  does  not 
follow,  becausfe  one  thinks  there  was  need  of  supernatural 
guidance,  that  therefore  there  was  such  guidance.  But  it  is 
^  Cf.  Lee,  The  Inspiration  of  Holy  Scripture,  p.  254. 


294  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

a  fact  of  no  small  moment  that  there  is  an  instinctive 
tendency  to  assume  the  need  and  the  fact  of  it.  This  im- 
pulse of  the  mind  is  itself  an  argument;  it  creates  at  least 
a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  that  the 
writers  of  the  Scriptures  were  favored  with  more  than  ordinary 
illumination. 

With  regard  to  certain  parts  of  the  Scriptures  this  presumption 
is  peculiarly  strong.  We  refer  to  those  books  which  were 
written  by  the  direct  recipients  of  divine  revelations.  While 
we  have  no  sufficient  reason  for  assuming  that  the  prophets 
and  apostles  were  tnore  inspired  when  writing  than  when 
officially  speaking,  we  certainly  have  no  good  reason  to  suppose 
that  they  were  less  inspired,  or  not  at  all  specially  inspired, 
when  writing.  It  is  with  reference  to  the  historical  books 
only  that  doubt  can  plausibly  be  entertained.  As  to  the  most 
of  the  Old  Testament  histories  we  know  nothing  about  their 
authors.  As  to  those  of  the  New  Testament,  we  know  that 
three  of  them,  at  least,  were  written  by  men  whom  we  have 
no  reason  to  regard  as  apostolically  inspired  men.  What  is 
the  proof  that,  just  in  the  composition  of  these  books,  Mark 
and  Luke  received  an  inspiration  which  they  had  at  no  other 
time  ?  The  answer  is  that  there  was,  so  far  as  any  one  can 
see,  as  much  need  of  supernatural  guidance  in  the  preparation 
of  the  history  of  Christ's  life  and  of  the  establishment  of  the 
Christian  Church  as  there  was  in  the  writing  of  the  Apostolical 
Epistles.  If  we  were  obliged  to  make  a  distinction,  we  should 
be  inclined  to  decide  that  the  portraiture  of  the  character, 
words,  and  works  of  Jesus  Christ  was  of  more  vital  importance 
to  the  succeeding  generations  of  Christians  than  the  meditations 
and  exhortations  which  were  the  outgrowths  of  that  history. 
The  burden  of  proof  certainly  rests  on  one  who  would  assert 
that  Paul's  Epistles  are  supernaturally  inspired,  but  that  Luke's 
histories  are  not ;  or  that  Matthew's  Gospel  is  inspired,  and 
Mark's  uninspired.  Such  a  conclusion  would  imply  that 
inspired  and  uninspired  histories  became  mixed  together  and 
made  of  practically  equal  authority  in  the  estimation  of  the 
Christian  Church.  The  only  alternative  of  one  who  denies 
the  specific  peculiarity  of  Biblical  inspiration  must  be  that  the 


THE   KECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  295 

inspiration  of  the  apostles  was  not  specifically  different  from, 
that  of  other  Christians.^ 

But  we  are  now  dealing  only  with  a  general  presumption. 
It  is  very  certain  that,  even  though  the  Biblical  writers  may 
not  have  been  aware  that  their  writings  were  to  be  preserved  as 
the  authoritative  record  of  the  divine  message  for  all  genera- 
tions, yet  such  was  to  be  the  fact.  And  God  must  have  known 
what  the  fact  was  to  be.  And  if  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
he  vouchsafed  special  illumination  to  prophets  whose  prophecies 
never  went  farther  than  to  their  contemporaries,  there  would 
seem  to  be  at  least  equal  reason  why  he  should  have  given 
special  aid  to  those  who  were  to  write  down  the  divine  revela- 
tions as  a  guide  for  all  ages. 

ii.  Another  consideration  of  no  little  weight  is  the  fact  that 
the  Scriptures  always  have  been  regarded  and  treated  by  the 
great  majority  of  the  Christian  world  as  inspired  in  an  altogether 
peculiar  sense.  It  is  true  that  this  is  not  a  decisive  argument. 
An  error  may  become  general  and  maintain  itself  persistently. 
The  general  opinion  of  the  Papal  Church,  that  the  Pope  is  in- 
fallible, can  hardly  be  taken  as  a  proof  of  the  correctness  of  the 
opinion.  Moreover,  exaggerated  and  even  fantastic  notions  con- 
cerning Biblical  inspiration  have  sometimes  had  wide  and  al- 
most universal  currency.  The  vagaries  of  the  allegorical  view 
of  Scripture,  and  the  extravagances  of  the  doctrine  of  verbal 
inspiration,  though  they  have  sometimes  been  shared  by  nearly 
all  Christians,  cannot  for  that  reason  be  regarded  as  justifiable. 

Nevertheless  these  very  extravagances  indicate  the  strength 

1  So  Professor  Ladd,  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  191.  But  lie 
goes  on  to  emphasize  tlie  fact  that  the  Apostles  were  better  fitted  than  others 
for  the  work  of  writing  as  well  as  preaching,  ( 1)  because  called  and  commis- 
sioned directly  by  Jesus,  (2)  because  they  "  had  a  more  abundant  endowment 
of  the  same  revelation  and  inspiration  which  belonged  to  Christians  in  general" 
(p.  192).  Elsewhere,  however,  in  speaking  of  apostolic  inspiration,  he  says 
(p.  85,  86),  "  The  effect  of  this  inspiration  is  a  special  and  supernatural  fitness 
for  their  work  of  receiving  men  and  training  them  in  the  Cliurch  of  Christ." 
This  seems  to  be  an  affirmation  of  all  that  need  be  claimed  for  apostolic  in- 
spiration, especially  as  it  is  made  to  cover  the  scriptural  activity  of  the  apostles 
also  (p.  79).  A  special  and  supernatural  fitness  for  their  work  must  imply  an 
inspiration  specifically  different  from  that  of  ordinary  Christians. 


296  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

of  the  underlying  conviction  that  the  Scriptures  possess  an  alto- 
getlier  exceptional  value  and  authority.  And  this  general  con- 
viction has  always  expressed  itself  in  the  doctrine  that  the 
Bible  was  written  under  the  special  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
That  such  a  doctrine  could  become  so  wide -spread  and  deep- 
seated,  is  a  significant  fact.  It  must  have  had  some  foundation. 
The  very  existence  of  such  a  belief  furnishes  a  presumptive  ar- 
gument in  favor  of  an  essential  truth  as  lying  at  the  basis  of  it. 
Such  a  belief  is  not,  it  is  true,  to  be  blindly  accepted  as  too 
sacred  to  be  critically  tested.  No  doctrine  of  inspiration,  as  has 
often  been  said,  can  be  a  true  doctrine  which  is  at  war  with 
facts.  If  a  scientific  examination  of  the  Bible  can  demonstrate 
that  the  common  notion  respecting  it  is  radically  erroneous,  that 
notion  must  be  abandoned,  however  hard  or  even  dangerous 
the  abandonment  may  seem  to  be.  But  such  an  examination 
must  respect  the  traditional  opinion,  and  seek  to  discover  the 
truth  which  it  contains,  even  though  error  may  be  found  mixed 
with  it.  For  one  of  the  facts  which  a  scientific  investigation 
must  take  cognizance  of  is  this  wide-spread,  persistent  notion 
respecting  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible. 

iii.  Starting  with  these  presumptions,  we  next  notice  the 
testimony  of  the  Bible  itself  concerning  Biblical  inspiration. 

Eespecting  this  testimony  it  hardly  needs  to  be  observed  that 
we  cannot  make  the  force  of  it  depend  on  the  assumption  that 
the  testimony  itself  is  inspired.  This  would  be  assuming  the 
thing  which  is  to  be  proved.  If  a  Biblical  writer  asserts  that 
the  Bible  in  general  is  an  inspired  book,  his  assertion  cannot  be 
accepted  as  true  on  the  ground  that  he  was  divinely  inspired  to 
say  so.  Nor  can  a  writer's  assertion  of  his  own  inspiration 
be  regarded  as  proof  positive  that  he  was  inspired.  Such  asser- 
tions, if  credible  at  all,  are  credible  for  the  reason  that  the 
writers,  aside  from  any  presupposition  as  to  their  peculiar  inspi- 
ration, are  sincere,  sensible,  and  godly  men,  and  that  therefore 
their  testimony  or  their  judgment  on  this  point  is  worthy  of 
credit. 

More  especially,  it  should  be  observed  that  the  testimony  of 
Jesus  Christ  on  this  point  is  of  peculiar  worth  and  authority. 
We  assume   him  now  to  have  been  the  inspired  Eevealer  of 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  297 

the  divine  character  and  purposes,  the  authoritative  expounder 
of  religious  truth.  If  he  declared  the  Old  Testament  to  be 
an  inspired  book,  his  declaration  must  be  accepted  as  true.  On 
this  point  there  can  be  no  concession.  Whatever  may  be  the 
fact  respecting  the  limitations  of  the  incarnate  Son,  it  is  certain 
that  concerning  the  matter  in  question  he  knew  more  than  any 
modern  critic.  He  who  was  commissioned  to  make  a  final  and 
perfect  revelation  of  God's  truth  cannot  be  called  in  question 
in  his  utterances  concerning  the  very  thing  which  it  was  his 
business  to  proclaim.  Even  if  it  should  be  conceded  that  he 
was  not  exempt  from  all  the  erroneous  notions  of  his  age  re- 
specting matters  lying  outside  of  the  province  of  a  religious 
dispensation,  it  cannot  be  conceded  that  he  could  have  been  in 
error  respecting  matters  which  do  emphatically  concern  such 
a  dispensation.  Coming  professedly  to  complete  a  revelation 
previously  given,  he  must,  if  not  a  veritable  impostor,  have 
been  competent  to  pass  judgment  on  that  previous  revelation. 
If  he  pronounced  it,  as  he  did,  to  be  in  some  respects  deficient 
and  in  need  of  supplementation,  his  assertion  is  to  be  implicitly 
trusted.  And  for  the  same  reason,  if  he  declared  the  record  of 
that  revelation  to  be  inspired  of  God,  we  cannot  question  his 
declaration  without  impugning  his  authority  in  general. 

It  may,  however,  be  alleged  that  Christ  nowhere  explicitly 
does  assert  the  peculiar  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament 
writers.  Strictly  speaking,  this  is  true;  and  it  is  also  true 
that,  with  a  single  exception,  none  of  the  Biblical  writers  in 
express  terms  makes  any  such  affirmation.  But  it  is  neverthe- 
less certain  that  the  notion  of  such  an  inspiration  was  cher- 
ished by  the  New  Testament  writers,  and  that  it  is  virtually, 
even  if  not  expressly,  conveyed  by  them.  The  single  passage 
just  alluded  to  (2  Tim.  iii.  16),  being  a  solitary  one,  would  not 
deserve  the  importance  generally  attached  to  it,  were  not  its  des- 
ignation of  the  Scriptures  as  inspired  of  God  substantially,  though 
not  in  form,  borne  out  by  the  general  drift  of  the  Xew  Testament 
references  to  the  Old.  The  doubt  about  the  correct  translation 
of  the  verse  does  not  materially  modify  the  force  of  its  testi- 
mony as  to  the  point  in  question.  If  we  assume  that  the 
epithet  "  inspired  of  God "  is  to  be  taken  as  belonging  to  the 


298  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

subject  (according  to  the  Eevised  Version),  still  the  verse  virtu- 
ally predicates  inspiration,  in  an  emphatic  sense,  of  the  Old 
Testament  as  a  whole.  The  apostle  has  (ver.  15)  just  spoken 
of  "the  sacred  writings"  (of  course,  the  Old  Testament  in 
general)  as  "  able  to  make  wise  unto  salvation."  And  now  he 
adds,  "Every  Scripture  inspired  of  God  is  also  profitable  for 
teaching,"  etc.  If  the  Old  Testament,  as  a  whole,  is  declared  to 
be  able  to  do  the  greater  thing,  —  make  wise  unto  salvation,  — 
it  would  be  inconceivable  that  Paul  could  now  mean  to  say 
that  the  lesser  thing  —  teaching,  reproving,  correcting,  and  in- 
structing—  could  be  done  only  by  the  inspii^ed  parts  of  the 
Old  Testament.  Timothy  had  certainly  never  been  taught 
to  make  any  such  discrimination ;  and  Paul,  if  he  meant  to 
imply  any,  leaves  Timothy  and  us  in  the  dark  as  to  where  the 
line  is  to  be  drawn.  If  deoirveva-To^  grammatically  belongs  to 
the  subject,  then  the  meaning  must  evidently  be :  "  Every  part 
of  Scripture,  being  inspired  of  God,  is  also  profitable,"  etc.^  Or 
if  any  discrimination  is  implied,  it  must  be  one  between  the 
Old  Testament  and  other  (uninspired)  writings.^ 

^  So  Origen,  in  Librum  Jesu,  Horn,  xix  :  vrSo-a  ypacftfi  BfOTTveva-ros  ovaa 
wcpeXiHos  earn.  Cf.  Beck,  Erklarung  der  zwei  Briefe  Pauli  an  Timotheus,  in 
he,  aud  Wace  (in  Speaker  s  Commentary)  in  loc.  The  "  also  "  likewise  best 
accords  with  this  interpretation. 

2  Or  possibly,  though  much  less  probably,  the  use  of  ■::a(Ta  ypa(pT}  without  the 
article  may  intimate  that  Paul  here  means  to  include,  with  the  Old  Testament 
Scriptures  (spoken  of  in  ver.  15  as  ra  lepa  ypannara),  also  the  New  Testa- 
ment Scriptures,  a  part  of  which  had  already  been  written.  So  Moshelm,  Er- 
kliirung  der  beyden  Briefe  den  Apostels  Pauli  an  den  Timotheum,  in  loc.  In 
either  case  it  cannot  be  Paul's  intention  to  imply  that  the  Scriptures  were 
made  up  of  inspired  and  uninspired  writings,  though  some,  as,  e.  g.,  Mar- 
tineau  {The  Rationale  of  Religious  Enquiry,  London,  1836,  p.  200),  so  inter- 
pret the  apostle.  Professor  Ladd  {Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  183) 
also  appears,  though  obscurely,  to  intimate  that  such  a  distinction  is  suggested. 
He  says :  "  All  Scripture  that  is  theopueustic  is  also  morally  profitable ;  and 
although  it  is  not  the  intent  of  the  writer  to  suggest  the  possibility  of  denying 
theopneusty  to  any  Scripture  whatever,  neither  is  it  his  intent  to  imply  such 
theopneusty  of  any  such  Scripture  as  is  not  also  morally  profitable.  Whether 
each  book  and  passage  in  the  Uph.  ypdnfiara  is,  taken  in  detail,  to  be  con- 
sidered as  theopueustic  and  also  profitable  for  the  purposes  specified,  the 
writer  does  not  pronounce."  The  meaning  of  this  is  not  altogether  clear. 
The  apodosis  seems  hardly  to  consist  with  the  protasis.     If  it  is  true  that  the 


THE   RECORD   OF  REVELATION.  — INSPIRATION.  299 

However  the  verse  may  be  translated,  it  affirms,  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament.  As 
to  the  meaning  of  Oeoirvevaro^  there  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  any 
material  difference  of  opinion.^  The  chief  difference  relates 
sacred  writer  does  not  iuteud  to  imply  tlieopneusty  "  of  any  such  Scripture  as 
is  not  morally  profitable,"  then  it  must  be  tiiat  he  intends  to  imply  that  such 
Scripture  is  not  theopneustic.  He  certainly  cannot  mean  to  imply  that  it 
is  neither  one  thing  nor  the  other.  If  Paul  regarded  any  part  of  Scrip- 
ture as  not  morally  profitable,  he  must,  by  fair  implication  (according  to  Pro- 
fessor Ladd),  have  regarded  it  as  not  theopneustic.  The  only  way  of  escape 
from  this  alternative  would  be  to  ascribe  to  the  apostle  the  agnostic  attitude  of 
not  determining  whether  any  Scripture  is  unprofitable  or  not.  But  even  this 
would  not  accomplish  the  purpose ;  for  such  a  non-committal  position  would 
at  least  still  "  suggest  the  possibilifj/  of  denying  theopneusty  "  to  some  parts 
of  Scripture.  Indeed  it  is  impossible  to  understand  what  reason  (if  Professor 
Ladd's  interpretation  is  correct)  Paul  could  have  had  for  using  the  term 
Beonvevaros  at  all,  unless  he  did  mean  to  imply  that  some  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament was  not  inspired,  and  hence  not  morally  profitable.  But  such  a  con- 
struction of  the  apostle's  language  would  conflict  with  the  almost  unanimous 
view  of  exegetes,  whichever  translation  they  adopt.  Thus,  EUicott  (^Pastoral 
Epistles,  in  loc.)  and  Huther  (in  Meyer's  Comm.  in  loc),  though  agreeing 
with  Professor  Ladd  as  regards  the  grammatical  construction,  find  no  impli- 
cation of  a  distinction  between  inspired  and  uninspired  Scripture.  Tiie  latter 
says :  "  There  was  no  reason  for  directing  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  whole 
of  Scripture  is  deoTrvevaros.  There  was  no  doubt  on  this  point  (viz.,  that  the 
whole  of  Scripture,  and  not  a  part  of  it,  was  inspired  of  God),  but  on  the  point 
whether  the  Scriptures  as  dfOTTVfva-roi  are  also  .  .  .  uxpeXi^oi."  The  trans- 
lation preferred  by  Ellicott,  Huther,  and  others  (followed  by  the  Revised 
Version)  takes  the  universal  inspiration  for  granted  ;  the  other  asserts  it.  As 
to  the  question,  which  translation  is  to  be  preferred,  though  the  weight  of 
scholarly  opinion  is  doubtless  against  the  rendering  of  the  Authorized  Vei'sion, 
the  authorities  are  still,  and  probably  always  will  be,  divided.  Against  the 
rendering  of  the  Revised  Version  are  such  scholars  as  Chrysostom,  Calvin, 
DeWette,  Wiesinger,  Conybeare,  Fairbairn,  Holtzmann,  and  likewise  Rothe 
(Zur  Bogmatik,  p.  181),  whom  Professor  Ladd  {Ihid)  seems  to  quote  as  if  on 
the  other  side. 

^  The  chief  lexical  difference  relates  to  the  question,  whether  it  is  to  be 
understood  passively  —  "  breathed  by  God  "  —  or  actively  —  "  God-breathing," 
i.  e.,  breathing  a  di^^ne  spirit.  The  latter  is  defended  by  Cremer,  Article  In- 
spiration in  Herzog  and  Plitt's  Reale7ici/clopddie,  and  in  his  Biblisch-theo- 
logisches  Lexicon,  sub  voc.  {vide  Supplement  to  the  Eng.  ed.),  though  the  other 
definition  was  given  in  the  first  and  second  editions.  Practically,  the  differ- 
ence is  not  very  great;  only  the  theory  of  verbal  inspiration  maybe  better 
defended,  if  the  first  definition  is  adopted.     Defined  in  the  second  way,  the 


300  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

rather  to  the  object  and  the  degree  of  the  inspiration :  whether 
it  is  the  writings,  or  the  writers,  that  are  inspired ;  and  whether 
the  inspiration  secures  absolute  infallibility  or  not.  From  the 
word  itself,  however,  as  Ellicott,^  Warington,^  and  others 
properly  insist,  we  cannot  infer  a  verbal  inspiration  such  as 
the  older  theologians  taught ;  nor  can  we  directly  draw  any  in- 
ference from  it  as  to  the  degree  of  the  inspiration.  But  the 
passage  does  affirm  the  universal  inspiration  of  the  Old 
Testament. 

Although  the  epithet  "  inspired  of  God  "  is  found  only  this 
once,  the  notion  conveyed  by  it  is  found  in  abundance.  The 
general  manner  in  which  the  New  Testament  writers  refer  to 
the  Old  corresponds  perfectly  with  the  declaration  of  the 
verse  we  have  been  considering. 

(1)  The  very  names  by  which  the  Old  Testament  is  designated 
are  significant  of  the  peculiar  dignity  accorded  to  it.  Its  books 
are  called  "  The  Scriptures,"  (or  collectively)  "  The  Scripture."  ^ 
And  these  writings,  thus  distinguished  from  and  above  all 
others,  are  everywhere  spoken  of  as  the  depository  of  the 
divine  will,  as  the  immutable  word,  and  as  the  arbiter  of  truth. 
Those  Scriptures,  it  was  held,  "  must  be  fulfilled  "  (Mark  xiv.  49  ; 
Acts  i.  16 ;  John  x.  35);  the  apostles  reasoned  from  them  (Acts 
xvii.  2);  the  Scriptures  were  to  be  carefully  searched,  as  the 
source  of  religious  truth  (John  v.  39;  Acts  xvii.  11). 

(2)  The  language  of  the  Old  Testament  is  often  quoted  as 
the  language  of  God  or  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  even  when  in  the 
original  the  words  are  not  directly  attributed  to  God.  So 
especially  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews ;  for  example,  i.  6,  7, 
ii.  12,  iii.  7,  iv.  3,  4,  v.  6,  x.  5, 15 ;  but  also  in  Eom.  xv.  10 ; 
Eph.  iv.  8. 

(3)  The  emphasis  which  is  laid  upon  the  word  of  revelation 
as  written  is  significant.     Jesus  met  the  tempter  by  quoting  to 

phrase  implies  the  activity  of  the  divine  Spirit  in  inspiring  the  writers ;  defined 
in  the  first  way,  it  more  directly  asserts  it.  Thayer's  Grimm's  New  Testament 
Lexicon  gives  the  passive  sense. 

^  Pastoral  Epistles,  in  loc.  ^  Inspiration  of  Scripture,  p.  48. 

8  E.ff.,  Matt.  xxi.  42,  xxii.  29 ;  Mark  xiv.  49 ;  Luke  xxiv.  27,  32, 45  ;  John 
V.  39  ;  Acts  xviii.  24 ;  Eom.  xv.  4. 


THE   RECORD   OF  REVELATION.  — INSPIRATION.  301 

him  that  which  was  written  (Matt.  iv.  4,  7,  10).  It  is  insisted 
that  the  things  which  are  written  must  be  fulfilled  (Luke  xviii. 
31,  xxi.  22,  xxiv.  44).  The  Scriptures  are  said  to  have  been 
written  for  the  instruction,  warning,  and  comfort  of  those  that 
were  to  come  after  (Eom.  iv,  23,  xv.  4;  1  Cor.  ix.  10,  x.  11).^ 
Paul  frequently  personifies  the  Scripture,  as  when  he  says  (Gal. 
iii.  8),  "  The  Scripture,  foreseeing  that  God  would  justify  the 
Gentiles  by  faith,  preached  the  gospel  beforehand  unto  Abra- 
ham." And  continually,  in  instances  too  numerous  to  adduce, 
appeal  is  made  to  the  Scriptures,  as  the  rule  of  faith  and  conduct, 
in  the  use  of  the  formula,  "  it  is  written,"  or  "  as  it  is  written  " 
(as,  for  example.  Matt.  xxi.  13;  John  vi.  31,  45;  Acts  xv.  15; 
Eom.  i.  17,  iii.  4,  x.  15  ;  1  Cor.  xv.  45).  Such  forms  of  expression 
indicate  not  merely  that  special  authority  was  attached  to 
Moses  and  the  prophets,  as  men  of  God,  not  merely  that  the 
Old  Testament  economy  in  general  was  held  to  be  of  divine 
institution,  not  merely  that  certain  individuals  were  inspired ; 
but  that  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures,  as  they  were  known  to 
the  New  Testament  writers  and  to  Christ  himself,  were  re- 
garded as  of  special  sacredness  and  authority  —  as  divinely 
inspired.  What  Peter  expressly  asserted  as  to  the  inspiration 
of  the  prophets  (1  Pet.  i.  10,  11 ;  2  Pet.  i.  21)  is  implicitly  as- 
serted of  the  Scriptures  in  general ;  for  they  are  all  referred  to 
in  the  same  way. 

(4)  The  typical  significance  which  Christ  and  his  disciples 
found  in  the  Old  Testament  indicates  that  they  regarded  it  as 
divinely  and  peculiarly  inspired.  Even  if  one  should  disagree 
with  them  in  their  interpretation,  the  argument  is  not  affected. 
The  fact  that  they  found  a  wealth  of  typical  meaning  in  what 
might  seem  to  be  of  slight  significance  indicates  that  they  con- 
ceived the  Scriptures  to  be  in  a  peculiar  sense  inspired  of  God. 
The  more  trivial  and  far-fetched  these  applications  of  the  Old 
Testament  writings  may  seem  to  be,  the  more  cogently  may  we 
conclude  that  the  writers  conceived  the  divine  mind  to  have 
been  peculiarly  concerned  in  determining  the  form  and  the 
sense  of  the  Scriptures.^ 

1  Cf.  John  ii.  22,  xx.  9 ;  Acts  viii.  32 ;  Rom.  iv.  3 ;  1  Pet.  ii.  6. 

2  Ou  this  see  Baiinermau,  Inspiration,  pp.  311  sqq. 


302  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

These  several  points  might  be  expanded;  but  it  is  hardly 
necessary.  What  Paul  expressed  by  that  general  characteriza- 
tion of  the  Old  Testament  as  inspired  of  God,  is  borne  out  by 
the  general  manner  in  which  those  Scriptures  are  referred  to  in 
the  New  Testament.  Eothe,  who  assumes  the  liberty  to  disagree 
with  the  New  Testament  writers  in  this  respect,  is  yet  emphatic 
in  asserting  that  they  held  a  very  extreme  doctrine  of  verbal 
inspiration.  These  authors,  he  says,  "  regard  the  words  of  the 
Old  Testament  as  immediate  words  of  God,  and  introduce  them 
expressly  as  such,  even  those  which  are  by  no  means  reported 
as  direct  utterances  of  God."  ^ 

When  Eothe,  however,  undertakes  to  find  a  sharp  distinction 
between  Christ  and  his  disciples  as  regards  the  mode  in  which 
they  view  the  Old  Testament,  we  must  pronounce  the  attempt 
a  total' failure.  He  finds  only  two  occasions  on  which  Christ 
appears  to  endorse  the  notion  of  the  special  inspiration  of  the 
written  word.  These  are  Llatt.  v.  18  (cf.  Luke  xvi.  17)  and 
xxii.  43  (cf.  Mark  xii.  36).  In  the  first,  he  says,  Christ  refers, 
not  to  the  Mosaic  codex  of  laws,  but  to  the  law,  and  therefore 
cannot  mean  to  lay  stress  on  the  minutiae  of  the  written  form. 
As  to  the  second,  he  argues  that  our  Saviour's  language  only 
affirms  that  David  was  inspired  in  composing  Ps.  ex.,  but  not 
that  he  was  inspired  in  writing  it.  But  these  are  subtleties 
that  carry  with  them  their  own  condemnation.  Eothe's  case  is 
made  only  the  worse,  when  he  undertakes  to  show  that  Jesus 
directly  undertook  to  combat  the  current  conception  of  the  Old 
Testament,  and  quotes  as  proof  Matt.  xxii.  29  (cf.  Mark  xii.  24), 
where  Christ  says  that  the  Jews  did  not  understand  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  John  v.  39,  where,  he  asserts,  Christ  even  affirms  it 
to  be  a  mere  conceit  on  the  part  of  the  Jews  to  suppose  that 
they  could  find  eternal  life  in  a  hook.  As  to  the  latter  passage, 
it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  this  interpretation  of  it  is  itself  a  con- 
ceit without  foundation.^  In  both  this  and  the  other  passage 
Jesus  simply  tells  the  Jews  that,  much  as  they  professed  to 

^  Ziir  Doffmatik,  pp.  180  sq. 

^  Although  countenanced  by  some  ot.licrs,  as  Weiss,  Der  Johanneische 
Lehrbpf/riff,  p.  106,  and  Hilgenfeld,  Das  Ecangelium  und  die  Briefe  Johunnis, 
p.  213. 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  303 

reverence  the  Scriptures,  they  did  not  really  understand  them. 
They  searched  the  Scriptures,  he  said,  in  order  to  find  in  them 
eternal  life ;  and  so  they  might,  if  they  only  found  him  there 
testified  of ;  for  he  would  give  them  life  (verse  40).  The  fault 
was  not  that  they  thought  too  much  of  the  Scriptures,  but  that 
the  word  did  not  abide  in  them  (verse  38), —  that,  though  trust- 
ing in  jVIoses,  they  yet  did  not  believe  him  (verses  46,  47).  It  is 
past  comprehension  how  these  charges,  that  the  Jews  had  failed 
to  understand  the  Scriptures,  in  any  way  imply  that  the  Scriptures 
were  not  divinely  inspired.  On  the  contrary,  the  clear  implica- 
tion is  that,  if  the  Old  Testament  is  only  rightly  understood,  it 
will  lead  to  eternal  life.  If  there  were  anywhere  any  plain  in- 
timation from  Jesus  that  he  repudiated  the  doctrine  of  inspira- 
tion, the  case  would  be  different.  But  the  word  used  (So/tew), 
like  the  English  "  think,"  cannot  be  understood  to  denote  an 
erroneous  opinion,  unless  there  is  some  other  evidence  that  this 
is  the  case  than  the  mere  use  of  the  word.  And  everywhere 
Jesus  is  represented  as  speaking  with  the  utmost  reverence  of 
the  Jewish  Scriptures ;  ^  nowhere  does  he  speak  of  them,  or  any 
part  of  them,  slightingly.  It  may,  indeed,  be  urged  that  he  em- 
phasizes the  spirit  of  the  Scriptures,  as  contrasted  with  the 
letter ;  and  in  this  respect  he  undoubtedly  did  differ  from  his 
Pharisaic  and  superstitious  countrymen.  But  we  are  now 
comparing  him,  not  with  the  unbelieving  Jews,  but  with  the 
enlightened  and  believing  apostles ;  and  we  find  them  likewise 
exalting  the  spirit  above  the  letter  (2  Cor.  iii.  6).  In  short,  it 
is  only  a  misplaced  subtlety,  or  a  predetermination  to  discover  a 
difference,  which  can  find  that  Christ's  general  attitude  towards 
the  Hebrew  Scriptures  is  essentially  different  from  that  of  the 
New  Testament  writers.  Though  the  phrase  "inspired  of  God" 
is  only  once  applied  to  the  Old  Testament,  the  notion  expressed 
by  it  is  found  throughout  the  New  Testament,  no  less  in  the 
quoted  utterances  of  Christ  than  in  the  independent  declarations 
of  the  apostles. 

He,  therefore,  who  seeks,  as  Eothe  does,  to  plant  himself  on 
the  authority  of  Christ,  as  distinguished  from  that  of  the  New 

1  See,  e.  g.,  Matt.  xxi.  42,  xxvi.  54,  56;  Luke  xvi.  29,  31,  xxiv.  27;  John 
X.  35. 


304  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

Testament  writers,  in  defining  the  doctrine  of  the  inspiration  of 
the  Old  Testament,  has  the  feeblest  kind  of  foothold.  There  is 
a  strong  presumption  that  the  apostles  and  historians  who  por- 
tray the  life,  work,  and  doctrine  of  Jesus  intend  not  only  to 
report  what  he  said  and  did,  but  also  to  accept  his  views  and 
carry  them  out.  If  they  held  different  opinions  from  his  re- 
specting the  Old  Testament,  and  were  conscious  of  that  difference, 
then  they  were  consciously  disloyal  to  the  Master  whom  they 
professed  implicitly  to  follow.  If  they  disagreed  with  him  un- 
conscioushj,  then  the  necessary  conclusion  seems  to  be  that 
though  they  were  intelligent  enough  to  report  Christ's  words 
accurately,  yet  tliey  were  not  intelligent  enough  to  see  wherein 
those  words  were  in  conflict  with  their  own  sentiments.  Such 
a  phenomenon  is  perhaps  conceivable ;  but  he  who  assumes  it 
to  be  a  fact  can  have  but  little  respect  for  the  authority  of 
writers  who  are  so  conspicuously  deficient  in  intellectual  and 
spiritual  clearness  of  apprehension.  At  all  events,  before  we 
can  accept  such  a  theory,  we  must  have  cogent  proof  of  it.  And 
when  we  find  that  the  alleged  proof,  as  soon  as  tested,  entirely 
collapses,  we  may  safely  dismiss  the  theory  which  it  is  employed 
to  support. 

The  fact  stands  fast,  therefore,  that  both  Christ  and  his  dis- 
ciples ascribed  to  the  Old  Testament  as  a  whole  the  character 
of  a  divinely  inspired  book.  The  book  was  then  well  defined 
in  its  form  and  extent.  It  was  a  collection  of  various  writings, 
but  recognized  as  being  essentially  a  unit,  and  as  embodying  the 
substance  of  God's  revelation  of  himself  to  the  Jewish  people. 

The  question  of  the  inspiration  of  the  New  Testament  is  in 
some  respects  a  distinct  one.  We  still  have,  and  even  in  a 
heightened  form,  the  arguments  from  the  presumptive  need  of 
supernatural  aid  on  the  part  of  the  writers,  and  from  the  general 
judgment  of  Christendom.  But  we  cannot  quote  Christ  as 
affirming  the  inspiration  of  a  book  which,  when  he  lived,  was 
not  yet  written.  We  can  only  draw  inferences  from  what  the 
New  Testament  writers  say  of  themselves. 

We  shall  look  in  vain,  if  we  expect  to  find  any  general  asser- 
tion covering  the  whole  New  Testament  Canon.  This  Canon 
was  not  formed ;  the  writings  of  the  apostles  had  not  been  col- 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  305 

lected  together.  It  is  not  probable  that  in  any  case  these 
writers  wrote  with  the  distinct  consciousness  that  their  writings 
were  to  become  co-ordinate  with  the  Old  Testament  as  sacred 
Scripture,  or  that  these  writings  were  at  once  regarded  and 
treated  as  such  by  others.  The  very  fact  that  in  2  Pet.  iii.  15, 
16  the  Epistles  of  Paul  are  spoken  of  as  being  a  part  of  the 
"  Scriptures,"  constitutes  one  reason  for  doubting  the  genuine- 
ness of  the  Epistle.  If  the  declaration  had  been  more  compre- 
hensive, embracing  all  the  books  now  known  as  the  New 
Testament,  especially  if  they  had  been  designated  by  a  compre- 
hensive title,  the  ground  for  suspicion  would  have  been  still 
greater.  All  that  we  can  naturally  look  for  is  individual  testi- 
mony as  to  individual  inspiration,  or  general  statements  about 
apostolic  inspiration,  but  without  reference  to  books  already 
written. 

These  testimonies  are  of  three  kinds :  (1)  the  promises  given 
by  Christ  of  the  special  help  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  the  apostles 
in  their  apostolic  work;^  (2)  the  historical  account  of  the  fulfil- 
ment of  these  promises ;  ^  and  (3)  the  direct  claims  made  by  the 
apostles  that  they  have  this  promised  help.^  We  assume  the 
trustworthiness  of  these  statements,  but  refrain  from  a  particu- 
lar analysis  and  examination  of  the  several  passages.  This 
work  has  been  often  done ;  and  the  general  significance  of  the 
testimonies  lies  on  the  surface.  There  are,  however,  some  con- 
siderations which  may  seem  to  indicate  that  these  passages  do 
not  prove  a  specifically  peculiar  inspiration  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment writers. 

(a)  Both  the  promises  and  the  claims  have  respect  to  the 
general  apostolic  commission,  and  not  particularly  to  the  apos- 
tles as  writers.     This  is  true ;  but  the  general  commission  surely 

1  Here  belong  Matt.  x.  19,  20,  xxviii.  20;  Mark  xiii.  11 ;  Luke  xii.  11,  12, 
xsl  14,  15,  xxiv.  49;  John  xiv.  16-18,  26,  xv.  26,  27,  xvi.  12-15,  xx.  22,  23. 

^  Particularly,  Acts  ii.  4,  iv.  31,  xiii.  2-4,  xvi.  6,  7. 

8  Kff.,  Acts  XV.  2S;  1  Cor.  ii.  10-16,  xiv.  37;  2  Cor.  x.  8-11,  xii.  9,  12, 
xiii.  2,  3;  Gal.  i.  9-12,  15,  16;  Eph.  iii.  1-7;  1  Thess.  ii.  13,  iv.  1,  2,  15; 
2  Thess.  ii.  13-15 ;  1  Pet.  i.  10-12 ;  2  Pet.  iii.  2 ;  1  John  i.  1-3 ;  Rev.  i.  1-3. 
xxii.  6,  7.  To  which  may  be  added  Paul's  general  claims  of  apostolic  power, 
as  Rom.  i.  1 ;  1  Cor.  i.  1,  ix.  1,  xv.  8-10;  2  Cor.  xi.  5;  Gal.  i.  1,  ii.  6-9; 
Eph.  i.  1 ;  Col.  i.  1 ;  1  Tim.  i.  1 ;  Tit.  i.  1-3. 

20 


306  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

may  be  assumed  to  cover  the  several  forms  which  the  apostolic 
functions  assumed.  And  though  we  may  not  find  any  promise 
or  claim  of  peculiar  aid  as  enjoyed  by  the  apostles  in  writing, 
quite  as  little  can  we  reasonably  assume  that  the  general  prom- 
ise failed  them  when  they  were  discharging  this  important  duty. 
Moreover  Paul,  in  2  Thess.  ii.  15,  plainly  co-ordinates  his  oral 
and  scriptural  injunctions,  and  the  Epistle  to  the  Galatians  was 
manifestly  written  with  the  consciousness  that  the  readers  were 
to  recognize  in  these  written  words  the  full  inspiration  and 
apostoHc  authority  of  the  writer.  It  is  not  necessary  to  decide 
whether  the  special  inspiration  of  the  apostles  was  a  general 
and  uniform  one,  or  was  more  or  less  occasional,  being  imparted 
when  particularly  needed.  We  find  that  sometimes  there  is  a 
special  mention  of  their  being  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost,^  as  if 
ordinarily  they  were  less  under  his  power.  Even  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  inspiration  was  of  this  intermittent  sort,  yet  it 
must  be  insisted  that  the  apostles  never  needed  it  more  than 
when  engaged  in  writing  epistles  and  histories  which  were  to 
be  perpetual  sources  of  instruction  to  the  Christian  Church.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  hold  the  inspiration  to  have  been  a  con- 
stant charism  of  the  apostles,  then  as  a  matter  of  course  it  must 
have  controlled  them  when  writing.  On  the  whole,  then,  this 
objection  is  of  slight  account. 

(6)  It  may  be  said  that  the  promises  of  special  help  and 
illumination  made  to  the  apostles  are  not  to  be  understood  as 
limited  to  them,  but  rather  as  applicable  to  all  believers.  Christ 
in  his  high-priestly  prayer  prayed  not  merely  for  the  apostles, 
but  for  all  who  should  believe  on  him  through  their  word.^ 
The  Holy  Ghost  on  the  day  of  Pentecost  fell  not  only  on  the 
apostles,  but  on  all  the  Christians  who  were  assembled  with 
them.3  Kepeatedly  the  Spirit  is  said  not  merely  to  have  filled 
or  directed  such  leading  men  as  Stephen  (Acts  vi.  5,  vii.  55)  and 
Philip  (viii.  29),  but  to  have  fallen  upon  the  multitudes  of 
believers  (viii.  17,  x.  44,  xv.  8,  xix.  6).  The  Christian  life  is 
uniformly  described  as  a  life  the  marked  characteristic  of  which 

1  E.  g..  Acts  iv.  8,  xiii.  9,  xvi.  6,  7. 

2  John  xvii.  20. 

^  Acts  ii.  1-4 ;  of.  verses  14,  15. 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  307 

is  the  indwelling  and  influence  of  the  Spirit.^  By  what  right, 
then,  it  may  be  asked,  can  the  inspiration  of  the  apostles  be 
pronounced  specifically  different  from  that  of  the  whole  com- 
munity of  believers  ? 

This  is  an  objection  of  decidedly  greater  weight  than  the  one 
previously  mentioned,  and  requires  careful  consideration.  We 
observe  with  regard  to  it : 

(1)  So  far  as  the  Christian  life  in  general  is  a  life  controlled 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  of  course  it  must  be  granted  that  both  the 
apostles  and  ordinary  Christians  alike  shared  the  gift.  This 
gift,  however,  is  often  described  according  to  the  ideal  Christian 
life,  some  Christians  being  represented  as  not  possessing  the 
Spirit,  or  at  least  scarcely  deserving  to  be  called  spiritual. 
Especially  noteworthy  is  the  manner  in  which  Paul  character- 
izes the  Corinthians  as  not  spiritual,  but  carnal  (1  Cor.  iii.  1-3), 
though  shortly  afterwards  he  says,  "  Know  ye  not  that  ye  are  a 
temple  of  God,  and  that  the  Spirit  of  God  dwelleth  in  you  ? "  (iii. 
16).  So  he  says  to  the  Galatians,  "  Having  begun  in  the  Spirit, 
are  ye  now  perfected  in  the  flesh  ? "  (Gal.  iii.  3)  ;  and  later  (vi.  1) 
he  intimates  that  the  church  is  made  up  of  the  "  spiritual "  and 
those  who  are  not  spiritual.  This  spirituality  was  conceived, 
then,  as  varying  in  degree;  and  though  Paul  sometimes  speaks 
as  though  some  were  already  "  perfect"  (1  Cor.  ii.  6  ;  Phil.  iii.  15), 
yet  he  disclaims  even  for  himself  having  been  made  perfect 
(Phil.  iii.  12),  and  the  perfection  spoken  of  evidently  either  is 
meant  in  a  relative  sense,  or  (as,  for  example,  1  Cor.  xiii.  10 ; 
Eph.  iv.  13 ;  Col.  i.  28)  is  conceived  as  an  unrealized  ideal.  In 
this  general  sense,  as  Christians,  needing  the  sanctifying  power 
of  the  Holy  Ghost  (Tit.  iii.  5),  both  apostles  and  others  stood  on 
common  ground,  though  the  apostles  may  be  presumed  to  have 
excelled  most,  or  all,  others  in  their  spiritual  attainments.  All 
this,  however,  does  not  settle  the  question  whether  the  apostles 
may  not  have  had  peculiar  gifts  of  the  Spirit,  whereby  they 
were  distinguished  from  other  Christians,  We  observe,  therefore, 
further : 

1  E.ff.,^om.  V.  5,  viii.  1-5,9-14;  1  Cor.  vi.  19,  xii.  3-13;  Gal.  iii.  2,  v.  16 ; 
Epli.  i.  13,  iv.  30,  V.  18 ;  1  Thess.  iv.  8 ;  2  Thess.  ii.  13;  Tit.  iii.  5  ;  1  Pet.  i.  2, 
iv.  1 4 ;  1  John  iii.  24. 


308  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

(2)  The  objection,  if  pressed,  proves  too  much ;  for  it  may 
be  carried  to  the  extreme  of  obliterating  all  essential  distinction 
between  Christ  himself  and  his  followers.  There  is  scarcely 
any  distinction  of  the  Redeemer  which  cannot  be  paralleled  by 
what  is  predicated  in  the  New  Testament  of  the  redeemed.  Is 
he  the  Son  of  God  ?  But  so  are  Christians  "  sons  of  God " 
(1  John  iii.  1,  2  ;  Gal.  iv.  5-7).  Is  he  "the  heir  of  all  things  " 
(Heb.  i.  2)  ?  But  so  are  Christians  "  heirs  of  God,  and  joint- 
heirs  with  Christ"  (Rom.  viii.  17;  Gal.  iv.  7).  Is  he  a  King 
and  a  Priest?  But  so  are  Christians  "a  royal  priesthood," 
"  kings  and  priests  unto  God "  (1  Pet.  ii.  9 ;  Rev.  i.  6).  Is  he 
to  be  the  Judge  of  the  world?  But  so  we  read  that  "the 
saints  shall  judge  the  world"  (1  Cor.  vi.  2).  Is  he  one  with 
God,  the  possessor  of  divine  glory  ?  But  so  it  is  said  to  be  the 
destiny  of  Christians  to  be  "  partakers  of  the  divine  nature " 
(2  Pet.  i.  4) ;  and  Christ  says  of  his  disciples,  "  The  glory  which 
thou  hast  given  me  I  have  given  unto  them  "  (John  xvii.  22). 
Did  Christ  suffer  for  the  sake  of  the  elect  ?  But  Christians  are 
said  to  be  partakers  of  his  sufferings  (2  Cor.  i.  5,  7  ;  Phil.  iii.  10), 
and  even  to  fill  up  that  which  is  lacking  in  his  afflictions  for 
the  sake  of  the  Church  (Col.  i.  24). 

Now  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  enter  minutely  into  an  exam- 
ination of  these  and  other  such  representations,  and  show  that 
after  all  the  general  impression  left  by  the  New  Testament 
teaching  is  that  Christ  is  unapproachably  superior  to  all  other 
men.  That  he  is  thus  unique  is  made  very  obvious  even  to  a 
careless  reader.  And  similarly,  although  the  apostles  and  other 
Christians  are  said  to  share  common  gifts,  it  is  still  obvious 
that  there  was  a  distinction  accorded  to  the  apostles.  While 
some  of  the  promises  made  to  them  may  fairly  be  made  to  ex- 
tend to  all  of  Christ's  disciples,  others  are  meant  especially  for 
the  apostles  (for  example,  John  xiv.  26,  xx.  23  ;  Matt,  xviii. 
18).  He  also  imparted  to  them  the  power  to  cure  diseases 
(Matt.  X.  1).  They  were  to  be  in  an  emphatic  sense  the  leaders 
and  pillars  in  establishing  the  Church  of  Christ  on  earth  (Matt, 
xxviii.  19,  20 ;  Luke  xxiv.  47-49  ;  John  xxi.  15-17,  xx.  21 :  Acts 
i.  8).  He  had  left  them  with  no  written  instructions.  They 
were  the  sole  media  of  the  communication  to  the  world  of  his 


THE   KECORD   OF   REVELATION.  — INSPIRATION.  309 

everlasting  gospel.  They  were  to  speak  and  act  with  authority. 
And  so  in  fact  they  did.  On  the  day  of  Pentecost  and  after- 
wards they  assumed  the  attitude  of  commissioned  leaders  and 
teachers  (Acts  ii.  14  sqq.,  iv.  13).  When  the  disciples  made  com- 
mon stock  of  their  possessions,  the  apostles  were  made  the  guar- 
dians of  it  (Acts  iv.  35).  They  gave  direction  concerning  the 
appointment  of  assistants  in  the  management  of  the  external 
duties  of  the  church  (vl  1-4).  They  assumed  authority  to 
settle  disputed  questions  concerning  doctrine  and  practice  (xv. 
1-29).  Paul,  who  was  not  one  of  the  original  apostles,  is 
especially  emphatic  in  insisting  upon  the  peculiar  prerogatives 
of  the  apostles  (Eom.  xi.  13  ;  1  Cor.  ix.  1,  xii.  28 ;  2  Cor.  xii. 
11,  12;  Eph.  ii.  20,  iv.  11)  and  upon  his  co-equality  with  the 
others  (2  Cor.  xi.  5 ;  Gal.  i.  1,  ii.  6).  It  was  to  him  a  distinct 
and  peculiarly  responsible  office;  and  in  all  his  letters  he 
speaks  as  one  having  authority.  The  distinction  was  not 
merely  that  the  apostles  had  been  eye-witnesses  of  Jesus'  works 
and  hearers  of  his  words.  Others  besides  them  had  had  this 
privilege,  and  Paul  had  not  had  it.  When  after  the  defection 
of  Judas  the  apostles  chose  Matthias  to  take  his  place,  they 
acted  in  the  consciousness  that  the  apostolic  office  was  one 
which  was  invested  with  a  peculiar  dignity  and  responsibility. 
This  being  so,  that  which  was  common  to  the  apostles  and 
their  fellow-Christians  cannot  be  adduced  as  proof  that  there 
was  nothing  peculiar  to  the  apostles.  And  as  their  office  was 
peculiar,  so  their  endowments  were  peculiar  also.  Though  there 
was  but  one  Spirit,  there  were  diversities  of  gifts  (1  Cor.  xii.  4)  ; 
"  and  he  gave  some  to  be  apostles  "  (Eph.  iv.  11 ;  1  Cor.  xii.  28). 
There  were  spiritual  powers  which  could  be  recognized  as  "  the 
signs  of  an  apostle  "  (2  Cor.  xii.  12).  The  principal  work  of  the 
apostles  was  to  teach  and  preach  authoritatively  the  gospel  of 
Christ  (Matt,  xxviii.  19,  20 ;  Acts  vi.  4,  xx.  24;  1  Cor.  i.  17,  xv. 
1 ;  Gal.  i.  8,  9,  11,  12).  And  this  gospel  was  set  forth  not  only 
by  oral  preaching,  but  in  written  histories  and  homilies.  It  was 
committed  to  the  apostles  so  to  set  it  forth  that  it  might  safely 
serve  for  all  coming  ages  as  a  "  foundation "  on  which  others 
might  build  (Eph.  ii.  20 ;  1  Cor.  iii.  10-12).  That  they  might 
do  this,  they  had  a  special  revelation  from  the  Spirit  of  God 


310  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

(1  Cor.  ii.  6-13),  and  were  so  sure  of  the  authoritativeness  of 
their  teaching  that  they  could  anathematize  any  who  should 
dare  to  preach  a  different  gospel  (Gal.  i.  8,  9). 

(c)  A  further  difficulty  may  be  raised  on  the  ground  that  not 
all  of  the  books  of  the  New  Testament  were  written  by  apostles. 
If  special  inspiration  is  argued  on  the  ground  of  apostolical 
authorship,  what  shall  be  said  of  the  Gospels  of  Mark  and  Luke, 
the  Book  of  Acts,  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  not  to  speak  of 
other  books  of  disputed  authorship  ?     As  to  this  we  remark  : 

(1)  Even  if  the  books  above  mentioned  were  to  be  regarded 
as  uninspired,  or  less  inspired  than  the  apostolical  ones,  we 
should  still  have  the  larger  part  of  the  New  Testament  vouched 
for  as  specially  inspired.  The  other  books  would  even  in  that 
case  not  be  valueless.  As  the  works  of  conscientious  and 
painstaking  men,  having  access  to  the  best  sources  of  informa- 
tion, they  would  be  invaluable.  This  would  be  true  of  the 
Book  of  Acts  in  an  especial  degree,  as  there  is  nothing  else  that 
covers  the  same  ground. 

(2)  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume  such  a  sharp  distinction 
between  the  two  classes  of  books.  The  promise  of  special  in- 
spiration to  the  eleven  apostles  does  not  exclude  the  supposition 
that  certain  others  might  likewise  be  made  subjects  of  a  similar 
distinction.  The  case  of  Paul  is  here  in  point.  He  was  not  one 
of  those  to  whom  the  promises  of  Jesus  were  addressed.  Yet 
no  one  ^  would  now  esteem  him  as  inferior  in  spiritual  endow- 
ment and  divine  inspiration  to  the  other  apostles.  Though 
"born  out  of  due  time,"  yet  he  became  an  apostle,  and  was 
recognized  as  such  by  the  others  and  by  the  churches.  He 
was  not  chosen  to  fill  a  vacancy,  but  was  directly  commissioned 
as  the  thirteenth  apostle  by  Jesus  Christ  himself  (Gal.  i.  1,  15, 
16;  Acts  xxvi.  16).  Somewhat  similar  is  the  case  of  Stephen, 
who  is  particularly  described  as  a  man  "  full  of  faith  and  of  the 
Holy  Ghost"  (Acts  vi.  5,  vii.  55),  as  doing  miracles  (vi.  8),  and 
as  preaching  with  irresistible  power  (vi.  10).  So  Philip  the 
Evangelist  became  a  distinguished  preacher  and  a  miracle- 
worker  (viii.  5-7,  13),  and  received  special  revelations  (viii.  29, 
39),  while  Philip  the  Apostle  is  not  once  mentioned  as  doing 

^  Except  Swedenborgians,  and  a  few  others. 


THE   RECORD  OF  REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  311 

apostolic  work.  Barnabas  likewise  is  said  to  have  been  "  full 
of  the  Holy  Ghost "  (xi,  24).  He  secured  Paul's  recognition  on 
the  part  of  the  apostles  (ix.  27),  and  became  Paul's  companion 
in  labor,  and  once  seems  even  to  be  called  an  apostle  himself 
(xiv.  14). 

It  is  a  noticeable  fact  that,  while  (except  in  the  catalogue  of 
Acts  i.  13)  none  of  the  apostles  are  mentioned  by  name  in  the 
Acts  or  in  the  Epistles,  besides  Peter,  John,  and  the  two  Jameses, 
prominence  is  given  to  the  labors  of  those  just  mentioned  as 
well  as  of  Judas  Barsabas,  Silas,  Apollos,  Titus,  Timothy,  Tychi- 
cus,  Epaphroditus,  Mark,  and  Luke.  Timothy  is  associated  with 
Paul,  as  if  joint  author  of  the  Second  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians, 
and  of  the  Epistles  to  the  Philippians,  the  Colossians,  and  the 
Thessalonians.  Silas  (Silvanus)  appears  as  joint  author  of  First 
and  Second  Thessalonians.  While  none  of  these  men  can  be 
put  on  a  par  with  Paul  in  point  of  apostolic  authority,  there  is 
evident  reason  for  assuming  that  they  had  a  peculiar  measure  of 
the  Spirit.  If  Paul,  though  not  included  among  those  whom 
our  Lord  before  his  ascension  commissioned  and  to  whom  he 
promised  special  inspiration,  afterwards  was  invested  with  apos- 
tolic authority  and  inspiration,  surely  Mark  and  Luke  may  like- 
wise have  been  commissioned  and  qualified  to  write  the  histories 
which  are  ascribed  to  them.  The  ancient  tradition  that  Mark 
wrote  as  a  reporter  of  Peter's  preaching  and  with  his  approba- 
tion, and  that  Luke's  Gospel  was  written  under  the  influence 
and  with  the  sanction  of  Paul,  is  intrinsically  probable,  and 
only  tends  to  strengthen  one's  confidence  in  the  trustworthi- 
ness of  the  Gospels,  and  to  give  to  them  a  quasi-apostolical 
authority. 

(3)  The  very  fact  that  these  writings,  and  no  others  of  the 
many  that  appear  to  have  come  early  into  existence,  were 
acknowledged  and  used  by  the  early  Christians  as  canonical,  is 
itself  an  evidence  that  they  were  regarded  as  composed  under 
the  special  direction  of  the  Spirit.  The  value  of  this  evidence 
does  not  depend  on  any  supposed  supernatural  illumination  of 
those  who  fixed  the  limits  of  the  Canon.  It  simply  shows 
that,  since  Sacred  Scripture  in  general  was  conceived  as  inspired 
of  God,  they  would  not  have  put  these  writings  into  that  class 


312  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

unless  tliey  had  deemed  them  to  have  that  character.  This 
judgment  may  indeed  be  regarded  as  a  mistaken  one ;  but  there 
is  a  presumption  in  favor  of  this  judgment,  as  compared  with 
any  later  one,  for  the  reason  that  those  who  formed  it  stood 
nearer  to  the  time  of  the  origin  of  the  books,  and  had  therefore 
better  grounds  of  judgment. 

{d)  But  it  may  be  urged,  as  another  difficulty  in  determining 
the  fact  and  the  nature  of  the  inspiration  of  the  New  Testament 
books,  that  the  authors  themselves  do  not,  as  a  rule,  make  any 
claims  to  being  specially  inspired.  At  the  most  only  Paul  and 
John  (in  the  Apocalypse)  have  anything  to  say  about  the 
special  authority  of  their  writings. 

This  is  a  consideration  which  may  be  adduced  quite  as  much 
for  as  against  the  inspiration  of  the  books  in  question.  Any 
formal  announcement  made  by  the  writer  say,  for  example,  by 
Luke  in  his  prefaces)  that  he  had  received  a  special  commission 
and  inspiration  to  write  a  book  might  be  regarded  as  the  mark 
of  one  who  is  thus  endeavoring  to  secure  currency  for  the  book. 
Frequent  and  explicit  appeals  to  divine  inspiration  as  vouching 
for  the  authenticity  and  authority  of  a  book  would  excite  sus- 
picion. The  claims  which  Paul  himself  makes  are  all  incidental 
and  not  formal.  He  nowhere  makes  a  general  statement  that 
his  letters  are  peculiarly  inspired.  What  he  says  about  his 
inspiration  has  reference  to  the  general  commission  of  himself 
and  the  other  apostles ;  or,  in  so  far  as  it  relates  particularly 
to  himself,  it  is  called  out  by  the  partisan  opposition  of  enemies. 

Particular  interest  belongs  to  those  passages  in  which  Paul 
apparently  disclaims  inspiration  with  reference  to  certain  of 
his  written  utterances.^  In  these  cases  at  all  events,  it  is 
sometimes  argued,  the  apostle  gives  us  to  understand  that  he 
speaks  simply  in  the  character  of  an  uninspired  man.  The  reply 
sometimes  made,  that  the  disclaimers  relating  to  those  few 
passages  prove  only  the  more  emphatically  that  Paul  claims 
full  inspiration  for  all  the  others,  may  have  some  force  as  an 
argumentuin  ad  hominem,  but  not  otherwise.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  argue  from  them  that  if  here,  then  in  all  probability 

1  Especially  1  Cor.  vii.  6,  10,  12,  25  ;  2  Cor.  xi.  17,  23 ;  Rom.  iii.  5,  vi.  19 ; 
Gal.  iii.  15. 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  313 

also  elsewhere,  the  apostle  may  be  regarded  as  speaking  only 
as  a  man  without  special  inspiration,^  is  quite  beside  the  mark. 
The  true  explanation  of  the  problem  raised  by  these  passages 
in  1  Cor.  vii.  is  that  there  is  not  a  sharp  distinction  between 
them  and  Paul's  other  written  utterances  in  point  of  inspiration, 
but  rather  that  they  point  to  a  distinction  between  what  Paul 
says  on  the  ground  of  express  commands  given  by  Christ  and 
what  lie  says  by  virtue  of  his  own  general  apostolic  authority .^ 
It  may,  indeed,  fairly  be  inferred  from  these,  as  well  as  from  many 
other,  utterances,  that  the  apostle's  human  personality  asserted 
itself  in  his  writings  and  in  his  apostolic  utterances ;  but  this 
is  all.  To  argue  the  total  absence  of  inspiration  from  these 
particular  passages  is  to  resort  to  a  theory  of  inspiration  almost 
as  mechanical  as  the  exploded  one  of  the  post-Eeformation 
theologians.  It  implies  that  the  inspired  writer  was  ordinarily 
distinctly  coilscious  of  a  divine  suggestion  or  dictation,  but 
that  here  and  there  he  suddenly  found  himself  left  to  his 
unaided  wisdom.  There  are,  it  is  true,  indications  of  special 
revelations  received  by  the  apostles ;  for  example,  2  Cor.  xii 
1-4;  Gal.  ii.  2.  These  refer  apparently  to  occasional  and  ex- 
ceptional experiences ;  but  there  is  no  good  reason  for  assuming 
that  the  ordinary  inspiration  of  the  apostles  was  of  an  inter- 
mittent sort.  This  may  with  more  probability  be  affirmed  of 
the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament  prophets.  Under  the 
Old  Covenant,  when  "  the  Spirit  was  not  yet  given  "  (John  vii. 
39)  as  a  general  possession  of  the  people  of  God,  the  contrast 
between  the  prophet  and  ordinary  men,  as  also  between  the 
prophet's  ordinary  state  and  his  state  of  prophetic  inspiration, 
was  doubtless  greater  than  existed  under  the  New  Covenant. 
It  is  also  very  doubtful  whether  any  sharp  distinction  can 
be  made  between  the  official  and  the  extra-official  activity  of 
the  apostles.^  It  is  by  this  distinction  that  the  difficulty  arising 
from  Peter's  defection  at  Antioch  *  is  got  over.     He  was,  it  is 

^  As  is  done  by  Row,  Revelation  and  Modern  Theology  Contrasted,  pp. 
113  sq. 

^  Vide  Cremer,  in  Herzog  and  Plitt's  Realenci/clopadie,  art.  Inspiration ; 
Ladd,  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  203 ;  Wright,  Divine  Authority 
of  the  Bible,  pp.  29  sq. 

*  As  is  done  by  Lee,  Inspiration,  etc.,  pp.  237  sqq.        *  Gal.  ii.  11-14. 


814  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

said,  then  acting  as  a  mere  man,  not  as  an  apostle.  But  Paul 
evidently,  in  his  rebuke  of  Peter,  made  no  such  distinction.  To 
his  mind  Peter,  by  his  weakness,  was  lending  all  his  apostolic, 
as  well  as  personal  influence  in  favor  of  a  course  that  was  to 
be  condemned.  If  his  conduct  tended  to  force  the  Gentile  con- 
verts to  Judaize  (Gal.  ii.  14),  it  was  doubtless  because  it  was 
viewed  as  the  conduct  of  an  aiJostle.  Barnabas  and  the  others 
were  "  carried  away  "  by  Peter's  example,  because  it  was  Peter  the 
Apostle  who  set  the  example.  If  it  should  be  said  that,  though 
they  may  have  thought  him  to  be  acting  officially,  yet  in  reality 
he  was  at  that  moment  destitute  of  apostolic  character,  it  is 
sufficient  to  answer  that  such  a  distinction  between  apostolic 
and  unapostolic  character  is  practically  an  idle  one,  unless  it  is 
meant  that  all  that  an  apostle  did  was  without  authority,  but 
that  all  he  said  and  wrote  was  strictly  inspired.  This,  however, 
is  an  utterly  untenable  position.  Paul  in  this  same  chapter 
(ii.  2)  tells  of  an  action  which  was  done  "  by  revelation,"  and 
goes  on  to  speak  of  his  action  relative  to  Titus  as  having  been 
taken  in  order  "that  the  truth  of  the  gospel  might  continue 
with"  the  Galatians  (ver.  5).  On  the  other  hand  Paul's  words 
addressed  to  the  high-priest,  as  recorded  in  Acts  xxiii.  3,  can 
hardly  be  regarded  as  according  to  the  mind  of  the  Spirit ;  for 
Paul  himself  found  immediate  occasion  to  apologize  for  them. 
Actions  speak  louder  than  words ;  and  apostolic  conduct  must 
have  been  a  very  important  part  of  apostolic  teaching. 

Still  it  may  be  rightly  urged  that  a  man's  utterances  are 
more  likely  to  be  correct  than  his  conduct.  The  judgment  and 
the  conscience  are  usually  in  advance  of  the  will.  One  may 
through  the  force  of  sudden  temptation  commit  an  act  which 
he  would  condemn  when  speaking  or  writing  dispassionately 
and  giving  utterance  to  his  conscientious  convictions.  It  has 
often  been  remarked  that  Peter's  addresses  and  epistles  give  no 
countenance  to  the  error  which  was  countenanced  by  his  conduct 
at  Antioch.  And  it  may  in  general  be  observed  that  in  the  act 
of  writing  one  is  least  of  all  in  danger  of  being  swept  away  by 
external  solicitation  or  by  sudden  gusts  of  passion  into  rash  and 
unguarded  utterances.^     An  inspired  man,  writing  for  the  editi- 

1  Cf.  Rougemont,  Christ  et  ses  femoins,  vol.  ii.  p.  343.    Yet  some  have  argued 


THE   RECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  315 

cation  of  the  churches,  would  naturally  in  this  act,  when  he 
could  weigh  his  words  and  summon  up  all  his  deepest  con- 
victions and  most  instructive  knowledge,  give  utterance  to 
the  purest  and  truest  sentiments  of  which  he  is  possessed. 
On  this  ground,  but  not  on  the  ground  of  any  inspiration  \ 
peculiar  to  apostolic  writing,  as  distinguished  from  apostolic 
speaking,  the  writings  of  the  apostles  may  be  said  to  be  of 
superior  value  to  their  oral  utterances,  or  to  the  lessons  of 
their  conduct. 

(g)  But  it  may  still  be  objected,  that  little  practical  advan- 
tage is  gained  by  the  theory  that  a  peculiar  inspiration  was 
accorded  to  the  writers  of  the  Bible,  so  long  as  no  one  can  define 
what  its  nature  was,  nor  tell  how  much  was  accomplished  by  it. 
If  the  writers  wrote  out  of  the  impulse  of  their  own  minds ;  if 
there  is  really  a  human  element  in  the  Scriptures;  if  even  we 
undertake  to  specify  different  degrees  in  the  inspiration,^  —  then 
is  there  not  given  to  us  scope  for  the  most  unlimited  caprice  in 
determining  what  and  how  much  shall  be  accepted  as  strictly 
divine  and  authoritative  ? 

To  this  we  reply,  that,  though  we  may  not  know  precisely  how 
and  how  far  inspiration  worked,  it  is  yet  not  a  matter  of  in- 
difference whether  the  Biblical  writers  enjoyed  a  special  divine 
guidance.  Their  words  have  for  us  another  force,  when  re- 
garded as  peculiarly  inspired  of  God,  than  when  regarded  as 
written  only  under  such  divine  influence  as  is  accorded  to  all 
godly  men.  For  though  we  may  and  must  make  a  distinction 
between  revelation  and  the  record  of  revelation,  yet  practically 
to  us  now  the  record  is  the  revelation  itself.     "We  know  accu- 

in  just  the  opposite  way,  urging  tliat,  since  preaching,  not  writing,  was  the 
main  commission  and  work  of  the  apostles,  and  they  had,  so  far  as  we  know, 
no  expectation  that  their  writings  would  ever  be  treated  as  canonical  Scripture, 
it  is  probable  that  they  took  the  most  pains  with  the  preparation  of  their  oral 
addresses.     So  Rothe,  Zur  Dogmatik,  p.  213. 

^  As,  eg,  Kahnis,  Lutherisrhe  Dogmatik,  vol.  iii.  p.  161,  who  finds  three 
degrees:  (1)  that  of  prophets  and  apostles;  (2)  the  writers  of  the  poetic  and 
didactic  books  ;  (3)  the  historians.  Among  the  latter,  however,  he  makes  dis- 
tinctions, putting  Joshua,  Judges,  etc.,  above  Ruth,  Esther,  etc.  (the  histories 
in  the  Hagiograplia),  and  in  the  New  Testament  Matthew  and  John  above 
Mark  and  Luke. 


316  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

rately  of  the  things  revealed  only  through  the  written  record. 
And  as  the  revelation  is  authoritative  to  us  only  by  virtue  of 
its  being  a  special  communication  of  God,  so  the  Scriptures,  as 
the  record  of  revelation,  and  as  being  practically  the  real  reve- 
lation, can  effectually  maintain  their  authoritative  position  as 
the  norm  of  Christian  life  and  opinion,  only  as  they  are  held 
to  have  been  penned  under  a  divine  direction  which  invests 
them  with  an  altogether  peculiar  authority.^  And  the  objec- 
tion, that  one  cannot  define  how  the  inspiration  of  the  Biblical 
writers  differed  from  that  of  other  godly  men,  is  no  more  con- 
clusive against  the  fact  of  such  difference,  than  the  impossi- 
bility of  exactly  defining  the  inspiration  of  the  prophets  and 
other  organs  of  special  revelation  is  a  proof  that  there  never 
has  been  any  special  revelation  at  all. 

With  reference  to  this  and  other  difficulties  that  may  be 
raised,  the  words  of  Bishop  Butler^  are  still  pertinent:  "The 
only  question  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity  is  whether 
it  be  a  real  revelation,  not  whether  it  be  attended  with  every 
circumstance  which  we  should  have  looked  for ;  and  concerning 
the  authority  of  Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to  be, 
not  whether  it  be  a  book  of  such  sort,  and  so  promulgated,  as 
weak  men  are  apt  to  fancy  a  book  containing  a  divine  revelation 
should.  And  therefore  neither  obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccu- 
racy of  style,  nor  various  readings,  nor  early  disputes  about  the 
authors  of  particular  parts,  nor  any  other  things  of  like  kind, 
though  they  had  been  much  more  considerable  in  degree  than 
they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority  of  the  Scripture,  unless 
the  prophets,  apostles,  or  our  Lord  had  promised  that  the  book 
containing  the  divine  revelation  should  be  secure  from  those 
things." 

But  how  are  we  to  understand  this  "  authority  of  the  Scrip- 
ture "  of  which  Bishop  Butler  speaks  ?  Is  it  a  strict  authority, 
—  an  ultimate,  absolute  authority  ?  Or  is  it  to  be  supplemented, 
or  even  corrected,  by  something  else,  • —  by  the  human  reason, 
or  the  Christian  judgment  and  experience  ?     Are  the  Scriptures 

^  Cf.  Prof.  G.  N.  Boardman  on  Inspiration  {Bihliotheca  Sacra,  1884,  pp. 
527  sq.). 

^  Analogy,  etc.,  part  il.  chap.  iii. 


THE   EECORD   OF   REVELATION.  —  INSPIRATION.  317 

to  be  regarded  as  the  supreme  authority,  or,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  the  so-called  "  Christian  consciousness  "  ^  to  be  regarded  as  a 
secondary  or  co-ordinate  authority  alongside  of  the  Scriptures  ? 
The  consideration  of  this  question  is  necessary  as  a  supplement 
to  the  foregoing  discussion. 

^  This  barbarous  phrase,  imported  into  our  language  as  a  translation  from 
the  German,  wliere  also  it  is  a  modernism  dating  from  Schleiermacher,  is  an 
unfortunate  one,  the  use  of  which  ought  to  be  discouraged.  In  spite  of  all 
explanations,  it  will  often,  if  not  generally,  be  understood  as  implying  (what 
the  English  word  naturally  means)  a  direct  perception  or  intuition  of  truth 
analogous  to  what  is  commonly  meant  by  "  consciousness ; "  and  so  the  dispute 
about  the  thing  is  complicated  by  a  misunderstanding  about  the  meaning  of 
the  word.  If  the  Christian  is  really  conscious  of  this  or  that,  wby,  that  should 
be  the  end  of  all  debate ;  if  not,  then  why  use  a  word  which  properly  means 
tliat  ?  Better  avoid  the  phrase  entirely  rather  than  foster  needless  confusion 
and  contention.  It  is  true  that  there  is  no  one  word  which  fully  expresses  the 
somewhat  complex  conception  meant  to  be  expressed  by  the  phrase  "  Christian 
(or  religious)  consciousness."  But  "experience,"  "judgment,"  "feeling," 
"mind,"  or  "sense,"  can  generally  be  used,  and  certainly  have  the  advantage 
of  not  being  ambiguous  and  misleading.  The  term  "  consciousness  "  is  es- 
pecially objectionable  in  composition,  as,  e.  g.,  "  God-consciousness "  and 
"world-consciousness," — hideous  terms  which  are  used  as  the  equivalents 
of  Gottesbewusstsein  and  Welthewusstsein,  i.  e.  consciousness  (or  sense)  of  God 
and  of  the  world.  But  the  terms  might  as  well  mean  God's  consciousness 
and  the  world's  consciousness ;  in  fact,  Mr.  Royce,  in  his  Religious  Aspect  of 
Philosophr/,  p.  348,  uses  the  terra  "world -consciousness"  in  the  sense  of  "uni- 
versal consciousness,"  as  contrasted  with  the  individual's  consciousness. 


318  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION, 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   AUTHORITY   OF   THE    SCEIPTUEES. 

THE  fact  of  a  divine  revelation  is  now  taken  for  granted. 
Christianity  is  assumed  to  be  the  chief  and  final  disclo- 
sure of  the  character  and  purposes  of  God.  But  it  is  a  some- 
what different  question,  whether  the  Bible,  as  we  have  it,  can  lay 
claim  to  be  an  absolute  authority. 

Much  is  said  nowadays  about  the  matter  of  religious  assur- 
ance. The  need  is  felt  of  a  firm  and  impregnable  ground  to 
stand  on,  as  over  against  the  assaults  of  skeptics  and  materialists 
from  without,  or  the  unsettling  effects  of  inward  doubt.  Some 
find  it  in  the  Christian  experience  ;i  others  in  the  objective 
authority  of  the  Bible.  Thus,  for  example,  President  F.  L.  Patton 
says :  "  A  man  feels  certain,  let  us  suppose,  that  Christ  is  his 
Saviour.  .  .  .  How  does  he  know  that  his  certitude  rests  on  a 
sure  basis  ?  Because,  we  shall  be  told,  this  certitude  is  the  wit- 
ness of  the  Spirit  of  God.  But  what  has  led  him  to  interpret  his 
consciousness  in  this  way  ?  The  Bible,  of  course ;  for  it  is  there 
we  learn  that  the  Christian  hath  the  witness  in  himself.  The 
case,  then,  seems  to  be  this :  The  Christian  has  the  present 
certitude  of  consciousness.  When  he  reflects  upon  it,  however, 
he  finds  that  subjective  certitude  is  not  necessarily  a  guaranty  of 
objective  fact.  He  seeks  to  corroborate  his  certitude  by  account- 
ing for  it.  He  accounts  for  it  by  ascribing  it  to  the  witness  of 
the  Spirit.  He  is  authorized  to  ascribe  it  to  this  cause  by  the 
Bible.  So  that  the  certitude  of  consciousness,  after  all,  depends 
upon  the  authority  of  the  Bible.     But  what  becomes  of  the  certi- 

^  E.  ft-,  Borner,  in  the  conviction  of  sin  and  in  the  apprehension  of  Christ 
as  a  sufficient  Saviour,  Christian  Doctrine,  \  11;  Frank,  in  the  consciousness 
of  beiuff  rp£:fenerate.  System  der  christlichen  Gewisshelt,  §  15  (in  Clark's  Theo- 
logical Library,  Sjslem  of  Christian  Certainty/). 


THE   AUTHORITY  OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  319 

tilde  of  consciousness,  if  this  certitude  rests  ultimately  upon  the 
Bible,  and  the  Bible  gives  us  only  probability  ? "  ^ 

The  implication  here  is  that  the  Bible  is  the  ultimate  source 
of  Christian  assurance,  and  that  therefore  there  can  be  no  real 
certitude  unless  the  Bible  can  be  depended  on  as  absolutely 
infallible.  But  this  at  once  suggests  the  further  question  :  How 
does  one  come  to  know  that  the  Bible  is  infallible  ?  If  we 
depend  on  its  testimony  for  our  Christian  certitude,  then  we  must 
be  sure  that  its  testimony  is  absolutely  trustworthy.  It  is  not 
infallible  to  us,  unless  we  believe  in  the  infallibility  of  the  judg- 
ment which  pronounces  it  to  be  infallible.  How,  then,  is  this 
judgment  reached  ? 

There  are  two  methods  by  which  the  authority  of  the  Bible  is 
argued,  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  The  first  is  that  em- 
phasized by  the  early  Protestant  theologians,  who  affirmed  that 
tlie  Christian  recognizes  the  divinity  of  the  Scriptures  by  virtue 
of  the  direct  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit  within  him;  the 
judgment  being  a  sort  of  intuitive  judgment,  perfectly  satis- 
factory, though  not  capable  of  being  reduced  to  the  form  of  a 
logical  argument.  It  is  manifest  that,  if  this  is  the  source  of 
our  knowledge  of  the  Bible's  infallibility,  then  a  most  important 
function  is  thus  assigned  to  the  Christian's  private  judgment. 
Inasmuch  as  the  Spirit's  testimony  cannot  be  consciously  distin- 
guished from  the  Christian's  own  mental  process,  and  inasmuch 
as  the  Christian  mind  is  in  any  case  a  mind  enlightened  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  this  alleged  recognition  of  the  divine  authority  of 
the  Scriptures  is  practically  a  simple  deliverance  of  the  Chris- 
tian "  consciousness  "  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  term. 

It  would  seem  to  be  an  obvious  inference  from  this  doctrine, 
that  a  judgment  or  intuition  which  is  able  directly  and  infallibly 
to  pronounce  all  the  books  of  the  Bible  —  these  wholly  and 
these  alone  —  to  be  the  inspired  and  faultless  Word  of  God, 
must  be  infallible  with  regard  to  spiritual  truth  in  general ;  and 
so  a  very  wide  door  is  opened  for  the  largest  claims  which  may 
be  made  on  behalf  of  the  authority  of  the  "  Christian  conscious- 
ness." True,  the  doctrine  was  not  so  meant.  The  design  was 
to  postulate  for  the  Christian  soul  the  power  unerringly  to  detect 
1  The  New  York  Independent,  Dec.  4,  18S4. 


320  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

in  the  Bible  a  diviue  standard  of  truth,  which  being  discovered, 
the  Christian's  judgment  can  be  absolutely  trusted  in  nothing 
else;  the  objective  standard,  discovered  by  the  subjective  method, 
must  be  accepted  as  the  only  and  perfect  standard.  But  this 
itself  suggests  the  weak  point  in  the  doctrine.  This  alleged 
faculty  of  the  Christian  mind,  if  it  really  gives  us  assurance 
concerning  the  special  inspiration  and  divine  authority  of  just 
our  canonical  Scriptures,  must  be  able,  in  order  to  do  this,  to  dis- 
cern the  perfect  truth  and  divinit}^  of  each  and  every  part  of 
the  Bible.  It  must  be  able  infallibly  to  distinguish  the  apoc- 
ryphal from  the  canonical.  It  must  be  able  to  pronounce  judg- 
ment concerning  the  genuineness,  or  at  least  the  inspiration,  of 
the  disputed  books.  It  must  be  able  to  detect  all  interpolations 
of  uninspired  transcribers,  and  all  deviations  of  the  manuscripts 
from  the  original  record.  And  all  this,  before  it  can  pronounce  the 
Bible  as  a  whole  to  be  absolutely  infallible.  For  unless  the  Chris- 
tian is  sure  respecting  all  these  critical  and  historical  questions,  lie 
cannot  be  sure  that  eveiy  part  of  the  Bible  as  we  have  it  is  strictly 
divine,  and  therefore  he  cannot  pronounce  the  whole  to  be  so. 

Evidently  this  is  attributing  altogether  too  much  to  the  author- 
ity of  the  "  Christian  consciousness."  However  true  it  may  be 
that  the  Bible  carries  with  it  a  power  peculiarly  its  own,  and 
makes  an  impression,  in  its  general  import  and  drift,  of  convey- 
ing a  divine  message,  probably  few  can  be  found  who  would 
claim  for  the  Christian  judgment  the  power  of  intuitively  settling 
all  the  vexed  questions  of  canonicity  and  inspiration.  The  true 
Christian  spirit  itself  rejects  the  assumption  which  has  been 
made  on  its  own  behalf 

Whatever  of  truth  there  is  in  this  doctrine  of  the  testimonium 
Spiritu  Sancti  can  have  relation  only  to  the  vital  truths  of  reve- 
lation,—  the  saving  truths  that  are  capable  of  being  translated 
into  religious  experience.  A  testimony  of  the  Spirit  which 
should  go  further  than  this,  —  which  should  testify  concerning 
the  infallible  inspiration  of  every  minutest  utterance  of  the 
sacred  writers,  however  remote  it  might  be  from  one's  actual 
religious  life,  —  such  a  testimony  would  be  itself  nothing  short 
of  a  new  revelation.  The  testimony  of  the  Spirit,  unless  it  is 
such  a  supernatural  communication,  can  be  nothing  but  a  con- 


THE  AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  321 

scious  experience  of  a  spiritual  sort,  —  as,  for  example,  of  re- 
generation, of  the  beatifying  and  purifying  effect  of  the  sense 
of  pardon,  of  a  growing  love  to  God  and  men,  etc.,  —  such  an 
experience  as  illustrates  and  confirms  what  relates  to  it  in  the 
Scriptures.  But  no  religious  experience  can  ever  enable  a  man 
to  determine  whether  the  name  of  the  great  king  of  Babylon 
should  be  called  Nebuchadnezzar  or  Nebuchadrezzar.  A  Chris- 
tian man  will  find  in  the  Scriptures  as  a  whole  a  spirit  which 
seems  to  him  to  be  of  divine  origin.  His  own  spirit,  illumined 
by  the  Divine  Spirit,  will  discern  in  the  Scriptures  the  marks 
of  a  superhuman  influence  that  must  have  been  concerned  in 
the  production  of  them.  He  will  be  conscious  of  a  peculiar 
stimulus  and  illumination  as  coming  from  the  contents  of  the 
Bible,  But  no  religious  experience  can  go  to  the  length  of  en- 
abling a  man  to  recognize  the  divine  inspiration  and  authority 
of  every  part  of  the  Biblical  books. 

And  so  we  come  to  the  second  method  by  which  the  divine 
authority  of  the  Bible  is  argued,  —  the  objective  method,  which 
relies  on  the  so-called  external  evidences.  In  brief  it  is  this : 
The  apostles  were  honest,  earnest,  and  intelligent  men ;  they 
affirmed  the  sinlessness  and  divinity  of  Jesus  Christ ;  they  re- 
corded that  he  promised  them  the  inspiration  of  the  Holy 
Ghost ;  therefore  the  books  written  by  them  must  be  infallibly 
inspired.  But  plainly  this  argument  is  not  a  logically  demon- 
strative one,  however  great  its  force  may  be.  The  first  premise 
is  denied  by  some ;  but  granting  its  validity  we  meet  at  every 
point  a  lack  of  absolute  conclusiveness.  For  example,  how  does 
the  general  promise  of  inspiration  necessarily  involve  absolute 
infallibility  ?  All  Christians  enjoy  the  indwelling  of  the  Spirit ; 
where  do  we  find  indicated  the  sharp  distinction  between  apos- 
tolic infallibility  and  the  general  fallibility  of  all  other  Chris- 
tians ?  Again,  how  does  the  general  promise  of  inspiration 
imply  special  and  infallible  inspiration  in  the  act  of  writing  ? 
And  again,  even  if  this  were  made  out,  how  does  the  promise 
of  the  special  inspiration  to  the  eleven  apostles  involve  equal 
inspiration  to  all  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament  ?  Paul, 
Mark,  and  Luke  were  not  among  those  to  whom  the  promises 
were  addressed.  Only  a  small  part  of  the  New  Testament  pro- 
21 


322  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

fesses  to  be,  and  not  even  all  of  this  part  is  universally  admitted 
to  be,  the  work  of  any  of  those  to  whom  Christ  was  speak- 
ing. But  further,  even  if  this  flaw  in  the  argument  be  over- 
looked, how  are  we  absolutely  certain  that  the  books  which  we 
have  are  exactly  the  same  as  those  which  came  from  the  hands 
of  the  writers  ?  Clearly,  then,  this  argument  cannot  be  pro- 
nounced perfectly  conclusive.  If  the  Christian,  in  order  to  be 
certain  of  salvation  through  Christ,  depends  on  the  Biblical 
statement  respecting  the  witness  of  the  Spirit ;  and  if  his  as- 
surance of  the  truth  of  this  statement  depends  upon  his  cer- 
tainty that  all  of  the  Bible  (at  least  all  of  the  New  Testament) 
is  infallibly  true ;  and  if  his  certainty  on  this  point  is  derived 
from  the  argument  above  given,  —  then  his  certitude  must  be 
badly  affected  with  uncertainty.  The  most  certain  thing  about 
it  is  that,  if  the  authority  of  the  Bible  rests  for  us  on  the  logical 
cogency  of  this  argument,  if  it  can  be  no  more  absolute  than 
the  argument  is  irrefragable,  then  the  Bible  does  "give  us  only 
probability,"  —  a  very  high  degree  of  probability,  no  doubt,  but 
still  only  probability. 

Each  of  these  methods  of  proof,  then,  is  by  itself  defective. 
Neither  of  them  is  adequate  to  demonstrate  tlie  infallible  au- 
thority of  the  Scriptures.  Will,  however,  both  combined  accom- 
plish the  desired  object  ?  Undoubtedly,  as  there  is  force  in  each, 
the  two  strengthen  each  other.  But  two  probabilities  cannot 
be  added  together  so  as  to  produce  an  absolute  certainty.  And 
in  the  present  case  it  is  to  be  noted  that  each  argument  is 
w^eakest  in  the  same  place :  in  the  demonstration  of  the  infalli- 
bility of  those  portions  of  the  Scriptures  which  have  the  least 
to  do  with  what  is  vital  to  the  Christian  life. 

The  consciousness  of  this  weakness  of  the  argument  has  led 
on  both  sides  to  the  adoption  of  the  view  that  Biblical  inspira- 
tion has  chiefly  or  wholly  to  do  with  moral  and  religious  truth, 
and  does  not  necessarily  secure  to  the  writer  such  absolute  free- 
dom from  all  error  as  can  scarcely  be  anything  but  the  product 
of  omniscience.  The  locibs  classieus  on  the  subject  of  Biblical 
inspiration  (2  Tim.  iii.  15,  16)  itself  lays  all  the  stress  on  just 
this  spiritual  use  of  the  Scriptures.  Accordingly  it  has  become 
a  wide-spread  opinion  that,  while  the  Bible  must  be  regarded  as 


THE  AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  323 

infallible  in  its  religious  teachings,  it  may  be  left  an  open  ques- 
tion, at  least,  whether  its  writers  may  not  have  erred  with  regard 
to  historical,  philosophical,  and  scientific  matters.  In  one  way 
this  conception  of  the  subject  is  certainly  an  improvement  on 
that  which  makes  the  reality  of  revelation  as  a  whole  stand  or 
fall  with  the  perfect  agreement  of  every  minutest  pait  of  the 
Bible  with  the  results  of  the  latest  scientific  researches.  But 
the  theory  has  some  difficulties  of  its  own.  It  retains  the  as- 
sumption of  an  absolute  infallibility  in  the  Bible,  but  makes  a 
theoretical  distinction  between  the  religious  and  the  scientific 
which  in  point  of  fact  it  is  difficult  or  impossible  to  carry  out. 
No  man  can  tell  where  the  religious  ends  and  the  scientific 
begins.  And  the  difficulty  becomes  all  the  greater,  the  more 
clearly  it  is  recognized  that  Christianity  is  essentially  not  so 
much  a  system  of  revealed  doctrines  as  it  is  a  body  of  historic 
facts.  To  distinguish  sharply  between  the  historical  and  the 
religious  in  Christianity  is  impossible,  for  the  historical  is  re- 
ligious.i  If  inspiration  is  supposed  to  have  guided  the  writers 
in  all  their  religious  communications,  and  to  have  been  denied 
them  in  everything  else,  the  practical  result  of  such  a  view  will 
be  that  one  will  feel  himself  to  be  at  liberty  to  draw  the  line  of 
demarkation  between  the  true  and  the  erroneous  wherever  he 
may  please.  This,  then,  is  obviously  not  the  full  solution  of 
the  problem. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  it  is  equally  clear  that  the  prob- 
lem is  not  solved  by  ascribing  to  the  Christian  judgment  the 
capacity  of  discerning  and  testing  religious  truth  independently 
of  Biblical  or  other  external  helps.  If  the  individual  mind  is  the 
absolute  criterion,  then  the  individual  is  to  that  extent  infallible. 
But  individual  Christians  do  not  all  agree  with  one  another,  and 
of  course  not  all  of  them  are  infallible.  Is,  then,  the  common 
Christian  judgment  the  unerring  standard  of  religious  truth  ? 
Tliis  is  more  plausible ;  but  the  common  judgment  is  only  the 
aggregate  of  the  individual  judgments  ;  and  unless  there  is  some 
infallible  method  of  striking  an  average  which  will  yield  us  an 
infallible  result,  it  is  idle  to  hold  up  the  common  judgment  as  the 

'  See  a  suggestive  discussion  of  this  point  by  Prof.  E.  P.  Gould  on  the 
Extent  of  Inspiration,  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra  for  1878. 


324  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

unfailing  standard.  Besides,  does  not  the  history  of  the  Church 
seem  to  show  that  the  majority  of  Christians  may  become  the  vic- 
tims of  error  ?     As  Protestants,  how  can  we  think  otherwise  ? 

What  shall  we  say  then  ?  Let  us  attempt  to  fix  upon  some 
of  the  general  principles  which  must  underlie  any  correct  settle- 
ment of  this  question. 

1.  Christianity  is  not  the  offspring  either  of  man's  natural 
consciousness  or  of  the  Bible.  It  originated  as  a  revelation  from 
God  mediated  by  Jesus  Christ.  Although  men  often  loosely 
speak  as  if  the  New  Testament  were  the  source  of  Christianity, 
yet  the  truth  needs  only  to  be  stated  to  receive  immediate  assent, 
that  neither  originally,  nor  generally  at  present,  do  men  become 
believers  in  Christ  directly  and  simply  on  account  of  what  they 
find  in  the  New  Testament.^  Originally  Christianity  was  widely 
established  before  there  was  any  New  Testament.  The  apostles 
preached  it  as  a  divine  revelation  ;  their  successors  handed  down 
their  testimony.  Parents  taught  the  Christian  faith  to  their 
children,  and  churches  were  planted  all  over  the  Eoman  Empire 
before  the  Gospels  and  the  Epistles  were  written.  And  no  less 
true  is  it  now  that  the  Christian  religion  is  propagated  from 
person  to  person,  and  not  chiefly  by  the  reading  of  the  Bible. 
Children  are  taught  to  believe  in  Christ  before  they  are  able 
intelligently  to  read  the  New  Testament.  The  impenitent  are 
gathered  into  the  Church  mostly  through  the  personal  influence 
of  Christians,  and  not  by  first  becoming  convinced  of  the  divine 
authority  of  the  Bible. 

It  is  equally  manifest  that  Christianity  did  not  originate,  and 
is  not  now  propagated,  as  a  mere  intuition  of  the  human  mind. 
It  is  not  a  system  of  truths  wrought  out  by  philosophical  medi- 
tation, and  is  not  now  presented  to  men  as  something  which  every 
one  is  capable  of  evolving  out  of  his  own  consciousness.  It  comes 
to  men  as  a  divine  revelation,  communicated  from  one  generation 
to  another.  Just  as  soon  as  professed  Christians  discard  this 
view,  and  pretend  that  the  essence  of  Christianity  is  to  be  found 
in  every  man's  intuitions,  we  know  that  such  men  have  lost,  or 
have  never  found,  the  essence  of  Christianity, 

1  Cf.  Kalinis,  Luthe.rhche  Bogmatik,  vol.  iii.  §§  6,  8.  "In  fact,  the  ordinary 
way  by  wbicli  the  Word  brings  man  to  the  truth  is  that  of  tradition." 


THE  AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  325 

2.  In  the  strict  sense  neither  human  opinion  nor  the  Bible 
is  invested  with  any  authority  over  the  Christian  Church.  Christ 
is  the  supreme  and  only  authority.  He  is  the  Lord  and  Master. 
All  branches  of  Christendom  recognize  this ;  but  Papists  make 
the  clergy  or  the  Pope  Christ's  infallible  representative,  and  so, 
]iractically,  the  substitute  for  Christ  as  an  authority.  Protes- 
tants sometimes  do  nearly  the  same  thing,  when  they  pin  their 
faith  to  the  dicta  of  some  great  theologian.  But  it  is  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  Protestant  Christianity,  that  Christians  have 
direct  access  and  relation  to  their  divine  Master,  and  need  no 
priestly  or  other  human  intervention.  The  convictions  or  specu- 
lations of  no  successor,  or  substitute,  or  representative,  of  Christ 
can  replace  him  as  Master,  or  claim  the  right  to  control  Christian 
faith  or  life. 

So  far  all  is  clear.  But  is  not  the  Bible  —  at  least  the  New 
Testament  —  after  all  in  some  sense  an  authority?  What  are 
the  facts  ?  As  we  have  observed,  the  New  Testament  was  not 
the  source,  but  only  the  product  or  depository,  of  the  Christian 
revelation.  It  is  not  authoritative  as  being  the  author  of  our 
religion.  But  is  not  the  New  Testament  an  authoritative  record  ? 
It  certainly  was  not  such  before  it  was  in  existence.  When 
Christ's  gospel  was  proclaimed  only  orally,  men  received  the 
apostolic  testimony  whenever  they  became  convinced  of  its 
truth ;  and  they  did  not  become  convinced  of  its  truth  by  first 
becoming  convinced  of  the  infallible  authority  of  the  apostles. 
And  after  men  became  Christians,  they  were  not  expected  to 
acknowledge  the  apostles  as  having  a  right  authoritatively  to 
control  their  religious  conduct  and  opinions.  Paul  expressly 
disclaims  any  right  to  exercise  lordship  over  the  faith  of  his 
converts  (2  Cor.  i.  24).  And  though  he  sometimes  (especially 
in  the  Epistle  to  the  Galatians)  seems  to  assume  magisterial 
authority,  he  is  careful  to  make  it  clear  that  he  speaks  as  "  a 
servant  of  Christ"  (i.  10);  and  his  reproof  of  the  Galatians  is 
put  on  the  ground  that  they  had  disobeyed,  not  him,  but  the 
gospel  which  he  had  preached  (i.  6-9).  "We  preach  not  our- 
selves, but  Christ  Jesus  as  Lord  "  (2  Cor.  iv.  5),  —  this  is  every- 
wliere  the  spirit  of  the  apostolic  message. 

If  now  the  apostles  as  living  preachers  exercised  and  claimed 


326  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

no  authority  over  the  churches,  no  more  can  such  authority  be 
ascribed  to  their  writings.  What  the  apostles  said  by  word  of 
mouth  and  what  they  said  by  letter  would  naturally  be  held  in 
equal  estimation.  Nowhere  do  they  themselves  attribute  supe- 
rior weight  to  their  writings.  Why,  then,  is  so  much  importance 
now  attached  to  the  New  Testament  ?  For  the  obvious  reason 
that  the  apostles  and  other  early  witnesses  of  Christ's  work  and 
words  are  dead.  If  Peter  and  John  were  still  living  with  un- 
clouded memories  and  with  apostolic  inspiration,  and  could  tell 
us  in  person  what  they  saw  and  heard  and  thought,  that  testi- 
mony would  be  quite  as  valuable  as  what  we  now  get  from  their 
writings,  —  and  indeed  more  so,  inasmuch  as  it  would  be  more 
full  and  direct,  and  more  free  from  the  liability  of  being  modi- 
fied and  adulterated  which  besets  the  transmission  of  written 
records  through  the  centuries.  But  the  apostles  had  to  die  ;  and 
that  process  has  been  a  natural  and  indeed  a  necessary  one,  by 
which  their  writings,  and  the  writings  of  others  who  stood  near 
to  them  and  to  the  things  narrated,  became  invested  with  an 
increasing  value.  Those  writings  embodied  the  substance  of 
the  oral  apostolic  testimony  on  which  the  Church  had  been 
founded.  There  was  danger  that  without  such  a  permanent 
record  of  their  teachings  the  gospel  might  become  corrupted. 
The  farther  the  Church  is  removed  from  the  time  of  the  apostles, 
and  consequently  from  a  trustworthy  tradition  of  their  utterances, 
the  more  valuable  and  indispensable  do  these  Scriptures  become. 
They  must  continue  to  be  the  canon,  the  rule,  the  safeguard 
against  abnormal  deviations  from  what  Christ  and  his  immediate 
followers  taught. 

In  an  important  sense,  therefore,  the  Scriptures  (especially 
those  of  the  New  Testament)  are  authoritative  ;  but  they  are  only 
mediately  authoritative.  They  are  authoritative  as  a  written 
edict  is  which  purports  to  have  come  from  a  sovereign;  the 
written  words  have  no  authority  except  as  they  make  known  the 
will  of  him  in  whom  the  authority  resides.  So  over  the  Chris- 
tian Church  Christ  is  still  the  only  Master.  Our  allegiance  is 
due  to  him,  not  to  the  Scriptures.  As  the  Church  was  founded 
and  for  a  considerable  time  was  propagated  without  any  written 
law,  so  it  is  conceivable  that  it  might  have  continued  to  the 


THE  AUTHORITY. OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  327 

present  day  without  the  written  records.  As  already  intimated, 
in  an  important  sense  it  has  been  so  handed  down.  There  exists 
a  great  volume  of  Christian  faith  which,  beginning  during  the 
life  of  Christ,  has  been  propagated  from  generation  to  generation 
by  living  believers  from  that  time  to  this.  This  Christian  faith, 
experience,  sentiment,  motive,  hope, —  in  short,  this  Christian 
life,  in  so  far  as  it  is  genuine,  also  possesses  a  sort  of  authority. 
Otherwise  it  could  not  be  commended  with  confidence  by  one 
to  another.  But  it,  too,  has  only  a  relative  authority.  It  is  an 
outflow  from  Him  who  alone  is  the  absolute  Truth  and  Life. 

But  this  suggests  the  question :  Which  has  the  most  of  this 
relative  authority,  —  the  Bible  or  the  Christian  experience  ? 
To  this  it  may  be  replied  in  part  by  observing  that  — 

3.  It  is  impossible  that  in  any  vital  respect  a  normal  Chris- 
tian experience  should  conflict  with  a  correct  understanding 
of  the  Christian  Scriptures.  For  both  the  Christian  experience 
and  the  Christian  Scriptures  come  from  the  same  source,  —  from 
Him  who  is  the  Truth  and  the  Life.  It  is  idle,  therefore,  to 
speak  of  these  as  materially  conflicting  with  each  other. 

To  be  sure,  it  may  be  said  that  these  three  qualifications  here 
rob  the  proposition  of  all  special  value.  What  is  a  normal 
Christian  experience  ?  and  a  correct  understanding  of  the  Scrip- 
tures ?  and  a  conflict  on  vital  points  ?  Who  is  to  determine 
when  these  conditions  are  fulfilled  ?  Yet  it  is  not  without  im- 
portance to  emphasize  the  proposition,  self-evident  as  it  may 
seem  to  be.  For  if  Christian  life  and  the  Christian  Scriptures 
come  from  the  same  source,  then  the  question  as  to  the  relative 
authority  of  the  two  loses,  to  say  the  least,  much  of  the  signifi- 
cance often  attached  to  it.  At  all  events,  an  abnormal  or  spu- 
rious Christian  experience  has  no  authority ;  and  neither  has  the 
Bible,  wrongly  understood.  But  a  healthy  Christian  sentiment 
is  of  more  weight  than  a  wrong  conception  of  Biblical  truth  ;  as,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Scriptures,  understood  according  to  their  true 
spirit,  are  of  more  weight  tlian  a  perverted  Christian  judgment. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  do  not  the  Scriptures  have  a  certain 
priority  ?  In  order  to  secure  a  normal  development  of  the 
Christian  life,  must  we  not  make  the  Bible  the  standard  of  faith 
and  conduct  ?     If  it  is  true  that  a  healthy  Christian  experience 


328  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

will  not  conflict  with  the  Bible,  is  not  that  because  a  Christian 
experience  is  healthy  only  when  it  is  built  up  on  the  Bible  ? 
It  would  be  easy,  perhaps,  to  give  an  unqualifiedly  affirmative 
answer  to  these  questions,  were  we  not  at  once  confronted  with 
the  requirement  that  the  Scriptures,  in  order  to  be  a  safe  guide, 
must  be  rightly  understood,  and  that  they  can  be  rightly  under- 
stood only  by  one  who  already  has  a  normal  Christian  experience. 
We  thus  seem  to  be  moving  in  a  circle  :  The  normal  Christian 
experience  depends  on  a  correct  understanding  and  application 
of  the  Bible,  while  a  correct  understanding  of  the  Bible  depends 
on  a  normal  Christian  experience.  The  solution  of  the  difficulty 
is  to  be  sought  in  the  very  fact  above  emphasized,  that  both  the 
personal  Christian  life  and  the  history  of  God's  revelation  come 
from  the  same  source ;  neither  of  them  is  solely  dependent  on 
the  other ;  and  for  the  same  reason  neither  of  them  can  materi- 
ally conflict  with  the  other.  If  God  revealed  himself  in  the 
gospel  of  Christ,  and  provided  that  that  gospel  should  be  both 
preached  and  recorded  by  the  original  recipients  of  the  revela- 
tion, and  that  the  gospel  should  be  continuously  propagated, 
there  must  be  essential  agreement  between  the  written  record 
and  the  continuous  product  of  the  revelation.  This  is  said  on 
the  assumption  that  our  New  Testament  is  what  it  has  com- 
monly been  supposed  to  be,  namely,  a  trustworthy  history  of 
the  origin  of  Christianity,  and  a  correct  embodiment  of  its 
essential  spirit.  And  on  this  there  is  virtual  unanimity.  If  tlie 
fact  were  otherwise,  if  the  New  Testament  were  (as  some  ex- 
tremists have  held)  the  product  of  the  second  century  and  in  its 
distinctive  features  untrustworthy,  then  the  necessary  inference 
would  be  that  we  have  no  certain  knowledge  of  the  Christian 
revelation,  and  indeed  that  it  is  doubtful  whether  there  was  any 
revelation,  properly  so  called,  at  all.  For  the  New  Testament  at 
all  events  represents  what,  at  the  time  of  its  production,  were 
supposed  to  be  the  facts  respecting  the  origin  and  the  essence  of 
the  Christian  revelation.  No  oral  tradition  could  in  any  case 
be  more  trustworthy  than  these  written  productions,  as  regards 
the  primitive  history  of  Christianity.  In  point  of  fact,  however, 
the  oral  tradition  itself  unanimously  testifies  to  the  trustworthi- 
ness of  the  written  records. 


THE  AUTHORITY   OF   THE   SCRIPTURES.  329 

Thus  far,  then,  Christian  experience  and  the  Bible  seem  to  be 
in  a  sense  co-ordinate,  each  having  a  relative,  but  neither  of  them 
an  absolute,  authority.  And  they  are  assumed  to  be  in  essential 
concord.  But  the  question  may  still  be  pressed :  Suppose  there 
is,  at  least  on  some  points,  an  alleged  disagreement  between 
Christian  sentiment  and  the  language  of  the  Scriptures,  what 
then  ?     As  to  this  we  observe  : 

4.  In  so  far  as  the  Bible  and  Christian  opinion  can  be  set 
over  against  each  other,  the  Bible  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
superior  and  regulative  authority.  If  for  no  other  reason,  the 
Scriptures  possess  a  peculiar  authority  by  virtue  of  their  being 
the  most  original  exposition  of  Christian  truth  and  history. 
Their  authors  lived  nearest  to  the  sources  of  information,  and 
even  if  endowed  with  no  peculiar  gifts,  they  are,  on  ordinary 
principles  of  judgment,  to  be  regarded  as  better  exponents  of 
Christian  truth  than  any  later  authorities  can  be.  And  even  if 
in  certain  matters  of  unimportant  detail  it  seems  impossible  to 
give  full  assent  to  the  Biblical  statements,  the  corrective  is  to  be 
found  in  other  parts  of  the  Bible  itself.  It  is  certainly  con- 
ceivable that  some  incidental  features  of  the  Bible  are  inconsis- 
tent with  the  main  drift  of  Biblical  teaching.  In  such  cases  it 
is  not  the  Christian  judgment  as  an  independent  authority,  but 
the  Christian  judgment  as  formed  and  enlightened  under  the 
influence  of  the  Scriptures  themselves,  which  modifies  the  Scrip- 
tural statements.  Manifestly  in  such  instances  one  cannot 
speak  of  the  Christian  judgment  as  overruling  or  contradicting 
the  Bible.  It  is  a  judgment  in  which  the  general  drift  of  the 
Scriptures  is  set  over  against  subordinate  features  of  it.  Whether 
there  is  a  real  contradiction  between  the  general  drift  and  these 
incidental  features  is  a  distinct  question,  respecting  which  a 
difference  of  opinion  may  exist.  At  this  point  we  need  only  to 
insist  that  there  is  a  general  presumption  in  favor  of  the  correct- 
ness of  the  Biblical  statements. 

So  much  will  be  readily  conceded  by  all  who  hold  that  the 
Bible  —  especially  the  New  Testament  —  is  in  general  a  trust- 
worthy record  of  God's  special  revelation  of  his  saving  grace. 
Let  one  make  what  distinctions  he  will  between  the  main  pur- 
pose of  the  book  and  its  incidental  features,  still  the  very  fact 


330  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

that  the  main  purpose  is  one  of  supreme  importance  diminishes 
the  probability  of  serious  faults  in  the  subordinate  particulars. 
If  we  find  there  a  correct  account  of  Christ,  his  character,  words, 
and  work,  the  presumption  is  that  the  local,  historical,  and  in- 
cidental setting  of  that  account  is  correct  also  ;  especially  as  the 
portraiture  of  Christ  and  his  work  is  so  largely  given  in  the 
form  of  historical  sketches  that  serious  inaccuracy  in  the  details 
must  almost  necessarily  involve  inaccuracy  with  regard  to  the 
main  point.  Moreover,  if  we  believe  that  the  preparation  and 
preservation  of  these  early  written  memorials  of  the  work  of 
redemption  were  in  the  divine  mind  of  serious  importance  as  a 
means  of  securing  the  transmission  of  a  correct  report  to  later 
generations,  we  can  hardly  avoid  believing  that  these  memorials 
were  in  some  sense  prepared  under  special  providential  direc- 
tion, and,  to  say  the  least,  possess  a  peculiarly  high  degree  of 
credibility.  Although  the  revelation  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  written  record  of  it,  yet,  if  the  written  record  was  needed  (on 
account  of  the  certain  danger  of  error  in  merely  oral  tradition) 
in  order  to  preserve  a  pure  gospel,  it  was  needful  that  the  record 
itself  should  be  substantially  free  from  error. 

We  have  thus,  at  the  outset,  what  we  may  call  a  deliverance 
of  the  Christian  judgment  itself  in  favor  of  the  general  and 
special  trustworthiness  of  the  New  Testament  in  its  description 
of  Christ  and  the  Christian  revelation.  As  over  against  those 
who  regard  the  Christian  Scriptures  as  generally  the  work  of 
weak,  fanatical,  and  untrustworthy  men,  Christians  must  regard 
them,  on  the  contrary,  as  of  peculiar  value.  It  is  practically 
inconceivable  that  the  Christian  Church  in  general  should  ever 
come  to  adopt  the  view  that  one  may  freely  doubt,  disbelieve, 
modify,  or  correct  the  Biblical  account  of  God's  revelation  of 
himself.  Such  a  position  would  amount  to  the  self-destruction 
of  Christianity. 

Does  this  mean,  now,  that  everything,  without  exception,  that 
is  found  in  the  Scriptures  is  to  be  accepted  as  alisolutely  un- 
adulterated truth  ?  Is  all  critical  inquiry  into  the  historical  and 
scientific  accuracy  or  logical  soundness  of  Biblical  utterances  to 
be  cut  off?  By  no  means.  The  Bible  was  written  by  imper- 
fect and  fallible  men ;  and  it  is  only  by  the  use  of  the  rational 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF   THE   SCRU^TURES.       ,  331 

and  critical  judgment  that  Christians  have  come  to  regard  it  as 
of  exceptional  trustworthiness.  If  the  same  method  of  exami- 
nation should  reveal  occasional  instances  of  discrepancy  and 
error,  this  would  be  nothing  more  than  what  might  be  expected, 
unless  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  the  writers  were  so  in- 
spired as  to  make  them  absolutely  infallible.  But  no  such 
demonstration  has  ever  been  made.  On  the  contrary,  it  has 
become  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  Biblical  criticism,  that  the 
existence  of  discrepancies,  on  minor  points,  between  different 
writers  who  have  traversed  the  same  ground  is  one  of  the  best 
evidences  of  the  independence,  originality,  and  genuineness  of 
the  writings. 

But  while  the  possibility  and  even  probability  of  unimportant 
inaccuracies  in  the  sacred  record  may  be  admitted,  it  must  still 
be  insisted  that  the  general  faith  in  the  genuineness  of  the 
Christian  revelation  carries  with  it  such  a  presumption  in  favor 
of  the  trustworthiness  of  the  Bible,  not  only  in  general,  but  in 
detail,  that  the  burden  of  proof  may  always  be  rightly  thrown 
upon  the  man  who  brings  a  charge  of  error  even  respecting 
minor  and  incidental  matters.^  And  at  all  events,  as  regards 
the  main  purpose  and  drift  of  the  record  of  revelation,  the 
Biblical  books  must  be  regarded  as  the  perpetual  fountain  and 
only  external  standard  of  revealed  truth  and  religious  life. 
This  must  be  the  Christian  attitude  towards  the  Scriptures  in 
general.  In  particular,  the  New  Testament  as  a  whole  must  be 
taken  as  the  regulative  source  of  our  knowledge  of  Christ's 
nature,  doctrines,   and  work.      There   are  only  three   possible 

1  Whether  any  of  the  apparent  inaccuracies  and  discrepancies  of  the  Bible 
are  incontestably  such  is  a  question  on  which  opinions  will  vary  according  to 
one's  preconceptions.  The  general  fact  is  that,  if  one  is  predisposed  to  find 
error,  he  can  make  out  a  Ust  of  indefinite  length  ;  whereas  if  one  is  predisposed 
to  believe  that  there  are  none  at  all,  the  apparent  errors  can  be  explained  away 
with  greater  or  less  plausibility.  On  either  side  there  is  a  liability  to  use  some 
violence  in  the  interpretation  of  the  facts.  We  cannot  go  into  the  vexed  ques- 
tions in  detail,  but  must  refer  to  the  Commentaries,  Bible  Dictionaries,  and 
other  works  treating  of  the  several  points  in  dispute.  J.  W.  Haley,  Allegea 
Discrepancies  of  the  Bible,  gives  perhaps  the  most  comprehensive  discussion 
of  the  subject.  Prof.  J.  J.  Given,  The  Truth  of  Scripture  in  connection  tcith 
Revelation,  Inspiration,  and  the  Canon,  discusses  some  of  the  more  difficult 
cases. 


332         .  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

ways  in  which  this  knowledge  can  be  supposed  to  have  come 
to  us :  by  direct  personal  intercourse  with  Christ ;  by  oral  tra- 
dition through  the  Christian  Church ;  by  written  records.  As 
to  the  first,  while  it  must  always  be  insisted  that  there  is  a 
direct  relation  of  every  Christian  to  Christ,  and  such  a  relation 
that  we  may  say  with  John  (1  John  i.  3),  "  Our  fellowship  is 
with  the  Father,  and  with  his  Son  Jesus  Christ,"  yet  all  attempts 
to  attain  such  a  fellowship  by  a  purely  direct  process,  indepen- 
dently of  the  help  and  guidance  of  the  outward  historical  sources 
of  knowledge,  invariably  tend  to  a  one-sided  and  fanatical  mysti- 
cism. Though  it  is  a  truth  never  to  be  surrendered,  that  each 
individual  must  believe  or  disbelieve  for  himself,  yet  it  is  equally 
true  that  no  one  can  attain  a  genuine  faith  which  is  not  largely 
the  product  of  external  instruction.  Mysticism  itself,  even  in 
its  wildest  forms,  cannot  disengage  itself  from  the  influence  of 
example  and  education.  The  more  it  undertakes  to  do  so,  the 
more  certainly  does  it  violate  the  fundamental  principle  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  Christians  are  to  constitute  a  hody,  a  brotherhood, 
each  of  whom  is  to  be  helpful  and  indebted  to  every  other ;  the 
more  certainly,  too,  will  it  degenerate  into  unbridled  caprice, 
and  become  a  hotbed  of  intellectual  vagaries,  of  moral  lawless- 
ness, or  of  deceitful  pretensions  to  prophetic  inspiration. 

What,  then,  shall  be  the  regulative  check  to  prevent  such 
fanatical  excesses  ?  Shall  it  be  the  oral  tradition  of  the  Chris- 
tian Church  ?  In  an  important  sense  it  must  be.  Christianity 
is  transmitted  orally,  and  has  been  so  transmitted  from  the  first. 
Tor  nearly  a  generation  tradition  was  the  principal  or  only 
source  of  transmission.  When  the  New  Testament  books  were 
first  written,  the  testimony  of  the  still  living  apostles  was  co- 
ordinate with  those  books  as  a  source  of  enlightenment  respect- 
ing Jesus  Christ.  And  if  the  traditions  concerning  apostolic 
teaching  could  liave  been  orally  propagated  in  an  uncorrupt 
form,  they  might  properly  still  be  accepted  as  a  valid  and  au- 
thoritative source  of  information  respecting  Christian  truth. 
But  all  experience  shows  that  tradition  cannot  be  depended  on 
to  preserve  itself  for  long  periods  free  from  error.  It  can  claim 
infallibility  only  in  so  far  as  it  can  claim  to  be  itself  super- 
naturally  preserved  from  error,  —  a  claim  which  can  never  be 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  333 

substantiated.  Moreover,  even  tradition  itself  asserts  the  supe- 
rior authority  of  the  Scriptures.  Even  the  extremest  Papal 
doctrine  of  the  authority  of  tradition  has  never  gone  so  far  as 
in  theory  to  set  tradition  above  the  New  Testament  as  a  source 
of  light  and  authority.  The  Scriptures  have  by  all  the  prin- 
cipal branches  of  Christendom  been  accepted  as  constituting  the 
standard  of  truth  contrary  to  which  no  pretended  authority  can 
be  valid.  They  are  a  fixed  standard ;  tradition  is  variable. 
They  are  the  oldest  standard  ;  all  subsequent  traditions  and 
speculations  must  be  tested  by  them. 

The  Scriptures,  then,  must  constitute  the  only  regulative 
standard  of  Christian  belief  and  practice.  Whatever  growth 
or  progress  there  may  be  in  the  Christian  Church  must  be  a 
growth  out  of,  not  away  from,  the  original  germ,  whose  most 
authentic  accessible  embodiment  is  found  in  the  New  Testament 
Scriptures.  It  is  practically  inconceivable  that  any  tradition 
should  be  more  trustworthy  than  those  records,  or  that  any 
intuition  or  reflection  should  lead  one  to  more  truthful  con- 
ceptions of  the  nature  and  mission  of  Christ  than  those  which 
are  there  found  set  forth  or  involved. 

But  the  question  still  remains :  In  case  those  Scriptures  are 
inconsistent  with  themselves,  or  seem  to  contradict  the  better 
religious  sense  of  men,  must  not  that  religious  sense  become 
the  decisive  arbiter  ?  To  this  it  must  be  answered  that,  if  the 
pretended  religious  sense  contradicts  the  general  drift  of  the 
teaching  of  the  New  Testament,  then  it  necessarily  ceases  to  be 
a  Christian  religious  sense.  It  is  more  plausible  when  some 
men  insist  that,  as  Christ  is  the  centre  of  Christianity,  that 
part  of  the  Scripture  is  to  have  the  precedence  in  which  his 
own  language  is  directly  given ;  in  other  words,  that  the 
Gospels  are  to  be  decidedly  preferred  to  the  rest  of  the  New 
Testament,  as  an  exponent  of  the  true  Christian  doctrine.  But 
this  is  an  illegitimate  position.  There  would  be  more  plausi- 
bility in  it,  if  Christ  had  left  us  a  history  of  his  life  and 
utterances  recorded  by  himself.  But  inasmuch  as  this  is  not 
the  case,  the  Gospels  stand  upon  the  same  footing  as  the  other 
books.  When,  therefore,  men  undertake  to  contrast  the  doctrines 
of  Christ  with  those  of  his  followers,  they  seem  to  forget  that 


334  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

we  learn  of  Christ's  doctrines  only  through  his  followers.  If 
the  general  fallibility  of  the  apostles  and  other  disciples  of 
Christ  is  regarded  as  a  reason  for  giving  to  their  statements 
only  a  qualified  confidence,  then  it  may  equally  well  be  made 
a  reason  for  distrusting  their  accuracy  in  reporting  the  language 
and  doings  of  Jesus  Christ.  The  Epistles,  no  less  than  the 
histories,  profess  to  set  forth  what  Christ  is  and  has  done. 

This  distinction  between  the  Gospels  and  tlie  Epistles  is 
usually  made  with  special  reference  to  Paul.  He  is  contrasted 
with  the  Evangelists,  as  one  who  introduced  new  features  into 
Christianity.  This  is  sometimes  argued  as  a  merit,  sometimes 
as  a  demerit.  In  the  latter  case,  his  doctrines  are  sharply 
condemned  as  being  in  many  respects  opposed  to  those  of 
Christ,  or  at  least  as  something  new,  not  found  in  the  Gospels. 
But  such  critics  apparently  forget  that  Paul's  principal  Epistles 
were  written  before  the  Gospels  were,  and  that,  though  he  had 
not  been  a  disciple  of  Jesus,  he  had  abundant  opportunit}'^  (even 
if  no  stress  is  laid  on  the  direct  revelations  which  he  claimed 
to  have  received)  to  learn  from  the  disciples  about  Jesus  and 
his  doctrines.  We  do  not  know  that  Mark  or  Luke  had  any 
personal  intercourse  with  Christ.  Their  Gospels,  therefore,  are 
exposed  to  the  same  charge  that  is  brought  against  Paul's 
writings,  namely,  that  they  are  a  report  at  second  hand.  There 
is  also  strong  reason  for  judging  that  much  of  the  First  Gospel 
could  not  have  been  written  by  an  eye-witness,  though  the 
tradition  that  Matthew  wrote  it  be  adopted  as  substantially 
correct.  And  however  firmly  we  may  hold  to  the  Johannean 
authorship  of  the  Fourth  Gospel,  it  is  yet  a  fact  that  it  has 
been  vigorously  and  plausibly  contested,  whereas  the  genuineness 
of  Paul's  piincipal  Epistles  is  as  good  as  unquestioned.  The 
attempt,  therefore,  to  set  up  the  Gospels  against  the  Epistles, 
as  presenting  to  us  Christianity  in  a  purer  form,  rests  on  a 
false  assumption.  We  must  affirm  that  there  is  an  altogether 
peculiar  authority  in  Chiist;  but  we  cannot  distinguish  any 
parts  of  the  New  Testament  as  surpassing  all  other  parts  in  the 
same  way  that  Christ  surpasses  his  disciples ;  for  every  part  of 
the  book  was  written  by  his  disciples.  We  can  only  say,  in 
general,  that  the  New  Testament  gives  us  a  portraiture  of  Christ 


THE  AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  335 

as  he  impressed  himself  on  his  immediate  followers.  We  must 
take  the  portraiture  as  it  is,  and  make  the  best  of  it. 

"When,  for  example,  some  persons  contrast  Christ's  references 
to  the  Old  Testament  with  those  of  Paul,  and  find  the  latter  to 
be  more  or  less  fanciful  and  rabbinical,  and  Christ's  not  at  all  of 
this  nature,  what  shall  we  say  ?  In  the  first  place,  the  differ- 
ence, if  it  exist  at  all,  is  much  smaller  than  it  is  often  repre- 
sented as  being.  Indeed  it  may  plausibly  be  argued  that  there 
is  nothing  of  this  sort  in  Paul's  writings  which  cannot  be  paral- 
leled in  the  reported  utterances  of  Christ.^  But  besides  this  it 
is  to  be  considered  that  what  is  reported  as  from  Christ  is  but 
a  small  part  of  what  he  said.  We  are  told  that  he  opened  the 
apostles'  mind,  that  they  might  understand  the  Scriptures  (Luke 
xxiv.  45).  We  have  no  right  to  presume  that  what  may  hap- 
pen to  strike  us  unpleasantly  in  the  apostolic  interpretations 
of  Scripture  is  certainly  not  sanctioned  by  Christ's  authority, 
simply  because  we  do  not  find  it  beforehand  in  the  Gospels. 
There  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  general  presumption  that,  as  the 
apostles  were  in  constant  communion  with  hira  during  his 
ministry  and  received  instruction  from  him  concerning  his  work 
and  his  truth,  they  must  have  become  indoctrinated  with  his 
view  of  the  Old  Testament  in  its  relation  to  him.  Nor  can  an 
exception  be  made  of  Paul.  We  cannot  press  his  claim  that  he 
did  not  receive  the  gospel  from  the  apostles  to  tlie  extent  of 
supposing  that  he  got  absolutely  nothing  from  them.  What 
was  he  talking  about  with  Peter  during  those  fifteen  days  when 
he  visited  him  at  Jerusalem  (Gal.  i.  18)  ?  Or  if  we  press  this 
claim  to  the  extreme,  we  must  remember  that  over  against  it  is 
his  claim  that  he  received  the  gospel  directly  from  Christ ;  and 
how  much  that  revelation  contained  of  specific  instruction  con- 
cerning the  interpretation  of  the  Old  Testament,  no  one  can 
affirm. 

On  the  whole,  then,  the  conclusion  must  be  that,  though 
Christ  was  radically  superior  to  his  disciples,  this  fact  cannot 
be  made  use  of  in  order  to  discredit  any  part  of  the  New  Testa- 

^  Dean  Burgon  (Inspiration,  etc.,  pp.  134  sq.^  refers  to  Luke  xx.  37,  38, 
Matt.  xxii.  41-46,  and  John  x.  34-30,  to  show  that  the  criticisms  made  on 
Paul  might  with  equal  justice  be  made  on  Christ. 


336  SUPERNATUEAL   REVELATION. 

merit,  unless  in  equal  degree  the  whole  is  discredited.  But  if 
the  whole  is  discredited,  that  is,  if  no  part  of  it  can  be  trusted  in 
its  representation  of  Christ,  we  are  left  without  any  certain 
knowledge  of  him  at  all ;  and  in  that  case  it  is  idle  to  hold  up 
his  authority  as  over  against  the  Scriptural  account  of  him. 
Every  attempt  to  distinguish  the  pure  and  original  Christianity 
from  the  apostolic  additions  to  it  or  corruptions  of  it  gives  us 
simply  the  opinion  of  the  individual  critic ;  and  this  opinion  is 
founded  on  the  reports  of  the  very  men  whose  trustworthiness 
is  denied.  The  ultimate  result  of  the  various  efforts  to  discover 
the  genuine  Christ  and  the  pure  gospel  is  of  course  a  multitude 
of  gospels  all  derived  from  the  New  Testament  writings. 

Still  less  can  one  hope  to  reach  the  unadulterated  truth  of 
Christianity  by  any  arbitrary  reconstruction  of  the  Canon,  or  by 
deciding  in  his  own  mind  what  books  of  the  New  Testament  shall 
be  recognized  as  representing  the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus.  Sucli 
a  procedure  is  opposed  to  all  sound  principles  of  historical 
and  critical  evidence.  The  New  Testament  as  a  whole  must  be 
taken  as  the  source  from  which  is  to  be  derived  the  true  con- 
ception of  what  Christianity  originally  was,  and  was  intended 
to  be.  And  the  more  it  is  insisted  that  Christianity  is  essen- 
tially a  new  life-force  rather  than  a  mere  system  of  propositions 
or  dogmas,  the  more  important  does  it  become  to  call  into  requi- 
sition every  part  of  the  original  documentary  records  of  the 
history  of  Christ's  life  and  of  its  workings  on  the  primitive 
Church.  Whereas  a  petty  and  arbitrary  criticism  would  under- 
take to  say  that  only  one  type  of  conception  is  to  be  adopted  as 
regulative  of  our  judgment,  a  broader  and  more  truthful  view 
would  rather  emphasize  the  need  and  importance  of  a  variety  in 
the  sources  of  information,  in  order  that  the  picture  of  the  true 
gospel  may  be  made  as  complete  as  possible.  In  such  a  search 
one  will  not  be  alarmed  by  contrasts  or  even  apparent  contra- 
dictions. He  will  not  be  disturbed,  but  rather  helped,  when 
he  sees  how  different  in  many  respects  John's  portraiture  of  the 
Redeemer's  life  and  words  is  from  that  of  Mark  or  Luke.  He 
will  not  set  Paul  against  John,  or  John  against  Paul,  but  will 
put  the  two  together  as  supplementing  one  another.  He  will 
make  use  of  every  detail  of  both  the  histories  and  the  Epistles 


THE  AUTHOEITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  337 

in  his  effort  to  obtain  an  accurate  and  comprehensive  view  of 
what  Christian  truth  really  is.  But  this  very  fact,  that  one 
must  put  together  and  compare,  suggests  another  reflection  : 

5.  The  religious  experience  and  insight  of  Christians  has  an 
important  and  decisive  function.  The  regulative  authority  of 
the  Scriptures  does  not  execute  itself.  Their  authority  is  no 
authority  till  their  meaning  is  understood.  And  what  they  mean 
must  be  determined  by  men  in  the  exercise  of  their  own 
faculties.  Christians,  though  as  Christians  they  cannot  freely 
set  aside,  correct,  or  supplement  the  Scriptures,  must  interpret 
them.  The  new  life  which  was  brought  into  the  world  by 
Jesus  Christ  is  an  expansive  one,  propagating  itself  from 
generation  to  generation  and  from  race  to  race.  In  itself  it 
remains  essentially  the  same.  And  living  Christians  must 
have  more  or  less  definite  opinions  respecting  the  vital  features 
and  truths  of  the  Christian  religion.  These  opinions  cannot  be 
formulated  and  deposited  in  any  verbal  statement  in  such  a 
way  as  to  have  a  meaning  and  validity  independent  of  the 
active  judgment  of  the  living  Christian.  Statements,  creeds, 
the  New  Testament  itself,  mean  nothing  to  him  except  as  he 
individually,  by  the  exercise  of  his  own  Christian  powers  of 
apprehension,  attaches  a  meaning  to  them.  Every  one,  there- 
fore, is,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  an  interpreter  of  the 
Scriptures.  And  in  this  interpretation  two  things  in  particular 
must  be  taken  into  account. 

(a)  Christians  in  their  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures  must 
distinguish  between  what  is  fundamental  and  universal,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  what  is  incidental  or  temporary,  on  the  other. 
They  may  differ  from  one  another  on  the  question,  what  is 
essential  and  what  is  incidental ;  but  every  one  makes  dis- 
tinctions, and  attaches  greater  importance  to  some  portions  of 
Holy  Writ  than  to  others.  And  since  no  explicit  rule  can  be 
found  in  the  Bible  itself,  each  one  must  follow  the  leadings  of 
his  own  judgment.  In  many  cases,  or  even  the  most,  this 
judgment  may  be  little  more  than  a  trustful  acceptance  of  tlie 
distinction  which  others  have  already  made ;  but  still  the 
distinction  is  one  which  has  been  made,  and  must  be,  made,  by 
Christians,  and  that,  too,  with  no  infallible  inspiration  to  guide 
22 


338  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

them.  In  a  general  way  there  is  substantial  agreement  as  to 
what  the  most  vital  features  of  the  gospel  are.  It  is  agreed 
that  the  main  purpose  of  the  Christian  revelation  was  a  spiritual 
one  :  Jesus  came  to  seek  and  to  save  that  which  was  lost.  All 
the  particular  features  of  the  evangelical  history  and  teachings  are 
to  be  viewed  in  relation  to  this  grand  central  feature  of  Christ's 
mission, — the  regeneration  aud  purification  of  man's  moral  nature. 

But  the  gospel,  while  it  aims  to  save  all,  and  is  therefore 
essentially  the  same  to  all,  must  adapt  itself  to  each  man,  and  so, 
in  a  sense,  be  a  special  gospel  to  every  individual.  It  must  be 
adapted  to  different  nations  and  different  ages.  Consequently  it 
cannot  be  rigidly  and  minutely  defined  and  bounded  by  any  one 
man  or  group  of  men,  in  such  a  way  as  to  overlook  the  peculiarities 
of  others.  A  certain  degree  of  indefiniteness  and  flexibility  must, 
therefore,  be  assumed  as  characterizing  it.  What  Paul  said  of 
himself,  as  the  preacher  of  the  gospel,  may  be  said  of  the  gospel 
itself:  it  becomes  all  things  to  all  men,  that  by  all  means  it  may 
save  some.  Consequently  only  that  which  is  of  universal  appli- 
cation can  in  the  strictest  sense  be  regarded  as  essential  in  the 
gospel.  Principles,  precepts,  promises,  and  offers  of  a  general 
sort  are  to  be  sought  for  as  the  underlying  substance  of  the 
scheme  of  redemption,  while  the  particular  application  and  de- 
velopment of  them  depends  more  or  less  upon  the  necessities, 
temperament,  and  circumstances  of  the  individual. 

Here,  then,  tlie  Christian  common  sense  must  be  acknowledged 
to  have  a  legitimate  function  :  it  must  judge  how  far  the  Bibli- 
cal word  is  to  be  pressed  in  its  literalness.  It  must  judge,  for 
example,  whether  literal  compliance  with  the  command  to  give 
to  every  one  that  asks  (Matt.  v.  42)  would  best  fulfil  the  real 
spirit  of  the  command.  It  must  judge  whether  the  injunction 
to  anoint  one's  self  before  fasting  is  not  to  be  interpreted  in  the 
light  of  the  customs  of  the  time  in  which  Jesus  lived.  It  must 
judge  whether  Paul's  advice  respecting  marriage  and  the  de- 
meanor of  women  is  to  be  regarded  as  determined  in  its  form 
somewhat  by  the  sentiments  of  the  age  and  the  local  circum- 
stances of  those  particularly  addressed,  and  therefore  not  neces- 
sarily applicable  in  all  its  strictness  to  the  churches  of  the 
present  day.     This  judgment  may  err  either  on  the  side  of  exces- 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF   THE   SCRIPTURES.  339 

sive  literalness,  or  on  the  side  of  excessive  freedom ;  but  when 
the  question  presents  itself  to  him,  the  Christian  must  form  a 
judgment.  In  any  case,  however,  even  though  one  judge  that 
a  Biblical  precept  or  statement  received  a  shaping  and  shading 
from  the  local  and  temporary  circumstances  which  called  it  forth, 
yet  that  judgment  does  not  involve  a  charge  of  error,  unless  it 
goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  local  and  temporary  circumstances 
themselves  called  for  something  different. 

(h)  The  second  task  which  the  interpretation  of  the  Bible 
imposes  on  the  Cliristian  is  that  of  harmonizing  the  representa- 
tions of  the  different  parts  and  authors,  Christianity  is  a  unit, — 
a  self-consistent  thing.  It  must  be  such  at  least  to  every  sincere 
Christian.  Yet  apparent  differences  or  contradictions  in  the 
statement  of  Christian  principles,  or  in  the  living  illustration  of 
the  Christian  spirit,  will  be  found  in  the  original  records  of 
Christian  life  and  thinking.  Particularly  this  function  of  recon- 
ciliation relates  to  the  harmonizing  of  the  utterances  of  the 
different  writers  of  the  New  Testament. 

The  original  recipients  and  transmitters  of  the  Christian  reve- 
lation were  men,  having  each  his  own  peculiarities  of  mind  and 
character.  Consequently  each  one's  conception  and  representa- 
tion of  the  divine  revelation  must  have  borne  the  mark  of  his 
own  individuality ;  and  therefore  the  different  men  could  not 
but  present  different  phases  of  the  common  treasure  of  revealed 
truth.  Over  against  the  older  method  of  interpretation  which 
by  use  of  the  "  analogy  of  faith  "  tended  to  obscure  or  ignore  the 
differences  of  the  several  authors  of  the  sacred  books,  the  science 
of  Biblical  theology  aims  to  recognize,  and  perliaps  tends  to 
exaggerate,  these  differences.  Now,  just  where  differences  pass 
over  into  discrepancies,  and  discrepancies  into  contradictions,  it 
is  difficult  to  determine;  but  the  abandonment  of  the  older 
theory  of  verbal  and  mechanical  inspiration  requires  us  to  assume 
that  each  Biblical  writer  was  in  a  proper  sense  an  author,  writing 
out  of  his  own  religious  apprehensions  and  experience,  and  that 
accordingly,  not  only  with  regard  to  incidental  matters,  but 
with  regard  to  the  truths  and  facts  of  revelation,  the  personal 
peculiarities  of  the  writers  more  or  less  affected  their  conceptions 
and  representations. 


340  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

What  attitude  now  does  Christian  thought  take  with  reference 
to  this  feature  of  the  Scriptures  ?  Here,  as  in  the  case  of  dis- 
crepancies of  a  more  external  character,  it  is  obvious  at  all  events 
that  the  distinctively  Christian  mind  does  not  predispose  one 
to  look  for  and  find  coutradictions  and  errors  in  the  religious 
and  moral  teachings  of  the  Bible.  The  Christian,  while  he  will 
not,  if  truth-loving,  shut  his  eyes  to  plain  facts,  is  not  naturally 
inclined  to  emphasize  these  differences,  but  to  reconcile  them. 
It  was  a  normal  impulse  which  led  the  older  theologians  to  con- 
struct doctrinal  systems  whose  aim  was  to  harmonize  and  com- 
bine all  parts  and  statements  of  the  Biblical  books,  whatever 
may  be  thought  of  their  assumption  that  those  books  are  all 
absolutely  and  equally  faultless.  It  is  a  legitimate  desire  of  the 
Christian  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  plan  of  redemp- 
tion, and  to  make  all  the  parts  of  the  scheme,  and  all  the  utter- 
ances of  the  human  organs  of  revelation,  work  harmoniously 
together.  But  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  this  effort  to 
harmonize  and  systematize  is  itself  a  movement  and  an  impulse 
of  the  Christian  spirit.  There  would  be  no  motive  for  it  and  no 
interest  in  it,  unless  there  were  antecedently  a  Christian  life,  sen- 
timent, type  of  feeling  and  thinking,  which  has  continuously 
flowed  forth  from  the  original  fountain  of  the  Christian  revelation, 
and  which  finds  in  the  Scriptures  the  most  original  and  authentic 
statement  of  that  on  which  Christian  belief  and  life  are  founded. 

With  reference,  then,  to  both  the  above-mentioned  points  the 
Christian  must,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  exercise  a  judgment. 
If  there  are  apparent  inconsistencies  needing  to  be  harmonized, 
it  is  the  Christian  mind  that  must  do  the  work.  And  in  order 
to  do  it  one  must  adopt  some  guiding  principle  of  interpretation. 
If  two  Biblical  writers  seem  to  be  at  variance  with  one  another, 
the  expositor  who  desires  to  bring  them  into  harmony  must 
somehow  fix  upon  a  standard  of  truth  according  to  which  the 
two  are  to  be  judged.  The  more  strict  his  theory  of  inspiration 
may  be,  the  more  urgently  is  he  impelled  to  search  for  some 
canon  of  judgment  that  shall  regulate  the  process  of  reconcilia- 
tion. And  in  deciding  on  this  canon  he  is  left  to  himself  or  to 
the  judgment  of  those  Christians  in  whom,  for  whatever  reasons, 
he  has  the  most  confidence. 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  341 

The  necessity  which  is  put  upon  Christians  of  exercising  a 
judgment  relative  to  these  matters  is  most  strikingly  evinced 
in  the  very  fact  that  even  as  regards  questions  of  the  highest 
doctrinal  and  practical  consequence  various  views  are  enter- 
tained. Respecting  the  attributes  of  God,  the  nature  of  Christ, 
the  relative  importance  of  divine  and  human  agency  in  salva- 
tion, the  nature  of  justifying  faith,  the  relation  of  this  life 
to  the  next;  respecting  the  true  idea  of  the  earthly  church, 
its  authority,  polity,  and  sacraments;  respecting  moral  duties, 
such  as  forgiveness,  veracity,  self-defense,  oaths,  charitable  aid 
to  the  poor;  —  respecting  these  things  conscientious  Christians 
come  to  different  results,  all  professing  too  to  be  following 
the  same  Scriptures.  The  variant  views  may  all  be  fairly  de- 
fended from  the  Scriptures.  Thus,  the  divine  sovereignty 
is  certainly  taught  there ;  but  so  is  human  responsibility. 
How  they  are  related;  which  shall  be  regarded  as  outrank- 
ing the  other  in  religious  importance  ;  or  whether  both  are 
to  be  somehow  reconciled  through  some  third  principle,  — 
these  are  questions  on  which  the  Christian  world  has  come  to 
no  agreement.  Where  the  Old  Testament  seems  in  general  to 
differ  from  the  New,  as,  for  example,  respecting  the  lex  talionis, 
the  Christian  interpreter  must  regard  the  New  Testament  as 
being  the  superior  authority.  But  when  the  New  Testament 
seems  to  countenance  opposing  views,  the  interpreter  must 
either  show  that  there  is  no  real,  though  there  may  be  a  formal, 
difference  ;  or  else  he  must  regard  one  passage  as  furnishing  the 
canon  by  which  the  other  is  to  be  interpreted. 

In  general,  it  is  clear  that  the  different  phases  of  Christian 
truth  do  not  receive  in  different  parts  of  the  New  Testament 
the  same  relative  prominence ;  or  they  are  even  made  to  come 
into  apparent  disagreement.  There  is  no  doubt  that  James 
emphasizes  the  duty  of  a  strict  morality,  and  seems  to  depre- 
ciate the  faith  which  Paul  emphasizes  as  the  central  thing. 
Unquestionably  John  lays  stress  on  the  divinity  of  Jesus 
Christ,  while  Matthew  lays  stress  on  his  descent  from  David 
and  his  Messianic  calling.  Or  the  same  writer  may  seem  to 
contradict  himself,  as,  for  example,  when  John  at  one  time 
(1  John  i.  8)  says  that  Christians  deceive  themselves  if  they 


342  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

say  they  have  no  sin,  whereas  at  another  (iii.  9)  he  affirms  posi- 
tively that  those  who  are  born  again  do  not  and  even  cannot 
sin.  But  is  there  a  real  contradiction  or  only  an  apparent 
one  ?  Must  we  adopt  the  maxim  that  the  Bible  is  absolutely 
free  from  error  aud  self-contradiction  ?  Or  shall  we  admit  that  it 
is  more  or  less  imperfect  in  some  of  its  subordinate  features  ? 
These  are  questions  which  must  be  answered  by  the  Christian 
in  the  exercise  of  his  own  sanctified  common  sense.  They 
are  not  answered  for  him  by  any  authority  palpably  supreme 
and  beyond  appeal.     With  reference  to  tliem  we  may  observe  : 

6.  The  general  theory  that  the  Bible  is  absolutely  perfect 
and  infallible  does  not  solve  the  particular  questions  respecting 
which  differences  of  opinion  exist.  From  the  general  proposi- 
tion, that  the  Bible  is  infallible,  one  may  infer  that  all  apparent 
contradictions  and  errors  may  somehow  be  explained  away. 
Somehow,  but  how  ?  Where  is  the  rule  of  interpretation  to  be 
found  ?  Little  or  no  help  is  obtained  by  saying,  with  the  au- 
thors of  the  Westminster  Confession,  that  "  the  infallible  rule 
of  interpretation  of  Scripture  is  the  Scripture  itself."^  If  the 
Bible,  like  a  living  Pope,  could  issue  an  authoritative  and  un- 
mistakable utterance,  whenever  its  meaning  is  dark  or  disputed, 
and  thus  remove  all  doubts  and  differences,  there  would  indeed 
be  an  end  of  all  controversy.  But  so  long  as  this  is  not  the 
case,  the  statement  that  the  Bible  infallibly  interprets  itself 
must  be  regarded  as  more  rhetorical  than  serviceable.  Doubt- 
less in  an  important  sense  the  Bible  is  self-interpreting ;  one 
part  helps  us  to  understand  another,  —  as  may  be  said  of  any 
other  book.  But  when  it  is  said  that  the  Bible  furnishes  an 
infalHhle  rule  of  interpretation,  we  cannot  but  ask  how  a  rule 
can  be  infallible  which,  in  point  of  fact,  when  applied  by  dif- 
ferent Christian  interpreters,  yields  discordant  results.  The 
infallibility  of  the  rule  is  of  no  use  unless  it  can  be  infallibly 
applied ;  and  how  this  is  to  be  done  we  can  never  know,  until 
we  find  another  infallible  rule  by  which  we  can  infallibly  deter- 
mine how  this  first  infallible  rule  is  to  be  infallibly  used  by 
fallible  Christians. 

Practically,  then,  there  would  seem  to  be  little  difference 
^  Chap.  i.  art.  ix. 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF  THE  SCRIPTURES.  343 

between  those  who  hold  the  strict  theory  of  the  absolute  iufal- 
libility  of  every  part  of  the  Bible,  but  cannot  agree  in  their 
understanding  of  it,  and  those  who  admit  the  possibility  or  even 
reality  of  incidental  errors,  and  yet  hold  that  the  Scriptures  give 
us  an  essentially  truthful  account  of  what  God  has  revealed  con- 
cerning his  character,  will,  and  redeeming  work.  Both  bring  to 
the  study  of  the  Scriptures  certain  preconceptions  derived  from 
religious  and  philosophical  training,  and  both  may  come  to  the 
same  general  result  as  to  the  essential  truths  of  revealed  religion. 
But  those  who  hold  the  stricter  theory  of  Biblical  infallibility 
are  led  by  their  preconceptions  —  their  "Christian  conscious- 
ness"—  to  put  a  strain  upon  those  parts  of  Scripture  which 
seem  not  to  harmonize  with  their  system ;  while  the  others  are 
led  by  their  preconceptions  to  look  upon  such  parts  as  of  subor- 
dinate importance,  and  as  being  affected  by  the  imperfection  to 
which  all  human  productions  are  liable.  The  stricter  school 
may  accuse  the  others  of  unsettling  the  foundations  of  faith,  if 
they  admit  the  possibility  of  any  error  in  Holy  Writ ;  while  the 
latter  may  urge  that  the  foundations  of  faith  are  in  danger  of 
being  unsettled,  if  the  faith  is  made  to  rest  on  a  theory  of  Bibli- 
cal infallibility  of  which  there  is  no  cogent  proof,  and  which  can 
be  maintained  only  by  violent  distortions  of  the  obvious  mean- 
ing of  Scriptural  language. 

Still  it  may  be  contended  that,  if  the  strict  theory  of  the  in- 
fallibility of  the  Bible  is  relaxed,  a  flood-gate  is  opened  for  the 
introduction  of  the  wildest  vagaries  and  conceits  in  judging  of 
Biblical  history  and  teaching.  If  amj  part  of  it  can  be  adjudged 
faulty,  what  is  to  hinder  every  part  from  being  in  turn  denounced 
as  unworthy  of  confidence  ?  The  answer  is  that  we  are  now 
dealing  with  Christian  judgments  of  the  Bible ;  and  no  real 
Christian  can  do  otherwise  than  find  the  Bible  in  its  general 
drift  a  truthful  account  of  a  divine  revelation.  No  doubt,  it  may 
seem  extremely  desirable  to  be  able  to  hold  that  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  error  in  the  Scriptures,  even  though  we  may  not  be 
able  to  agree  as  to  what  is  error  and  what  is  truth.  But  at  all 
events  the  theory  of  Biblical  infallibility  cannot  accomplish  any 
useful  purpose,  unless  it  is  itself  well  established.  With  refer- 
ence to  this  point  we  may  at  least  remark  that  — 


344  SUI^ERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

7.  Every  theory  of  the  infallibihty  of  the  Scriptures  must  be 
rejected  which  is  contradicted  by  the  Scriptures  themselves. 
We  may  go  further,  and  maintain  that  no  theory  of  Biblical  in- 
fallibility is  susceptible  of  proof.  The  Bible  does  not  affirm  its 
own  infallibility.  Even  if  we  press  to  the  utmost  such  language 
as  Ps.  xix.  7,  "The  law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect,"  we  cannot 
make  it  cover  the  whole  Bible,  to  say  nothing  of  the  somewhat 
lax  manner  in  which  this  epithet  is  used,  as,  for  example,  where 
Noah  (Gen.  vi.  9),  Jacob  (Gen.  xxv.  27,  vide  Marg.  of  E.  V.), 
and  Job  (Job  i.  1)  are  called  "  perfect."  The  assertion  that  the 
Old  Testament  is  inspired  of  God  (2  Tim.  iii.  16)  also  falls  short 
of  an  affirmation  of  absolute  infallibility. 

But  more  than  this :  the  Bible  not  only  does  not  affirm  its  own 
perfectness,  it  affirms  its  own  imperfectness.  Especially  is  the 
Old  Testament  declared  to  be  defective.  It  is  little  less  than 
self-evident  that,  if  the  Old  Testament  revelation  had  been 
ideally  perfect,  there  would  have  been  no  need  of  another.  It 
lies  on  the  surface  of  the  New  Testament  that  the  Mosaic 
dispensation  was  in  some  sense  insufficient,  temporary,  and 
defective.  The  New  Testament  abounds  in  utterances  which 
imply  or  assert  this.  The  whole  matter  is  succinctly  stated  in 
Heb.  viii.  7,  "  If  that  first  covenant  had  been  faultless,  then 
would  no  place  have  been  sought  for  a  second."  In  view  of 
so  explicit  a  statement  as  this  it  is  almost  incredible  that 
Christians  should  ever  have  undertaken  to  treat  the  Old  Tes- 
tament as  of  equal  authority  with  the  New.  And  yet  the 
motive  is  obvious.  If  the  Old  Testament  contains  a  divine 
revelation,  it  seems  like  an  impeachment  of  the  divine  power, 
wisdom,  or  veracity,  to  say  that  the  revelation,  or  the  record 
of  it,  is  faulty.  But  here  in  one  of  the  books  of  the  New 
Covenant  itself  we  find  this  flatly  affirmed.  And  what  is  here 
thus  declared  in  general  terms  is  implied  everywhere  else. 
Jesus'  answer  to  the  question  respecting  divorce  (Matt.  xix.  8), 
in  which  he  affirms  that  Moses  permitted  easy  divorce  as  a 
concession  to  the  hardness  of  the  Jews'  hearts,  gives  us  a 
specific  example  of  the  general  fact.  And  this  shows,  moreover, 
that  the  faultiness  is  something  positive,  —  that  the  Mosaic  law 
was  in  some  particulars  not  merely  defective  in  the  sense  of 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF   THE   SCRIPTURES.  345 

being   germinal   or   prophetic,   but   defective   in  the   sense   of 
requiring  amendment  or  abolition. 

There  are  numerous  questions  which  spring  up  in  tliis  con- 
nection,—  questions  especially  concerning  the  character  of  the 
morality  of  the  Old  Testament,  the  accuracy  of  its  prophecies,  the 
truthfulness  and  symmetry  of  its  theology,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  correctness  of  its  representations  of  historical  and  scientific 
matters.  If  we  compare,  for  example,  Ps.  Ixix.  21-28  with 
the  account  of  Christ's  crucifixion,  we  find  that  the  Psalmist, 
after  charging  his  enemies  with  giving  him  vinegar  to  drink, 
supplicates  God  to  pour  out  his  indignation  on  them ;  while 
Jesus,  whose  similar  experience  is  regarded  as  typified  by  this 
(John  xix.  28),  begs  God  to  forgive  his  enemies.  If  we  compare 
this  with  Christ's  own  comment  on  the  lex  talionis  (Matt.  v.  38- 
46),  it  is  impossible  to  pronounce  the  spirit  of  the  psalmist  to 
be  a  model  for  ourselves.  If,  however,  on  Christ's  own  warrant 
we  may  charge  faultiness  on  one  feature  of  the  Old  Testament, 
what  shall  hinder  us  from  extending  the  charge  over  other 
features  ?  But  in  this  case,  in  what  sense  can  we  retain  faith 
in  the  Old  Testament  economy  as  a  genuine  revelation  of  God  ? 
Be  the  answer  what  it  may,  it  should  not  be  made  without 
recognizing  the  undeniable  fact  tliat,  while  the  New  Testament 
in  general,  and  Christ  in  particular,  explicitly  assert  the  faulti- 
ness of  the  Old  Testament,  they  also  with  equal  or  greater  clear- 
ness assert  that  the  Mosaic  economy  was  a  genuine  revelation 
from  God.     Tlie  two  affirmations  must  stand  together. 

Our  Saviour  tells  us  that  the  imperfectness  of  the  Mosaic  law 
was  on  account  of  the  necessity  of  accommodating  it  to  the  con- 
dition and  needs  of  the  Jewish  people.  What  he  says  respecting 
divorce  must  doubtless  be  said  respecting  many  other  things. 
No  one  would  now  seriously  propose  to  enact  all  the  civil  laws 
of  Moses  identically  as  they  stand  in  the  Pentateuch,  still  less, 
to  insist  on  the  enforcement  of  the  ceremonial  law.  In  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount,  though  Christ  begins  by  declaring  that 
he  does  not  come  to  destroy  the  law,  he  yet  gives  to  it  a  higher 
and  more  spiritual  sense  than  his  hearers  could  ever  have  had, 
and  such  as  would  not  naturally  have  suggested  itself  to  those 
who  lived  under  the  law.     It  is  manifest  that  the  accommoda- 


346  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

tion  spokeu  of  by  our  Lord  consisted  largely  in  leaving  existing 
customs  essentially  unchanged,  even  when  perfection  of  char- 
acter and  social  condition  required  a  change.  The  laws  concern- 
ing slavery  and  polygamy  were  given  for  those  to  whom  these 
institutions  were  familiar.  The  laws  aimed  to  mitigate  the  evils 
of  the  institutions,  but  did  not  undertake  at  once  to  abolish 
them.  There  was  an  apparent  sanction  of  practices  which  were 
gradually  given  up  by  the  Jews  who  lived  under  these  laws,  and 
which  are  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  many  of  the  other  pre- 
cepts of  the  same  code.  Indeed  the  Mosaic  law  contains  the 
highest  rules  of  conduct  and  character.  The  commands  to  love 
God  with  all  the  heart,  and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves,  which 
Jesus  pronounced  to  be  the  greatest  of  all  the  commandments, 
are  quoted  from  the  Pentateuch  (Deut.  vi.  5  ;  Lev.  xix.  18) ;  and 
we  find  there,  besides,  the  precept,  "  Be  ye  holy,  for  I  am  holy  " 
(Lev.  xi.  44,  xix.  2),  —  which  seems  to  lift  us  up  to  the  very 
summit  of  spiritual  life.  Is  there  not,  then,  an  inconsistency 
between  such  precepts  and  those  laws  which  sanction  or  tolerate 
practices  which  we  must  regard  as  marking  a  low  moral,  social, 
and  political  state  ?  And  can  that  be  a  divinely  given  or  di- 
vinely sanctioned  system  which  contains  such  an  inconsistency  ? 
The  feeling  which  underlies  such  questions  is  that  whatever 
comes  from  God  must  be  absolutely  perfect  and  faultless,  —  in 
other  words,  that  an  accommodation  of  the  divine  law  to  human 
weakness  is  impossible,  being  inconsistent  with  the  holiness  and 
immutability  of  God  himself.  But  the  same  authority  which 
warrants  us  in  believing  in  the  divinity  of  the  Old  Testament 
revelation  warrants  us  also  in  asserting  that  there  was  this  ac- 
commodation. And  there  need  be  no  difficulty  in  admitting 
this  principle  as  a  feature  of  a  supernatural  revelation.  To  say 
that  God  adapts  his  communications  and  legislation  to  the 
capacities  and  circumstances  of  his  creatures  is  not  to  impeach 
either  his  wisdom  or  his  holiness.  It  is  a  universal  i)rinciple 
that  parents  and  teachers,  in  training  the  young,  must,  in  order 
to  be  successful,  adapt  their  method  of  administering  instruction 
and  commands  to  the  capacities  and  peculiarities  of  the  pupils. 
Many  things  may  be  winked  at  in  one  child  which  need  to  be 
rebuked  in  another.      Slow  and   patient  use  of  symbols  and 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  347 

illustrations  are  required  for  some,  while  otliers  spring  readily  to 
the  apprehension  of  abstract  truth.  In  order  to  make  a  correct 
impression  on  the  whole,  a  representation  must  often  be  made 
which,  judged  by  a  strict  scientific  standard,  would  be  incorrect. 
Correctness  of  impression  is  more  important  than  mere  correct- 
ness of  statement.  It  is  universally  conceded  that  in  our 
conceptions  of  the  Divine  Being  and  character  certain  anthropo- 
morphisms must  enter  in,  even  though  we  may  be  morally 
certain  that,  in  a  higher  state  of  existence  and  with  different 
faculties  of  apprehension,  we  should  form  different  conceptions. 
In  so  far  as  this  inaccuracy  of  conception  is  made  necessary  by 
the  limitation  of  man's  intellectual  and  moral  nature,  it  must 
be  taken  into  account  also  by  God  "himself,  if  he  would  make 
a  revelation  of  himself  The  principle  of  accommodation 
or  concession,  in  a  revelation  which  is  to  be  adapted  to  the 
actual  condition  and  necessities  of  men,  seems,  then,  to  be 
indispensable.^ 

Notwithstanding  these  concessions,  however,  there  is  to  be 
recognized  a  very  substantial  truth  in  the  common  affirmation 
that  the  Bible  is  a  perfect  and  infallible  rule  of  faith  and  prac- 
tice.    The  truth  may  be  stated  in  the  following  form : 

8.  The  Bible  is  perfectly  adapted  to  accomplish  the  end  for 
which  it  was  made,  when  used  by  one  who  is  in  sympathy  with 
that  end.  The  sweeping  statement  that  the  Bible  is  perfect 
requires  in  any  case  that  one  should  understand  in  what  sense 
the  term  "  perfect "  is  used.  If  we  can  say  that  the  Bible  is  as 
nearly  perfect  as  under  the  circumstances  it  was  possible  for  it 
to  be,  this  ought  to  satisfy  any  reasonable  demand.  Since  a 
revelation  had  to  be  given  to  imperfect  men,  jjossessing  imper- 
fect powers  of  apprehension;  since  it  could  be  communicated 
only  through  human  media,  and  had  to  be  adapted  at  first  to 
those  more  immediately  addressed,  —  it  was  necessarily  deficient 
in  that  sort  of  perfectness  which  it  might  have  had  if  these  con- 
ditions had  been  different.  If  the  media  had  been  infallible, 
if  men's  powers  of  spiritual  apprehension  had  been  perfect,  no 
doubt  the  revelation  might  have  been  more  absolutely  faultless. 

^  Cf.  J.  L.  Mozley,  Ruling  Ideas  in  Early  Ages  ;  Newman  Smyth,  Morality 
of  the  Old  Testament ;  G.  F.  Wriglit,  Dicine  Authority  of  the  Bible,  pp.  1G2  sq. 


348  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

But  in  that  case  it  would  not  have  been  needed.  It  was  because 
men  were  imperfect  and  sinful  that  a  special  manifestation  of 
divine  grace  was  necessary. 

But  what  is  meant  in  any  case  by  saying  that  a  book  is  per- 
fect ?  Even  when  a  book  treats  of  one  of  the  exact  sciences,  as 
of  some  branch  of  mathematics,  the  epithet  "perfect"  can  be 
applied  only  in  a  loose  sense.  The  book  may  be  confidently 
pronounced  free  from  all  false  statements,  and  yet  not  be  per- 
fect in  the  sense  that  it  treats  the  subject  in  the  absolutely  best 
way.  It  may  omit  some  things  which  it  would  be  well  to  insert, 
or  it  may  contain  some  things  which  had  better  have  been 
omitted.  If  the  subject  of  the  book  is  not  one  of  the  exact 
sciences,  it  is  still  more  difficult  to  determine  when  it  can  be 
called  perfect.  No  one  supposes  that  a  strictly  perfect  treatise 
on  physiology,  or  chemistry,  or  geology,  or  even  astronomy,  has 
ever  yet  been  produced.  And  still  more  impracticable  is  it  to 
attain  a  perfect  treatment  of  psychology  or  ethics.  But  the 
Bible  is  a  book  which  is  at  almost  the  furthest  remove  from  a 
treatise  on  an  exact  science.  Neither  the  subjects  treated  of 
nor  the  method  of  treatment  permits  the  application  of  any 
simple  objective  standard  of  perfection.  It  is  a  heterogeneous 
work.  It  treats  no  subject  in  a  scientific  manner.  It  deals 
with  themes  which  transcend  human  comprehension.  It  ad- 
dresses the  sensibilities  and  the  conscience,  rather  than  the 
intellect;  and  the  appeal  is  for  the  most  part  indirect  rather 
than  direct.  In  it  examples  take  the  place  of  precept,  and 
history  the  place  of  analysis.  It  embodies  the  sentiments  and 
conceptions  of  very  different  men.  It  exhibits  an  advancing 
development  of  divine  truth,  a  gradual  execution  of  divine 
purposes,  rather  than  a  consummated  system.  It  gives  God's 
thoughts  as  reflected  in  the  mirror  of  his  human  agents. 

A  book  may  be  perfect  in  a  negative  or  in  a  positive  sense. 
To  be  perfect  in  the  negative  sense  of  being  free  from  erroneous 
statements  would  be  of  itself  a  ver}''  meagre  excellence.  Such 
freedom  might  belong  to  a  book  comparatively  inane  and 
worthless.  Inasmucli  as  the  purpose  of  a  divine  revelation  is 
the  production  of  spiritual  renovation  in  men,  that  record  of 
the  revelation  might  be  properly  called  perfect  which  is  best 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  349 

fitted  to  accomplish  this  purpose.  This  is  perfection  in  the 
positive  sense.  It  may  indeed  be  contended  that  a  Bible  might 
have  been  produced  which  would  do  a  better  work  than  the  one 
we  have.  It  may,  for  example,  be  thought  that,  if  some  of  the 
genealogical  matter  were  left  out,  and  some  of  Paul's  lost 
epistles  were  put  in,  the  Bible  would  assuredly  be  a  better  book, 
and  better  fitted  to  do  its  work.  But  all  such  speculations 
prove  nothing  more  than  the  individual  opinions  of  the  pro- 
mulgators of  them.  The  only  certain  thing  about  the  matter 
is  that  in  a  vast  number  of  instances  the  Bible  has  accomplished 
its  purpose :  it  has  made  men  "  wise  unto  salvation." 

But,  it  may  be  objected,  in  many  other  instances  this  purpose 
has  not  been  accomplished ;  multitudes  have  heard  or  read  the 
"Word  of  God  and  been  made  no  better,  or  have  even  been 
offended  and  injured  by  it.  But  the  obvious  answer  is  that, 
as  the  Bible  cannot  act  median ically,  and  the  effect  it  produces 
must  depend  on  the  spiritual  attitude  of  the  reader,  it  can 
perfectly  accomplish  its  purpose  only  in  so  far  as  its  message  is 
addressed  to  a  receptive  spirit.  He  who  feels  his  need  of  divine 
mercy  and  guidance  finds  in  the  recorded  revelation  that  which 
perfectly  answers  to  his  needs.  He  who  comes  to  the  Scriptures 
without  such  a  sense  of  need  is  not  made  wise  unto  salvation 
by  them ;  and  he  would  not  be,  however  perfect  might  be  the 
form  of  the  message.  Such  a  one  would  find  fault  with  the 
most  faultless  book. 

In  short,  every  doctrine  concerning  the  authority  or  infalli- 
bility of  the  Scriptures  must  take  into  account  the  persons  to 
whom  they  are  addressed  and  the  end  which  they  aim  at.  To 
call  the  Bible  perfect,  irrespective  of  its  relation  to  those  who 
use  it,  is  like  calling  an  article  of  food  perfect,  apart  from  its  fit- 
ness to  support  physical  vigor.  The  same  food  which  is  good  for 
one  man  may  be  bad  for  another.  In  general,  certain  articles  of 
food  have  been  found  to  be  wholesome  and  useful.  Those  which 
in  the  greatest  number  of  cases  seem  to  be  best  adapted  to 
nourish  the  human  system  may  in  a  loose  sense  be  called  per- 
fect. But  for  many  persons  food  which  for  the  most  would  be 
called  inferior  may  be  better  than  that  which  is  generally  called 
the  best. 


350  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

In  like  manner  the  Bible  is  to  be  judged  according  to  its  fit- 
ness to  do  its  work.  Not  every  part  of  it  is  equally  adapted  to 
every  individual,  or  to  the  same  individual  at  different  stages  of 
his  spiritual  life.  What  to  some  may  seem  the  most  useless  or 
questionable  parts  of  the  book  often  prove  to  be  effective  in 
leading  others  into  tbe  way  of  life.^  And  no  one  will  be  led  by 
it  into  the  truth  who  comes  to  it  in  the  wrong  way.  If  one  is 
hardened  to  religious  influences,  oris  filled  with  captiousness  and 
self-sufficiency,  the  Bible  cannot  do  its  proper  work  on  him. 
Only  one  who  is  seeking  life  and  salvation  will  find  it  to  be  a 
perfect  guide.  Only  such  a  one  finds  and  appropriates  the  deeper 
religious  lessons  and  stimulus  which  the  book  furnishes.  The 
more  he  is  illumined  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  the  more  does  he 
find  of  this  fulness  of  spiritual  instruction.  He  finds  it  even 
in  that  which  to  the  light-minded  and  the  scoffing  furnishes 
occasion  for  offense  or  for  ridicule.  He  finds  even  in  that  which 
shows  traces  of  the  human  weakness  of  the  sacred  writer  a 
religious  help,  so  that  the  imperfect  and  the  fallible  may  itself 
become,  in  its  connection  with  the  general  burden  of  the  divine 
message,  an  infallible  guide,  —  a  guide  which  does  not  mislead, 
but  helps  one  onward  towards  that  perfection  which  it  is  the 
object  of  revelation  to  produce.  In  short,  the  Bible  is  perfect 
and  infallible,  for  the  purpose  which  revelation  aims  to  accom- 
plish, to  every  one  who  in  using  it  is  led  by  the  Holy  Spirit. 
It  cannot  be  infallible  to  those  of  a  different  spirit;  for  in  their 
case  it  fails  of  its  chief  end.  An  abstract,  absolute,  ideal  infalli- 
bility, that  is  to  be  defined  irrespective  of  the  practical  end  to 
be  attained  by  the  infallibility,  would  be  worthless  in  itself,  and 
would  moreover  after  all  forever  be  indefinable. 

One  who  on  a  clear  summer  day  looks  from  the  Swiss  vil- 
lage of  Beatenberg  upon  the  view  there  spread  before  him,  — 
the  malacliite  green  waters  of  Lake  Thun  two  thousand  feet 
sheer  below  him  ;  the  steep  undulating  slopes  between,  clothed 
with  grass  and  groves  ;  the  ranges  of  mountains  beyond,  overlap- 

^  E.g.,  Josepli  Kabinowitz  of  Kisclienev,  Russia,  wlio  was  converted  from 
Judaism  to  Christianity  by  reading  the  New  Testament,  and  has  since  labored 
amongst  the  Jews  in  that  place  with  great  success,  was  greatly  influenced  at 
the  outset  by  the  genealogical  tables  in  Matthew  and  Luke. 


THE   AUTHORITY  OF  THE   SCRIPTURES.  351 

ping  one  another,  till  at  the  furthest  and  highest  point  the  land- 
scape is  terminated  by  the  snow-clad  monarchs  of  the  Bernese 
Alps,  —  he  who  beholds  this  scene,  with  its  manifold  and  con- 
tinually varying  shades  of  richest  color,  may  well  exclaim, 
"  This  is  a  perfect  view."  But  a  captious  critic  might  object 
that  many  a  tree  is  defective  or  abnormal  in  shape ;  that  many 
a  chalet  is  rude  or  dilapidated ;  that  the  pure  green  of  the 
lake  is  sometimes  marred  by  the  turbid  waters  of  the  inflow- 
ing streams ;  that  here  and  there  a  different  contour  of  the 
mountain  outline  would  be  more  according  to  artistic  ideas  of 
beauty ;  or  that  a  more  unbroken  snow  covering  on  the  lofty 
summits  would  enhance  the  charm  of  the  scene.  But  he  who 
looks  at  the  scene  with  an  eye  sensitive  to  the  power  of  true 
beauty  and  grandeur  will  be  unmoved  by  such  petty  carpings. 
Taking  in  the  grand  whole,  with  its  fascinating  combinations  of 
light  and  sliade,  of  height  and  depth,  of  form  and  color,  he  will 
still  say  of  it,  "  This  is  a  perfect  view." 

And  so  he  who  looks  at  the  Bible,  with  its  manifold  pictures 
from  the  history  of  divine  revelations,  with  its  matchless  por- 
traitures of  character,  with  its  disclosures  of  the  depths  of  hu- 
man depravity  and  human  necessities,  with  its  fervid  effusions 
of  religious  feeling,  with  its  pungent  appeals  to  the  conscience, 
and  above  all  with  its  disclosures  of  the  holiness  and  majesty 
of  God  and  the  riches  of  his  redeeming  love,  —  he  who  looks  at 
the  book  with  feelings  alive  to  the  realities  and  necessities  and 
possibilities  of  man's  spiritual  nature,  will  say  of  it,  "  This  is  a 
perfect  book."  It  presents  a  manifoldness  of  elements  which  in 
their  combination  blend  together  into  one  grand,  impressive 
picture,  stimulating,  elevating,  purifying.  If  a  sharp-eyed  critic 
complains  of  defects  and  mistakes,  and  points  out  wherein  the 
several  parts  might  be  improved,  he  who  reads  it  with  a  sense 
of  religious  need  will  doubt  the  power  of  mere  human  acumen 
to  reconstruct  it  for  the  better,  and  will  say  of  it  that  it  is  a 
book  unique  in  its  power  to  meet  one's  deepest  wants ;  that  it 
alone,  among  all  the  books  of  the  world,  perfectly  fulfils  the  end 
of  communicating  and  preserving  God's  revealed  truth,  and  of 
impressing  it  upon  men. 

But  the  objection  may  be  here  raised,  that  by  this  mode  of 


352  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

conceiving  the  matter  the  real  regulative  guide  is  made  to  be 
not  the  Word  of  God,  but  the  human  spirit.  As  the  thoughtful 
man  can  find  "  sermons  in  stones,  books  in  the  running  brooks, 
and  good  in  everything,"  so  the  religious  man  may  find  sugges- 
tions and  lessons  in  those  parts  of  the  Bible  which  are  intrinsi- 
cally of  no  special  worth.  In  such  a  case  is  it  not,  after  all,  the 
Christian  mind  which  puts  the  significance  into  those  things 
that  in  themselves  and  to  the  more  unreflective  have  no  higher 
significance  at  all  ?  Are  we  not  lending  countenance  to  the  old 
objection,  that  the  Bible  can  be  made  to  teach  whatever  one 
chooses  to  make  it  teach  ?  Is  not  the  '  Christian  consciousness  " 
thus,  after  all,  made  the  supreme  source  of  religious  opinion  ? 

The  objection  is  easily  removed.  The  fundamental  and  essen- 
tial elements  of  Christian  truth  are  of  divine  communication. 
Christianity,  as  we  have  before  observed,  is  not  a  product  of  the 
natural  consciousness,  intuition,  or  reflection  of  man ;  it  is  a 
revelation.  And  if  Christianity  itself  is  thus  essentially  a  di- 
vine, and  not  a  human,  product,  the  record  of  it  cannot  be 
a  thing  having  no  intrinsic  significance,  and  be  capable  of  mean- 
ing whatever  any  one  may  choose  to  make  it  mean.  On  the 
contrary,  Christian  experience  and  Christian  thought  being  an 
outflow  from  the  revelation  whose  most  original  and  authentic 
expression  is  in  the  Scriptures,  it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that 
the  Christian  mind  can  legitimately  make  those  Scriptures  mean 
anything  and  everything.  They  not  only  have  a  meaning  of 
their  own,  but  they  are  normative  and  regulative  for  Christian 
experience  and  thought  itself  It  is  the  business  of  the  Chris- 
tian to  find  out  what  they  do  mean,  not  to  say  what  they  shall 
mean.  They  are  the  perennial  source  from  which  Christendom 
must  draw  its  knowledge  and  conception  of  what  the  Christian 
revelation  conveyed  and  involved.^ 

When,  then,  the  endless  variety  of  opinions  and  forms  of 
doctrine  which  men  profess  to  derive  from  the  same  Bible  is 
adduced  as  proof  that  its  meaning  does  not  control,  but  is  con- 
trolled by,  its  readers,  it  is  to  be  replied  that  this  objection  is 
pertinent  only  as  directed  against  allegorical  and  purely  fanciful 
interpretations  of  Scripture.  And  even  tliese  are  governed  to  a 
1  Cf.  Doruer,  Christian  Ethics,  p.  45. 


THE   AUTHORITY   OF   THE   SCRIPTURES.  353 

large  extent  by  the  distinctively  Christian  conceptions  which 
are  common  to  all  Christians.  Nothing,  however,  is  really  legiti- 
mate in  the  interpretation  of  the  Bible  but  an  honest  effort  to 
find  out  what  the  written  word  was  intended  to  mean.  That  dif- 
ferent men  should  come  to  different  results,  is  not  strange.  That 
certain  features  of  the  Biblical  books  should  sometimes  be  made 
unduly  prominent,  and  certain  other  more  important  ones  should 
be  overlooked ;  or  that  different  Christians  should  differ  from  one 
another  as  to  what  the  relative  importance  and  right  proportions 
of  Scriptural  truth  really  are,  —  this,  too,  can  be  easily  under- 
stood. That  through  the  influence  of  early  education  and  biasing 
predilections  the  obvious  meaning  of  certain  Scriptures  should 
be  distorted,  is  also  natural  and  intelligible.  It  is  clear,  too,  that 
there  is  no  rule  of  interpretation  which  can  lay  claim  to  be  the 
only  correct  and  authoritative  one.  In  their  methods  and  in 
their  results  Christians  do,  and  doubtless  long  will,  disagree  more 
or  less  with  one  another.  If  these  differences,  as  we  may  hope, 
shall  gradually  disappear  ;  if  there  shall  be  developed  out  of  the 
present  divergence  a  universal  accord  in  religious  doctrine,  — 
this  will  not  be  a  general  agreement  arrived  at  irrespective  of 
the  intrinsic  meaning  of  the  Scriptures,  but  rather  it  will  come 
as  the  result  of  a  more  accurate  understanding  of  what  that 
intrinsic  meaning  is.  Any  other  view  would  require  us  to 
assume  that  Christian  thought  and  feeling  can  arrive  at  religious 
truth  independently  of  the  Christian  revelation.  If  the  Chris- 
tian mind  can  develop  truth  which  contradicts  or  supplants  that 
which  is  contained  in  the  records  of  divine  revelation,  then 
the  conclusion  must  be  that  Christian  tliinking  is  a  more  author- 
itative revealer  of  truth  than  Christ.  But  this,  of  course,  is 
equivalent  to  the  denial  of  the  Christian  revelation  itself  If 
there  has  not  been  introduced  into  the  world,  once  for  all,  an 
authoritative  and  ample  fountain  of  religious  instruction  and 
religious  Ufe,  then  the  alternative  conclusion  is  that  all  religion 
is  a  phenomenon  of  evolution ;  that  the  so-called  inspiration 
of  to-day,  though  possibly  superior  to  that  of  yesterday,  is  des- 
tined to  be  supplanted  by  that  of  to-morrow ;  that  all  theology 
is  a  mere  matter  of  changing  opinion,  and  all  religion  a  shifting 
mood  of  feeling,  regulated  by  no  standard  of  truth  or  of  right. 
23 


354  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

The  conclusion  of  the  matter,  then,  must  be  that  man's  reli- 
gious sense  has  indeed  a  part  to  play,  but  that  it  is  not  the  part 
of  originating  a  sure  knowledge  of  God,  still  less,  the  part  of 
originating  the  truths  of  Christianity.  Its  part,  so  far  as  reve- 
lation or  the  record  of  revelation  is  concerned,  is  to  apprehend 
it.  This  apprehension,  as  time  passes,  and  Christian  experience 
is  enlarged,  may  grow  clearer ;  there  may  be  a  development  and 
progress  in  the  right  understanding  of  the  deeper  meaning  of 
the  Scriptures ;  but  there  cannot  be  a  development  which  will 
supersede  the  Scriptures  or  essentially  add  to  them.  What 
that  deeper  meaning  is  which  lies  below  the  surface,  and  is 
gained  only  through  experience  and  devout  meditation,  must  of 
course  be  left  indeterminate.  Certain  fanciful  and  arbitrary 
modes  of  exegesis  may  indeed  be,  and  for  the  most  part  are 
already,  discarded.  But  there  is  a  possibility,  in  abandoning 
capricious  interpretations,  of  pushing  a  literal  interpretation  to 
the  extreme.  A  certain  degree  of  spiritualizing  is  legitimate  ; 
the  Scriptures  themselves  set  us  the  example,  and  suggest  the 
general  principles  which  are  to  be  observed  in  making  use  of  it. 
The  reverent  and  judicious  use  of  the  Bible,  which  only  seeks  in 
a  legitimate  way  to  find  the  spiritual  lessons  and  suggestions 
that  do  not  disclose  themselves  to  an  irreverent  or  unbelieving 
reader,  is  not  to  be  condemned,  but  rather  to  be  commended. 
It  is  self-evident  that  the  spiritualizing  interpretation  must  be 
one  which  is  fitted  to  meet  a  response  in  the  general  community 
of  believers.  Individual  conceits,  quixotic  manipulations  of 
numbers  and  letters  which  aim  to  bring  out  some  hidden  mean- 
ing or  unsuspected  revelation,  —  all  this,  and  everything  akin 
to  this,  is  to  be  rejected.  But  he  who  holds  that  the  Scriptures 
embody  the  revealed  will  and  truth  of  God,  and  are  therefore 
able  to  make  men  wise  unto  salvation,  will  more  and  more  learn 
that  every  Scripture  is  "  profitable  for  teaching,  for  reproof,  for 
correction,  and  for  instruction  which  is  in  righteousness,"  so  tliat 
he  who  devoutly  studies  them  will  be  "  complete,  furnished 
completely  unto  every  good  work." 


CONDITIONS  AND  LIMITS  OF  BIBLICAL  CRITICISiL        355 


CHAPTER  XT. 

THE   CONDITIONS   AND   LIMITS   OF   BIBLICAL   CRITICISM. 

IF  we  understand  by  the  term  " criticism "  the  careful  and  dis- 
criminating examination  of  the  facts  concerning  the  origin 
and  characteristics  of  a  book,  according  to  the  best  attainable 
evidence,  it  is  manifest  that  criticism  is  not  only  legitimate  but 
desirable  with  reference  to  the  Bible  no  less  than  any  other 
book.  Learning  how  a  thing  came  to  be  is  an  important  part 
of  learning  what  it  is.  It  would  be  the  mark  of  a  narrow  and 
foolish  spirit  to  be  afraid  of  the  most  searching  investigation 
which  scholarship  can  institute  into  the  age,  the  authorship,  the 
authenticity,  and  the  import  of  the  several  books  of  the  Bible. 
Whatever  can  thus  be  discovered  ought  to  be  welcomed  by  all. 

But  not  every  critical  study,  however  conducted,  can  be  de- 
pended on  to  arrive  at  sure  and  trustworthy  results.  There  are 
limitations  and  difficulties  in  the  nature  of  the  subject,  there 
are  imperfections  and  prepossessions  in  the  critic,  which  may 
lead  astray  or  leave  the  result  indecisive. 

Without  attempting  an  exhaustive  discussion  of  the  condi- 
tions and  limits  of  a  sound  Biblical  criticism,  we  may  lay  down 
a  few  general  propositions. 

1.  Freedom  from  prepossessions  is,  as  a  qualification  for  criti- 
cal research,  neitlier  attainable  nor  desirable.  It  is  easy  and 
plausible  to  say  that  one  who  is  seeking  to  ascertain  the  truth 
concerning  any  matter  should  care  only  for  the  truth,  and  should 
allow  no  antecedent  convictions  to  bias  him  in  his  investiga- 
tions. It  is  self-evident  that  a  man  who  is  searching  for  the 
truth  should  honestly  desire  to  find  it;  but  it  is  not  evident 
that  a  man  can  in  his  search  divest  himself  of  opinions  already 
formed.  If,  whenever  one  undertakes  a  new  study,  he  should 
begin  by  regarding  everything  as  uncertain,  it  is  clear  that  noth- 
ing new  would  ever  be  learned.     Research  would  result  only  in 


356  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

an  increase  of  uncertainty.  The  superstructure  of  a  house  can- 
not be  built  unless  there  is  first  a  foundation.  Whatever  sure 
conclusions  and  convictions  a  person  has  arrived  at  on  any  point 
constitute  a  body  of  prepossessions  which  he  must  and  should 
carry  with  him  in  his  further  research.  Provided  the  earlier 
convictions  are  well  grounded,  he  would  be  a  fool,  if  at  every 
new  step  in  his  progress  he  should  allow  himself  to  unsettle 
those  convictions,  and  attempt  to  build  up  again  from  the  very 
foundations.  It  is  true,  the  earlier  convictions  may  be  erro- 
neous, and  therefore  the  later  studies  may  receive  an  injurious 
bias.  Of  course  the  abstract  possibility  of  error  must  always  be 
conceded.  To  err  is  human.  But  if  one  should  undertake  to 
act  on  the  principle  of  distrusting  conclusions  already  reached, 
one's  whole  time  and  energy  would  have  to  be  spent  in  retracing 
all  the  steps  previously  taken ;  and  so  no  real  advance  could 
ever  be  made.  The  investigations  and  conclusions  of  one  gen- 
eration would  be  of  no  use  to  the  next.  No  system  of  truth 
could  ever  be  accumulated  and  made  the  foundation  of  further 
research  or  of  assured  faith.  All  traditional  knowledge  would 
have  to  be  denounced  as  worthless.  No  one  could  be  an  au- 
thority in  any  sense  to  another.  No  science  of  any  sort  could 
ever  be  regarded  as  established ;  each  one  would  have  to  be  set 
up  afresh  by  each  individual ;  and  the  diversity  of  opinions 
which  would  inevitably  result  would  be  a  reason  for  doubting 
the  correctness  of  them  all.  Universal  skepticism  would  be  the 
certain  and  logical  result.  There  could  be  not  only  no  advance 
in  knowledge,  but  no  real  knowledge  at  all. 

It  may  indeed  be  held  that  sure  knowledge  is  not  only  unat- 
tainable, but  not  even  desirable.  This  is  what  is  meant  —  if 
indeed  anything  intelligible  is  meant — by  Lessing's  famous 
saying  about  the  search  for  truth  being  preferable  to  the  pos- 
session of  it.^     The  maxim,  doubtless,  owes  its  longevity  to  its 

^  "  Not  by  the  possession,  but  by  the  search,  of  truth  is  breadth  given  to 
the  faculties  in  wliich  alone  man's  growing  perfection  consists.  Possession 
makes  one  quiet,  indolent,  proud.  If  God  should  hold  all  truth  in  his  right 
hand,  and  in  his  left  hand  the  single,  ever-active  impulse  to  get  truth,  even 
though  with  the  condition  that  I  sliould  forever  and  eternally  fail  of  it,  and 
should  say  to  me,  'Choose!'  I  woidd  humbly  turn  to  his  left  hand  and  say, 


CONDITIONS  AND  LIMITS  OF  BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.         357 

very  extravagance  ;  it  sounds  brilliant,  though  in  itself  it  is  little 
else  than  a  bald  absurdity.  If  it  really  were  better  to  pursue 
than  to  find,  if  the  ideal  state  were  that  of  chasing  and  never 
catching,  and  if  it  were  possible  to  realize  that  ideal,  then  the 
result  would  have  to  be  that  the  object  of  the  pursuit  must  be 
forever  unknown;  truth  being  never  attained,  one  could  not 
even  say  that  he  is  pursuing  truth ;  he  would  not  know  what 
he  is  pursuing ;  the  only  thing  he  could  be  sure  of  would  be 
that  he  could  never  be  sure  of  anything  but  the  pursuit.  And 
even  that,  if  one  is  really  sure  of  it,  would  be  a  truth,  and  there- 
fore to  be  got  rid  of  as  soon  as  possible.  In  this  case,  however^ 
it  becomes  a  mystery  wherein  the  joy  and  zest  of  the  pursuit 
can  consist.  If  ignorance  is  the  certain  goal,  one  does  not  need 
to  hunt  and  chase  in  order  to  reach  it ;  the  starting-point  and 
the  goal  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  But,  it  is  said,  the  good 
of  the  search  is  in  the  search  itself ;  it  is  in  the  mental  exercise 
given  by  the  search.  "It  is  not  knowledge,"  says  Hamilton, 
"  it  is  not  truth,  that"  the  votary  of  science  "  principally  seeks ; 
he  seeks  the  exercise  of  his  faculties  and  feelings."  ^  This  is 
simply  not  true.  What  the  votary  of  science  seeks,  if  he  de- 
serves the  name,  is  knowledge.  The  mental  gymnastic  which 
conies  through  the  search  is  doubtless  a  good;  but  it  comes 
as  an  incidental  advantage  ;  it  is  not  the  thing  directly  and 
principally  aimed  at.  And  moreover  an  intellectual  exertion 
whose  sole  and  certain  end  were  simply  error  and  ignorance 
would  itself  be  a  more  than  doubtful  good.  A  cat  vainly 
chasing  her  own  tail  gets,  perhaps,  a  useful  exercise  by  the 
process ;  but  she  is  wise  enough  to  give  up  the  pursuit  when 
she  finds  that  the  tail  cannot  be  caught.  A  true  type  of  Les- 
sing's  ideal  truth-hunter  would  be  a  cat  eternally  pursuing  her 
tail,  though  growing  more  and  more  doubtful  whether  the  tail 
is  after  all  anything  but  an  illusive  phantom. 

But  there  are  few  who  would  deliberately  go  to  this  extreme. 

'Father,  give  me  this.     The  pure  truth  is  for  thee  alone  '"  (E'uie  Duplik,  §  1). 
Sir  William   Hamilton  (^Metaphysics,   p.   13)  quotes   this    (apparently   from 
memory)  and  other  similar  sayings  with  approval.     A  poor  compliment  to 
his  own  philosophy ! 
^  Metaphysics,  p.  10. 


858  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  truth  is  attainable,  and  that  the 
attainment  of  it  is  intrinsically  desirable.  But  all  hope  of  an 
increase  of  knowledge  depends  upon  the  assumption  that  some 
knowledge  has  been  already  attained.  And  this  previous  knowl- 
edge, or  supposed  knowledge,  constitutes  a  prepossession.  It 
may  indeed  be  an  error,  and  lead  astray,  but  it  cannot  be 
ignored.  Different  prepossessions  may,  therefore,  lead  in  dif- 
ferent directions.  An  atheist,  to  whom  a  supernatural  revelation 
is  simply  impossible,  must  regard  the  Bible  not  only  as  not 
divinely  infallible,  but,  on  the  contrary,  as  full  of  falsehood. 
He  will  not  deem  it  worth  the  while  to  investigate  particularly 
the  merits  of  the  several  parts ;  for  his  prepossession  necessarily 
makes  him  condemn  the  whole  fabric  as  a  structure  of  fiction 
and  foolish  fancy.  His  general  opinion  as  to  the  origin  and  value 
of  the  book  must  be  totally  different  from  that  of  him  who  comes 
to  the  study  of  it  with  an  opposite  prepossession.  Between  the 
outright  atheist  and  the  man  who  has  been  trained  to  believe 
that  every  word  of  Scripture  is  in  the  strictest  sense  a  direct 
utterance  of  a  personal  God  there  are  many  grades  of  opinion ; 
but  every  opinion  rests  on  a  prepossession  of  some  sort.  It 
may  be  only  a  prepossession  in  favor  of  the  trustworthiness 
of  one's  parents;  it  may  be,  on  the  contrary,  an  antipathy  to 
those  by  whom  one  is  instructed,  leading  to  a  disinclination  to 
accept  their  opinions.  It  may  be  a  prepossession  derived  from 
the  books  which  have  come  in  one's  way,  or  from  tlie  friends 
that  one  has  chanced  to  find.  But  prepossessions  of  some  kind 
there  are  and  must  be  in  every  case. 

There  is  nothing  more  shallow  than  the  doctrine  so  often 
paraded  before  the  public,  that  every  one  should  be  left  to 
choose  and  formulate  his  own  religious  opinions,  undetermined 
by  parents  or  by  any  other  outward  influence.  Even  if  it  were 
possible  for  parents  to  avoid  exerting  an  influence  on  the  de- 
velopment of  their  children's  minds,  an  influence  would  inevi- 
tably come  from  some  other  source.  The  infant  mind  reaches 
out  for  guidance  and  instruction  as  naturally  as  a  plant  seeks 
the  sun.  But  even  if  this  instinct  could  be  suppressed,  and 
each  budding  mind  could  be  perfectly  guarded  against  being 
influenced   by  other  minds,  how  preposterous  it  would   be   to 


CONDITIONS  AND  LIMITS   OF  BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.         359 

attach  any  importance  to  the  conclusions  to  which  such  a  mind 
might  come,  deprived  of  the  light  which  the  experience  and 
reflection  of  previous  generations  might  have  giveu.^  Even 
if  under  such  circumstances  the  mind  could  be  developed 
rationally  at  all  (which  is  more  than  doubtful),  the  most  that 
could  result  would  be  a  multitude  of  notions  which  could  at 
the  best  claim  to  be  nothing  better  than  individual  conceits. 
One  could  not  speak  of  these  conceits  as  truthful;  for  this 
epithet  implies  some  commonly  accepted  standard  according  to 
which  an  opinion  is  judged.  Moreover,  unless  by  this  inde- 
pendent method  of  arriving  at  opinions  all  should  somehow 
come  to  exactly  the  same  (which  nobody  would  expect),  then 
certainly  not  all  of  them  could  be  correct ;  and  if  the  opinions 
should  ever  come  to  be  compared,  the  comparison  would  disclose 
disagreement,  the  disagreement  would  lead  to  discussion,  and 
the  discussion  would  result  in  influencing  some  minds  to 
modify  or  reverse  their  previous  opinions.  And  so  we  should 
have  at  the  last  what  is  deprecated  at  the  first,  —  opinions 
formed  through  outward  influence.  The  independently  formed 
opinions  which  are  given  up  as  the  result  of  discussion  with 
other  persons  would  then  have  to  be  called  prepossessions, 
so  that  if  all  prepossessions  are  to  be  abolished,  we  should 
have  to  abolish  this  same  independent  method  of  forming 
opinions.  So  suicidal  and  absurd  is  the  doctrine  that  religious 
notions,  or  any  other  notions,  ought  to  be  formed  without 
biasing  influences. 

There  is  no  more  arrant  quackery  in  the  world  than  that 
which  is  seen  in  the  boasted  "freedom,"  or  "free-thinking,"  of 
those  who  have  broken  away  from  the  traditional  views  of 
parents  and  early  associates.     Whether  their  change  is  for  the 

^  "  It  is  neither  the  wise  nor  the  good  by  whom  the  patrimony  of  opinion 
is  most  lightly  regarded.  Such  is  tlie  condition  of  our  existence  tliat,  beyond 
the  precincts  of  abstract  science,  we  must  take  much  for  granted,  if  we  would 
make  any  advance  in  knowledge,  or  live  to  any  useful  end.  Our  hereditary 
prepossessions  must  not  only  precede  our  acquired  judgments,  but  must 
conduct  us  to  them.  To  begin  by  questioning  everything  is  to  end  by  an- 
swering nothing ;  and  a  premature  revolt  from  human  authority  is  but  an  in- 
cipient rebellion  against  conscience,  reason,  and  truth."  —  Sir  James  Stephen, 
Essays  in  Ecclesiastical  Biography  (on  Richard  Baxter),  4th  ed.,  pp.  337,  338. 


360  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

better  or  for  the  worse,  is  a  question  by  itself;  but  in  no  case 
has  the  change  come  about  independently  of  outward  influences. 
If  it  had  so  come  about,  if  the  new  opinion  were  absolutely 
new,  —  not  suggested  to  the  mind  by  any  other  person  or  any 
book, —  then  that  would  itself  be  generally  regarded  as  pre- 
sumptive evidence  against  it.  Or  if  it  were  able  to  vindicate 
itself,  then  that  would  mean  that  it  becomes  a  force  which 
modifies  the  opinions  of  others ;  the  others,  after  that,  would 
not  have  independent  opinions ;  only  this  one  could  boast  that 
merit.  Universal  and  absolute  independence,  in  short,  in  the 
formation  of  judgments  is  an  impossibility  and  an  absurdity. ^ 

It  is  only  a  particular  application  of  this  general  principle, 
when  we  remark  that  — 

2.  One's  critical  judgment  of  the  Christian  Scriptures  must 
be  largely  modified  by  one's  antecedent  judgment  respecting 
Christ  and  Christianity.  Christianity  is  at  all  events  a  great 
fact;  and  according  as  it  is  or  is  not  regarded  as  a  divine  reve- 
lation, men  will  pronounce  it  a  great  boon  or  a  great  fraud. 
And  the  Christian  Scriptures  being  the  product  and  expression 
of  Christianity,  this  prejudgment  concerning  the  producer  can- 
not but  have  a  determining  influence  on  one's  judgment  con- 
cerning the  product. 

But  here  the  objection  may  be  made :  A  pre-judgment  is  a 
pre-judice;  and  prejudice  is  an  evil,  to  be  avoided  or  overcome 
as  far  as  possible.  To  this  the  Christian  believer  may  reply : 
Christianity  is  not  a  new  thing  just  beginning  to  urge  its  claims 
on  the  world.  It  is  nearly  two  thousand  years  old.  It  has 
passed  through  storms  of  opposition.  It  has  not  run  its  course 
in  a  dark  corner  of  the  earth,  but  has  been  exposed  to  the 
brightest  light.  If,  then,  in  spite  of  the  natural  human  de- 
pravity which  it  everywhere  meets  and  denounces,  and  in  spite 
of  the  malicious  and  subtle  opposition  of  learned  foes,  it  has 
continued  to  assert  and  propagate  itself;  if  it  has  even  survived 
its  own  corruptions,  and  has  relaxed  no  whit  of  its  original 
claims  concerning  itself,  —  then  it  must  be  said  to  have  conquered 

*  Cf.  E.  C.  Bissell,  The  Pentateuch,  pp.  45  sq.  "  Prepossessions  are  inevi- 
table. We  can  no  more  get  rid  of  them  than  of  our  skins.  They  are,  indeed, 
an  essential  part  of  our  mental  and  moral  furnishing." 


CONDITIONS  AND   LIMITS   OF  BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.         361 

a  right  to  be;  and  Christians  have  a  right  to  treat  it  as  having 
a  presumption  in  its  favor.  It  is  simply  impossible  for  them 
to  regard  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion  as  a  matter  of 
everlasting  doubt. 

Now  this  belief  in  Christianity  as  a  divine  revelation  is 
something  anterior  to  all  critical  study  of  the  Christian  Scrip- 
tures. Tlie  faith  grew  up  before  those  Scriptures  were  written. 
It  rests,  primarily,  upon  the  evidence  found  in  the  character, 
words,  and  works  of  Jesus  Christ.  It  rests,  secondarily,  on  the 
historical  working  of  Christianity  in  the  world.  It  has  become 
one  of  the  great  forces  and  facts  of  the  universe.  The  Christian 
Scriptures  are  only  the  record  of  the  origin,  early  propagation, 
and  effects  of  the  new  faith.  They  serve,  it  is  true,  to  pre- 
serve and  regulate  that  faith.  They  have  characteristics  which 
may  be  used  as  arguments  for  the  validity  of  the  claims  of 
Christianity  to  be  a  genuine  revelation.  But,  in  general,  their 
office  is  to  state  what  Christianity  is,  and  how  it  came  to  be ; 
they  do  not  constitute  the  original  ground  of  the  Christian 
faith. 

Now  it  is  simply  impossible  for  a  Christian  not  to  be 
prejudiced  in  favor  of  these  Scriptures.  Belief  in  their  im- 
portance and  in  their  essential  truthfulness  as  an  exposition  of 
the  history  and  spirit  of  the  Christian  system  is  a  part  of  his 
Christian  faith  itself.  He  cannot  hold  to  the  one,  and  despise 
the  other.  And  equally  it  is  impossible  for  an  enemy  of 
Christianity  to  look  with  favor  and  confidence  on  the  primitive 
records  of  the  Christian  Church.  If  he  regards  the  fundamental 
claim  of  the  religion  to  be  false ;  if  he  does  not  trust  the  pre- 
tensions of  the  Founder ;  if  he  sees  no  evidence  of  its  divinity 
in  the  history  of  its  effects  on  the  world ;  if,  rather,  he  is 
convinced  that  Christianity  is  a  cheat  and  is  a  damage  to  the 
world,  —  why,  then  he  must  be  predisposed  to  find  evidence 
that  the  alleged  records  of  primitive  Christianity  are  tainted 
with  delusion  and  fraud.  He  cannot  hate  the  one,  and  love 
the  other.  The  Christian  and  the  infidel,  starting  with  such 
opposite  predilections,  cannot  but  disagree  in  their  critical 
judgments.  The  one  wiU  be  disposed  to  find  evidence  for,  the 
other  evidence   against,  the   genuineness  and   authenticity    of 


362  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION". 

the  New  Testament  books.  And  what  one  desires  to  find  he 
will  be  likely  to  find. 

But,  it  may  now  be  said,  all  this  only  goes  to  show  that  both 
the  friend  and  the  enemy  of  Christianity  are  biased,  and  there- 
fore likely  to  reach  a  wrong  conclusion.  Eeal  candor,  it  may 
seem,  can  be  found  only  in  one  who  is  in  a  state  of  absolute 
indifference,  —  only  in  one  who  has  no  impression  whatever  as 
to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  claims  of  Christianity.  But 
ignorance  is  not  the  chief  desideratum  in  a  critic.  It  would 
be  difficult,  in  the  first  place,  except  in  heathen  lands,  to  find 
any  one  who  has  absolutely  no  opinion  about  Christianity.  But, 
in  the  second  place,  when  such  a  man  is  found  and  put  upon 
his  critical  examination  of  the  Biblical  books,  he  must  needs 
first  of  all  make  himself  acquainted  with  the  facts  which  bear 
upon  the  question  to  be  solved.  And  foremost  among  these  facts 
is  the  history  of  the  Christian  Church  from  the  beginning  on. 
No  intelligent  opinion  of  the  character  of  the  New  Testament 
can  be  formed,  till  one  has  learned  what  it  was  that  gave  rise 
to  it,  —  amid  what  circumstances  and  under  what  impulses  it  was 
produced.  But  by  the  time  this  stage  of  intelligence  is  reached, 
some  impression  will  have  been  formed  concerning  the  merits 
of  Christianity.  And  so  we  shall  have  what  we  set  out  to 
avoid,  namely,  a  prejudice,  in  one  direction  or  the  other. 

No  doubt,  on  either  side  there  may  be  often  a  lack  of  candor. 
Both  the  believer  and  the  skeptic,  under  the  influence  of  their 
prepossessions,  may  ignore  facts  or  be  perverse  in  their  infer- 
ences from  facts.  On  the  contrary,  there  may  be  on  both  sides 
a  painstaking  effort  to  ascertain  the  truth,  and  no  conscious 
desire  to  reason  unfairly.  But  if  the  prepossessions,  the  pre- 
suppositions, are  in  the  two  cases  different,  the  conclusions 
will  most  probably  be  difterent.  If,  for  example,  one  man 
starts  out  with  the  assumption  that  no  miracle  is  possible  or 
credible,  all  his  interpretation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  New 
Testament  must  be  colored  by  this  assumption.  He  feels 
bound  to  explain  the  reported  miracles  away.  The  super- 
naturalist,  on  the  other  hand,  to  whom  the  miracles  are  not 
offensive,  but,  on  the  contrary,  probable  and  welcome,  cannot 
but  take  an  entirely  different  view  of  the  written  record.     The 


CONDITIONS   AND  LIMITS   OF  BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.         363 

difference  is  a  radical  one,  and  the  root  of  it  is  to  be  found 
in  difference  of  view  on  questions  lying  at  the  very  foundation 
of  religion.     There  must  on  both  sides  be  a  bias. 

Freedom  from  bias  cannot  be  attained  unless  one  can  attain  a 
state  of  perfect  indifference  respecting  truth  in  general.  It  might 
seem  as  if  the  ideal  impartiality  would  be  that  of  him  who  is  in  a 
state  of  chronic  doubt  as  to  whether  there  is  a  God  or  not,  whether 
sin  is  a  reality  or  not,  whether  Jesus  Christ  ever  lived  or  not,  or  if 
he  did,  whether  he  was  an  impostor  or  not.  But  such  an  impar- 
tiality would  be  called,  in  any  other  sphere,  scientific  or  prac- 
tical, the  extreme  of  folly  or  of  madness.  It  would  make  doubt 
and  indecision  a  perpetual  duty.  It  would  paralyze  all  research. 
Under  cover  of  a  desire  to  get  at  the  exact  facts,  it  would  make 
belief  in  the  reality  of  any  fact  impossible ;  for  such  a  belief 
would  become  a  determining  bias  in  all  future  investigation. 

The  Christian  scholar  need,  therefore,  not  be  disconcerted  by 
the  charge  that  he  is  biased,  when  he  finds  himself  inclined 
in  general  to  defend  the  genuineness  and  authenticity  and 
authority  of  the  Scriptures.  If  he  is  a  Christian  in  real  earnest, 
he  cannot  do  otherwise. 

3.  Neither  critical  research  nor  Christian  insight  will  ever 
effect  a  reconstruction  or  expurgation  of  the  Canon  of  Sacred 
Scripture.  Both  these  forces  operated  in  the  original  fixing  of 
the  Canon.  And  the  decision  finally  arrived  at  was  not  the 
result  of  accident ;  it  was  not  brought  about  by  any  arbitrary 
decrees  of  Councils.  The  Councils  only  gave  expression  to  what 
had  come  to  be  the  conviction  of  the  Christian  Church  in  general. 
"We  know  that  the  process  was  a  slow,  deliberate,  and  careful 
one,  by  which  the  Canon  was  formed.  The  times  and  the  men 
are  now  gone  that  were  best  able  to  determine  what  books 
deserved  to  be  reckoned  in  the  Biblical  Canon.  Criticism,  how- 
ever subtle  and  learned,  will  never  be  able  to  prove  the  early 
Church  to  have  been  mistaken  in  its  judgment  respecting  the 
authorship  of  any  of  the  Biblical  books.  The  presumption  must 
continue  to  be  in  favor  of  the  judgment  of  those  who  lived 
nearest  to  the  time  of  the  origin  of  the  writings,  and  had  the  best 
opportunities  of  determining  the  facts  concerning  them. 

But  in  so  far  as  the  fixing  of  the  Canon  was  determined  by 


364  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

the  discriminating  tact  of  the  religious  sense,  there  is  likewise 
a  presumption  in  favor  of  the  selection  that  was  originally  made. 
Those  who  stood  nearest  to  the  traditions  of  the  vehicles  of 
divine  revelation  could  best  detect  what  writings  most  perfectly 
reflected  the  spirit  of  the  prophets  and  apostles. 

But  it  may  be  asked  whether  it  is  not  possible  for  the  Chris- 
tian Church  after  all  to  reverse  the  original  decision.  Is  it  not 
conceivable  that,  notwithstanding  our  greater  remoteness  in  time, 
we  may  yet  have  in  some  respects  clearer  light  or  a  more  deli- 
cate spiritual  sense,  and  so  be  able  to  form  a  wiser  judgment  as 
to  what  ought  to  have  been  admitted  into  the  Canon  ?  Theoreti- 
cally, perhaps,  such  a  possibility  may  be  admitted.  Tlie  original 
act  of  determining  the  limits  of  the  Canon  was  not  controlled  by 
any  special  supernatural  inspiration.  The  Church  followed  its 
own  best  judgment;  we  do  not  know  what  biasing  influences 
may  have  co-operated  in  securing  just  the  selection  which  has 
been  handed  down  to  us.  The  Church  of  the  post-apostolic 
period  cannot  claim  to  have  had  any  divine  authority  to  deter- 
mine for  all  time  precisely  what  books  must  be  treated  as  having 
peculiar  divine  sanction.  Why  might  not  the  Church  of  any 
subsequent  period  have  exercised,  or  still  exercise,  the  right  of 
revising  that  first  decision  ?  It  certainly  might,  if  it  could  make 
it  clear  that  it  had  better  means  of  settling  the  Canon  than  the 
early  Church  had.  But  just  here  is  the  difiiculty  which  will 
never  be  removed.  It  may  be  imagined  as  possible  that  some 
new  historical  evidence  should  come  to  light  proving  clearly 
that  certain  books  were  admitted  into  the  Canon  on  account  of  a 
mistaken  impression  as  to  their  authorship.  If  it  can  be  shown 
that  these  books  —  say,  Jude  or  Solomon's  Song —  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  excluded,  had  they  been  known  to  be  not 
genuine,  and  if  it  can  now  be  proved  that  they  are  not  genuine, 
does  it  not  follow  that  they  ought  now  to  be  ejected  ?  Yes,  no 
doubt.  And  so  we  may  imagine  the  possibility  that  all  the  New 
Testament  books  are  spurious  and  unauthentic.  But  it  is  prac- 
tically certain  that  such  a  possibility  can  never  be  transformed 
into  a  demonstrated  fact.  And  so,  though  not  with  the  same 
degree  of  positiveness,  we  must  say  that  it  is  practically  certain 
that  no  new  evidence  can  ever  be  discovered  going  to  show  that 


CONDITIONS  AND   LIMITS   OF  BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.      365 

any  of  tbe  Biblical  books  were  pronounced  canonical  on  the 
ground  of  erroneous  notions  concerning  tbeir  authorship. 

Still,  it  may  be  said,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  limits  of  the  Canon 
were  fixed  only  after  much  division,  doubt,  and  hesitation. 
What  was  originally  doubtful  cannot  have  grown  certain  through 
the  mere  lapse  of  time.  Canonicity  is,  therefore,  a  quality  of 
a  rather  indefinite  sort,  and  no  peculiar  sanctity  can  attach  to 
just  those  writings  which  happen  to  have  been  called  canonical. 
The  Church  is  to  this  day  divided  as  regards  the  canonicity  of 
the  Old  Testament  Apocrypha. 

What  shall  we  say  to  this  ?  Even  if  a  certain  degree  of  doubt 
may  be  cherished  as  to  a  few  of  the  Biblical  books ;  even  though 
the  line  between  the  canonical  and  the  uncanonical  is  not  per- 
fectly sharp  and  definable,  —  still  this  indefiniteness  does  not  do 
away  with  the  distinction.  The  border  line  between  animals 
and  vegetables  is  difficult  to  fix  with  precision ;  but  the  general 
distinction  between  the  two  kingdoms  is  marked  and  unmistak- 
able. Just  so,  as  regards  the  Canon,  even  though  it  may  be 
considered  doubtful  whether  certain  books  ought  not  to  have 
been  left  out,  and  certain  others  let  in,  the  essential  distinction 
between  the  canonical  and  the  uncanonical  is  not  obliterated. 
At  the  most,  we  can  only  say  that  whatever  valid  ground  for 
hesitation  existed  originally  may  be  held  to  exist  stilL  We 
may  derive  from  the  course  of  the  early  Church  a  warrant  for 
receiving  somewhat  doubtfully,  and  with  a  certain  qualification, 
a  few  of  the  Biblical  books.  But  as  to  the  larger  part  the  origi- 
nal decision  is  practically  binding  on  us.  The  evidence  of  their 
being  genuine  and  authoritative  exponents  of  the  facts  and 
truths  of  revelation  is  indissolubly  connected  with  the  evidence 
that  we  have  any  correct  knowledge  of  the  revelation  at  all.^ 
The  same  men  who  transmitted  to  us  the  gospel  of  Christ  trans- 
mitted to  us  these  Scriptures  as  the  inspired  memorials  of  his 
gospel. 

The  Canon  of  Scripture,  then,  especially  that  of  the  New 
Testament,  practically  stands  or  falls  with  Christianity  itself, 
for  it  was  the  outgrowth  and  expression  of  Christianity.     This 

1  Cf.  Westcott,  Histori/  of  the  Canon  of  the  New  Testament,  5th  ed.,  1881, 
pp.  500  sq. 


366  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  casting  discredit,  through 
critical  research,  upon  certain  portions,  larger  or  smaller,  of  the 
Canon.  It  cannot  be  laid  down  as  an  axiom,  that  no  part  even 
of  the  New  Testament  is  in  the  slightest  degree  untrustworth)^, 
or  that  through  interpolation  or  errors  of  transcription  some  parts 
may  not  have  been  more  or  less  corrupted.  But  the  existence 
of  such  incidental  defects  can  be  effectively  made  out,  if  at  all, 
only  in  so  far  as  the  authenticity  and  authority  of  the  collection 
as  a  whole  are  admitted.  It  is  as  impossible  to  show  that  the 
New  Testament  does  not  exhibit  the  genuine  religion  of  Jesus 
Christ  as  it  is  to  prove  that  the  writings  commonly  ascribed  to 
Plato  do  not  correctly  represent  Plato's  philosophy.  There  is 
this  difference,  it  is  true,  between  the  two  cases,  that  the  Pla- 
tonic writings  purport  to  come  from  the  philosopher  himself, 
whereas  the  New  Testament  is  the  work  of  various  men,  and  not 
at  all  the  work  of  Christ.  But  this  difference  only  serves  to 
enhance  the  strength  of  the  Christian  case.  It  is  barely  con- 
ceivable that  the  treatises  ascribed  to  Plato  might  be  proved  to 
have  originated  from  some  other  man,  just  as  of  late  years  cer- 
tain literary  adventurers  have  (in  imagination  at  least)  proved 
that  the  so-called  plays  of  Shakspeare  were  after  all  written  by 
Bacon.  But  in  that  case,  though  the  philosophy  would  still  be 
the  same,  it  could  no  longer  properly  be  called  Platonism.  The 
system  of  Christian  doctrine,  however,  is  essentially  connected 
with  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ.  Even  if  the  books  of  the  New 
Testament  could  be  shown  to  have  originated  at  another  time 
and  from  another  source  than  is  commonly  supposed,  they  would 
still  represent  the  faith  of  the  Christian  Church,  and  the  person 
of  Christ  would  still  be  the  centre  of  that  faith.  But  though  it 
is  conceivable  that  the  Christian  world  may  be  shown  to  have 
been  mistaken  in  regard  to  the  age  and  authorship  of  their 
Sacred  Scriptures,  it  is  practically  certain  that  not  even  this  can 
ever  be  proved.  They  will  forever  remain,  in  their  general 
extent  and  drift,  the  Canon  of  Christian  faith  and  practice. 

Practically,  then,  the  Canon  is  impregnable.  It  must  remain 
as  it  is.  No  consensus  of  the  Church  can  ever  be  expected  to 
revise  the  general  results  of  the  early  decision.  But  another 
and  kindred  question  here  meets  us :  Though  the  collection  may 


CONDITIONS   AND   LIMITS   OF   BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.       367 

be  left  as  it  is,  and  be  accepted  as  conveying  to  us  authentic 
testimony  concerning  divine  truth  and  the  divine  economy,  still 
may  not  the  spiritual  insight  of  the  Church  detect,  as  it  were,  a 
Canon  within  the  Canon,  distinguishing  the  true  Word  of  God  — 
the  kernel  —  from  the  enveloping  Imsk  of  human  forms,  concep- 
tions, and  traditions  ?  Must  we  not  say  that  the  Bible  contains 
the  Word  of  God,  rather  than  that  it  is  the  Word  of  God  ? 

In  an  important  sense  this  must  be  regarded  as  a  correct  con- 
ception. The  term  "  Word  of  God  "  is  nowhere  used  in  the  Bible 
as  a  comprehensive  name  of  the  canonical  collection ;  from  the 
nature  of  the  case  it  could  not  have  been  so  used  before  all  the 
books  in  question  were  written.  But  even  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment the  Old  Testament,  though  then  a  finished  whole,  was 
never  as  a  whole  called  the  Word  of  God.  Where  that  phrase 
occurs  with  reference  to  the  Old  Testament  it  refers  to  some 
particular  divine  command  (Mark  vii.  13 ;  2  Pet.  iii.  5)  or  prom- 
ise (Eom.  i.x.  6).  In  by  far  the  most  numerous  instances  the 
phrase  is  used  as  nearly  synonymous  with  "  the  gospel,"  as  Acts 
iv.  31,  vi.  7,  xi.  1,  xii.  24,  xviii.  11,  xix.  20  ;  1  Cor.  xiv.  36  ;  1  Thess. 
ii.  13 ;  2  Tim.  ii.  9 ;  Tit.  ii.  5  ;  Heb.  iv.  12 ;  1  Pet.  i.  23 ;  Eev.  i. 
9,  XX.  4.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  meaning  of  it  also  in  2  Cor. 
iv.  2,  though  this  verse  is  commonly  quoted  as  if  referring  to  the 
Scriptures.  Nowhere  is  the  term  "  Word  of  God  "  used  of  the 
collected  books  of  the  Old  Testament.^ 

Too  much  stress,  however,  must  not  be  laid  on  this.  Though  the 
use  of  the  phrase  "  Word  of  God  "  as  synonymous  with  "  Scripture  " 
is  comparatively  modern,  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  this  use 
of  the  phrase  is  out  of  keeping  with  the  usage  of  the  Biblical 
writers.  On  the  contrary,  when  the  Old  Testament  is  as  a  whole 
called  "  inspired  of  God,"  we  must  say  that  this  epithet  implies 
as  mucli  as  the  term  "  Word  of  God  "  would  imply  with  reference 
to  the  divine  origin  of  the  book,  unless  this  term  is  taken  in  its 
most  literal  sense,  namely,  that  of  words  uttered  by  God  and 
simply  recorded  by  men.  But  that  there  is  a  human  element 
in  the  Scriptures  we  now  take  for  granted.  When,  however,  we 
speak  of  them  as  characterized  by  both  a  human  and  a  divine 

1  Cf.  Ladd,  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  ii.  p.  503  ;  Warington,  Inspiration,  p.  273, 
for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this. 


368  SUPEENATURAL   REVELATION. 

element,  how  do  we  understand  the  two  to  be  rehited  ?  Are 
they  distinguishable,  though  conjoined  ?  Can  we  sift  out  the 
human,  and  leave  the  divine  unadulterated  ?  Can  we  separate 
the  chapters,  verses,  or  words  that  are  purely  divine  from  those 
that  are  purely  human  ?  Evidently  such  a  conception  of  the 
matter  is  crude.  Such  a  mechanical  mixture  of  the  divine  and 
the  human  is  well-nigh  inconceivable,  and  is  certainly  attested 
by  no  evidence.  The  union  of  the  divine  and  human  must 
rather  be  regarded  as  a  blending  of  the  two  into  one,  —  an  in- 
terpenetration  which  makes  a  nice  dissection  impossible.  The 
ability  to  enucleate  the  purely  divine,  to  distinguish  it  infallibly 
from  the  human,  can  at  the  best  be  only  a  divine  prerogative. 
The  same  limitations  and  weaknesses  of  human  nature  which 
occasioned  the  presence  of  a  human  element  in  the  word  of 
revelation  cannot  but  make  themselves  felt  in  the  interpretation 
and  application  of  tliat  word.  We  have  the  treasure  of  the  light 
of  the  knowledge  of  the  glory  of  God,  but  we  have  it  in  earthen 
vessels  (2  Cor.  iv.  7).  The  knowledge  will  grow  more  and  more 
perfect  as  we  advance  in  spirituality  ;  but  now  we  see  in  a  mirror 
darkly ;  now  we  know  only  in  part  (1  Cor.  xiii.  12). 

What,  then,  will  be  the  effect  of  a  growing  apprehension  of 
divine  truth  in  the  individual  and  in  the  community  ?  Will  it 
lead  to  a  sharper  distinction  between  one  part  of  the  Bible  and 
another,  according  as  they  are  discerned  to  have  respectively 
more  or  less  of  the  human  element  ?  Will  the  result  be  that  by 
degrees  certain  books  of  the  Bible  will  be  practically  detached 
from  the  Canon,  and  no  longer  recognized  as  either  being  or 
containing  the  Word  of  God  ?  Will  other  books  be  analyzed 
and  dissected,  certain  verses  or  sections  branded  as  containing 
nothing  but  human  matter,  and  the  rest  as  being  worthy  to  be 
called  inspired  ?  Will  the  analysis  proceed  so  far  that  we  shall 
discern  several  grades  of  inspiration,  and  shall  be  able  to  assign 
each  sentence  of  Scripture  to  one  or  to  the  other,  or  to  relegate 
it  to  the  class  of  the  wholly  uninspired  ones  ?  Such  a  concep- 
tion is  certainly  not  the  correct  one.  It  cannot  be  carried  out 
practically.  No  two  men  would  coincide  with  each  other  in 
their  analysis.  And  it  involves  a  mechanical  theory  of  inspira- 
tion.    To  suppose,  for  example,  Paul  to  have  been  inspired  in 


CONDITIONS   AND   LIMITS  OF  BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.      369 

general  when  writing  to  Timothy,  but  to  have  been  left  without 
inspiration  when  he  spoke  about  the  cloak  and  parchments 
(2  Tim.  iv.  13),  is  to  make  a  distinction  for  which  there  is  no 
warrant.  No  doubt  we  may,  as  Lowth  says,^  "  distinguish  the 
mysteries  of  faith  and  the  rules  of  practice  from  a  cloke  and 
parchments,  or  a  journey  to  Corinth;"  and  no  doubt  this  and 
other  similar  references  to  purely  personal,  local,  temporary,  or 
physical  matters  are  of  less  consequence  than  that  which  relates 
directly  to  redemption  and  sanctification.  No  doubt,  if  we  were 
to  have  a  Bible  consisting  wholly  either  of  2  Tim.  iv.  13  or  of 
John  iii.  16,  it  would  be  infinitely  more  important  to  have  the 
revelation  of  God's  saving  love  than  the  information  about  Paul's 
transient  necessities.  No  doubt  the  most  extreme  sticklers  for 
the  plenary  inspiration  of  each  and  every  part  of  Holy  Writ 
have  always  practically  attached  greater  weight  to  some  por- 
tions of  it  than  to  others.  But  what  of  that  ?  If  inspiration  is 
to  be  measured  and  mapped  according  to  the  relative  importance 
of  the  several  utterances  of  inspired  men,  we  shall  have  to  dis- 
tinguish, not  merely  two  or  three  grades,  but  an  indefinite  num- 
ber of  them ;  we  shall  have  to  distinguish  even  in  separate 
sentences  the  more  important  from  the  less  important,  and 
argue,  for  example,  that,  where  a  different  conjunction  or  prepo- 
sition would  seemingly  have  answered  just  as  well  or  even  bet- 
ter, the  writer  could  not  have  been  inspired  in  the  use  of  those 
parts  of  speech,  though  he  may  have  been  inspired  in  his  use  of 
the  nouns  and  verbs. 

Manifestly  this  criterion  cannot  be  made  to  work.  Eevela- 
tion  and  inspiration  have,  it  is  true,  moral  and  spiritual,  rather 
than  physical  and  scientific,  ends.  But  this  attempt  to  analyze 
inspiration  according  to  the  comparative  importance  of  the  sev- 
eral utterances  of  the  subjects  of  it  virtually  leads  to,  even  if  it 
does  not  proceed  from,  a  theory  of  verbal  inspiration  of  the 
rankest  sort.  It  can  logically  be  made  to  accord  only  with  the 
hypothesis  of  sheer  dictation.  If  inspiration  is  dynamic  rather 
than  mechanical,  if  it  is  a  force  moving  on  the  whole  inner  and 
spiritual  man,  rather  than  an  intermittent  prompter  of  words, 

^  Vindication  of  the  Divine  Authority  and  Inspiration  of  the  Old  and  New 
Testaments,  London,  1821,  p.  54. 

24 


370  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

then  it  is  present,  not  only  when  the  inspired  man  is  treating  of 
the  loftier  themes  of  redemption,  but  also  when  he  speaks  of 
subordinate  religious  or  moral  matters,  or  even  when  he  touches 
on  topics  of  a  purely  temporal  character.  As  an  ordinary  Chris- 
tian may  be  exerting  a  religious  influence,  not  only  when  he 
preaches  the  gospel  from  a  pulpit,  but  also  by  the  manner  in 
which  he  deports  himself  in  his  temporal  occupations,  so  the 
Biblical  writer's  inspiration  may  be  as  real  when  he  treats  of 
the  most  trivial  matters  as  when  he  is  enunciating  the  weightiest 
doctrines  of  grace. 

Nevertheless  we  may  discriminate  between  the  more  and  the 
less  important.  We  may  find  the  Old  Testament  in  general 
inferior  to  the  New.  And  in  each  Testament  we  may  find  some 
portions  more  intimately  related  to  the  central  truths  of  revela- 
tion than  others  are.  We  may  believe  that  in  every  portion 
there  are  traces  of  human  imperfection,  that  even  the  doctrines 
of  redemption  could  not  be  perfectly  set  forth  by  those  who 
knew  and  prophesied  only  in  part.  But  yet  we  shall  not  find 
any  part  destitute  of  the  working  of  the  Spirit  of  inspiration ; 
and  as  we  make  progress  towards  the  unity  of  the  faith  and  of 
the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,  towards  the  measure  of  the 
stature  of  the  fulness  of  Christ,  we  shall  not  be  led  to  intensify 
the  distinction  between  the  more  inspired  and  the  less  inspired 
parts  of  the  Scriptures,  and  to  find  some  to  be  not  inspired  at 
all ;  we  shall  rather  find  everywhere  more  and  more  of  the 
breathings  of  the  Spirit  of  truth  and  of  grace,  and  discover  that 
every  Scripture,  being  inspired  of  God,  is  also  profitable  for 
teaching,  for  reproof,  for  correction,  and  for  instruction. 

4.  Criticism  can  never  convince  Christendom  that  pious 
fraud  has  played  an  important  part  in  determining  the  substance 
or  form  of  the  Scriptures.  There  are  few  who  would  now  under- 
take to  maintain  that  wicked  and  malicious  deception  was  prac- 
tised in  the  composition  of  the  Biblical  books.  But  there  are 
many  who  are  ready  to  believe  that  a  more  innocent  or  even  a 
useful  deception  can  be  shown  to  have  been  extensively  resorted 
to  by  the  Biblical  writers.  The  Tubingen  theory  of  the  ori- 
gin of  the  New  Testament  —  the  so-called  Tcndcnz  theory  —  is 
founded  on  this  notion  that  a  pious  fraud  was  practised  in  order 


CONDITIONS  AND   LIMITS   OF   BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.       371 

to  advance  the  interests  of  Catholic  Christianity.  The  kernel 
of  the  theory  is  that  at  the  outset  radically  opposite  tendencies 
divided  the  Christian  Church,  —  Pauline  Christianity  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Ebionitism,  or  a  Judaizing  spirit,  on  the  other;  that 
some  of  the  New  Testament  books,  especially  the  first  four 
Pauline  Epistles  (the  only  ones  conceded  to  be  genuine),  repre- 
sent the  one  drift,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  Gospel  of  Mat- 
thew, the  Epistle  of  James,  Second  Peter,  and  the  Apocalypse 
represent  the  Judaistic  party ;  and  that  finally  another  group  of 
books  (such  as  Luke,  John,  Acts,  Ephesians,  Philippians,  Colos- 
sians,  the  Pastoral  Epistles,  and  First  Peter)  were  composed  for 
the  express  purpose  of  reconciling  the  opposing  parties.^ 

The  Tubingen  hypothesis  has  been  met  on  its  own  ground,  and 
shown  to  be  full  of  inherent  and  insuperable  difficulties,  even 
when  all  prejudices  in  favor  of  the  traditional  notion  of  the 
Biblical  books  is  laid  aside.  It  exists  now  only  as  a  ruin,  some 
of  its  assumptions  and  some  of  its  conclusions  being  still  held 
by  a  few,  while  the  critical  structure  as  a  whole  has  fallen  under 
the  attacks  of  counter-criticism  and  under  the  weight  of  its 
own  extravagance.  Apart,  however,  from  the  exposure  of  the 
intrinsic  groundlessness  of  the  fundamental  assumption  of  the 
school,  one  thing  that  has  powerfully  operated  to  prevent  the 
theory  from  gaining  any  general  acceptance  in  the  Christian 
Church  is  just  this  assumption  of  fraud  and  forgery  which  is 
involved  as  an  essential  part  of  the  theory.  The  whole  New 
Testament,  with  few  exceptions,  is  made  to  be  the  product  of 
Tcndcnz,  that  is,  in  plain  English,  of  a  conscious  falsification  of 
history  for  a  purpose.  Stories  of  Christ's  life  and  teachings  and 
the  narrative  of  early  apostolic  activity  are  alleged  to  have  been 
composed,  not  for  the  sake  of  reporting  what  actually  had  hap- 
pened, but  for  the  sake  of  making  men  believe  that  certain  things 
liad  happened.  Epistles  are  said  to  have  been  invented  at  a  late 
period,  and  ascribed  to  Paul  or  Peter,  not  for  the  purpose  of 

^  As  might  be  expected,  the  critical  sense  of  the  different  representatives  of 
the  Tubingen  school  varies  somewhat.  Pfleiderer,  e.gi.,  admits  the  genuineness 
of  Philippians,  Philemon,  and  First  Thessalonians,  and  calls  Colossians  and 
Second  Thessalonians  spurious  somewhat  doubtfully  (J)er  Paulinismus,  p.  28). 
Baur  acknowledged  only  the  first  four. 


372  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

making  known  what  these  apostles  really  taught,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  assuaging  the  antagonism  of  the  Pauline  and  Petrine 
parties  by  falsely  representing  that  Peter  and  Paul  after  all 
taught  substantially  the  same  doctrines.^  The  New  Testament 
in  general  is  made  by  this  theory  to  be,  not  the  trustworthy 
record  and  depository  of  the  original  Christian  history  and  Chris- 
tian doctrine,  but  the  product  of  a  fierce  theological  war,  in 
which,  as  in  military  contests,  each  party  dealt  freely  in  decep- 
tion in  order  to  gain  its  ends,  —  the  only  difference  being  that 
in  the  ecclesiastical  squabble  a  third  party  is  supposed  to  have 
come  in  and  to  have  practised  its  deceptions  on  the  other  two, 
in  order  to  persuade  them  that  they  have  really  had  no  good 
reason  for  fighting  at  all ! 

Now,  no  matter  with  how  great  a  display  of  learning  and  in- 
genuity this  conception  of  the  origin  of  the  New  Testament 
books  may  be  set  forth,  no  matter  in  what  euphemistic  phrase- 
ology the  charges  of  forgery  and  falsification  may  be  clothed, 
the  plain  blunt  common  sense  of  Christians  will  always  rebel  at 
any  such  hypothesis.  What  is  involved  in  the  acceptance  of 
it?  One  reads,  for  example,  in  Eph.  iv.  25,  "Wherefore  putting 
away  falsehood,  speak  ye  truth  each  one  with  his  neighbor ;  for 
we  are  members  one  of  another."  Then  he  reads  the  higher 
criticism  on  this  Epistle,  and  is  told  that  it  was  written  by  some- 
body a  hundred  years  after  the  time  of  Paul,^  yet  falsely  ascribed 
to  Paul  by  the  writer.  That  is,  the  author  who  embodies  in  his 
epistle  this  forcible  admonition  to  refrain  from  all  falsehood  is 
guilty  of  a  wholesale  falsehood  in  ascribing  this  admonition  and 
all  the  rest  of  the  epistle  to  a  man  who  did  not  write  it.  Now 
calling  this  proceeding  by  the  solemn-sounding  name  "  pseud- 
epigraphy  "  does  not  change  its  essential  character,  or  commend 
it  to  the  simple  conscience  of  a  Christian.  And  the  more  he 
finds  the  tender  and  lofty  Christian  sentiments  of  the  Epistle 
awakening  a  response  in  his  own  heart,  the  less  will  he  be  able 
to  believe  that  one  who  could  so  well  set  forth  Christian  truth 

*  See,  e.  g.,  Schwegler,  Las  nachapostolische  Zeitalter,  vol.  ii.  p.  4,  and 
passim. 

^  Schwegler,  I.  c,  finds  clear  evidence  that  the  Epistle  was  written  by  a  Mon- 
tanist. 


CONDITIONS    ANT)  LIMITS   OF  BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.         373 

and  duty  could  deliberately  make  himself  guilty  of  the  forgery 
and  deception  involved  in  the  repeated  ascription  of  the  Epistle 
to  Paul.^  Now,  if  it  were  a  demonstrated  fact  that  such  a  thing 
had  been  done,  we  should  have  to  admit  it  and  make  the  best 
of  it;  and  one  consequence  would  be  the  destruction  of  the 
canonical  authority  of  the  Epistle.  But  so  long  as  the  proofs  of 
alleged  pseudonymousness  are  pure  conjectures  and  subjective 
conceits,^  they  will  never  be  sufficient  to  outweigh  the  conviction 
of  the  Christian  Church,  —  against  which  no  historic  evidence 
can  be  adduced,  —  that  an  epistle  so  full  as  this  is  of  the  Pauline 
spirit,  and  itself  professing  to  be  the  work  of  Paul,  cannot  have 
been  fraudulently  ascribed  to  him. 

What  has  been  said  of  the  Tubingen  theory  of  the  origin  of 
the  New  Testament  must  be  said  mutatis  mutandis  of  its  coun- 
terpart, the  Kuenen-Wellhausen  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  Old 
Testament.  The  literary  and  historical  arguments  on  either  side 
must  be  allowed  free  course ;  and  whatever  is  proved  must  be 
accepted  as  true.  But  here,  as  in  the  other  case,  mere  subjective 
assumptions,  and  even  plausible  inferences,  can  never  be  suffi- 
cient to  convince  the  great  body  of  the  Christian  Church  that  the 
Scriptures  in  question  are  to  a  large  extent  fraudulent  documents 
designed  from  the  outset  to  deceive  the  reader  respecting  their 
authorship  and  respecting  the  course  of  sacred  history.    It  must 

1  Vide  i.  1,  iii.  1,  iv.  1,  vi.  20-22.  But  indeed  the  whole  Epistle  is  mani- 
festly constructed  with  this  reference.  All  the  personal  appeals  and  allusions 
(,e.g.,  i.  15  sq.,  iii.  2-8,  13-19,  iv.  17),  are  pointless  and  meaningless,  unless 
they  are  meant  to  make  the  impression  that  Paul  was  the  real  author. 

2  Thus  Pfleiderer  {Der  Faulinismus,  pp.  432,  433)  finds  the  question  of 
the  relation  of  Jews  and  heathen  to  Christ  in  this  Epistle  an  entirely  different 
one  from  what  it  had  been  in  Paul's  own  time.  At  first,  he  says,  it  was  neces- 
sary for  Paul  to  contend  for  the  equal  rights  of  the  heathen  against  Jewish 
exclusiveness ;  but  now,  he  adds,  "it  is  the  unchristian  pride  and  uncharitable- 
ness  of  the  Gentile  Christians  against  which  the  autlior  directs  himself,  reminding 
them  of  the  greatness  of  the  divine  act  of  grace  to  which  they  owe  their  reception 
into  the  Messianic  kingdom."  Just  as  if  Paul  must  always  be  harping  on  one 
string;  as  if  the  various  circumstances  and  tendencies  of  his  different  readers 
could  not  lead  him  to  emphasize  the  different  sides  of  Christian  truth ;  and, 
moreover,  as  if  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans  Paul  had  not  done  precisely  the 
same  thing  which  Pfleiderer  finds  to  be  a  proof  that  he  did  not  write  the  Epistle 
to  the  Ephesians.     Vide  Rom.  xi.  17-25. 


374  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

be  remembered  that  any  result  attained  by  means  of  critical  in- 
vestigation is  at  the  best  only  made  jprohahle,  however  great  the 
degree  of  probability  may  seem  to  be.  And  it  is  not  mere  bigoted 
"  traditionalism  "  which  sets  against  some  of  these  alleged  results 
the  extreme  improbability  that  any  important  part  of  the  Old 
Testament  became  accepted  by  the  Jewish  people  as  authentic 
history  or  as  divine  law  through  the  agency  of  falsification. 

True,  we  must  make  discriminations.  We  cannot  say  that 
fiction  has  no  place  in  the  Bible.  The  parables  of  our  Lord  are 
themselves  fictions.  We  cannot  say  that  no  pseudonymous  book 
can  have  place  in  the  Canon,  though  at  the  most  there  is  not 
more  than  one  book  (Ecclesiastes)  admitted  by  anything  like  the 
general  consent  of  scholars  to  belong  to  that  class.  It  is  note- 
worthy that  the  great  mass  of  works  of  this  sort,  of  which  there 
were  many,  never  found  their  way  into  the  recognized  Canon. 
But  it  has  been  asked,  "  Why  should  there  not  be  some  of  these 
in  the  Old  Testament  ?  ...  If  one  jpscudomjme,  for  example, 
Ecclesiastes,  be  admitted  in  the  Bible,  then  the  question  whetlier 
Daniel  and  Deuteronomy  are  pseudonymes  must  be  determined 
by  the  higher  criticism,  and  it  does  not  touch  the  question  of 
their  inspiration  or  authority  as  a  part  of  the  Scriptures  at  all." 
"  The  usage  of  literature,"  it  is  added,  "  ancient  and  modern,  has 
established  its  propriety."  ^  Stated  in  this  general  form,  the 
question  seems  very  simple  and  innocent.  But  there  are  some 
important  distinctions  to  be  made :  (1)  If  the  pseudonymous 
work  is  known  to  be  such  when  it  is  published,  there  can  be  no 
moral  objection  to  the  assumption  of  a  false  name.  No  one  is 
deceived,  and  no  harm  is  done.  (2)  If  the  assumed  name  is 
that  of  a  well-known  person,  it  is  especially  important  that  it 
should  be  known  that  it  is  fictitiously  ascribed  to  him.  The 
vast  preponderance  of  pseudonymous  works  bear  names  that  are 
themselves  fictitious.  In  this  case  it  is  of  less  importance  that 
everybody  should  know  that  the  name  is  feigned.  When  a  novel 
first  appeared  as  written  by  George  Eliot,  it  might  have  been 
imagined  by  many  that  this  was  the  real  name  of  the  author. 
But  no  harm  was  done  so  long  as  no  one  knew  anything  about 
a  person  of  that  name.  If,  however,  the  novel  had  been  falsely 
1  C.  A.  Briggs,  Biblical  SluJi/,  pp.  224,  225. 


CONDITIONS  AND  LIMITS   OF   BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.         375 

ascribed  to  a  well-known  personage,  there  would  at  once  have 
been  a  moral  question  involved.  If  that  person  had  been  living, 
so  that  he  might  possibly  have  been  the  author,  then,  whether 
the  fictitious  ascription  was  made  with  or  without  his  knowledge 
and  consent,  in  either  case  the  act  would  have  been  morally  re- 
prehensible.^ (3)  There  is  a  wide  difference  between  a  treatise 
of  an  ethical  or  philosophical  character  fictitiously  ascribed  to  a 
well-known  person,  and  a  treatise  of  a  legislative  or  historical 
character  similarly  ascribed.  In  either  case  the  fiction  is  inex- 
cusable, if  the  design  of  it  is  to  secure  currency  for  the  work 
by  virtue  of  the  fame  of  the  reputed  author.  But  mere  gen- 
eral meditations  or  disquisitions,  since  their  worth  is  intrinsic, 
being  the  same  from  whatever  source  they  may  have  come,  are 
none  the  less  instructive  for  being  attributed  to  another  than 
the  real  author.  But  when  the  fictitiousness  extends  so  far 
as  to  falsify  history,  and  to  foist  in  a  new  code  of  laws  under 
the  pretext  that  it  is  in  reality  an  old  code,  the  case  is  radically 
different. 

Take  the  case  of  Deuteronomy.  If  it  first  came  into  existence 
in  the  reign  of  Josiah,  as  the  critical  school  in  question  holds, 
we  have  before  us  something  quite  else  than  a  mere  instance  of 
pseudonymousness.  The  fiction  respecting  the  authorship  of  the 
hook,  though  bad  enough,  is  of  less  account  than  the  fiction  re- 
specting the  authorship  and  history  of  the  laws  contained  in  it. 
If  the  Book  of  Ecclesiastes  was  written  centuries  after  the  time 
of  Solomon,  then  even  if  (as  is  not  very  probable)  the  author 
could  have  made  the  people  believe  it  to  be  the  work  of  Solo- 
mon, though  never  heard  of  before,  still  the  belief  in  the  Solo- 
monic authorship  did  not  have,  and  was  not  designed  to  have, 
the  effect  of  changing  the  popular  notions  concerning  past  his- 
tory, or  of  introducing  a  new  code  of  laws.  No  one  attempted 
on  the  strength  of  the  deception  to  impose  legal  and  ceremonial 
oUifjations  on  the  people.     Pseudepigraphy  may  be  an  innocent 

^  Sir  James  Stephen  (^Essai/s  in  Eccl.  Biography,  p.  299,  4th  ed.)  mentions 
the  ease  of  Nicole,  who  wrote  De  la  Perpetuite  de  la  Foi  sur  VEucharistie,  but 
put  it  out  under  the  name  of  his  friend  Arnauld,  —  "on  the  side  of  Arnauld," 
observes  Stephen,  "  a  literary  and  pious  fraud  which  it  is  impossible  to  ex- 
cuse ; "  —  and  hardly  more  excusable,  we  may  add,  on  the  side  of  Nicole. 


376  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

thing,  if  all  that  is  done  is  merely  the  assumption  of  a  fictitious 
name ;  but  if  by  means  of  the  pseudepigraphy  one  undertakes 
to  levy  a  tax,  or  raise  an  army,  the  thing  is  no  longer  a  harmless 
freak,  but  becomes  a  criminal  fraud.  This  illustrates  what  the 
"  higher  criticism "  requires  us  to  believe  respecting  Deuteron- 
omy. The  ascription  of  the  legislation  in  it  to  Moses  was  not  a 
mere  literary  fiction ;  it  was  (on  the  theory  under  consideration) 
a  fiction  whose  object  was  the  accomplishment  of  a  practical 
end,  namely,  the  introduction  and  enforcement  of  a  new  code  of 
laws.  Whoever  wrote  the  book  must  have  given  it  the  form  of 
a  Mosaic  production  for  the  purpose  of  securing  for  it  a  sanction 
and  a  currency  which  otherwise  it  could  not  have  had.  If  that 
was  not  the  object,  it  had  no  intelligible  object.  And  if  the 
object  was  accomplished  by  the  device  of  representing  the  legis- 
lation as  ancient  Mosaic  legislation,  then  the  procedure  involved 
the  essential  elements  of  forgery  and  fraud.^  When,  therefore, 
one  asks.  Why,  if  one  pseudonyme  (Ecclesiastes)  be  admitted  in 
the  Bible,  may  we  not  admit  that  Deuteronomy  is  another  ?  the 
answer  may  be  given  by  asking,  Why,  if  it  was  a  harmless 
thing  for  Dickens  to  ascribe  his  novels  to  the  fictitious  "  Boz," 
would  it  not  also  have  been  proper  for  him  to  forge  an  Act  of 
Parliament  and  the  royal  signature  ordering  the  introduction  of 
the  decimal  system  into  the  English  currency  ?  He  might  have 
deemed  the  reform  a  desirable  one ;  and  in  view  of  the  improba- 
bility that  the  government  would  institute  it,  he  might  have 
thought  this  the  only  feasible  way  of  bringing  it  about.  Of 
course  we  do  not  need  to  inquire  whether  it  would  have  been 
possible  for  Dickens  to  carry  such  a  scheme  through,  and  really 
make  the  public  and  the  officials  of  tlie  Treasury  and  tlie  Mint 
believe  that  such  an  act  had  been  passed.  In  the  analogous 
case  of  the  Deuteronomic  legislation  the  critics  have  decided 
that  the  thing  was  done ;  we  are  now  only  inquiring  into  the 
moral  character  of  it. 

It  is  true,  the  critics  undertake  to  soften  down,  or  explain 
away,  the  fraudulent  character  of  the  proceeding.  Eobertson 
Smith  indeed  goes  so  far  as  to  affirm  that,  though  "the  new 

^  Cf.  Dean  Perowne,  The  Age  of  the  Pentateuch  {Contemporary  Review, 
1888,  p.  255). 


CONDITIONS   AND   LIMITS   OF   BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.      377 

laws  of  the  Levitical  code  are  presented  as  ordinances  of  Moses," 
yet,  when  they  were  first  promulgated,  "  every  one  knew  that 
they  were  not  so."  ^  It  was,  he  says,  simply  a  case  of  "  legal 
fiction."  "  All  law  was  held  to  be  derived  from  the  teaching  of 
Moses."  2  Therefore  the  new  law  had  to  be  called  Mosaic,  though 
everybody  knew  that  the  appellation  was  a  mere  form  \^  The 
above-quoted  utterance  of  Professor  Smith  relates  more  directly 
to  the  Levitical  code,  which  is  supposed  to  have  been  promul- 
gated authoritatively  by  Ezra.  He  is  not  so  explicit  as  to  the 
Deuteronomic  laws,  though,  if  the  principle  is  correct  with 
reference  to  the  Levitical  code,  it  must  be  equally  true  with 
reference  to  the  other.  Is  he  less  explicit  for  the  reason  that 
Deuteronomy  is  described  as  not  proceeding  from  the  king,  or 
the  priests,  or  any  one  in  authority,  but  simply  as  a  code  of  laws 
discovered  ?  The  "  legal  fiction  "  theory,  however  plausible  when 
applied  to  a  new  set  of  laws  issued  by  an  acknowledged  ruler  or 
leader,  somehow  has  a  different  look  when  applied  to  this  code 
which  is  described  as  unexpectedly  "  found  "  by  the  high-priest 
Hilkiah  (2  Kings  xxii.  8).  According  to  the  critics,  no  one 
knows  where  the  book  came  from.  Eobertson  Smith  is  sure 
that  Hilkiah  did  not  compose  it  —  not,  however,  because  "  I 
have  found "  evidently  means  something  else  than  "  I  have 
written ; "  but  because  the  new  law  was  less  favorable  to  the 
exclusive  privileges  of  the  temple  hierarchy  than  the  previous 
usage  had  been.^     All  we  can  say  is  that  the  law  turned  up. 

^  The  Old  Testament  in  the  Jewish  Church,  p.  387. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  385. 

'  Dr.  Dwinell,  iu  his  review  of  Professor  Smith's  later  work,  The  Prophets 
of  Israel  (Jiihliotheca  Sacra,  1S84,  p.  344),  seems  to  be  mistaken,  when 
he  represents  Professor  Smith  as  implying  that  the  Jews  were  originally 
deceived  by  the  attribution  of  the  new  laws  to  Moses.  —  Warington  {When  was 
the  Pentateuch  written?^.  Ill)  makes  a  good  point  against  the  assumption 
that  Moses'  name  was  so  great  that  all  legislation  must  needs  have  been  as- 
cribed to  him  :  "  Was  there,  in  the  times  when  these  frauds  are  said  to  have 
been  put  forth,  such  a  widespread  reverence  for  the  name  of  Moses  as  would 
lead  to  the  ready  acceptance  of  any  laws  bearing  his  superscription  ?  If  there 
was,  it  is  certainly  strange  that  Moses'  name  is  so  seldom  found  in  the  writings 
of  the  prophets ;  there  being  in  fact  but  one  passage  (Mai.  iv.  4)  wliere  he  is 
mentioned  as  giver  of  the  law  which  the  people  are  exhorted  to  obey." 

*  Ibid.,  p.  362.     This  argument  is,  however,  conclusive  only  on  the  assump- 


378  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

"  It  was  of  no  consequence  to  Josiah,"  says  Professor  Smith,  and 
"  is  of  equally  little  consequence  to  us,  to  know  the  exact  date 
and  authorship  of  the  book."  ^  "  Though  the  book  had  no  ex- 
ternal credentials,  it  bore  its  evidence  within  itself,  and  it  was 
stamped  with  the  approval  of  the  prophetess  Huldah."  Con- 
sequently it  "  smote  the  hearts  of  the  king  and  the  people."  ^ 
But  it  produced  this  effect  on  the  king  before  it  was  referred  to 
the  prophetess  for  her  opinion;  he  "rent  his  clothes"  (verse  11) 
as  soon  as  he  heard  the  book  read,  and  was  in  great  consterna- 
tion because  the  fathers  of  himself  and  of  his  people  had  "  not 
hearkened  unto  the  words  of  this  book"  (verse  13).  If  "  it  was 
of  no  consequence "  to  him  to  know  when  and  by  whom  the 
book  was  written  ;  if,  so  far  as  he  knew,  it  might  have  been  (as 
some  have  conjectured)  the  work  of  Hilkiah  himself,  how  should 
he  have  thought  that  Jehovah's  anger  was  great  because  the 
fathers  had  not  obeyed  the  book,  —  a  book  about  which  they 
could  have  known  nothing  ? 

It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  this  "  legal  fiction  "  theory  is  a 
pure  invention,  designed  to  make  the  doctrine  concerning  the 
origin  of  the  Mosaic  Code  less  objectionable  to  the  Christian 
public.  None  of  the  other  champions  of  the  newer  hypothesis 
seem  to  know  anything  about  this  "  fiction."  Kuenen  ^  is  very 
plain-spoken  :  "  It  is  certain  that  an  author  of  the  seventh  cen- 
tury B.  c.  —  following  in  the  footsteps  of  others,  for  example,  of 
the  writer  of  the  Book  of  the  Covenant  —  has  made  Moses  him- 
self proclaim  that  which,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  expedient  in  the 
real  interests  of  the  Mosaic  party  to  announce  and  introduce.  .  .  , 
Men  used  to  perpetrate  such  fictions  without  any  qualms  of  con- 
science. .  .  .  The  author  and  his  party  cannot  have  made  the 
execution  of  their  programme  depend  upon  a  lucky  accident. 
If  Hilkiah  found  the  book  in  the  temple,  it  was  put  there  by  the 
adherents  of  the  Mosaic  tendency.  Or  else  Hilkiah  was  of  their 
number,  and  in  that  case  he  pretended  that  he  had  found  the 
book  of  the  law.  ...  It  is  true,  this  deception  is  much  more 

tion  that  anything  like  disinterestedness  in  Hilkiah  is  to  be  regarded  as  alto- 
gether out  of  the  question. 

^  The  Old  Tedament  in  the  Jewish  Church,  p.  363. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  351. 

^  Religion  of  Israel ,  vol.  ii.  pp.  18,  19. 


CONDITIONS  AND   LIMITS   OF   BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.       379 

unjustifiable  still  than  the  introduction  of  Moses  as  speaking. 
But  we  must  reflect  here  also  that  the  ideas  of  those  days  were 
not  the  same  as  ours,  but  considerably  less  strict.  '  Now  or 
never '  the  Mosaic  party  had  to  gain  their  end."  Here  then  it 
is  squarely  avowed  that  the  successful  introduction  of  the  new 
code,  and  the  securing  of  Josiah's  adoption  of  it,  were  the  result 
of  a  bold  artifice,  a  "  deception,"  an  end  gained  by  "  cunning,"  — 
a  thing  not  to  be  wondered  at,  since  "  at  all  times  and  in  all 
countries  faction  and  intestine  quarrels  have  stifled  delicacy  in 
the  choice  of  means."  ^ 

Inasmuch  as  we  find  no  trace  in  the  Bible  itself  that  either 
the  Deuteronomic  or  the  Levitical  legislation  was  generally 
knoivn  to  be  ascribed  to  Moses  only  by  a  legal  fiction;  inasmuch  as 
rulers  and  kings  enacted  new  regulations  without  ever  suggesting 
that  their  laws  were  Mosaic ;  ^  inasmuch  as  it  is  certain  that  the 
laws  in  question  were  generally  regarded  as  really  the  laws  of 
Moses ;  inasmuch  as  the  narrative  in  2  Kings  xxii.  itself  plainly 
implies  that  the  law  there  spoken  of  was  either  a  genuine  law  of 
Moses  or  else  one  supposed  to  be  such,  — it  is  pretty  plain  that, 
if  the  book  "  found  "  by  Hilkiah  was  a  new  book,  it  must  have 
owed  its  successful  introduction,  not  to  a  "  legal  fiction  "  which 
deceived  nobody,  but  to  an  illegal  fiction  which  deceived  every- 
body, including  the  king  himself,  whose  co-operation  it  was 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  secure  in  carrying  out  the  new 
"programme."'^ 

^  Religion  of  Israel,  vol.  ii.  p.  19.  Riebm  {Gesetzgebung  Mosis  im  Lande 
Moab,  pp.  112-114)  likewise  calls  the  procedure  a  "  fiction."  He  excuses  it 
at  first  by  the  citation  of  the  pseudouymy  in  Ecclesiastes ;  but  he  recognizes 
the  difference  between  this  and  a  fiction  whose  object  was  "  to  secure  authority 
and  recognition  for  the  new  law-book,"  and  therefore  adds,  "  From  our  moral 
standpoint  we  cannot  justify  the  proceeding  of  the  Deuteronomist;  in  the  light 
of  the  *  law  of  perfect  liberty  '  (James  i.  25)  it  appears  after  all  as  somewhat 
dishonest  [unlauter\"  He  excuses  the  act,  however,  on  the  ground  that  the 
author  undoubtedly  regarded  tne  new  legislation  as  in  the  spirit  of  Moses,  "  so 
that  Moses,  if  he  had  foreseen  ihe  future  circumstances,  would  certainly  have 
said  the  same  thing,  and  instituted  tne  same  changes."  But  Riehm  had  not 
discovered  the  "  legal  fiction  "  which  everybody  knew  to  be  fiction  ! 

2  Cf.  Prof.  W.  H.  Green,  Professor  Robertson  Smith  on  the  Pentateuch,  in 
Presbyterian  Review,  January,  1882. 

*  Dean  Perowne,  The  Age  of  the  Pentateuch  {Contemporari/  Review,  1888, 


380  SUPERNATURAL  REVELATION. 

If  any  further  proof  of  this  be  needed,  it  may  be  found  in 
abundance  in  the  form  and  setting  both  of  the  so-called  Priestly 
Code  and  of  Deuteronomy.  They  are  both  made  to  have  all  the 
appearance  of  laws  enacted  in  the  time  of  Moses  himself. 
ISTot  only  are  they  ascribed  to  him,  but  they  are  interwoven 
with  a  history  which  connects  it  with  that  same  period.  The 
form  of  the  laws  is  largely  adapted  only  to  the  manner  of  life 
which  Israel  led  while  on  the  way  from  Egypt  to  Canaan.^  And 
when,  as  especially  in  Deuteronomy,  the  legislation  is  adapted 
to  the  more  settled  life  of  Palestine,  it  is  still  represented  as  a 
future  condition.^  At  whatever  time  the  books  were  composed, 
the  intention  must  have  been  to  give  them  the  a/ppcarance  of 
having  originated  under  Moses.  The  "  legal  fiction  "  of  ascribing 
the  laws  to  him  did  not  require  the  invention  of  a  historic  set- 
ting which  to  the  later  generations  could  have  had  no  use  and  no 
meaning,  if  it  was  understood  to  he  fictitious  history.     Especially 

pp.  255  sqq.),  forcibly  exposes  tlie  weakness  of  Professor  Smith's  assumption 
that  it  was  "  of  no  consequence  "  to  Josiah  or  any  one  else  where  the  new  code 
came  from.  "  Why  did  the  mere  fact  of  its  coming  as  a  Code  give  it  a  force 
which  no  prophetic  utterance  had  ever  possessed  ?  Why  should  a  Book  of 
Law,  backed  by  the  prophets,  but  without  any  external  credentials,  work  a 
revolution  which  centuries  of  prophetic  teaching  had  failed  to  work  ?  " 

^  In  Leviticus  the  ceremonial  precepts  ai'c  all  connected  with  "  the  tent  of 
meeting"  and  with  camp  life.     Cf.  i.  1-5,  iii.  2,  iv.  4,  12,  vi.  11,  etc. 

2  E.  ff.,  Deut.  xii.  21,  29,  xiii.  12,  xvi.  2,  xix.  1,  etc.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion  that  the  general  coloring  of  the  book  is  that  of  the  Mosaic  times.  When 
Robertson  Smith  (1.  c  p.  352)  and  others  lay  stress  on  the  language  of  Deut. 
xii.  8,  "  Ye  shall  not  do  after  all  the  things  that  we  do  here  this  day,  every 
man  whatsoever  is  right  in  his  own  eyes,"  as  proving  that  the  book  must  have 
been  composed  with  reference  to  the  times  of  Manasseb,  they  are  obliged  to 
assume  that  such  an  expression  (as  this  in  xii.  S)  was  not  applicable  to 
the  times  of  Moses,  and  therefore  must  have  crept  into  the  code  through  an 
inadvertence,  since  the  evident  effort  and  design  was  to  give  the  laws  the 
appearance  of  having  been  issued  by  Moses.  Tliese  same  critics  all  assume 
the  post-exilic  date  of  Isa.  xl.-lxvi.,  and  make  short  work  with  the  argument 
of  those  who  oppose  to  their  theory  the  fact  that  a  few  passages  (such  as 
xliii.  22-24)  seem  to  imply  that  the  temple  worship  is  not  suspended.  But 
if  the  fact  that  Isa.  xl.-lxvi.  in  general  has  the  coloring  of  the  time  of  the 
exile  is  made  to  overbear  the  force  of  a  few  passages  which  seem  to  fit  an  ear- 
lier period,  why  should  not  the  same  rule  be  equally  valid  as  proving  that 
Deuteronomy  belongs  to  the  Mosaic  period? 


CONDITIONS   AND   LIMITS  OF  BIBLICAL   CRITICISM.        881 

monstrous  is  the  supposition  which  the  Kuenen-Wellhausen 
theory  stoutly  maintains,  that  the  whole  detailed  description  of 
the  tabernacle  is  a  pure  invention  of  the  author  or  authors  of 
the  Priestly  Code  —  no  such  tabernacle  having  ever  been  made. 
That  is,  we  are  asked  to  believe  that,  after  the  return  from  the 
captivity,  a  new  ritual  was  introduced,  designed  for  temple 
worship  at  Jerusalem,  but  studiously  worded  so  as  to  be  strictly 
appropriate  only  to  the  nomadic  life  of  the  wilderness  and  to  a 
house  of  worship  which  never  existed  except  in  the  laboriously 
idle  fancy  of  the  authors  of  the  new  code.  If  "  every  one  knew," 
as  Eobertson  Smith  would  have  us  believe,  that  all  this  elaborate 
description  of  the  tabernacle  was  only  a  part  of  the  legal  fiction, 
it  is  difficult  to  say  who  were  the  greater  fools,  the  men  who 
spent  their  time,  ink,  and  parchment  in  describing  this  never- 
existent  tabernacle,  or  the  men  who  so  readily  submitted  to  the 
legislation  of  those  who  by  this  display  of  senseless  ingenuity 
had  etfectually  proved  their  unfitness  to  issue  laws  for  national 
observance. 

But  we  have  wasted  too  many  words  on  this  fiction  of  a 
"legal  fiction."  It  is  doubtful  whether  Eobertson  Smith  him- 
self adheres  to  it  any  longer.  There  is  no  consistent  ground  for 
the  advocates  of  the  new  hypothesis  to  take  but  this  :  that  the 
promulgators  of  the  new  codes  studiously  gave  them  the/o?'OT 
of  Mosaic  laws  in  order  to  secure  their  acceptance  and  observ- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  people ;  in  other  words,  that  they  prac- 
tised downright  fraud  in  order  to  gain  their  "  pious  "  purpose. 
We  will  not  dwell  on  the  critical  difficulties  which  this  theory 
of  the  "  higher  criticism  "  involves  ;  they  are  many  and  weighty, 
and  have  been  ably  set  forth.^     What  we  here  insist  on  is  that, 

^  See  especially  "W.  H.  Green,  Moses  and  the  Prophets,  and  The  Jewish 
Feasts ;  E.  C.  Bissell,  The  Pentateuch,  its  Origin  and  Structure;  G.  Vos,  The 
Mosaic  Origin  of  the  Pentateuchal  Codes;  R.  P.  Smith,  Introduction  to  the 
Pentateuch,  in  Comm.  on  Genesis  (Ellicott's  Old  Testament  Commentary'),  and 
Mosaic  Authorship  and  Crediljility  of  the  Pentateuch  {Present  Dai/  Tracts,  No. 
15) ;  F.  Watson,  The  Law  and  the  Prophets;  G.  Warington,  IFhen  was  the 
Pentateuch  Written  F;  H.  A.  Straek,  art.  Pentateuch,  in  Herzog's  Realency- 
clopddie,  2d  ed. ;  P.  Delitzsch,  Pentateuch-kritische  Studien  in  Zeitschrift  fiir 
kirchliche  Wissenschaft  und  kirrhliches  Ldjen,  18S0  ;  F.  E.  Konig,  Haupt- 
probleme  der  altisraelitischen  Religionsgeschichte,   1S84;  the  same  translated : 


382  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

in  any  discussion  of  the  question  of  the  age  and  character  of 
the  Old  Testament  books,  the  inherent  probability  or  improb- 
ability of  deliberate  deception  having  been  resorted  to  in  order 
to  secure  the  adoption  of  certain  books  of  law  and  history  is 
one  of  the  elements  to  be  taken  account  of  by  the  higher  criti- 
cism. This  criticism  deals  very  largely  in  speculations,  in  prob- 
abilities, in  combinations  ;  indeed  it  consists  almost  wholly  in 
these  things.  It  cannot  claim  for  itself  more  than  that  it  makes 
out  a  high  degree  of  probability  for  its  hypotheses.  But  if  it  is 
legitimate,  in  defense  of  their  theses,  for  the  critics  to  indulge 
in  speculations,  and  to  conjecture  what  under  given  circum- 
stances must  have  been  inherently  probable ;  if,  for  example,  it 
is  legitimate  to  argue  that  it  is,  psychologically  and  historically 
considered,  unlikely  that  the  Pentateuchal  codes  in  their  fuller 
form  could,  if  of  Mosaic  origin,  have  ever  become  so  neglected 
or  even  forgotten  as  the  rare  and  dubious  allusions  to  tliem  in 
the  historic  books  would  seem  to  indicate,  then  it  is  equally 
legitimate  to  reason  that,  from  a  psychological  and  historical 
point  of  view,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  unlikely  that  a  new  code 
could  have  been  introduced  and  enforced  on  the  strength  of  a  false 
allegation  that  it  was  really  an  old  code.  If  the  former  argumen- 
tation, then  surely  no  less  the  latter,  has  a  place  in  the  domain  of 
the  "  higher  criticism."  It  has  this  place  even  if  we  treat  Hebrew 
history  as  profane  history ;  it  has  it  all  the  more,  if  we  hold  that 
that  history  was  shaped  by  special  supernatural  guidance. 

Let  us  not  be  misunderstood.  It  is  perfectly  proper  for 
scholars  to  examine  the  Scriptures,  and  to  investigate  the  ques- 
tion of  their  composition,  with  the  utmost  freedom  and  thorough- 
ness. The  more  of  this  research  there  is,  the  better.  Nothing 
but  good  can  come  from  whatever  facts  can  be  discovered  re- 
specting the  origin  and  characteristics  of  the  Bible.  Even 
though  old  impressions  may  be  contradicted,  no  harm  can  ensue. 
No  truth  is  intrinsically  injurious.     If  it  is  true  that  Genesis  is 

Thr;  Religious  History  of  Israel,  Ediiiburc;h,  1885  ;  C.  J.  Brcdenkamp,  Gesetz 
und  Propheten,  1881 ;  J.  J.  S.  Perowne,  The  Age  of  the  Pentateuch  {Contempo- 
rary Review,  188S).  Tlie  time  has  certainly  not  come  for  assuming  the  new 
hypothesis  as  establislied,  and  attempting  to  popularize  it,  as  is  done  by  Prof. 
C.  H.  Toy,  in  The  History  of  the  Religion  of  Israel,  Boston,  1883. 


CONDITIONS   AND   LIMITS   OF  BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.         383 

made  up  of  two  or  more  documents  woven  together  ;  if  it  is  true 
that  not  all  of  the  Pentateuch,  or  even  that  the  smaller  part  of 
it,  was  committed  to  writing  by  Moses  himself,  —  what  reason  is 
there  for  hesitating  to  accept  these  results  of  critical  research  ? 
Nothino-  of  real  value  is  lost  by  the  admission.  There  is  noth- 
infT  in  the  Bible  itself  which  would  be  contradicted  by  such 
discoveries.  Even  though  the  new  doctrine  on  these  points  be 
only  made  strongly  probable,  and  by  no  means  certain,  there  is 
no  reason  why  it  may  not  be  adopted.  The  adoption  does  not 
involve  any  impeachment  of  the  divine  veracity ;  it  does  not 
conflict  with  any  statement  in  the  Pentateuch  itself.  Questions 
of  date  and  authorship,  of  editorial  arrangement  and  super- 
scription, of  mistakes  in  transcription,  of  intentional  or  unin- 
tentional interpolations,  and  other  like  questions  often  can  be 
settled  only  by  critical  investigation.  Traditional  opinions  on 
these  matters  have  at  the  most  only  the  presumption  in  their 
favor ;  they  have  no  prescriptive  right  to  hold  the  field  against 
the  force  of  clear  evidence.  Christians  may  honestly  differ  on 
the  question  whether  the  traditional  views  have  in  any  particular 
case  been  really  overthrown  ;  but  the  new  views  which  critics 
advocate  can  be  successfully  opposed  only  by  critical  weapons. 

And  even  when  the  dispute  relates  to  alleged  forgery  and 
deliberate  falsification  of  history,  the  defenders  of  the  genu- 
ineness and  credibility  of  the  portions  of  the  Bible  thus 
assailed  do  well  to  meet  critical  attack  with  critical  defense. 
The  defense  is  most  satisfactory  when  it  repulses  the  enemy  on 
his  own  chosen  ground.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  if,  on  that 
ground,  the  result  of  the  conflict  may  at  the  best  appear  to  be 
somewhat  doubtful,  the  Christian  believer  is  to  yield  up  his 
cherished  faith.  No;  there  is  another  weapon  which  he  may 
and  will  use,  and  cannot  be  made  to  surrender  :  he  will  maintain 
an  unconquerable  conviction  that  God  cannot  have  allowed  the 
record  of  his  revelation  to  be  adulterated  and  vitiated  by 
fraud  and  forgery.  Christian  insight  and  feeling  have  a  validity 
of  their  own.  He  to  whom  the  Gospel  of  John  has  been  his 
choicest  spiritual  food  may  rejoice  to  see  the  fierce  assaults 
that  have  been  made  upon  its  genuineness  and  authenticity  over- 
come by  critical  weapons.     But  even  without  these  that  Gospel 


384  SUPERNATURAL   REVELATION. 

would  doubtless  hold  its  position  as  a  genuine  and  authentic 
work,  by  virtue  of  that  Christian  judgment  which  instinctively 
rejects  the  allegation  that  it  is  a  "cunningly-devised  fable," 
skilfully  simulating  the  appearance  of  being  the  work  of  John, 
though  in  fact  the  work  of  some  unknown  man  living  at  least 
half  a  century  after  John  was  dead.  By  this  it  is  not  meant 
that  there  is  in  the  ordinary  Christian  a  "critical  feeling" 
which  enables  him  to  settle  intuitively  all  questions  of  author- 
ship and  authenticity  that  may  be  raised.  The  meaning  simply 
is  that,  the  truth  and  divine  authority  of  Christianity  being  to 
the  Christian  world  an  established  fact,  hypotheses  which  ex- 
plicitly or  implicitly  involve  the  rejection  of  this  fundamen- 
tal conviction  must  be  a  'priori  rejected.  Christians  can- 
not be  forever  re-examining  the  foundations  of  their  faith.  It 
may  indeed  be  held  that  Christianity  is  not  identical  with 
the  Biblical  books,  and  that  therefore  many  of  tliese  may 
be  acknowledged  to  be  spurious  or  unauthentic,  while  yet  the 
essential  truths  of  Christianity  are  retained.  But  no  one  can 
ever  know  what  the  essential  truths  of  Christianity  are,  if  all 
the  records  of  its  origin  are  liable  to  be  pronounced,  one  after 
the  other,  a  work  of  the  imagination.  If  the  Christian  religion 
is  assumed  to  be  divine,  then  whatever  allegations  are  made 
requiring  us  to  believe  that  the  Christian  Church  and  the  Chris- 
tian Scriptures  owe  the  commanding  position  they  have  ac- 
quired to  fraud,  whether  pious  or  impious,  —  no  matter  how 
ingeniously  or  plausibly  the  allegations  may  be  sustained,  the 
Christian  may,  without  bigotry  and  with  the  soundest  reason, 
reply,  "  I  will  not  believe  it."  For  at  the  most  the  attacks  on  the 
genuineness  of  the  canonical  books  never  have  succeeded,  and 
never  will  succeed,  in  establishing  anything  more  than  a  greater  or 
less  degree  of  prolmhility  that  fraud  and  forgery  have  played  a 
part  in  determining  the  contents  of  the  Scriptural  Canon.  Over 
against  this  probability  will  always  stand,  in  the  Christian  mind, 
the  still  greater  probability  that  God  would  not  have  allowed  his 
Church  to  make  the  work  of  deceivers  a  part  of  its  permanent 
canon  of  faith  and  practice,  and  that  Jesus  Christ  would  not 
have  set  upon  such  fraud  the  stamp  of  his  endorsement. 

For  the  ugly  fact  cannot  be  winked  out  of  sight,  or  in  any 


CONDITIONS   AND  LIMITS  OF  BIBLICAL  CRITICISM.         385 

way  be  got  rid  of,  that  if  the  theory  is  correct  which  is  often 
boastfully  said  to  have  secured  the  assent  of  all  the  scholars  ^ 
whose  opinion  is  worth  anything,  then  Christ  is  made  to  ratify, 
as  of  divine  authority,  a  book  which  according  to  the  theory 
is  largely  a  work  of  forgery  and  falsification  of  history.  It 
makes  little  difference  whether  his  ratification  of  the  divine 
authority  of  the  Old  Testament  is  supposed  to  have  been  given 
in  ignorance  of  the  facts  which  the  critics  think  they  have 
brought  to  light,  or  whether  he  endorsed  the  book  as  divine, 
although  knowing  that  it  was,  to  a  great  extent,  fraudulent  and 
fictitious.  In  either  case  an  assumption  is  made  respecting  the 
Eedeemer  which  the  ordinary  and  healthy  instinct  of  the 
Christian  will  unhesitatingly  repudiate.  The  critics  themselves 
may  in  some  cases  attempt  to  combine  the  holding  of  their 
hypothesis  with  a  genuine  faith  in  Christ  as  the  Mediator  and 
Saviour.  But  they  can  do  so  only  by  a  process  of  mind  similar 
to  that  of  Pomponatius,  Cesalpini,  and  other  philosophers  of  the 
Italian  Eenaissance,  who  are  said  to  have  undertaken  to  dis- 
tinguish between  truths  of  philosophy  and  truths  of  faith  in 
such  a  way  that  both  could  be  held,  though  in  direct  collision 
with  one  another.^  The  common  mind  cannot  satisfy  itself  by 
any  such  self-mystification.  The  course  of  reasoning  it  will 
adopt  is  short,  but  conclusive :  If  Jesus  was  either  so  ignorant 
as  not  to  know  that  the  Scriptures  to  which  he  ascribed  divine 
authority  were  vitiated  by  fraud,  or  so  unscrupulous  as  to 
endorse  them  although  he  knew  of  the  fraud,  then  he  cannot 
be  the  Truth,  the  Way,  and  the  Life.  But  we  are  sure  that  in 
him  are  hid  all  the  treasures  of  wisdom  and  of  knowledge,  and 
that  therefore  he  cannot  have  been  either  thus  ignorant  or  thus 
unscrupulous  j  consequently  we  cannot  and  will  not  believe 
any  one  who  pretends  to  have  discovered  that  the  Bible  is  full 
of  fictitious  history,  fraudulent  legislation,  and  supposititious 
homilies.     We  have  not  so  learned  Christ. 

^  All  the  younger  scholars,  it  is  often  remarked,  as  if  that  were  a  special 
recommendatiou  of  the  theory. 

"^  Of.  Cousin,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  51  (Wight's  trans- 
lation); Ritter,  Die  christliche  Philosophie,^o\.  ii.  pp.35  sqq.  Ritter,  however, 
questions  the  justice  of  the  charge  that  Pomponatius  was  hypocritical  in 
assenting  to  the  Christian  faitL 

25 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX. 


EXCURSUS  I.i 

DR.  MAUDSLEY    ON    THE   VALIDITY    OF    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

T\R.  MAUDSLEY 2  says,  "If  you  would  know  what  is  the 
-"-^  positive  value  of  the  direct  deliverances  of  an  individual 
consciousness,  you  must  compare  with  it  the  deliverances  of  con- 
sciousness in  other  persons  ;  it  must  be  supplemented  and  corrected 
by  these  aids  in  the  social  organism,  as  one  sense  is  supplemented 
and  corrected  by  another  sense  in  the  bodily  organism."  Again 
he  says :  *  "  A  logical  inference,  the  perception  of  a  general  law, 
a  mathematical  demonstration,  the  certainty  of  an  arithmetical 
calculation,  the  confidence  of  each  daily  action  among  men  and 
things,  the  understanding  of  another's  language  and  the  certainty 
that  mine  in  turn  will  be  understood, — all  these  appeal,  as  it 
were,  to  some  certainty  in  which  is  more  than  myself.  It  is 
the  common  mind  of  the  race  in  me,  which  belongs  to  me  as  to 
one  of  my  kind,  —  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  if  you  will. 
Because  the  kind  is  in  me  and  I  am  a  living  element  of  it, 
I  cannot  help  silently  acknowledging  its  rules  and  sanctions. 
There  is  no  rule  to  distinguish  between  true  and  false  but  the 
common  judgment  of  mankind,  no  rule  to  distinguish  between 
virtue  and  vice  but  the  common  feeling  of  mankind.  Wherefore 
the  truth  of  one  age  is  the  fable  of  the  next,  the  virtue  of  one 
epoch  or  nation  the  vice  of  another  epoch  or  nation,  and  the 
individual  that  is  deranged  has  his  private  truth-standard  that 
is  utterly  false."  Again : ^  "To  descant  upon  the  self-sufficiency 
of  an  individual's  self-consciousness  is  hardly  more  reasonable 
than  it  would  be  to  descant  upon  the  self-sufficiency  of  a  single 
sense.  The  authority  of  direct  personal  intuition  is  the  author- 
ity of  the  lunatic's  direct  intuition  that  he  is  the  Messiah  ;  the 
vagaries  of  whose  mad  thoughts  cannot  be  rectified  until  he  can 

1  See  p.  11.  2  sody  and  Win,  p.  40. 

8  Bid.,  pp.  41,  42.  *  Ibid.,  p.  44. 


390  APPENDIX. 

be  got  to  abandon  his  isolating  self-sufficiency  and  to  place 
confidence  in  the  assurances  and  acts  of  others."  This  is 
sufficiently  emphatic,  and  seems  to  coincide  substantially  with 
what  we  have  laid  down  as  to  the  importance  and  indispen- 
sableness  of  the  corroborative  testimony  of  other  men  in  order 
to  perfect  confidence  in  our  individual  experiences.  But  under- 
neath these  strong  affirmations  lies  the  tacit  assumption  that 
the  individual  has  somehow  become  assured  tliat  there  are  other 
persons,  and  that  these  other  persons  are  trusUvorthy.  This 
conviction  must  be  antecedent  to  the  use  which  is  made 
of  the  corroborative  testimony  of  these  fellow-beings.  The 
individual  must  first  be  sure  of  the  reality  of  these  beings 
before  he  can  accept  their  testimony.  The  question,  then, 
cannot  but  be  raised  whether  here  at  least  we  must  not  hold 
to  the  "self-sufficiency  of  an  individual's  self-consciousness." 
If  this  self-consciousness  which  makes  known  to  us  our  fellow- 
beings  is  not  self-sufficient,  but  needs  to  be  confirmed  or  rectified 
by  the  consciousness  of  others,  there  is  absolutely  no  escape 
from  the  circle ;  there  will  never  be  any  assured  knowledge  at 
all.  For  according  to  the  supposition,  in  order  to  get  the  needed 
corroborative  or  corrective  testimony,  we  must  first  be  assured 
of  the  reality  of  the  witnesses ;  and  if  we  must  have  the 
testimony  of  others  in  order  to  assure  us  of  the  reality  of  the 
witnesses,  then  we  must  have  what,  according  to  the  supposition, 
we  cannot  get.  There  rmist  be  somewhere  an  immediate,  in- 
tuitive, self-sufficient  cognition  ;  if  not,  the  child  can  never  get 
beyond  having  an  experience  of  sensations  about  the  correctness 
or  the  meaning  of  which  he  has  no  knowledge. 

This  power  of  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  other  persons  —  a 
power  implied  in  all  psychological  theories  —  is,  when  distinctly 
seen  and  recognized,  fatal  both  to  pure  idealism  and  to  pure  ma- 
terialism. Maudsley  himself  puts  vigorously  the  dilemma  of  the 
idealist :  ^  "If  there  be  a  world  of  consciousness  external  to  me, 
and  if  the  only  reality  be  in  consciousness,  then  my  real  exist- 
ence to  another  person  is  in  his  consciousness,  —  that  is,  external 
to  myself;  and  his  real  existence  to  me  in  like  manner  in  my 
consciousness,  —  that  is,  external  to  him.  But  where  does  he  get 
his  consciousnesss  of  me,  seeing  that  he  can't  get  at  my  con- 
sciousness, which  is  the  only  real  me  ;  and  where  do  I  get  con- 
sciousness of  him,  seeing  that  I  can't  get  at  his  consciousness  ? 
1  Bodij  and  Will,  pp.  53,  54. 


THE  VALIDITY  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  391 

He  has  got  my  real  existence  in  him,  and  I  have  got  his  real  ex- 
istence in  me,  notwithstanding  that  we  have  not  the  least  power 
of  getting  at  one  another's  consciousnesses,  which  are  the  only- 
realities.  All  which  is  a  triumph  of  philosophy,  or  a  reductio  ad 
absurdum,  according  to  the  light  in  which  one  elects  to  view  it." 
All  very  good,  as  a  refutation  of  pure  idealism.  And  yet  ideal- 
ism has  every  way  the  advantage  of  pure  materialism,  and  in 
some  relations  seems  even  to  have  the  advantage  of  every  other 
system.  For  it  rests  on  the  reality  of  consciousness,  as  the  one 
absolutely  irrefutable  fact ;  the  reality  of  the  outward  world  can 
be  doubted,  whereas  the  reality  of  the  modifications  of  conscious- 
ness cannot  be.  But  idealism  rigidly  carried  out  makes  it  impos- 
sible for  one  mind  to  recognize  the  reality  of  another.  For  such 
recognition,  as  men  are  now  constituted,  can  take  place  only 
through  the  medium  of  the  body.  We  can  become  aware  of 
other  viinds  only  by  becoming  aware,  first,  of  bodies  external  to 
ourselves.  The  mind  is  inferred  from  the  bodily  manifestations. 
If,  therefore,  these  bodies  are  merely  the  affections  of  our  minds, 
their  esse  being  only  a  percipi,  then  a  fortiori  the  minds  which 
seem  to  animate  those  bodies  have  no  objective  existence.  And 
so  each  man,  according  to  strict  idealism,  must  regard  his  own 
consciousness  as  the  only  real  thing.  But  this  reduces  the  whole 
theory  to  pure  absurdity.^ 

1  Berkeley  {Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  sect.  145)  touches  very  lightly  on 
this  point,  hardly  appearing  to  anticipate  that  any  one  could  regard  it  as  involving  any 
difficulty.  He  says  :  "  It  is  plain  that  we  cannot  know  the  existence  of  other  spirits 
otherwise  than  by  their  operations,  or  the  ideas  by  them  excited  in  us.  I  perceive 
several  motions,  changes,  and  combinations  of  ideas,  that  inform  me  there  are  certain 
particular  agents,  like  myself,  which  accompany  them  and  concur  in  their  production. 
Hence  the  knowledge  I  have  of  other  spirits  is  not  immediate,  as  is  the  knowledge  of 
my  ideas ;  hut  depending  on  the  intervention  of  ideas,  by  me  referred  to  agents  or 
spirits  distinct  from  myself,  as  effects  or  concomitant  signs."  But  this  is  a  very  inade- 
quate explanation  on  Berkeley's  own  theory.  According  to  him,  things  are  nothing  but 
ideas,  that  is,  sensations.  Even  the  brain  "  exists  only  in  the  mind  "  {Second  Bialogue 
between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  301,  Frazer's  ed.).  Whatever  we  per- 
ceive exists  only  as  it  is  perceived.  Consequently  what  one  calls  the  bodies  of  other 
men  can  exist  only  in  one's  own  mind.  At  the  best,  one  can  only  distinguish  between 
the  vague,  irregular  impressions  of  dreams  or  arbitrary  fancies  and  the  involuntary  im- 
pressions which  are  commonly  conceived  as  produced  by  external  nature.  This  differ- 
ence leads  Berkeley  to  argue  that  the  involuntary  and  orderly  impressions,  since  we  are 
conscious  of  not  producing  them,  must  be  produced  by  another  will,  namely,  God's. 
So  far  his  argument  is  valid  enough.  But  it  amounts  only  to  this :  that  the  subjective 
impressions  are  caused  by  an  external  power,  or  will ;  it  does  not  prove  that  there  is  any 


392  APPENDIX. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  how  is  materialism  affected  b}^  this  same 
fact  of  the  mutual  recognition  of  minds  ?  The  strict  materialist 
comes,  only  by  a  different  process,  to  substantially  the  same  result 

reality  corresponding  to  these  impressions ;  still  less  does  it  prove  that  these  ideas,  or 
things,  exist  to  the  mind  of  God  in  the  sense  of  heing  perceived  hy  him.  Yet  this  is 
Berkeley's  constant  assumption:  Things  exist  only  as  perceptions;  esse  est  percipi. 
Consequently,  he  says,  these  objects  of  perception  must  be  perceived  by  God,  and  in 
this  sense  are  real.  But  obviously  there  is  a  fallacy  here.  Our  perception  is  gained  by 
means  of  the  various  senses ;  Berkeley  says  that  when  several  ideas  accompany  one 
another,  they  come  to  be  marked  by  one  name,  as  apple,  stone,  etc.  (sect.  1,  Principles). 
Here  is  a  double  assumption  :  (1)  A  distinction  of  senses  is  assumed  —  of  sight,  smell, 
hearing,  etc.,  as  if  the  organs  of  these  senses  were  distinct  realities.  Consistency 
requires  him  to  say,  "  My  eye  exists  only  in  my  mind ;  also  colors  exist  only  in  my 
mind.  All  that  I  know  about  them  is  that  I  have  an  impression  of  them.  But  I  have 
no  right  to  speak  as  if  my  eye  perceived  colors,  or  even  as  if  my  mind  through  my  eye, 
perceived  colors."  But  (2)  it  is  assumed  that,  though  things  exist  only  as  they  are 
perceived,  it  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  them  to  go  out  of  existence  every  time  they  are 
unperceived  by  any  finite  mind,  since  God  perceives  them  constantly.  But  evidently 
this  is  a  pure  assumption.  According  to  the  main  hypothesis  a  thing  is  only  as  it  is 
perceived.  The  persistency  and  involuntariness  of  the  perception  lead  to  the  assump- 
tion of  an  outward,  divine  power  which  causes  the  perception.  But  that  is  a  very  dif- 
ferent thing  from  a  divine  being  perceiving  the  same  things,  and  perceiving  them 
constantly.  The  fact  that  I  perceive  may  indicate  that  I  am  caused  to  perceive ;  but 
when  one  says  that  therefore  the  causer  perceives  the  same  things,  and  perceives  them 
when  no  other  being  is  perceiving  them,  thei-e  is  a  manifest  non  sequifnr.  IMoreover, 
the  human  perception  is  inferred  not  to  be  a  mere  illusion  only  from  the  fact  of  its  in- 
voluntariness. Consistency  then  would  require  that  the  divine  perception  be  also  invol- 
untary.    But  this  would  imply  the  absolute  existence  of  the  perceived  objects. 

But  to  come  to  the  question  of  other  finite  spirits.  Their  existence  is  inferred,  says 
Berkeley,  from  certain  motions,  changes,  and  combinations  of  ideas.  But  how  are  we 
to  determine  which  of  these  are  caused  by  finite  spirits,  and  which  by  the  Divine 
Spirit?  His  only  solution  is  simply  in  the  assertion  (sect.  146)  that  "though  there 
be  some  things  which  convince  us  human  agents  are  concerned  in  producing  them,  yet 
it  is  evident  to  every  one  that  those  things  which  are  called  the  Works  of  Nature,  that 
is,  the  far  greater  part  of  the  ideas  or  sensations  perceived  by  us,  are  not  produced  by, 
or  dependent  on,  the  wills  of  men.  There  is,  therefore,  some  other  Spirit  that  causes 
them."  This  is  quite  astonishing.  On  his  ground  there  is  no  warrant  for  distinguish- 
ing between  different  kinds  of  outward  agents.  One  can  only  be  sure  that  his  own  will 
is  not  the  cause  of  all  his  ideas.  He  can  never  be  sure  that  other  beings  like  himself, 
as  distinguished  from  an  omnipotent  and  universal  agent,  cause  those  ideas.  On  his 
theory  no  idea,  i.  e.  perceived  object,  can  produce  effects.  Only  the  will  does  this. 
Consequently  one  cannot  at  the  best  know  more  than  that  certain  motions,  etc.,  are  per- 
ceived in  apparent  connection  with  certain  bodies.  That  a  will  is  connected  with  the 
body,  as  the  cause  of  the  motions,  cannot  be  inferred.  But  even  if  it  could  be,  the  per- 
ception of  other  human  beings  would  thus  be  made  a  matter  of  inference  of  which  only 
a  comparatively  mature  mind  is  capable ;  whereas  the  perception  is  in  fact  one  of  the 
very  earliest  experiences  of  the  infant. 


THE   VALIDITY   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  393 

as  the  strict  idealist.  Instead  of  positing  an  immaterial  mind  as 
the  organ  of  consciousness,  he  posits  a  material  organism,  and 
assumes  that  one  of  its  functions  is  to  think  —  to  conceive  of  a 
universe  of  material  objects  of  various  forms  and  characteristics 
as  existing  around  it.  But  Dr.  Maudsley  himself  assures  us  that 
this  individual  conception  is  of  no  value  until  it  has  been  supple- 
mented and  corrected  by  that  of  other  consciousnesses.  "  My 
subjective  states,"  he  says,^  "are  to  be  appraised  by  another's 
objective  observation  of  them  in  their  modes  of  outward  expres- 
sion, as  his  subjective  states  are  to  be  appraised  by  jht/  objective 
observation  of  them."  The  individual  organism,  therefore,  can 
only  be  sure  of  its  own  impressions ;  whether  an  objective  reality 
corresponds  to  those  impressions  is,  in  itself,  quite  a  matter  of 
uncertainty,  —  until  this  organism  has  learned  that  other  organ- 
isms have  the  same  experience.  But  here  there  presents  itself 
again  the  same  dilemma  as  before :  How  is  the  man  in  question, 
in  the  first  place,  ever  to  be  sure  of  the  fact  that  there  is  another 
organism  like  his  own  ?  He  has  certain  sensations,  certain  im- 
pressions concerning  other  beings  like  himself ;  but,  according  to 
the  theory  maintained,  those  are  mere  impressions,  having  no 
authoritative  value  until  confirmed  by  the  impressions  of  those 
same  other  organisms.  That  is,  I  cannot  be  sure  that  other  men 
really  exist,  until  I  know  that  they  tell  me  that  they  exist.  But 
how  can  I  ever  know  that  they  tell  me  so,  unless  I  am  first  con- 
vinced that  they  are  real  beings  ?  The  testimony  of  a  being  of 
doubtful  reality  must  necessarily  be  testimony  of  doubtful  value. 
And  so  on  this  theory  one  must  be  forever  precluded  from  ever 
coming  to  a  state  of  assured  conviction  about  anything.  But 
Maudsley  calmly  assures  us,^  that  "  the  worth  of  the  testimony 
of  consciousness  as  to  an  external  world  may  well  be  greater  than 
the  worth  of  its  subjective  testimony,  since  it  is  pretty  certain  that 
the  consciousnesses  of  other  persons,  and  the  consciousnesses  of 
animals,  in  so  far  as  they  are  similarly  constituted,  give  the  same 
kind  of  evidence."  In  short,  he  quietly  takes  for  granted  the 
very  thing  which  his  theory  makes  inadmissible  and  impossible ; 
he  assumes  that,  in  spite  of  the  utter  untrustworthiness  of  the 
individual  consciousness,  it  has  nevertheless,  all  by  itself,  become 
certain,  not  only  of  the  reality  of  other  men,  but  also  of  the 
reality  of  their  consciousness, — and  not  only  this,  but  also  of 
the  fact  that  their  consciousnesses  coincide  with  his  own ! 
1  Body  and  Will,  pp.  40,  41.  2  jud,^  p.  52. 


394  APPENDIX. 

Here  we  have  precisely  the  same  dilemma  into  which  Maudsley 
crowds  the  idealist.  In  fact,  idealism  and  materialism  easily 
pass  into  each  other.  In  the  one  case  the  individual  is  con- 
ceived as  thinking  mind,  in  the  other  as  thinking  matter,  —  in 
both  cases  as  a  conscious  unit,  able  to  think  of  itself  and  to  re- 
ceive sensations.  But  in  either  case  there  is  an  impassable  gulf 
between  the  mere  fact  of  sensation  or  consciousness  and  the 
assurance  that  there  is  an  external  world  distinct  from  the  con- 
scious individual.  The  idealist  may  be  content  to  infer  a  material 
world  from  his  conscious  sensations,  or  he  may  deny  that  there  is 
any  such  thing  as  a  material  world ;  in  either  case  he  denies  that 
we  directly  knoiv  anything  about  a  world  of  matter.  Just  so  the 
consistent  materialist  finds  himself  debarred  from  any  certain 
knowledge  of  anything  but  his  own  impressions.  It  makes  no 
difference  with  the  real  problem,  when  he  assumes  that  the  perci- 
pient or  thinking  agent  is  a  material  organism,  and  not  an  imma- 
terial mind.  There  is  precisely  the  same  difficulty  —  the  same 
impossibility  —  which  the  idealist  has  in  getting  over  the  gulf 
which  separates  the  conscious  individual  from  the  rest  of  the 
world.  In  either  case  it  is  only  by  an  illogical  leap  —  a  salto 
mortale  —  that  the  philosopher  comes  to  his  belief  and  assurance 
that  he  is  in  the  midst  of  a  world  of  beings  like  himself. 

But  the  materialistic  theory  has  still  further  difficulties  to  en- 
counter. There  is  not  merely  the  preliminary  one,  that  the  in- 
dividual sentient  organism  has  legitimately  no  way  of  learning 
that  there  is  an  external  world  in  general,  or  in  particular  that 
there  are  other  material  organisms  like  his  own ;  there  is  the 
further  difficulty,  that  he  can  still  less  assuredly  learn  that  other 
organisms  are  sentient  and  conscious  like  himself.  Let  it  be 
assumed  that  I  can  somehow  become  cognizant  of  the  real  exist- 
ence of  an  outward  world,  and,  in  that  world,  of  organic  as  dis- 
tinguished from  inorganic,  bodies ;  I  am  still  far  from  an  assured 
knowledge  that  any  of  these  organisms  think  and  feel  as  I  do. 
In  order  to  get  such  a  knowledge,  I  must  be  able  to  communi- 
cate with  them  by  means  of  some  sort  of  language}  Without 
this  there  is  an  absolutely  impassable  barrier  between  the  two 
organisms.     Even  though  they  be  assumed  to  be  cognizant  of  one 

^  In  tliis  argument  it  is  not  overlooked  that  brutes  communicate  with  one  another, 
tliough  they  have  no  language  in  the  ordinaiy  sense  of  the  word.  But  they  do  have  a 
sort  of  language ;  by  means  of  sounds  and  visible  signs  they  make  themselves  under- 
stood to  one  another. 


THE   VALIDITY  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  395 

another,  they  cannot  compare  their  cognitions,  and  thus  corrobo- 
rate one  another's  impressions  of  things,  unless  they  can  exchange 
thoughts  in  mutually  intelligible  language.  But  language  is 
essentially  and  purely  a  mental  product  and  agent.  Whatever  our 
definition  of  mind  may  be,  even  though  it  be  pronounced  to  be  noth- 
ing but  thinking  matter,  language  has  no  relation  to  it  except  as  it 
is  a  thinking  thing.  There  is  no  inherent  and  necessary  corre- 
spondence between  words  and  things.  The  same  thing  is  desig- 
nated in  different  languages  by  the  most  diverse  terms ;  and  all 
alike  appear  to  be  entirely  arbitrary.  Always  and  everywhere  lan- 
guage is  the  product  and  expression  of  conceptions,  —  of  mental 
states.  The  language  may  consist  simply  in  physical  gestures ;  but 
the  meaning  of  it  concerns  that  which  cannot  be  discerned  by  any 
of  the  senses.  A  thought  cannot  be  seen,  heard,  felt,  tasted,  or 
smelt.  How  does  the  organism  come  to  recognize  the  meaning  of 
these  apparently  arbitrary  symbols  ?  How  can  the  "hemispheri- 
cal ganglia  "  of  one  body,  by  means  of  a  word  or  a  visible  sign, 
become  aware  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  "  motor  centres "  of 
another  body  ?  Let  it  be  supposed  to  have  been  made  ever  so 
clear  how  a  particular  organism  can  come  to  have  mental  experi- 
ences by  virtue  of  "  specialization  "  and  "  integration  ;  "  let  it  be 
conceded  that  by  "  the  education  of  the  motor  centres "  the  or- 
ganism becomes  able  to  form  mental  conceptions  ever  so  refined. 
Yet  the  mystery  is  still  unsolved,  how  these  conceptions  can  be 
communicated  by  one  organism  to  another,  —  how  the  other 
organism,  which  can  by  no  possibility  see  the  "  motor  nerves " 
or  "the  mind-centres"  which  do  the  thinking  or  the  willing,  can 
yet  learn  what  the  thinking  is  about.  Dr.  Maudsley  says  :  "  Few 
persons,  perhaps,  consider  what  a  wonderful  art  speech  is,  or  even 
remember  that  it  is  an  art  which  we  acquire.  But  it  actually 
costs  us  a  great  deal  of  pains  to  learn  to  speak ;  all  the  language 
which  an  infant  has  is  a  cry  ;  and  it  is  only  because  we  begin  to 
learn  to  talk  when  we  are  very  young,  and  are  constantly  prac- 
tising, that  we  forget  how  specially  we  have  had  to  educate  our 
motor  centres  of  speech."  ^  Very  true ;  and  perhaps  it  may  be 
added  that  Dr.  Maudsley  himself  has  failed  to  grasp  the  true 
wonderfulness  of  speech.  He  recognizes  indeed  that  each  word 
has  "  no  independent  vitality,"  and  is  even  "  nothing  more  than 
a  conventional  sign  or  symbol  to  mark  the  particular  muscular 
expression  of  a  particular  idea."  ^  The  real  marvel,  however,  is 
1  Body  and  Mind,  p.  25.  ^  jbid.,  p.  26. 


396  APPENDIX. 

not  in  the  fact  that  children  have  to  learn  language  by  a  laborious 
process;  the  marvel  is  —  especially  on  the  materialistic  theory  — 
how  they  ever  learn  at  all,  or,  supposing  that  they  can  learn,  as 
parrots  can,  that  they  come  to  zmderstand  what  these  words  really 
represent  in  the  minds  of  their  teachers.  They  are  conventional 
signs,  Maudsley  says ;  but  how  did  these  mechanical  organisms, 
every  motion  of  which  is  determined  by  rigid  natural  forces,  ever 
come  to  agree  to  make  these  arbitrary  signs  have  certain  mean- 
ings ?  Maudsley  says  that  these  articulate  signs  came  to  be 
so  used  simply  because  they  are  the  most  "  convenient  for  the 
expression  of  our  mental  states."  This  is  very  true ;  but  it  does 
not  explain  how  they  come  to  be  understood  as  the  expression  of 
mental  states.  The  real  mystery,  quite  overlooked  by  the  ma- 
terialistic explanation,  is  in  the  possibility  of  the  communication 
between  two  "  mind-centres,"  —  the  possibility  of  agreeing  to 
make  certain  arbitrary  sounds  the  representatives  of  mental 
states.  Even  though  one  of  the  material  organisms  may  be  sup- 
posed to  be  determined  by  some  occult  natural  force  to  connect 
a  certain  sound  with  a  certain  object ;  yet  this  does  not  explain 
how  another  organism  comes  to  understand  what  object  is  repre- 
sented by  that  sound.  In  short,  the  recognition  of  personality 
in  beings  other  than  ourselves  must  precede  our  understanding  of 
their  language.^  Otherwise  all  their  words  and  gestures  would 
have  no  more  meaning  to  us  than  the  moaning  and  swaying  of 
trees  in  the  wind  or  the  dashing  and  babbling  of  a  brook. 

^  "  It  may  be  questioned  whether  this  [power  to  recognize  personality  other  than 
our  own]  is  to  be  accounted  for  without  postulating  the  existence  of  a  higher  kind  of 
instinctive  intelligence  than  that  which  is  needed  for  the  recognition  of  an  external 
world."  —  Murphy,  Scientific  Bases  of  Faith,  p.  150. 


THE  COSMIC  PHILOSOPHY.  397 


EXCURSUS    lU 

THE   COSMIC    PHILOSOPHY. 


TV /rODEEN  evolutionists  cannot  all  be  indiscriminately  put 
^^^  into  one  category.  Many  of  them  are  genuine  theists  and 
Christians.  Others  are  unmitigated  atheists  and  materialists ;  * 
while  still  others,  though  radically  opposed  to  the  characteristic 
doctrines  of  Christian  theism,  yet  repudiate  with  indignation 
both  these  names,  and  are  scarcely  more  willing  to  be  called 
pantheists.^  It  is  easy  here  to  fall  into  logomachy.  The  dis- 
tinction between  atheism  and  pantheism  is  itself  hard  to  draw. 
But  now  we  have  to  deal  with  those  who,  while  holding  views 
which  would  commonly  be  called  pantheistic,  if  not  atheistic, 
strenuously  insist  that  they  are  the  only  true  theists.  So,  for 
example,  Mr.  Fiske,^  who  emphatically  denies  that  the  Absolute 
Being  can  be  personal  (an  attribute  commonly  supposed  to  char- 
acterize the  God  of  the  theist),  and  maintains  that  every  other 
form  of  theism  than  his  own  is  beset  with  insoluble  difficulties. 
What  now  is  his  doctrine  ?  "  Our  choice,"  he  says,^  "  is  no 
longer  between  an  intelligent  Deity  and  none  at  all ;  it  lies  be- 
tween a  limited  Deity  and  one  that  is  without  limit."  The 
necessary  inference  from  this  is  that  the  Deity  is  not  intelligent. 
An  "  infinite  Person  "  is  expressly  declared  to  be  as  unthinkable 
as  a  "  circular  triangle."  "  Anthropomorphic  Theism  "  is  the 
name  given  to  the  ordinary  theism ;  but  in  place  of  it  is  put  a 
theism  which  affirms  a  Being  who,  though  not  a  person,  is  as 
much  higher  than  Humanity  as  the  heavens  are  higher  than  the 
earth.®  In  this  Mr.  Eiske  is  a  faithful  follower  of  Mr.  Spencer, 
who  asks  us,'  "  Is  it  not  just  possible  that  there  is  a  mode  of 
being  as  much  transcending  Intelligence  and  Will  as  these  tran- 
scend mechanical  motion  ?  It  is  true  that  we  are  totally  unable 
to  conceive  any  such  higher  mode  of  being.     But  this  is  not  a 

1  See  p.  33. 

2  Such  as  Carl  "Vogt,  Moleschott,  Biiehner.    Professor  Flint  (Jnii-theistic  Theories, 
Leet.  iv.)  calls  Mr.  Spencer  and  his  followers  materialists. 

3  E.  g.,  John  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  423.  *  Ihid.,  p.  408. 
6  Ihid.                     6  7^2^.^  p,  451,                     7  Yirst  Principles,  §  81. 


398  APPENDIX. 

reason  for  questioning  its  existence ;  it  is  rather  the  reverse." 
But  further :  Mr.  Fiske  ^  is  very  sure  that,  "  if  goodness  and 
intelligence  are  to  be  ascribed  to  the  Deity,  it  must  be  goodness 
and  intelligence  of  which  we  have  some  rudimentary  knowledge 
as  manifested  in  humanity  ;  otherwise  our  hypothesis  is  unmean- 
ing verbiage."  And  then  he  goes  on  to  affirm  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  ascribe  goodness  to  a  Being  of  infinite  power  and  fore- 
knowledge who  should  have  created  such  a  world  of  suffering  as 
our  world  is.  "As  soon  as  we  seek  to  go  beyond  the  process  of 
evolution  disclosed  by  science,  and  posit  an  external  Agency 
which  is  in  the  slightest  degree  anthropomorphic,  we  are  obliged 
to  supplement  and  limit  this  Agency  by  a  second  one  that  is  dia- 
bolic, or  else  to  include  elements  of  diabolism  in  the  character 
of  the  first  Agency  itself."  Plainly  all  this  means  that  the  Abso- 
lute Being  is  not  intelligent,  and  is  not  moral  in  any  sense  that 
would  not  be  "  unmeaning  verbiage."  But  in  the  same  book,  at  a 
later  point,^  he  says  that  the  "Inscrutable  Power"  may  "be  pos- 
sibly regarded  as  quasi-psychical."  In  another  book  he  leaves 
sometimes  the  "  quasi "  off,  and  calls  the  Infinite  Power  simply 
"  psychical,"  ^  and  moreover  affirms  that  "  we  know,  however  the 
words  may  stumble  in  which  we  try  to  say  it,  that  God  is  in  the 
deepest  sense  a  moral  being."  ^  Accordingly  we  are  to  under- 
stand that  God  is  not  intelligent,  but  is  psychical ;  he  is  not  good, 
but  he  is  moral !  ^  To  be  sure,  the  author  takes  pains  to  say  that 
God's  psychical  nature  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  just  like  ours  —  in 
which  all  Christian  philosophers  will  cordially  agree  with  him. 
But  what  then  becomes  of  his  assertion  that,  if  we  retain  the 
slightest  degree  of  anthropomorphism,  we  cannot  help  making 
God  either  diabolic  or  finite  ?  For  he  now  says  expressly  that 
"we  can  never  get  entirely   rid  of  all  traces  of  anthropomor- 

1  Cosmic  P/dhsop/it/,  vol.  ii.  pp.  406,  407.  ^  Bid.,  pp.  448,  449. 

8  Idea  of  God,  Preface,  p.  xxiv,  and  p.  135.  *  Bid.,  p.  167. 

^  It  is  to  be  presumed  that,  in  ascribing  psycbicalness,  and  denying  intelligence,  to 
the  Unknown  Force,  Spencerians  mean  something ;  but  it  would  be  well  if  they  would 
tell  what  they  mean.  If  we  are  to  judge  from  etymology  and  usage,  the  term  "  psychi- 
cal," if  it  is  to  be  applied  to  any  unintelligent  being,  must  denote  a  constitution  some- 
what like  that  of  the  lower  animals,  which  have  life  (a  4'^x'^)  ^^^^  ^  sort  of  unconscious 
impulse  which  faintly  resembles  intelligence.  Is  then  the  Deity  really  conceived  as 
intellectually  a  sort  of  magnified  polyp  ?  If  not,  and  if  yet  the  Absolute  Power  is 
declared  to  be  without  consciousness  (yiof^H.  Spencer,  Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  §  658, 
where  this  is  elaborately  argued),  then  to  call  that  Power  "  psychical "  is  to  use  phrase- 
ology which  has  a  philosophical  sound,  but  which  is  absolutely  meaningless. 


THE  COSMIC  PHILOSOPHY.  399 

phism,"  ^  and  that  "  to  every  form  of  theism  ...  an  anthropo- 
morphic element  is  indispensable.^  Furthermore,  while  the  teleo- 
logical  arguments  of  Paley  are  scouted  as  entirely  fallacious,  he 
yet  says  that  the  "  craving  after  a  final  cause  "  is  "  an  essential  ele- 
ment in  man's  religious  nature,"  and  "  that  there  is  a  reasonable- 
ness in  the  universe,  that  in  the  orderly  sequence  of  events  there 
is  a  meaning  which  appeals  to  our  human  intelligence.^  He  avows 
his  belief  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul  "  as  a  supreme  act  of 
faith  in  the  reasonableness  of  God's  work,"  and  because  to  deny 
this  persistence  of  the  spiritual  element  in  man  "  is  to  rob  the 
whole  process  [of  evolution]  of  its  meaning."  *  So  then  God's 
work  has  a  " meaning  which  appeals  to  our  intelligence ; "  yet 
God  is  himself  not  intelligent ! 

Now,  when  we  have  to  judge  of  the  theory  of  a  man  who  thus 
states  it  in  contradictory  propositions,  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
be  sure  of  the  correctness  of  our  judgment.  If,  when  he  calls  the 
Absolute  Power  "  psychical "  and  "  moral,"  he  means  what  the 
words  seem  necessarily  to  mean,  then  he  holds  to  the  personality 
of  God ;  and  we  have  no  further  controversy  with  him.  But  if 
he  means  by  these  terms  nothing  at  all  which  implies  a  conscious 
personality  working  with  a  conscious  purpose  ;  if  his  real  mean- 
ing is  that  God  is  not  intelligent  in  any  intelligible  sense,  that 
he  is  not  good  in  any  human  sense  of  goodness,  —  why,  then  we 
must  deny  to  him  the  name  of  theist  in  any  sense  that  would  not 
be  "  unmeaning  verbiage." 

But  without  undertaking  to  solve  these  contradictions,  let  us 
consider  the  implications  and  consequences  of  the  system  in 
general,  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  our  main  purpose.  One  thing 
is  certain :  Evolutionists  of  the  Spencerian  type  do  not  believe  in 
a  creation, — in  an  absolute  commencement  of  the  material  uni- 
verse. "The  Doctrine  of  Evolution  is  throughout  irreconcilably 
opposed  to  the  Doctrine  of  Creation;"^  so  that,  although  the 

1  Cosmic  Philosophi/,  vol.  ii.  p.  449. 

2  Idea  of  God,  p.  135. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  156. 

*  Destiny  of  Man,  p.  115.  It  might  be,  and  indeed  has  been,  thought  that  in  these 
later  works  Mr.  Fiske  has  made  an  advance  towards  belief  in  a  personal  God ;  but  he 
himself,  in  the  preface  of  the  one  last  published  (Idea  of  God),  expressly  denies  that 
in  that  respect  he  has  any  new  view.  He  only  acknowledges  that  in  the  Cosmic  Philoso- 
p/ifs  theistic  theory  he  did  not  adequately  evolve  what  was  involved,  namely,  the  teleo- 
logical  element  indicated  by  man's  place  in  nature  (p.  xxii). 

5  Fiske,  Cosmic  Fhilosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  376. 


400  APPENDIX. 

notion  of  the  eternity  of  matter  may  be  called  unthinkable/  yet 
there  is  no  alternative  but  to  believe  that  matter  never  had  a 
beginning.  This  is  the  assumption  that  underlies  the  system. 
The  persistence  of  Force,  which  is  assumed  as  an  axiom,  is  only 
another  expression  for  the  same  idea.  Matter  indestructible. 
Force  persistent,  —  this  means  that  there  never  has  been,  and 
never  will  be,  any  diminution  in  the  amount  of  the  material! 
universe.  A  sort  of  distinction  may  be  made  between  Force  and 
Matter,  —  Force  being  called  "  the  ultimate  of  ultimates,"  and 
Matter  "  the  differently  conditioned  manifestations  of  Force."  ^ 
That  is,  Force  is  the  really  objective  thing ;  Matter  is  the  phe- 
nomenal form  which  Force  assumes  to  the  cognitive  individual. 
Force  is  the  Unknown  Cause,  Matter  the  perceived  effect.  But 
a  distinction  is  again  made,  and  "  Force,  as  we  know  it,"  we  are 
told,  "  can  be  regarded  only  as  a  certain  conditioned  effect  of  the 
Unconditioned  Cause.  .  .  .  We  are  irresistibly  compelled  by  the 
relativity  of  our  thought  vaguely  to  conceive  some  unknown 
force  as  the  correlative  of  the  known  force."  ^  That  is,  matter 
and  known  force  are  one  and  the  same  thing  ;  but  we  are  obliged 
to  postulate  an  unknown  force  as  corresponding  to  the  phe- 
nomena, or  as  producing  them. 

Now  it  makes  no  essential  difference,  whether  we  say,  with 
Spencer,  that  this  unknown  Force  is  the  ultimate  producer  of 
the  visible  universe,  or,  with  Tyndall,*  that  Matter  itself  is  "  the 
promise  and  potency  of  every  form  and  quality  of  life."  The 
upshot  is  the  same  :  An  unintelligent,  unconscious  agent  is  made 
the  ultimate  cause  of  all  the  palpable  world  of  things,  events, 
and  persons.  So  long  as  the  Absolute  Force  is  assumed  to  be 
without  intelligence  and  will,  the  difference  between  Force  and 
Matter  is  a  mere  metaphysical  difference  ;  it  is  only  the  differ- 
ence which  divides  physicists  into  the  two  groups  of  atomists 
and  dynamists.  If,  as  the  latter  hold,  matter  is  nothing  but 
force,  then  to  hold  that  Force  is  the  Ultimate  and  Absolute 
Reality  is  no  less  correctly  to  be  called  materialism  than  that 
doctrine  which  pronounces  Matter  to  be  the  Fundamental  Reality, 
provided  in  both  cases  this  Absolute  or  Fundamental  Reality  is 
declared  to  be  unconscious  and  impersonal.  If  the  Spencerian 
sticks  consistently  to  this  ground,  then,  though  he  may  repudiate 

1  H.  Spencer,  Firsl  Principles,  p.  31.  2  j/^ij^  p   1(59, 

8  Ibid.,  p.  170. 

*  Belfast  Address  on  the  Advancement  of  Science,  p.  77. 


THE    COSMIC   PHILOSOPHY.  401 

the  name  of  materialist,  or  even  declare  that  materialism  is  "  irre- 
trievably doomed,"  ^  he  can  have  no  just  ground  for  complaint,  if 
the  name  is  still  applied  to  him.  If  he  holds,  with  Spencer  him- 
self,^ that  mental  action  is  nothing  but  transformed  physical 
force,  the  "  result  of  some  physical  force  expended  in  producing 
it,"  quite  analogous  to  the  transformation  of  physical  forces  into 
one  another,  it  avails  nothing  to  deprecate  the  name  of  material- 
ist. He  who  makes  mind  and  mental  action  the  simple  result  of 
physical  forces,  and  absolutely  dependent  on  a  physical  organism, 
makes  mind  by  implication  cease  with  the  physical  organism 
itself.* 

But  putting  aside  questions  of  personal  consistency  and  mere 
terminology,  let  us  come  down  to  more  vital  matters.  How  does 
this  Evolution  theory  leave  the  question  of  the  cognition  of 
truth?  Stated  in  brief,  the  theory  is  that  knowledge  is  rela- 
tive, which  doctrine  (correct  enough  if  properly  defined)  is  here 
made  to  mean  that  in  strictness  "  we  know  nothing  directly  save 
modifications  of  consciousness."  The  theory  is  Idealism,  with 
the  exception  that  there  is  assumed  or  inferred  an  Unknown 
Something  which  "causes  the  changes."  *  But  it  is  also  assumed 
that  the  Unknown  Something  "  might  generate,"  in  a  different 
being  from  man,  ''some  state  or  states  wholly  different  from 
what  we  know  as  the  cognition  of  a  material  object."  ^    Practi- 

1  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  440. 

2  First  Principles,  i  71. 

8  Fide  B.  P.  Bowne,  Philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer,  p.  IS.  Mr.  Spencer,  in  his 
Principles  of  Psychologij,  vol.  i.  part  ii.  chap,  i.,  does  indeed  seem  sharply  to  distinguish 
between  Mind  and  Matter,  and  even  says  that  it  would  be  easier  to  translate  physical 
phenomena  into  mental  phenomena  than  vice  versa  (p.  159).  But  the  conclusion  is 
that  with  reference  both  to  the  units  of  external  force  and  to  the  units  of  feeling  we 
only  know  them  as  presented  in  their  symbols,  and  "  no  translation  can  carry  us  beyond 
our  symbols"  (p.  161).  Ultimately  "the  conditioned  form  under  which  Being  is  pi-e- 
sented  in  the  Subject  cannot,  any  more  than  the  conditioned  form  under  which  Being 
is  presented  in  the  Object,  be  the  Unconditioned  Being  common  to  the  two  "  (p.  162). 
Thus,  after  all,  mind  and  matter  are  finally  identified  in  the  Unconditioned  Being.  They 
are  only  phenomenally  distinct.  Mr.  Fiske  (Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  444)  quotes 
Spencer  (p.  158),  as  arguing  against  the  possibility  of  identifying  a  unit  of  feeling  with 
a  unit  of  motion.  He  finds  it  necessary  to  change  Spencer's  "  nervous  shock  "  into 
"  psychical  shock,"  adding  that  Mr.  Spencer  authorizes  him  to  say  that  he  (Mr.  Spencer) 
"  thoroughly  approves  of  the  emendation."  It  is  noticeable,  however,  that  in  the  third 
edition  of  the  book,  published  seven  years  after  the  Cosmic  Philosophy,  the  passage  is 
left  absolutely  unchanged. 

4   Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  i.  pp.  86,  87.  ®  Ibid-,  p.  81. 

26 


402  APPENDIX. 

cally  the  Cosmic  Philosophy  has  all  the  strength  and  all  the 
weakness  of  Idealism.  Mr.  Fiske  ^  repudiates  Berkeley's  assump- 
tion of  a  divine  will  as  producing  in  us  these  various  states  of 
consciousness,  on  the  ground  that  "it  is  a  hypothesis  which  can 
be  neither  proved  nor  disproved."  But  in  place  of  God  Mr. 
Fiske  puts  an  Unknown  Eeality,  the  existence  of  which  is  also 
a  pure  hypothesis,  which  can  be  neither  proved  nor  disproved, 
—  certainly  not  on  the  principles  of  the  Cosmic  Philosophy. 
For,  according  to  those  principles,  causation  is  something  which 
we  come  to  believe  in  simply  through  experience.  Where  an 
experience  is  absolutely  uniform,  we  are  unable  not  to  think 
that  the  same  conditions  will  be  attended  with  the  same  ex- 
perience. If  fire  always  burns,  so  far  as  our  experience  goes, 
then  we  are  compelled  to  believe  that  it  has  always  burned, 
and  always  will  burn,  simply  because  we  cannot  "  transcend 
our  experience."  ^  But  how,  then,  do  we  come  to  know  any- 
thing about  the  Unknowable  Something  which  is  at  the  bottom 
of  all  our  various  states  of  consciousness  ?  Certainly,  accord- 
ing to  the  theory  in  question,  we  have  no  experience  of  that 
Unknown  Something  whose  existence  is  postulated.  If  the 
empirical  theory  of  the  notion  of  causation  contains  the  whole 
truth,  then  there  is  no  ground  whatever  for  inferring  the  ex- 
istence of  this  Absolute  Being,  nor  even  for  inferring  the  uni- 
versallty  of  a  connection  of  events,  simply  from  the  fact  that  we 
individually  never  experienced  an  exception. 

But  Mr.  Fiske  does  not  long  stick  to  his  own  explanation. 
When  he  asks  the  question,  "  What  is  the  belief  in  the  necessity 
and  universality  of  causation?"  he  answers, "It  is  the  belief  that 
every  event  must  be  determined  by  some  preceding  event,  and 
must  itself  determine  some  succeeding  event."  ^  Must  be  deter- 
mined ?  Why  must  be  ?  We  never  have  had  any  experience  of 
such  a  necessity.  But,  we  are  told,  an  event  "  is  a  manifestation 
of  force.  The  falling  of  a  stone,  the  union  of  two  gases,"  and 
every  other  event,  up  to  "  the  thinking  of  a  thought,  the  excite- 
ment of  an  emotion,  —  all  these  are  manifestations  of  force."  * 
Oi force?  What  force?  One  force?  or  various  forces?  And 
what  is  meant  by  force  ?  It  is  that  which  manifests  itself  in  an 
event, — which  is  simply  another  way  of  saying  that  the  force 
causes  the   event.     And  so  the  important  result  of  the  whole 

1  Cosmic  PkUosophj,  vol.  i.  p.  76.  ^  /^^^.^  pp.  146-149. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  147,  148.  *  Ibid.,  p.  148. 


THE   COSMIC   PHILOSOPHY.  403 

matter  is  that  our  belief  in  the  necessity  and  universality  of 
causation  is  the  belief  that  every  event  must  have  a  cause !  If 
the  author  had  propounded  this  as  an  ultimate  dictum  of  con- 
sciousness, we  might  accept  it  as  substantially  a  correct  state- 
ment of  the  truth.  But  when  it  comes  from  one  who  can  speak 
in  no  terms  too  contemptuous  of  those  who  pursue  the  "  subjec- 
tive "  or  a  priori  method  of  philosophizing,  we  are  compelled  to 
ask  what  else  this  is  than  an  a  priori  assumption.  But  Mr.  Fiske 
may  reply  that  he  discards  the  metaphysical  notion  of  cause  as  im- 
plying an  occulta  vis  '•  which  operates  as  an  invincible  nexus  be- 
tween it  and  the  effect."  "  Viewed  under  its  subjective  aspect," 
he  tells  us,  "  our  knowledge  of  causation  amounts  simply  to  this, 
—  that  an  experience  of  certain  invariable  sequences  among  phe- 
nomena has  wrought  in  us  a  set  of  corresponding  indissolubly 
coherent  sequences  among  our  states  of  consciousness ;  so  that 
whenever  the  state  of  consciousness  answering  to  the  cause 
arises,  the  state  of  consciousness  answering  to  the  effect  in- 
evitably follows."  And  then  we  are  further  told  that  "  the 
proposition  that  the  cause  constrains  the  effect  to  follow  is  an 
unthinkable  proposition ;  since  it  requires  us  to  conceive  the 
action  of  matter  upon  matter,  which  .  .  .  we  can  in  no  wise  do." 
"  What  we  do  know  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  what  is  given 
in  consciousness  ;  namely,  that  certain  coexistences  invariably 
precede  or  follow  certain  other  coexistences."  ^ 

Now  to  all  this  it  might  be  replied  that  what  is  here  affirmed 
as  the  essential  element  in  the  notion  of  causation,  namely,  the 
experience  of  an  invariable  sequence  in  consciousness  correspond- 
ing to  an  invariable  sequence  in  phenomena,  is  precisely  not  the 
essential  thing.  The  burnt  child  dreads  the  fire,  and  assumes 
that  the  fire  causes  the  burning  after  one  experience,  and  does 
not  go  on  indefinitely  experimenting  till  it  has  satisfied  itself 
that  the  experience  is  invariable ;  moreover,  that  it  is  absolutely 
invariable  could  never  be  determined  by  mere  experience.'^  But 
letting  this  pass,  how  is  it  that,  if  we  cannot  conceive  of  matter 
as  acting  on  matter,  we  not  only  can,  but  must,  according  to  this 

^   Cosmic  Philosophi/,  vol.  i.  pp.  154,  155. 

2  "This  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  the  order  of  nature  is  an  ultimate  fact  of  mind. 
It  is  not  produced  by  experience  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  anticipates  experience."  — J.  J. 
Murphy,  Scientific  Bases  of  Faith,  p.  96.  Of.  J.  Buchanan,  Faith  in  God  and  Modern 
Atheism  Compared,  vol.  i.  p.  224 ;  G.  H.  Lewes,  History  of  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  341 
(5th  ed.,  1880). 


404  APPENDIX. 

same  authority,  conceive  of  an  Absolute  Reality  as  causing  these 
changes  in  our  consciousness  ?  Mr.  Fiske  does  not  deny  the  in- 
trinsic possibility  of  matter  acting  on  matter,  but  simply  affirms 
that  we  have  no  consciousness  of  it.^  Very  well ;  but  does  he 
have  any  consciousness  of  this  Absolute  Power  as  generating 
within  him  his  changes  of  consciousness  ?  The  only  ground  he 
has  for  postulating  this  Unknown  Something  is  that  we  must 
assume  some  such  thing  as  the  cause  of  the  changes  in  us.^  And 
yet  this  Something,  he  says,  is  "beyond  consciousness."^  There 
is  certainly  a  great  lack  of  luminous  self-consistency  in  all  this. 
But  this  is  not  all.  What  is  it,  according  to  this  Cosmic  Philoso- 
phy, which  produces  these  changing  states  of  consciousness  in 
us  ?  At  one  time  *  we  are  told  that  they  are  "  wrought "  by  an 
"  experience  of  certain  invariable  sequences  among  phenomena ;  " 
at  another  time,^  that  these  changing  states  of  consciousness  are 
"caused"  by  the  "  noumenon,"  the  Absolute  but  Unknown  Some- 
thing. The  two  representations  may  indeed  be  reconciled,  if  the 
meaning  is  that  the  Something  directly  produces  the  phenomena, 
while  the  phenomena  directly  produce  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness. This  seems  to  be  implied  in  the  statement  elsewhere  ° 
made,  that  "there  is  a  single  Being  of  which  all  phenomena, 
internal  and  external  to  consciousness,  are  manifestations."  But 
what  are  we  to  understand  by  phenomena  "  external  to  conscious- 
ness "  ?  Inasmuch  as  all  we  know  is  "modifications  of  our  con- 
sciousness," '  what  ground  is  there  for  distinguishing  between  the 
internal  and  external  phenomena  ?  They  are  all  internal ;  and 
we  therefore  have  no  right  to  talk  about  "  an  experience  of  cer- 
tain invariable  sequences  among  phenomena  "  working  "  in  us  a 
set  of  corresponding  indissolubly  coherent  sequences  among  our 
states  of  consciousness."  "  What  we  mean  by  a  tree,"  we  are  told, 
"is  merely  a  congeries  of  qualities.  ...  If  we  were  destitute  of 
sight,  touch,  smell,  taste,  hearing,  and  muscular  sensibility,  all 
these  qualities  would  cease  to  exist,  and  therefore  the  tree  would 
cease  to  be  a  tree."  *  Here  is  pure  Idealism,  but  less  tenable 
than  that  of  Berkeley ;  for  Berkeley  consistently  held  that  our 
intuitive  belief  in  causation   necessitates  the  assumption  of  an 

1   Cosmk  PhilosopJn/,  vol.  i.  p.  155.  2  m^^  p   gy. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  84,  quoted  approvingly  from  Spencer's  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  i. 
p.  208. 

4  Ihid.,  p.  155.  5  Thid.,  p.  87.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  89. 

7  Ibid.,  pp.  86,  93.  8  iiuL,  pp.  80,  81, 


THE   COSMIC  PHILOSOPHY.  405 

Intelligent  Being  who  causes  our  sensations,  whereas,  when  the 
Cosmic  Philosophy  assumes  an  ''  Unknown  Eeality  which  causes 
in  us  these  groups  of  sensations,"  it  is  in  open  contradiction  with 
its  own  theory  of  the  notion  of  causation ;  since,  as  has  been 
shown,  to  assume  such  an  Unknown  Reality,  outside  of  conscious- 
ness, as  the  cause  of  the  subjective  phenomena,  while  at  the  same 
time  causation  is  affirmed  to  be  merely  an  experience  of  a  certain 
constant  correspondence  in  the  phenomena  inside  of  conscious- 
ness, is  a  most  flagrant  inconsistency.  If  the  philosophy  is  to  be 
made  consistent  with  itself,  we  must  retain  what  is  fundamental 
in  it,  namely,  the  empirical  theory  of  cognition,  and  abandon 
the  assumption  of  an  Absolute  Eeality  about  which  we  know 
nothing. 

But  the  point  to  which  we  are  coming  is  this  :  What  evidence 
have  we  that  any  one  of  these  states  of  consciousness  really 
answers  to  anything  distinct  from  itself?  In  other  words.  Is 
there  any  truth  in  these  phenomena  of  the  conscious  mind  ? 
When  the  fundamental  postulates  of  the  Development  philoso- 
phy are  divested  of  all  illicit  accretions,  it  is  found  to  be  an 
assertion  that  our  states  of  consciousness  are  an  ultimate  fact, 
and  that,  strictly  speaking,  we  know  nothing  else  than  that  we 
have  such  and  such  thoughts  and  sensations.  That  they  represent, 
or  correspond  to,  any  reality,  we  have  no  right  to  assert.  Reality 
is  nothing  but  "  inexpugnable  persistence  in  consciousness." 
What,  then,  is  the  test  of  truth  ?  Or,  we  may  perhaps  rather 
ask,  what  is  truth  ?  The  common  conception  of  it  is  the  agree- 
ment between  our  conceptions  and  objective  fact.  But  when  it  is 
expressly  maintained  that  we  can  know  nothing  about  objective 
facts,  how  are  we  ever  going  to  learn  whether  our  conceptions  do 
correspond  to  the  objective  facts  ?  Mr.  Fiske  says  the  above 
definition  is  a  definition  of  Absolute  Truth,  whereas  "  the  only 
truth  with  which  we  have  any  concern  is  Relative  Truth ; "  ^  and 
for  relative  truth  he  lays  down  the  criterion :  "  When  any  given 
order  among  our  conceptions  is  so  coherent  that  it  cannot  be 
sundered  except  by  the  temporary  annihilation  of  some  one  of 
its  terms,  there  must  be  a  corresponding  order  among  phenomena." 
But  why  'imist  there  be  ?  "  Because,"  it  is  added,  "  the  order  of 
our  conceptions  is  the  expression  of  our  experience  of  the  order 
of  the  phenomena."  ^    But  inasmuch  as,  on  the  theory  in  question, 

1  Cosmic  Fhilosophy,  vol.  i.  p.  70.  -  Uid.,  p.  71. 


406  APPENDIX. 

phenomena  are  nothing  but  subjective  experiences,  this  amounts 
only  to  saying  that  the  order  of  our  conceptions  is  what  it  is. 
Mr.  Fiske  illustrates  the  point  by  the  case  of  the  conception  of 
iron  as  being  that  of  something  which  will  not  float  in  water. 
"If  the  subjective  order  of  my  conceptions  is  such  that  the  con- 
cept of  a  solid  lump  of  iron  and  the  concept  of  a  body  floating 
in  water  will  destroy  each  other  rather  than  be  joined  together, 
and  I  therefore  say  that  a  solid  lump  of  iron  will  not  float  in 
water,  what  do  I  mean  by  it  ?  Do  I  intend  any  statement  con- 
cerning the  unknown  external  thing,  or  things,  which  when  acting 
upon  my  consciousness  causes  in  me  the  perception  of  iron,  and 
water,  and  floating  or  sinking  ?  By  no  means.  I  do  not  even 
imply  that  such  modes  of  existence  as  iron  or  water,  or  such 
modes  of  activity  as  floating  or  sinking,  pertain  to  the  unknown 
external  reality  at  all.  ...  By  my  statement  I  only  imply  that 
whenever  that  same  unknown  thing,  or  things,  acts  upon  my 
consciousness,  or  upon  the  consciousness  of  any  being  of  whom 
intelligence  can  be  properly  predicated,  there  will  always  ensue 
the  perception  of  iron  sinking  in  water,  and  never  the  perception 
of  iron  floating  in  water."  ^  But  if  the  thing  that  acts  on  my  con- 
sciousness is  absolutely  unknown,  how  can  I  legitimately  speak 
about  "  that  scane  unknown  thing,"  as  acting  at  different  times  and 
on  different  persons  ?  How  can  I  identify  this  unknown  thing 
at  all  ?  How  do  I  know,  in  case  I  have  a  repeated  experience  of 
the  same  sensation,  that  it  is  the  same  unknown  thing  that  pro- 
duces it  ?  If  the  thing  itself  is  unknown,  then  I  cannot  know 
enough  about  it  to  make  any  affirmation  about  it.  I  do  not  know 
but  that  different  unknown  things  may  make  the  same  impression, 
or  that  the  same  unknown  thing  may  make  different  impressions. 
In  fact,  on  the  theory  under  consideration,  I  really  know  nothing 
about  the  whole  matter  at  all,  except  that  I  have  such  and  such 
impressions,  perceptions,  conceptions,  or  whatever  else  my  states 
of  consciousness  may  be  called.  The  sole  test  of  truth,  according 
to  this  philosophy,  is  our  inability  to  "transcend  our  experience." 
"We  cannot  conceive  that  a  lump  of  iron  will  float  in  water. 
Why  ?  Because  our  conception  of  iron,  formed  solely  by  experi- 
ence, is  that  of  a  substance  which  sinks  in  water;  and  to  imagine 
it  otherwise  is  to  suppress  the  conception,  either  of  iron  or  of 
water,  and  to  substitute  some  other  conception  in  its  place."  ^ 

1  Cosmic  Philosophi/,  vol.  i.  pp.  69,  70. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  57. 


THE   COSMIC   PHILOSOPHY.  407 

And  tliis  is  all  that  is  meant  wlien  the  general  test  is  laid  down, 
that  "a  proposition  of  which  the  negation  is  inconceivable  is 
necessarily  true  in  relation  to  human  intelligence."  ^  Experience 
determines,  with  respect  to  mathematical  as  well  as  physical 
truths,^  what  we  can  conceive.  To  the  Indian  prince  who  had 
never  seen  water  frozen  it  was  inconceivable  that  water  should 
ever  become  hard.  Why  ?  Because  his  conception  of  water, 
formed  solely  by  experience,  was  that  of  a  substance  which  al- 
Avays  remains  liquid.  This  conception  of  water  was  true  to  him. 
It  was  ^^ relative  truth,"  indeed ;  but  as  relative  truth  is  "the  only 
truth  with  which  we  have  any  concern,"  it  was  genuine  truth,  —  just 
as  true  as  the  conception  of  the  Laplander,  to  whom  frozen  water 
is  very  familiar.  Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is  capable  of 
"transcending  his  experience,"  and  each  must  abide  by  it.  So 
with  regard  to  iron.  Other  men  than  Mr.  Fiske  have  seen  solid 
pieces  of  iron  float  ou  water.  An  ordinary  needle,  if  carefully 
dropped  on  a  smooth  surface  of  water,  so  that  it  strikes  hori- 
zontally, will  remain  floating  on  the  surface.  But  Mr.  Fiske  has 
evidently  never  had  an  "experience"  of  this.  Until  he  himself 
sees  it,  he  will  be  unable  to  believe  it.  To  him  the  proposi- 
tion that  a  solid  mass  of  iron  will  always  sink  in  water  is 
one  "the  negation  of  which  is  inconceivable" — just  as  incon- 
ceivable as  the  proposition  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  in- 
close a  space.^ 

Now,  if  this  is  so,  then  it  follows  that  one  man's  conceptions 
are  just  as  true  as  another's.  Whatever  one  experiences,  or  thinks 
he  experiences,  is  true.  The  only  kind  of  untruth  possible  would 
be  that  of  a  man  who  should  report  his  own  experience  falsely. 
If,  for  example,  one  should  say  that  to  him  all  objects  are  of  one 
color,  or  that  the  whole  of  an  apple  is  no  greater  than  a  half,  we 
might  say  that  the  man  is  telling  lies,  that  he  does  not  correctly 
report  his  own  experience  and  belief.  But,  after  all,  even  this 
cannot  be  made  certain.  What  he  affirms  may  be  unintelligible 
or  incredible  to  us ;  but  how  do  we  know  but  that  his  mind 
works  differently  from  ours  ?  How  do  we  even  know  what  he 
means  ?  We  only  hear  certain  sounds,  which  to  us  have  a  cer- 
tain meaning;  but  even  if  it  is  certain  that  those  sounds  are 
the  product  of  his  mind,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  they  mean  to  us 
what  they  mean  to  him.  Identity  of  experience  in  different  men 
i   Cosmic  Philosopkif,  vol  i.  p.  60.  ^  /i;^_^  p_  59^ 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  59,  67. 


408  APPENDIX. 

proves  nothing  with  respect  to  objective  fact.  It  only  proves  a 
similarity  in  the  different  minds.  It  is  still  possible  that  oysters 
on  the  one  hand,  or  Voltaire's  Micromegas  on  the  other,  may  have 
minds  of  such  a  different  order  from  ours,  that  what  is  truth  to 
us  is  falsehood  to  them.  The  human  race,  in  the  present  stage 
of  the  general  evolution  of  things,  happens  to  have,  in  many 
things  at  least,  a  similar  or  identical  mode  of  thinking ;  but  in 
the  distant  past  or  distant  future  an  entirely  different  condition 
of  things  from  that  which  now  exists  may  determine  mental 
action. 

Some  curious  results  follow  as  regards  the  main  purpose  for 
which  such  books  as  those  under  consideration  are  written.  Mr. 
Spencer  and  Mr,  Fiske,  for  example,  denounce  various  theories 
of  physics  and  metaphysics  as  being  incorrect.  They  reason  as 
if  they  thought  that  these  theories  were  really  untrue.  They  use, 
in  fact,  very  strong  language  in  their  condemnation  of  them. 
Who  would  think  that,  after  all,  they  really  hold  that  all 
theories  are  relatively  true,  and  that  none  can  be  called  abso- 
lutely true  ? 

But  again  :  These  evolutionists  labor  hard  not  only  to  show 
what  they  and  others  do  or  must  experience  now,  but  more  es- 
pecially to  show  what  has  been  the  history  of  things  in  the  in- 
definite past,  anterior  to  all  intelligence.  But  we  must  ask,  if 
knowledge  comes  simply  from  experience,  and  has  to  do  only  with 
phenomena,  what  right  has  one  to  make  affirmations  or  even  hy- 
potheses respecting  the  course  of  things  in  the  inaccessible  past  ? 
We  have  been  told  over  and  over  that  the  "  thing-in-itself  "  is  ut- 
terly unknowable,  that  nothing  can  be  cognized  but  phenomena, 
and  that  phenomena  are  non-existent  except  to  a  cognizant  mind. 
A  tree,  we  are  told,  "  would  cease  to  be  a  tree,"  if  we  were  desti- 
tute of  all  our  senses.-'  Of  course,  therefore,  in  the  geologic  ages  of 
the  distant  past,  before  intelligent  creatures  existed,  there  were  no 
trees,  nor  flowers,  nor  water,  nor  rocks,  nor  air,  nor  earth.  These 
phenomena  are  real  only  in  a  cognitive  consciousness ;  before  the 
development  of  such  a  consciousness,  accordingly,  these  things 
did  not  exist.  Of  course,  therefore,  it  is  absurd  to  undertake  to 
tell  about  the  history  of  these  non-existent  things.  To  argue,  for 
example,  that  a  primeval  mist  condensed  into  solid  worlds,  and 
that  in  these,  or  at  least  in  one  of  them,  various  changes  took 

1  Cosmic  PhilosopJii/,  vol  i.  p.  81. 


THE   COSMIC  PHILOSOPHY.  409 

place,  till  at  last  the  human  race  was  evolved,  —  all  this  implies 
that  there  really  was  such  a  mist,  and  that  there  were  afterwards 
various  real  forms  of  minerals,  that  in  those  distant  ages  there 
really  were  fire  and  water,  and  all  the  chemical  substances  which 
men  now  talk  of.  Large  volumes  are  written  to  tell  us  about 
the  slow  processes  by  which  these  substances  gradually  assumed 
the  shapes  and  qualities  which  the  visible  world  now  presents. 
What  does  all  this  mean  ?  There  could  have  been  no  trees  nor 
plants,  we  are  assured,  till  there  were  animals  able  to  see  them  ; 
but  on  the  other  hand  there  could  have  been  no  intelligent  ani- 
mals till  there  had  first  been  a  long  history  of  inorganic  and  vege- 
table objects  out  of  which  the  animals  were  evolved !  This  is  no 
caricature.  It  is  simply  putting  side  by  side  two  aspects  of  the 
philosophy  under  consideration.  If  the  two  are  inconsistent 
with  each  other,  that  is  not  our  fault.  The  only  relief  for  the 
philosopher  who  presents  us  with  this  conglomerate  as  the  final 
science  of  the  world,  is  to  hope  for  such  a  further  process  of  evo- 
lution as  will  develop  beings  capable  of  seeing  that  these  contra- 
dictions are  no  contradictions  at  all.^ 

But  still  another  interesting  corollary  may  be  drawn.  We 
have  no  knowledge,  it  is  said,  of  any  truth  but  relative  truth. 
Things  are  true  to  us,  or  false  to  us,  simply  according  as  they 
agree  or  disagree  with  our  experiences.  We  have  no  right,  it  is 
said,  to  affirm  that  any  proposition  is  absolutely  true.  Now,  then, 
what  follows  ?  When  it  is  asserted  that  no  proposition  can  be 
pronounced  absolutely  true,  is  this  assertion  itself  ahsolutcbj  true, 
or  only  relatively  true  ?  If  it  is  ahsolutelij  true,  then  we  get  this 
edifying  result:  The  proposition,  that  no  proposition  can  be 
called  absolutely  true,  is  an  absolutely  true  proposition !  This  of 
course  will  not  do.  It  is  a  worse  muddle,  if  possible,  than  the 
old  one  about  all  the  Cretans  being  liars.  But  what  is  the 
alternative  ?  If  we  cannot  say  that  the  proposition  in  question 
is  absolutely  true,  then  we  must  say  that  it  is  not  absolutely  true. 
But  if  it  is  not  absolutely  true,  then  it  is  false.  There  is  no  half- 
way place  between  truth  and  falsehood.  The  euphemism  ''  rela- 
tive truthfulness  "  may  serve  to  obscure  the  confusion  of  thought 
of  which  the  author  of  it  is  guilty,  but  it  can  serve  no  other  pur- 
pose. If  it  has  any  meaning  in  itself,  it  can  be  only  another 
way  of  expressing  doubt :    to  say  that  a  statement  is  relatively 

1  Unfortunately,  however,  for  this  hope,  Mr.  Fiske  is  quite  sure  (in  Lis  Desiin:,  of 
Man)  that  evolution  has  reached  its  acme  in  the  human  race. 


410  APPENDIX. 

true  may  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  perJiaps  it  is  not  true,  after 
all.  And  if  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  truth  is  made  general, 
it  can  mean  only  that  nothing  is  certain,  that  no  proposition 
can  be  known  to  be  either  true  or  false.  Consequently  the  af- 
firmation that  any  one  is  in  error  can  be  only  relatively  true,  — 
relatively,  that  is  to  say,  to  those  who  for  any  reason  think  that 
he  is  in  error.  The  difference  between  truth  and  error  is  a 
relative  difference  only.  Anything  is  true  —  at  least  relatively 
true  —  to  one  who  believes  it  to  be  true.  To  be  sure,  Mr.  Fiske 
tells  us  very  positively  —  so  positively  that  one  might  think  he 
means  it  as  absolute  truth  —  that  men  often  profess  to  believe 
what  they  cannot  conceive.  Thus  he  says  that  the  scholastic 
Eealists,  who  pretended  to  be  able  to  conceive  a  generic  horse,  as 
distinct  from  all  particular  horses,  did  not  in  fact  conceive  of 
such  a  horse  at  all,  but  deluded  themselves  with  the  conceit  that 
they  thought  what  in  reality  was  unthinkable.^  So  he  says  that 
those  who  profess  to  believe  in  a  creation  or  annihilation  of 
force  do  the  same  thing,  since  they  attempt  "the  impossible  task 
of  establishing  in  thought  an  equation  between  something  and 
nothing."^  "Until  men  have  become  quite  freed,"  he  says, 
"  from  the  inveterate  habit  of  using  words  without  stopping 
to  render  them  into  ideas,  they  may  doubtless  go  on  asserting 
propositions  which  conflict  with  experience ;  but  it  is  none  the 
less  true  \_relatively  true,  of  course]  that  valid  conceptions  wholly 
at  variance  with  the  subjective  register  of  experience  can  at  no 
time  be  framed.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  we  cannot  frame 
a  conception  of  nitrogen  which  will  support  combustion,  or  of 
a  solid  lump  of  iron  which  will  float  in  water,  or  of  a  triangle 
which  is  round,  or  of  a  space  enclosed  by  two  straight  lines."  ^ 
In  all  this  he  is  speaking  not  merely  for  himself,  but  for  all  men. 
"  So  long  as  human  intelligence  has  been  human  intelligence,"  he 
says,  "  it  can  never  have  been  possible  to  frame  in  thought  an 
equation  between  something  and  nothing."  *  Well,  we  quite  as- 
sent to  this  proposition,  and  even  believe  it  to  be  absolutely  true, 
though  of  course  we  do  not  for  that  reason  agree  that  this  is  a 
correct  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  creation.  But  the  philoso- 
pher who  maintains  that  experience  is  the  only  test  of  truth 
has  no  right  to  be  so  sweeping  in  his  affirmations.  The  doctrines 
which  he  rejects  cannot  be  consistently  called  by  him  erroneous ; 

1  Cosmic  P/iilosophy,  vol.  i.  p.  67.  ^  /^/^/.^  p.  143,  cf.  p.  Go. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  67.  *  Ibid.,  p.  65. 


THE  COSMIC  PHILOSOPHY.  411 

for  he  cannot  know  what  the  experience  of  other  minds  may  be. 
Error  and  truth  are  both  relative,  according  to  his  philosophy ; 
what  is  error  to  one  may  be  truth  to  another.  It  being  impos- 
sible to  know  anything  about  objective  facts,  nothing  can  cer- 
tainly be  affirmed  to  be  erroneous.  For  if  it  were  cei^tain  that 
any  opinion  is  erroneous,  then  we  should  have  an  absolute  truth; 
but  this  is  something  which  we  are  not  allowed  to  postulate. 
Such  is  the  hopeless  absurdity  into  which  this  evolutionary  doc- 
trine of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  necessarily  runs. 


412  APPENDIX. 


EXCUKSUS  III.^ 

PERSONALITY   AND    THE   ABSOLUTE. 

PEOBABLY  there  will  never  be  a  perfect  agreement  as  to  the 
value  of  the  outological  and  cosmological  arguments.  The 
view  we  have  expressed  seems  to  us  at  least  not  unfair,  and  one 
which  the  general  history  of  the  discussion  bears  out.^  It  is  note- 
worthy that  the  prevalent  tendency  of  non-Christian  thinking  at 
the  present  time  (as  seen  especially  in  Herbert  Spencer  and  his 
school)  is  to  insist  on  the  necessity  of  assuming  the  reality  of  an 
Absolute  Something  as  the  ens  realissimum.  It  is  true,  as  we 
have  shown,  that  this  conclusion  is  reached  at  a  considerable  ex- 
pense of  logical  consistency.  The  Spencerian  philosophy  agrees 
substantially  with  Hume  and  Mill  in  making  the  causal  judg- 
ment nothing  but  a  result  of  the  experience  of  invariable  se- 
quence.^ The  notion  of  cause  is,  properly  speaking,  evacuated  of 
its  meaning.  The  necessity  of  thinking  that  every  event  has  a 
cause  is  not  recognized,  —  a  necessity  which  is  as  imperative  at 
the  first  observation  of  a  certain  sequence  as  at  the  thousandth 
repetition  of  it.  In  short,  causation,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
the  word,  is  flatly  denied.  Yet  causation,  in  precisely  that  ordi- 
nary sense,  is  assumed  as  an  explanation  of  our  experience  of  the 
phenomenal  world.  The  only  evidence  of  an  Absolute  Some- 
thing is  the  necessity  of  a  cattse  for  the  experiences  which  we 
have.  So  Mr.  Fiske  in  fact  seems  to  conceive  the  matter.  "  Sup- 
pose now  we  grant,"  he  says/  "  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the 
only  real  existence  is  mind  with  its  conscious  modifications.  The 
question  at  once  arises,  What  is  the  cause  of  these  modifications  ? 
Since  consciousness  is  continually  changing  its  states,  what  is  it 
that  determines  the  sequence  of  states  ?  "  Again  :  "  There  can 
be  no  changes  in  our  consciousness  unless  there  exist  something 

1  See  p.  54.  *  cf  Dorner,  Christian  Doctrine,  §§  18-22. 

3  Mr.  Spencer  himself  nowhere,  so  far  as  we  know,  takes  up  this  question  as  a 
speculative  one.  There  is  good  reason  for  assuming,  however,  that  he  would  substan- 
tially agree  with  !Mr.  Fiske's  exposition  of  the  subject. 

*  Cosmic  Fhilosoplnj,  vol.  i.  pp.  75,  76. 


PERSONALITY  AND  THE   ABSOLUTE.  413 

which  is  changed,  and  something  which  causes  the  changes.  .  .  . 
Abolish  the  noumenon,  and  the  phenomenon  is  by  the  same  act 
annihilated."  ^  Here,  as  frequently  elsewhere,  the  necessity  of  a 
cause  is  assumed,  and  the  cause  is  regarded  as  that  which  '<  de- 
termines "  the  effect.  And  it  is  only  from  this  assumed  necessity 
of  a  determining  cause  that  the  existence  of  the  Absolute  Some- 
thing is  inferred.  When  he  discusses  causation,  however,  more 
formally,  he  affirms  that  it  is  nothing  but  "the  unconditional  in- 
variable sequence  of  one  event,  or  concurrence  of  events,  upon 
another."  '^  "  The  hypothesis  of  an  occulta  vis  .  .  .  straight- 
way lands  us  in  an  impossibility  of  thought.  The  proposition, 
that  the  cause  constrains  the  effect  to  follow,  is  an  unthinkable 
proposition.  .  .  .  What  we  do  know  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  what  is  given  in  consciousness,  namely,  that  certain  coexist- 
ences invariably  precede  or  follow  certain  other  coexistences."  ^ 
Now  it  may  be  that  the  author  might  make  some  subtle  distinc- 
tion by  which  it  would  appear  that  there  is  here  no  contradiction. 
But  to  the  ordinai'y  mind  it  would  seem  to  be  a  matter  of  com- 
parative indifference  whether  a  cause  is  defined  as  that  which 
"  determines  "  an  effect,  or  as  that  which  "  constrains  an  effect 
to  follow."  How  the  one  should  be  the  orthodox  conception 
of  cause,  and  the  other  "  an  unthinkable  proposition/'  is  itself 
unthinkable. 

But  the  salient  point  here  is  that  in  spite  of  its  theoretic  em- 
piricism this  philosophy  recognizes  and  even  emphasizes  the  a 
priori  conception  of  causality,  and  thence  deduces  the  reality  of 
a  First  Cause.  In  a  general  way,  then,  we  may  say  that  the  Spen- 
cerian,  as  well  as  the  Idealist,  the  Sensationalist,  and  the  Natural 
Kealist,  assumes  the  existence  of  a  Something  distinct  from  the 
conscious  mind.  In  the  definition  of  this  Something  they  may 
disagree ;  but  all  agree  that  there  is  a  Reality  —  an  ultimate 
Substance,  or  Force,  or  Energy,  or  Person  —  of  which  the  palpa- 
ble universe  of  things  is  an  effect,  or  outflow,  or  expression.  In 
the  Anselmic  form  the  ontological  argument  can  hardly  have  much 
weight,  in  so  far  as  it  gives  itself  out  as  a  real  argument.  But  it 
is  certainly  valid  when  one  argues  that,  if  there  is  any  real  exist- 
ence, there  must  be  an  ultimate,  eternal,  and  necessary  reality. 
The  alternative  is  plain :  The  universe  either  must  have  begun 
to  exist,  or  it  must  have  existed  eternally.     But  it  could  not  have 

1  Cosmic  Philosophi/,  vol.  i.  pp.  86,  87-  ^  Il^id.,  p.  154. 

*"  Ibid.,  p.  155. 


414  APPENDIX. 

begun  to  exist  without  a  cause  outside  of  itself.  This  cause,  then, 
must  itself  have  been  eternal,  or  in  turn  the  effect  of  another 
cause ;  and  so  on.  But  an  infinite  series  is  impossible,  and  would 
afford  the  mind  no  relief  even  if  it  were  possible.  We  must 
assume  an  Ultimate  Cause,  a  First  Cause,  which  must  be  also  an 
eternal,  self-existent  Cause.  This  argument,  however,  only  amounts 
to  this  :  that  something  has  existed  eternally,  that  something  is  ab- 
solute and  self-existent.  This  something,  so  far  as  the  argument 
goes,  may  however  be  a  blind  and  unconscious  Force.  It  cannot 
even  be  proved  to  be  absolutely  necessary  to  assume  that  this 
eternal  something  is  in  any  strict  sense  a  unit.  The  argument 
does  not  demonstrate  but  that  a  multitude  of  things  may  have 
been  eternally  existent,  although  it  may  easily  be  made  probable 
that  there  has  been  some  single  or  unifying  principle  underlying 
all  the  phenomenal  world.  It  is,  therefore,  not  clear  how  one 
can  go  so  far  as  to  affirm,  as  Professor  Harris  does,^  that  ''in 
the  knowledge  of  rationality  we  necessarily  postulate  absolute 
Eeason."  That  the  phenomena  of  rational  minds  suggest  a  Su- 
preme Being  possessed  of  reason ;  that  the  existence  of  a  universe 
of  rational  beings  leads  the  mind  to  favor,  or  even  almost  irre- 
sistibly leads  it  to  adopt,  the  hypothesis  of  a  Supreme  Rational 
Being,  may  be  freely  admitted  and  even  insisted  on.  But  all  this 
falls  short  of  saying  that  in  the  knowledge  of  rationality  we 
necessarily  postulate  absolute  Reason.  There  is  no  self-contradic- 
tion —  nothing  strictly  inconceivable  —  in  the  hypothesis,  that 
human  reason  is  the  product  of  an  unreasoning  force.  Dr.  Harris's 
proof  of  his  proposition  seems  to  be  substantially  only  a  mere 
repetition  of  it.  "The  possibility  of  concluding  reasoning  in  an 
inference  which  gives  knowledge  rests  on  universal  truths  regula- 
tive of  all  thinking."  This,  of  course,  is  true.  But  when  there 
follows  the  statement,  "The  validity  of  these  universal  truths 
involves  the  existence  of  Reason  unconditioned,  universal,  and 
supreme,  the  same  everywhere  and  always,"  one  may  ask.  How 
does  this  appear?  In  geometrical  reasoning  certain  universal 
and  regulative  truths  are  assumed.  But  does  it  necessarily  follow 
that  there  is  a  Supreme  Being  in  whom  these  truths  are  realized, 
or  by  whom  they  are  constituted  truths  ?  Would  not  mathemati- 
cal axioms  be  true  even  if  there  were  no  Supreme  Rational  Being? 
Would  it  not  still  be  true  that  a  thing  cannot  at  once  be  and  not 
be  ?     If  so,  how  can  one  conclude,  with  Dr.  Harris,  "  If  absolute 

1  Self-Revelation  of  God,  p.  155. 


PERSONALITY  AND  THE  ABSOLUTE.         415 

Reason  does  not  exist,  no  reason  and  no  rational  knowledge  exist"  ? 
By  "  absolute  Eeason "  is  evidently  meant  an  absolute  personal 
Being  endowed  with  reason ;  otherwise  the  phrase  would  have  no 
intelligible  sense.^  But  the  argument,  however  forcible  as  the 
analysis  of  an  instinctive  theistic  impulse,  can  hardly  be  urged 
as  a  conclusive  demonstration.  Even  though  it  be  made  certain 
that  without  the  assumption  of  a  personal  God  the  universe  and 
human  history  become  an  impenetrable  mystery  and  a  wretched 
farce,  still  no  one  can  say  that  this  cannot  possibly  be  the  correct 
description  of  the  actual  state  of  tilings.  One  does  not  like  to 
think  that  everything  has  been  and  ever  must  be  a  farce ;  but 
this  dislike  does  not  disprove  absolutely  the  proposition  that  it 
is  one. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  agnostic  doctrine  that  the  Absolute 
Being  cannot  be  personal  is  still  less  tenable.  The  Ultimate 
Substance  is  first  defined  in  such  a  way  that  personality  cannot 
belong  to  it ;  and  then  a  solemn  argument  is  constructed  to  show 
that  we  cannot  properly  conceive  it  as  personal !  "  The  definition 
of  the  Absolute,"  says  Mr.  Fiske,^  "  is  that  which  exists  out  of 
all  relations.'*  In  like  manner  Dean  Mansel  ^  says,  "  The  Abso- 
lute, as  such,  is  independent  of  all  relation."  Herbert  Spencer 
quotes  this  approvingly ;  and  all  three  deduce  the  inference  that 
the  Absolute  cannot  be  conceived,  though  Spencer  argues,  against 
Hamilton  and  Mansel,  that  the  notion  of  the  Infinite  and  the 
Absolute  is  not  a  pure  negation.  He  speaks  of  the  Absolute  as 
the  "  Irrelative  "  *  or  "  Non-relative."  ^  He  compares  the  anti- 
thesis with  that  between  the  correlative  concepts  of  Whole  and 
Part,  Equal  and  Unequal,  Singular  and  Plural,  and  says  that,  as 
there  can  be  no  idea  of  equality  without  one  of  inequality,  so 
"  the  Relative  is  itself  conceivable  as  such,  only  by  opposition  to 
the  Irrelative  or  Absolute."^  Now  this  is  mere  word-jugglery. 
It  is  true  that,  to  us  at  least,  clear  knowledge  implies  distinction 
of  one  thing  from  another,  and  especially  of  things  from  their 
opposites.      Some  conceptions  necessarily  imply  others.      Thus 

1  This  is  more  distinctly  avowed  at  a  later  point,  where  the  argument  is  more 
expanded,  pp.  366  sqq. 

2  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  i.  p.  9. 

8  Limits  of  Religions  Thought,  5th  ed.,  p.  53.     On  page  31  he  defines  it  as  "that 
■whieh  exists  in  and  by  itself,  having  no  necessaiy  relation  to  any  other  being." 
*  First  Principles,  2d  ed.,  p.  89. 
6  Ibid.,  p.  91.  6  ii,j^^  p.  89. 


416  APPENDIX. 

"  husband  "  has  no  meaning  except  as  "  wife  "  is  implied.  Mr. 
Spencer,  however,  would  apparently  find  the  true  antithesis  to  be 
"husband"  and  " not-husband."  Well,  we  can,  if  we  choose,  so 
treat  every  conception:  "sweet"  may  be  contrasted  with  the 
"not-sweet,"  "long"  with  "not-long,"  "cat"  with  "not-cat,"  etc. 
But  this  is  not  the  way  in  which  we  come  to  these  conceptions. 
A  child  learns  to  distinguish  a  cat  from  a  dog,  or  from  a  hen,  or 
from  a  horse ;  but  no  one  undertakes  to  help  the  infantile  cog- 
nitions by  contrasting  the  cat  with  the  non-cat.  So  with  the 
Kelative.  The  natural  antithesis  is  between  the  relative  and  the 
correlative.  A  parent  is  a  parent  only  as  related  to  a  child ;  a 
son  is  a  son  only  as  related  to  a  parent.  Each  term  is  relative; 
each  is  related  to  the  other ;  there  is  an  antithesis,  not  of  contra- 
diction, but  of  relation.  Now,  when  one  speaks  of  the  Relative  in 
the  abstract,  he  is  speaking  of  what  has  no  substantial  existence ; 
and  it  is  mere  word-play  to  set  it  over  against  a  Non-relative  that 
has  as  little  substantial  existence.^  If  one  speaks  of  a  particular 
thing,  as,  say,  of  the  Mediterranean,  one  may  describe  it  by  setting 
forth  its  relations,  —  its  length  and  breadth,  as  related  to  a  con- 
ventional standard  of  measurement;  its  constitution,  as  related 
to  other  material  substances  ;  its  position,  as  related  to  continents 
and  oceans,  etc.  Any  one  concept  is  thus  defined  by  a  multitude 
of  relations.  But  if  any  one  should  define  the  Mediterranean  as 
the  Relative,  or  a  Relative,  to  be  conceived  and  defined  as  con- 
trasted with  the  Absolute,  we  should  have  doubts  of  his  sanity, 
Now,  what  we  know  of  relations  has  to  do  with  these  mutual  rela- 
tions, —  correlations.  In  a  general  way,  it  may  be  said  that  every 
individual  object  is  related  to  every  other  more  or  less  intimately. 
The  cosmos  is  a  network  of  correlated  things.  But  by  what 
right  do  we  lump  all  these  things  together  and  dub  them  "  the 
Relative  "  ?  There  is  no  ground  for  doing  so,  and  no  meaning  in 
it,  unless  we  know  of  some  object  which  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  totality  of  the  cosmos,  and  which  yet  sustains  a  relation 
to  it.  But  if  there  is  such  an  object ;  if  for  this  purpose  the 
1  A  little  child  once  asked  his  mother,  "Does  God  know  everything?"  "Yes, 
certainly,"  she  replied.  "  No,"  was  the  retort,  "  there  is  one  thing  he  does  not  know  ; 
he  does  not  know  what  '  gookie '  means."  This  "  gookie,"  which  the  child  had  invented 
as  meaning  nothing,  may  not  inaptly  be  likened  to  the  philosophers'  Relative,  being  abont 
equally  shadowy  and  unmeaning ;  and  the  setting  of  the  Relative  and  the  Non-relative 
over  against  each  other,  with  the  philosophical  subtleties  that  are  connected  with  the 
process,  is  about  as  instructive  as  it  would  be  to  discourse  about  the  "gookie"  and  the 
"  non-gookie." 


PERSONALITY  AND   THE   ABSOLUTE.  417 

cosmos  may  be  conceived  as  a  unit,  and  the  otlier  object  as  another 
unit,  —  then  the  two  objects  are  related  to  each  other;  they  are 
correlatives.  If,  for  example,  the  universe  of  animate  and  inan- 
imate things  is  as  a  whole  conceived  to  have  been  created  by  a 
Divine  Being,  then  this  Being  and  the  Universe  are  related  to 
each  other  as  Creator  and  Creation.  Mr.  Spencer  himself  cannot 
avoid  implying  this.  He  speaks  repeatedly  of  the  ''relation" 
between  the  Relative  and  the  Non-relative. '  Now,  if  one  chooses 
to  call  the  world  as  a  whole  the  Relative,  he  can  do  so ;  albeit  the 
expression  conveys  no  clear  sense.  Also,  if  he  chooses,  he  can 
conceive  the  world  as  distinguished  from  and  related  to  the  Deity, 
and  can  call  the  Deity  the  Absolute.  But  if,  after  thus  naming 
these  correlative  objects,  he  adds  that  the  proper  dehnition  of  the 
Absolute  is  that  which  is  independent  of  all  relations,  and  goes 
on  to  entangle  himself  in  metaphysical  snarls  growing  out  of  this 
gratuitous  self-contradiction,  it  is  difficult  to  have  patience  with 
the  process,  or  to  have  much  respect  for  the  logical  acumen  of  the 
reasoner. 

Yet  this  is  precisely  what  these  writers  do.  The  existence  of 
the  Absolute  is  inferred  from  the  essential  relativity  of  human 
knowledge.  "There  can  be  no  impressions  unless  there  exist  a 
something  which  is  impressed  and  a  something  which  impresses. 
.  .  .  Abolish  the  noumenon,  and  the  phenomenon  is  by  the  same 
act  annihilated."  Consequently,  it  is  said,  we  must  postulate  a 
First  Cause.  But  such  a  cause  "  can  have  no  necessary  relation 
to  any  other  form  of  being ; "  for  if  it  had,  it  would  be  partially 
dependent  upon  that  other  form  of  being,  and  would  not  be  the 
First  Cause.  Consequently  the  First  Cause  must  be  complete  in 
itself,  independent  of  all  relations  ;  that  is,  it  must  be  absolute.^ 
And  so  the  result  is  that,  since  the  phenomenal  world  cannot  be 
conceived  except  as  related  to  a  cause  (which  cause  must  then  of 
course  be  related  to  the  world),  this  cause  must  be  one  that  has  no 
relations,  and  consequently  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  world!  It 
needs  but  a  small  modicum  of  clear  thought  to  enable  one  to  say  : 
If  (as  is  affirmed)  the  Relative  and  the  Absolute  imply  one  an- 
other, that  is,  are  correlatives,  then  both  the  Relative  and  the  Abso- 
lute are  relatives ;  consequently,  to  define  the  Absolute  as  the 
Non-relative  is  a  simple  piece  of  stupidity  and  superfluous  self- 
contradiction. 

^  First  Principles,  vol.  i.  p.  91. 

*  This  is  given  almost  verbatim  from  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  i.  pp.  8,  9,  87. 
27 


418  APPEXDIX. 

So  witli  regard  to  the  conception  of  the  Infinite.  No  doubt 
there  are  difficulties  in  framing  this  conception.  From  the  time 
when  Zeno  proved  the  impossibility  of  motion,  down  to  the  time 
when  Kant  and  Hamilton  set  forth  their  antinomies,  the  specu- 
lative mind  has  amused  or  vexed  itself  with  metaphysical  puzzles 
growing  out  of  the  conceptions  of  the  infinite  and  the  infinitesi- 
mal.^ If  the  Infinite  is  conceived  as  the  sum  total  of  reality  — 
as  the  All  —  then  there  is  no  Finite  that  can  be  contrasted  with 
it,  unless  we  conceive  of  the  Infinite  as  a  whole,  made  up  of  finite 
parts.  But  such  an  Infinite  would  not  be  truly  infinite,  unless  we 
assume  the  finite  parts  to  be  infinite  in  number ;  and  even  then 
the  conception  is  not  pure.  The  parts  may  be  conceived  as  smaller 
or  larger.  Would  an  infinite  number  of  large  parts  make  a 
larger  Infinite  than  an  infinite  number  of  small  ones?  Now,  when 
one  simply  defines  God  as  the  Infinite,  and  (consciously  or  un- 
consciously) cherishes  this  quantitative  conception  of  infinity, 
and  yet  desires  to  distinguish  the  material  universe  and  the 
human  race  from  God,  he  can  involve  himself  in  inextricable 
tangles.  But  why,  in  the  name  of  common  sense,  should  one 
manufacture  a  maze  to  get  lost  in  ?  What  is  the  necessity  for 
attaching  to  the  Deity  this  mathematical  notion  of  quantitative 
boundlessness  ?  If  he  is  thought  of  as  Spirit,  such  a  physical 
conception  of  him  is  incongruous.  If  the  term  Infinite  is  applied 
to  him  at  all,  it  must  be  so  defined  as  to  be  consistent  with  what 
is  really  thought  about  him.  He  cannot  be  thought  of  as  occupy- 
ing infinite  space  ;  and  as  to  infinite  duration,  whatever  difficulty 
may  inhere  in  the  conception,  it  is  no  greater  as  related  to  God 
than  as  related  to  any  single  atom,  or  the  universe  of  atoms, 

1  The  puzzles  are  real ;  and  it  is  not  a  full  solution  to  argue,  with  Spencer  and  many- 
other  critics  of  the  Hamiltonian  doctrine,  that  we  have  a  positive  though  inadequate, 
as  distinguished  from  a  negative,  conception  of  the  Infinite.  All  men  can  have  only 
an  inadequate  notion  of  the  distance  between  the  earth  and  Sirius ;  but  it  can  be  ex- 
pressed in  figures  which  have  a  definite  relation  to  distances  of  which  we  do  have  a  very- 
positive  conception.  But  when  it  is  said  that  100  forms  no  larger  proportion  of  an 
infinite  number  than  10  does,  we  are  introduced  into  an  altogether  different  order  of 
relations.  We  can  after  a  sort  conceive  of  half  the  distance  to  Sirius  ;  but  when  it  is 
said  that  an  infinite  distance  is  not  divisible  into  parts,  while  we  may  still  retain  the 
positive  conception  of  distance,  the  infinity,  qua  infinity,  is  certainly  not  positively 
conceived.  But  this  does  not  imply  that  we  may  not  have  a  positive  notion  of  some- 
thing of  which  infinity  is  predicated.  We  have  a  positive  notion  of  space  ;  and  when 
we  say  that  space  is  infinite,  we  still  retain  the  positive  notion  of  space,  though  we  do 
not  have  a  positive  conception  of  the  infinity. 


PERSOXALITY  A2^D  THE  ABSOLUTE.  419 

provided  they  are  conceived  as  eternal.  Wlien  infinity  is  predi- 
cated of  his  knowledge  or  his  power,  it  can  properly  mean  no 
more  than  that  he  can  know  all  that  there  is  to  know,  and  do  all 
that  can  be  done  consistently  with  his  other  attributes  and  with 
the  nature  of  things. 

When,  now,  we  are  loftily  told  that  personality  is  utterly  incon- 
sistent with  infinity  and  absoluteness,  we  can  receive  the  dictum 
with  great  equanimity.  Personality,  it  is  said,  involves  limitation. 
Consciousness,  we  are  reminded,  is  formed  of  successive  states, 
whereas  such  a  succession  is  irreconcilable  with  the  unchange- 
ableness  and  omniscience  ascribed  to  the  Deity.  Volition  in  like 
manner  is  declared  to  be  quite  inconceivable  in  an  infinite  being. 
"The  willing  of  each  end  excludes  from  consciousness  for  an 
interval  the  willing  of  other  ends,  and  therefore  is  inconsistent 
with  that  omnipresent  activity  which  simultaneously  works  out 
an  infinity  of  ends."  Likewise,  inasmuch  as  intelligence,  as 
alone  conceivable  by  us,  presupposes  existences  independent  of  it 
and  objective  to  it,  "to  speak  of  an  intelligence  which  exists 
in  the  absence  of  all  such  alien  activities  is  to  use  a  meaningless 
word."  The  conclusion,  then,  is  that  our  conception  of  the  First 
Cause  is  not  pure,  till  it  has  sloughed  off  all  these  anthropomor- 
phic limitations,  and  "  becomes  a  consciousness  which  transcends 
the  forms  of  distinct  thought,  though  it  forever  remains  a 
consciousness."  ^ 

After  having  established  this  point,  Mr.  Spencer  proceeds  to 
meet  an  objection  naturally  raised  against  his  ghost  theory  of  the 
origin  of  religious  conceptions.  Since  the  savage's  notion  of 
"  the  material  double  of  a  dead  man  "  is  baseless,  how,  it  is  asked, 
can  a  purification  of  this  conception  lead  to  anything  better 
founded  ?  "  If  the  primitive  belief  was  absolutely  false,  all  de- 
rived beliefs  must  be  absolutely  false."  To  this  it  is  replied  that 
there  is,  after  all,  a  germ  of  truth  in  the  primitive  conception,  "the 
truth,  namely,  that  the  power  which  manifests  itself  in  conscious- 
ness is  but  a  differently  conditioned  form  of  the  power  which 
manifests  itself  beyond  consciousness."  That  is,  it  is  explained, 
every  voluntary  act  yields  to  the  primitive  man  proof  of  a  source 
of  energy  within  him.  His  "sense  of  effort,  being  the  perceived 
antecedent  of  changes  jjroduced  by  him,  becomes  the  conceived 
antecedent  of  changes  not  produced  by  him."     He  conceives  the 

1  H.  Spencer,  Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  2d  ed.,  pp.  835-837  (Part  VI.  of  Prin- 
ciples of  Sociology/). 


420  APPENDIX. 

"  doubles  of  the  dead  "  to  be  the  workers  of  "  all  but  the  most 
familiar  changes."  In  course  of  time  the  idea  of  force  "comes 
to  be  less  and  less  associated  with  the  idea  of  a  human  ghost," 
and  "  the  dissociation  reaches  its  extreme  in  the  thoughts  of  the 
man  of  science  who  interprets  in  terms  of  force  not  only  the 
visible  changes  of  sensible  bodies,  but  all  physical  changes  what- 
ever." Nevertheless  even  the  scientist  "  is  compelled  to  symbolize 
objective  force  in  terms  of  subjective  force  from  lack  of  any  other 
symbol."  And  so,  "the  final  outcome  of  that  speculation  com- 
menced  by  the  primitive  man,  is  that  the  Power  manifested  through- 
out the  Universe  distinguished  as  material  is  the  same  Power 
which  in  ourselves  wells  up  under  the  form  of  consciousness."^ 

It  is  difficult  not  to  think  that  Mr.  Spencer  feels  the  force  of 
the  objection  more  keenly  than  he  confesses.  If  not,  his  compo- 
sure is  not  creditable  to  his  perspicacity.  Observe  the  position : 
Personality,  as  implying  self-consciousness,  volition,  and  intelli- 
gence, is  declared  to  be  quite  inconceivable  in  the  Absolute  Being. 
The  process  of  "deanthropomorphization"  (to  use  Mr.  Piske's 
term)  has  gone  so  far  as  to  abolish  all  the  characteristics  of  per- 
sonality from  the  Pirst  Cause  and  leave  it  nothing  but  pure  Force 
or  Energy  as  its  essential  feature.  "The  last  stage  reached  is 
recognition  of  the  truth  that  force  as  it  exists  beyond  conscious- 
ness cannot  be  like  what  we  know  as  force  within  consciousness ; 
and  that  yet,  as  either  is  capable  of  generating  the  other,  they 
must  be  different  modes  of  the  same."  '^  Here  are  several  strange 
things :  (1)  Two  forms  of  force  are  declared  to  be  "  different 
modes  of  the  same,"  and  yet  not  "like."  Just  before  we  are  told 
that  the  internal  energy  of  which  external  changes  are  the  conse- 
quents "  is  the  same  energy  which,  freed  from  anthropomorphic 
accompaniments,  is  now  figured  as  the  cause  of  all  external  phe- 
nomena." The  same  energy,  and  yet  not  like  !  But  (2)  this  same- 
ness is  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  two  forms  are  capable 
of  generating  each  other.  The  conscious  person  generates  force. 
Good ;  let  this  be  granted.  And  the  conscious  person  is  led  by 
the  principle  of  causality  to  infer  a  power  outside  of  him  as  the 
cause  of  his  conscious  personality.  Good  again  ;  but  how  does  it 
appear  that  the  two  forces  are  necessarily  the  same  ?  All  that 
consciousness  testifies  to  is  at  best  only  that  there  is  causation  in 
the  two  cases.     But  if  they  are  the  same  because  both  are  the 

1  Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  2d  ed.,  pp.  837-839. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  839. 


PERSONALITY   AND  THE  ABSOLUTE.  421 

result  of  energy,  why  not  conclude  that  both  kinds  are  conscious 
energy  rather  than  that  one  is  conscious  and  the  other  uncon- 
scious ?  All  that  we  are  directly  conscious  of  is  the  exercise  of 
force  in  ourselves.  If  this  is  the  primitive  source  of  our  notion 
of  power,  then  how  does  it  come  to  be  so  defecated  as  to  lose  the 
one  characteristic  (volition)  which  originally  marked  it]  But 
our  perplexity  is  increased,  when  we  compare  all  this  with  what 
Mr.  Spencer  elsewhere  ^  says.  Speaking  of  the  First  Cause,  he 
says,  "  Can  it  be  like  in  kind  to  anything  of  which  we  have  sen- 
sible experience?  Obviously  not.  Between  the  creating  and  the 
created  there  must  be  a  distinction  transcending  any  of  the 
distinctions  existing  between  different  divisions  of  the  created. 
That  which  is  uncaused  cannot  be  assimilated  to  that  which  is 
caused,  the  two  being,  in  the  very  naming,  antithetically  opposed. 
...  It  is  impossible  to  put  the  Absolute  in  the  same  category  with 
anything  relative."  But  now  we  are  assured  that  the  two  kinds 
of  force  generate  each  other ;  each  is  both  creator  and  created ; 
instead  of  arguing  that  the  creating  and  the  created  must  as  such 
be  utterly  unlike,  he  assumes  them  for  that  very  reason  to  be 
only  different  modes  of  the  same  power !  (3)  Another  difficulty 
appears  when  we  ask  why  the  distinction  between  the  Absolute 
and  the  Relative  is  so  fatal  to  personality  in  the  Absolute,  but  is 
not  also  fatal  to  power  in  the  Absolute.  Consciousness,  will,  etc. 
in  finite  man,  we  are  told,  are  known  only  as  concerned  with  suc- 
cession, with  correlated  existences,  etc.  Therefore,  it  is  said, 
these  attributes  of  personality  cannot  belong  to  the  Absolute, 
since  they  would  annul  the  absoluteness.  Well,  then,  what  about 
the  power  of  which  the  finite  person  is  conscious?  Does  not 
every  exertion  of  power  imply  an  objective  something  on  which 
it  is  exerted?  Does  it  not  imply  succession  in  time?  Each  exer- 
tion can  be  conceived  as  real,  only  as  distinguished  from  others. 
Finiteness  and  relativity  belong  to  the  exertion  of  power  as  much 
as  to  the  phenomena  of  consciousness.  How  then  can  there  be  an 
Absolute  Power,  but  not  an  Absolute  Person  ?  Every  metaphys- 
ical difficulty  which  may  be  brought  against  the  one  may  be 
equally  well  brought  against  the  other ;  and  the  upshot,  if  one 
allows  himself  to  be  frightened  by  the  bugbear  of  the  Absolute  at 
all,  is  that  it  must  be  pronounced  to  be  without  any  definable 
character  whatever.     It  can  only  be  called  Something,  unless  the 

1  Firsl  PriHciples,  2d  ed.,  p.  8L 


422  APPENDIX. 

Hegelian  designation,  Nothing,  may  be  thought  preferable.  IMr. 
Spencer,  to  be  sure,  resents  the  imputation  that  in  making  the 
Absolute  unknowable  he  makes  it  a  mere  negation,  and  takes 
offense  at  Mr,  Harrison  for  calling  his  Absolute  the  "All-nothing- 
ness." ^  But  he  does  not  satisfactorily  meet  the  charge  that  his 
doctrine  of  the  Absolute  is  self-contradictory.  He  has  no  right  to 
call  it  unknowable,  if  he  knows  it  to  be  a  power  at  all.  But  ac- 
cording to  his  premises  respecting  the  absolute,  he  has  no  right  to 
predicate  power  or  any  other  conceivable  attribute  to  it. 

We  can,  therefore,  afford  to  listen  with  great  composure  to 
these  oracular  utterances  respecting  the  impossibility  of  predicat- 
ing personality  of  the  Absolute.  Even  though  we  may  concede 
that  for  us  conscious  personality  involves  a  constant  succession 
and  change  of  conscious  states,^  we  are  not  therefore  obliged  to 
assume  that  there  can  be  no  form  of  consciousness,  in  which 
there  is  no  such  change  and  succession.  But  even  if  it  could  be 
proved  that  consciousness  necessarily  implies  change  and  suc- 
cession, what  shall  the  theist  say  ?  Why,  simply  that  God, 
then,  is  not  unchangeable  in  any  such  sense  as  to  exclude  con- 
sciousness. If  any  scholastic  notions  of  the  divine  attributes 
lead  to  a  doctrine  of  God  which  involves  such  a  limitation  of 
him,  there  is  no  law  of  the  Medes  and  Persians  which  prohibits 
us  from  abandoning  such  a  self-fettering  method  of  conceiving 
the  Deity .^  Absolute  and  rigid  changelessness  is  neither  a  more 
precious,  nor  a  more  necessary,  element  in  our  conception  of  the 
Deity  than  conscious  personality.  Least  of  all  need  we  to  be 
frightened  from  the  current  notion  of  the  divine  Personality  by  a 
philosopher  who  tries  to  frighten  us  from  it  by  a  process  of 
argumentation  which  swarms  with  self-contradictions. 

1  Nineteenth  Century,  1884,  p.  502. 

2  As  argued  by  Mr.  Spencer,  Prhiciples  of  Tsychology,  chap.  xxvi.  et  passim. 

8  Cf.  the  Neiv  Englander,  1875,  my  article  on  the  Metaphi/sical  Idea  of  Eternifi/. 


THE  PKIMEVAL  REVELATION.  423 


EXCURSUS    IV.^ 

LELAND  AND  WATSON  ON  THE  PRIMEVAL  REVELATION. 

pROFESSOE  FLINT  {Thekm,  ed.  5,  note  iv,  p.  338)  quotes 
and  endorses  Dr.  Fairbairn  on  this  point.  He  makes  the 
additional  argument,  that  the  theory  of  primeval  revelation  is  in- 
consistent with  the  Protestant  rejection  of  tradition,  besides  be- 
ing "wholly  untenable  in  the  light  of  modern  science."  He 
does  not  explain  how  either  of  these  considerations  conflicts  with 
the  theory.  Such  an  explanation  is  especially  needed,  inasmuch 
as  he  has  immediately  before  (p.  21)  distinctly  emphasized  that 
"  we  owe  our  theism  in  great  part  to  our  Christianity,  —  that 
natural  religion  has  had  no  real  existence  prior  to  or  apart  from 
what  has  claimed  to  be  revealed  religion."  His  view,  then,  ap- 
parently is  the  very  defensible  one,  that  religion  is  both  natural 
and  revealed,  that  man  has  a  natural  tendency  to  believe  in  a 
God,  and  that  God  also  has  from  the  beginning  specially  revealed 
himself,  thus  confirming  the  natural  tendency.  It  is  not  obvious 
what  especially  new  light  has  been  thrown  on  this  problem  by 
the  wider  study  of  ethnography  which.  Dr.  Flint  intimates,  has 
overthrown  the  theory  of  a  primitive  revelation  as  a  source  of 
religious  belief.  Whatever  difficulties  may  be  found  in  the  mul- 
tiplicity and  diversity  of  human  religions,  these  do  not  disprove 
the  theory  of  a  primitive  revelation  which  may  have  become 
corrupted  or  obscured.  Professor  Flint  refers  with  approval  to 
Professor  Cocker's  discussion  of  this  question  in  his  Christianity 
and  Greek  Philosophy.  Cocker  holds  that  "the  universal  phe- 
nomenon of  religion  has  originated  in  the  a  ^r/ori  apperceptions 
of  reason  and  the  natural  instinctive  feelings  of  the  heart,  which 
from  age  to  age  have  been  vitalized,  unfolded,  and  perfected  by 
supernatural  communications  and  testamentary  revelations  "  (p. 
97).  He  refers  (p.  86)  with  condemnation  to  Leland,  Watson, 
and  others  as  holding  that  "all  our  religious  knowledge  is  de- 
rived from  oral  revelation  alone."  The  difference  between  the 
two  views  is,  however,  too  much  emphasized.  Thus  Leland  (Ad- 
1  Sec  p.  G'J. 


424  APPENDIX. 

vantage  and  Necessity  of  the  Christian  Revelation,  cliap.  i.  p.  35) 
starts  with  the  proposition  that  "  man  is  a  religious  creature." 
He  says  (p.  36)  that  ''men  have  faculties  capable  of  contem- 
plating the  great  Author  of  their  being,  and  (pp.  38,  39)  that  God 
"originally  formed  and  designed  him  for  religion.  .  .  .  He  put 
him  at  his  first  creation  into  an  immediate  capacity  of  answering 
this  end  of  his  being  and  entering  on  a  life  of  religion."  He  then 
adds  that  we  must  suppose,  either  that  God  left  man  to  himself 
"to  acquire  the  knowledge  of  religion  and  his  duty  by  the  mere 
force  of  his  own  unassisted  reason  and  experience,  or  .  .  .  that 
the  wise  Author  of  his  being,  at  his  first  creation,  communicated 
to  him  such  a  knowledge  of  religion  as  enabled  him  immediately 
to  know  his  Maker  and  the  duty  required  of  him."  The  argu- 
ment is  that  it  is  not  probable  that  God  would  leave  the  first 
man  without  adequate  religious  knowledge.  And  to  the  sug- 
gestion that  man  "  by  the  force  of  his  own  reason  might  soon 
acquire  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  God  and  of  his  duty,  and  con- 
sequently of  true  religion,"  he  replies  that,  "though  the  main 
principles  of  all  religion,  .  .  .  when  clearly  propounded  to  the 
human  mind,  .  .  .  are  perfectly  agreeable  to  the  most  improved 
reason  and  understanding  of  man,  yet  it  can  hardly  be  supposed 
that  the  first  man  or  men,  if  left  to  themselves  without  any  in- 
struction or  information,  would  have  been  able  to  have  formed  in 
a  short  time  a  right  scheme  of  religion  for  themselves  founded 
upon  those  principles.  It  would  probably  have  been  a  long  time 
before  he  raised  his  thoughts  to  things  spiritual  and  invisible,  and 
attained  to  such  a  knowledge  and  contemplation  of  the  work  of 
nature  as  to  have  inferred  from  thence  the  necessary  existence  of 
the  one  only  true  God  and  his  infinite  perfections"  (p.  40).  It  is 
here  clearly  implied  that  man,  as  originally  created,  not  only  had 
the  capacity  for  understanding  a  revelation,  but  also  had  faculties 
by  which  he  might  in  course  of  time  have  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  God  and  duty.  There  is  in  reality  only  the  slightest  difference 
between  Leland  and  Cocker.  The  latter  emphasizes  that  religion 
must  have  originated  in  the  apperceptions  of  reason,  that  a  revela- 
tion could  not  have  been  apprehended  or  believed  without  a  pre- 
vious belief  in  the  reality  of  God.  Leland  urges  that  God  could 
not  have  left  man  to  himself,  and  must  therefore  at  the  very  out- 
set have  made  himself  more  particularly  known.  The  one  lays 
stress  on  the  one  side,  the  other  on  the  other ;  but  both  admit 
both ;  and  they  are  substantially  at  one. 


THE  PRIMEVAL  REVELATION.  425 

The  ca,se  is  nearly  the  same  with  Watson.  He  concludes  in- 
deed {Theological  Institutes,  vol.  i.  p.  303)  that  <'  we  owe  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  his  attributes  to  revelation 
alone."  But  he  not  only  follows  this  statement  with  the  other, 
that  these  being  now  discovered,  "the  rational  evidence  of  both  is 
convincing  and  irresistible,"  but  he  also  says,  when  first  arguing 
for  the  necessity  of  a  revelation  :  ''  The  whole  of  this  argument  is 
designed  to  prove  that,  had  we  been  left,  for  the  regulation  of  our 
conduct,  to  infer  the  will  and  purposes  of  the  Supreme  Being 
from  his  natural  works  and  his  administration  of  the  affairs  of 
the  world,  our  knowledge  of  both  would  have  been  essentially  defi- 
cient ;  and  it  establishes  a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  a  direct 
revelation  from  God  to  his  creatures,  that  neither  his  will  con- 
cerning us  nor  the  hope  of  forgiveness  might  be  left  to  dark  and 
uncertain  inference,  but  be  the  subject  of  an  express  declaration" 
(p.  12).  Here  again  it  is  plainly  implied  that,  left  to  himself, 
man  might  have  inferred,  by  the  use  of  his  natural  faculties,  the 
existence  and  the  will  of  God ;  it  is,  however,  argued  that  this 
inference  would  have  been  uncertain,  and  would  have  fallen  short 
of  positive  knoicledge.  Watson  does  not  deny,  but  asserts,  that 
one's  natural  constitution  predisposes  him  to  inquire  concerning 
God  and  his  will.  He  only  insists  that  man's  full  knowledge  of 
God  comes  from  revelation,  whereas  without  the  revelation  men 
would  have  been  able,  at  the  best,  only  to  infer  and  conjecture 
the  existence  and  character  of  a  Divine  Being. 


426  APPEKDIX. 


EXCUESUS  W 

THE   CERTAINTIES    OF   THE    AGNOSTIC. 

THE  demand  which  is  made  by  the  author  of  Supernatural 
Religion,  that,  before  any  testimony  for  the  occurrence  of  a 
miracle  can  even  be  listened  to,  the  existence  of  a  personal  God 
must  first  be  demonstratively  established,  provokes  one  to  a 
retort  the  validity  of  which,  on  the  ground  assumed  by  him,  ought 
not  to  be  questioned.  The  argument  against  miracles  rests  upon 
the  assumption  that  certain  laws  of  nature  are  incontestabl}^  as- 
certained to  be  facts.  But  suppose  one  should  question  the  cer- 
tainty of  this  assumption.  The  very  existence  of  a  material 
world  has  been  plausibly  denied  by  many  philosophers ;  and 
many  others,  if  not  the  most,  admit  that  the  existence  of  such 
a  world  is  a  mere  inference  from  certain  mental  phenomena. 
And  even  if  one  adopts  the  common-sense  doctrine  of  the  direct 
perception  of  matter,  yet  he  is  soon  nonplussed  by  the  allegation 
that  what  seems  to  be  directly  perceived  is  only  seemingly  per- 
ceived, —  that  matter  is  made  up  of  invisible  atoms  prohaUij ; 
or,  if  not  of  atoms,  of  forces  which  answer  the  same  purpose ; 
and  that  atoms,  in  order  to  unite  in  the  formation  of  concrete 
objects,  must  further  be  assumed  to  be  supplemented  by  ether, 
which  is  also  invisible  and  still  more  hypothetical  than  the 
atoms.  Matter,  therefore,  being  something  inferred,  but  never 
perceived,  of  course  all  propositions  concerning  the  laivs  of  matter 
must  be  equally  hypothetical,  or  even  more  so ;  for  our  notion  of 
laws  depends  on  induction ;  the  laws  must  come  as  a  secondary 
inference.  The  fact  of  matter  must  be  more  certain  than  the 
special  qualities  of  it.  Consequently  the  laws  of  matter  must 
be  more  hypothetical  than  the  fact  of  matter ;  there  is  an  un- 
certainty of  the  second  degree.  But  this  overthrows  the  whole 
argument  against  the  reality  of  miracles.  The  argument  rests  on 
the  assumption  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  known  and  are  ab- 
solutely uniform ;  but  if  the  very  existence  of  the  natural  world 
is  philosophically  dubious,  if  it  is  problematical  whether  matter 
itself  is  a  reality,  of  course  no  solid  conclusion  can  be  founded 
on  the  supposed  inviolability  of  the  laivs  of  matter.  It  is  true, 
1  See  p.  100. 


THE   CERTAINTIES   OF  THE   AGNOSTIC.  427 

this  skeptical  conclusion  invalidates  the  argument  for  miracles 
as  much  as  the  one  against  them  ;  it  brings  us  to  the  point  at 
which  all  argument  and  all  belief  are  annulled.  But  it  shows 
that  the  boasted  argument  against  the  credibility  of  miracles  is 
a  gun  which  is  as  destructive  at  the  breech  as  at  the  muzzle.  He 
who  in  so  lordly  a  manner  treats  theism  as  a  mere  hypothesis 
not  deserving  any  consideration,  unless  it  can  be  established  by 
a  mathematical  demonstration,  may  well  be  required  to  consider 
how  deficient  his  own  argument  is  in  the  rigid  conclusiveness 
which  he  demands  of  others.^ 

The  author's  faith  in  natural  law  is  so  great  that  he  sees  no 
need  of  any  special  interference  on  the  part  of  God,  even  if  there 
be  a  God.  After  giving  a  representation,  not  to  say  caricature, 
of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  creation,  the  fall,  and  redemp- 
tion, he  remarks  that  the  theory  of  a  depravation,  and  the  con- 
sequent need  of  a  redemption,  of  man  is  entirely  disproved  by 
"  the  constitution  of  nature,"  which,  he  says,  "  bears  everywhere 
the  record  of  systematic  upward  progression."  The  Christian 
theory,  he  goes  on  to  say,  "  is  contradicted  by  the  whole  opera- 
tion of  natural  laws,  which  contain  in  themselves  inexorable 
penalties  against  retrogression  "  (p.  49)  ;  and  he  then  fortifies 
this  statement  by  a  quotation  from  Herbert  Spencer  {Social 
Statics,  p.  64),  who  gives  a  demonstration  of  this  proposition, 
and  invites  any  one  who  demurs  to  it  to  point  out  the  error. 
The  argument  is  in  brief  that,  all  imperfection  being  "  unfitness 
to  the  conditions  of  existence,"  and  this  unfitness  consisting  in 
a  deficiency  or  excess  of  faculties,  both  the  deficiency  and  the 

1  An  interesting  instance  of  the  adventurousness  of  scientists  with  respect  to  things 
unknown  is  found  in  an  author  ( Philipp  Spiller,  Die  Entstehung  der  Welt,  1870,  and 
other  works),  who  makes  ether  the  primeval  source  of  all  heing  and  development  (p.  508 
et passim).  Yet  the  very  existence  of  any  such  ether  is  an  unproved  hypothesis;  the 
conception  is  one  which  it  is  impossible  to  carry  out  without  self-contradiction.  The 
existence  of  ether  is  assumed  in  order  to  account  for  effects  apparently  produced  by  one 
body  on  another  at  a  distance  from  it  (action  at  a  distance  being  assumed  to  be  impos- 
sible); but  the  ether  itself  being  conceived  to  be  extraordinarily  rarefied,  its  particles 
must  (in  proportion  to  their  size)  be  at  a  considerable  distance  from  one  another;  and 
so  we  have,  after  all,  action  at  a  distance  ;  and  even  if  we  assume  a  still  finer  and  more 
gaseous  substance  to  fill  up  the  still  empty  space  between  the  several  ether  particles,  and 
so  ad  hifinitum,  we  still  do  not  get  away  from  the  assumption  of  action  at  a  distance. 
Yet  the  pressure  and  movements  of  this  ether  are  made  by  Spiller  to  explain  gravitation, 
electricity,  life,  and  everything  else.  This  is  called  science  —  sure  knowledge.  Herbert 
Spencer  forcibly  states  the  metaphysical  difficulty  involved  in  the  hypothesis  of  an  ether- 
{First  Pmiciples,  §  18). 


428  APPENDIX. 

excess  will  in  time  be  removed  by  the  very  fact  that  the  circum- 
stances of  life  always  tend  to  exercise  and  strengthen  those 
faculties  which  are  most  needed,  and  to  weaken  those  not  needed. 
Consequently  "  all  excess  and  all  deficiency  must  disappear ;  that 
is,  all  unfitness  must  disappear;  that  is,  all  imperfection  must 
disappear."  One  might  be  the  more  tempted  to  have  confidence 
in  Mr.  Spencer's  logical  substitute  for  Eedemption,  if  he  himself 
had  not  furnished  the  refutation  which  he  triumphantly  chal- 
lenges the  world  to  produce.  In  chap,  xxiii  of  his  First  Princijjles, 
he  demonstrates  with  equal  cogency  that  it  is  the  law  of  things, 
after  evolution  has  reached  a  certain  point,  that  a  process  of 
dissolution  shall  take  place,  —  a  dissolution  which  does  not  even 
wait  for  absolute  perfection  to  be  reached  before  it  begins,  but 
takes  place  when  an  "equilibrium"  has  been  reached  (p.  519), 
whatever  that  may  mean.  This  social  and  national  dissolution, 
he  says,  often  takes  place  ;  such  dissolutions  may  be  occasioned 
by  "  plague  or  famine  at  home,  or  a  revolution  abroad  "  (p.  520) ; 
this  is  a  sort  of  premature  dissolution ;  but  dissolution  must  at 
any  rate  begin  "  where  a  society  has  developed  into  the  highest 
form  permitted  by  the  characters  of  its  units  "  (p.  521).  Ulti- 
mately, he  concludes,  the  whole  solar  system  will  be  dissolved 
into  the  primeval  nebulosity,  and  then  begin  again  a  new  process 
of  evolution,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum  (pp.  527-537). 

Now,  Mr.  Spencer  can  hardly  mean  to  say  that  the  nations  which 
have  undergone  the  process  of  dissolution  had  previously  reached 
the  stage  of  absolute  perfection ;  and  the  question  arises.  What 
in  this  case  becomes  of  this  law  of  his,  according  to  which  all 
imperfection  must  ultimately  disappear  ?  The  puzzle  is  increased 
by  the  very  illustration  which  Mr.  Spencer  uses  in  the  argument 
itself  which  is  said  to  demonstrate  that  evolution  necessarily  leads 
to  perfection.  He  says,  we  infer  that  all  men  will  certainly  die, 
because  all  men  have  died,  and  that  with  the  same  certainty  we 
must  infer  that  organs  and  capacities  grow  by  use  and  diminish 
by  disuse,  simply  because  all  observation  shows  that  they  have 
thus  grown  and  diminished  in  the  past.  But  this  example  of 
death  is  a  wondrously  unhappy  illustration  to  make  use  of;  for 
what  is  death  but  the  culmination  of  a  weakening  process  which 
the  organs  undergo  in  spite  of  exercise  ?  This  is  enough  to  say 
in  reply  to  the  wonderful  argument.  It  might  indeed  be  urged 
that  the  whole  of  it  is  vitiated  by  an  utter  ignoring  of  the  facts 
of  the  moral  and  spiritual  world. 


BEYSCHLAG  ON  MIRACLES.  429 


EXCUESUS    VI.i 
Betschlag  on  the  Miracle  of  the  Loaves. 

TF  Rothe  were  now  living,  he  would  find  occasion  still  to  be  sur- 
-*-  prised  at  the  efforts  of  believing  critics  to  explain  miracles 
and  make  them  intelligible.  Among  these  efforts  may  be  men- 
tioned the  treatment  of  the  question  of  miracles  by  Beyschlag  in 
his  Leben  Jesic  (1885,  vol.  i.  pp.  34  sqq.).  He  says  that  nature  is 
in  a  state  of  disorder  caused  by  sin,  as  Paul  represents  it  (Rom. 
viii.),  and  that  the  supernatural  may  be  regarded  as  a  restoration 
of  the  truly  natural.  He  then  asks:  "What  if  this  were  the 
law  of  the  Biblical  miracles,  that  the  Spirit  of  God,  who  fills  the 
bearers  of  revelation,  releases  in  them  (especially  in  certain 
moments  of  their  official  life)  those  slumbering  higher  natural 
forces,  in  order,  in  individual,  and  as  it  were  prophetical,  cases, 
to  produce  that  abolition  of  evil  [of  which  Paul  speaks]  and  the 
restoration  of  ideal  naturalness  ? "  This  view  he  enforces  by 
the  consideration  that  the  best  attested  miracles  are  those  of 
healing,  which  is  simply  a  restoration  of  the  normal  and  natural 
conditions. 

It  is  not  clear  what  is  meant  here  by  the  suggestion  concerning 
"slumbering  forces."  Evidently  it  is  not  what  would  be  under- 
stood by  such  a  phrase  in  common  life.  The  divine  act  of  "  re- 
leasing "  the  slumbering  forces  in  the  cases  of  the  Biblical  miracles 
is  clearly  not  analogous,  say,  to  that  conjunction  of  natural  agencies 
by  which  electricity  is  discharged,  and  what  is  ordinarily  unper- 
ceived  and  appears  to  be  inactive  becomes  a  most  effective  and 
terrific  agent.  Beyschlag  in  his  definition  of  miracles  (p.  30) 
likens  God's  miraculous  intervention  to  the  act  of  a  man  whose 
will  modifies,  though  it  does  not  violate,  the  forces  of  nature. 
Very  well ;  but  human  agency  can  make  use  only  of  the  known 
and  ordinary  forces ;  it  is  no  part  of  man's  province  to  awaken 
slumbering  (that  is,  unknown)  forces.  The  hypothesis  of  such 
forces  is  manifestly  resorted  to  in  order  to  explain  the  rare  and 
exceptional  character  of  miraculous  events.  It  is  another  way 
of  saying  that  God  intervenes  at  certain  periods,  and  produces 
1  Seep.  111. 


430  APPENDIX. 

startling  effects  wliich  the  ordinary  forces  of  nature  could  not 
have  produced.  We  must  object,  however,  to  this  theory  of 
"slumbering  forces,"  in  the  first  place,  that  the  conception  is 
vague  and  fanciful.  What  is  a  slumbering  force  ?  Natural 
science  certainly  knows  nothing  of  natural  forces  which  in  any 
proper  sense  can  be  called  slumbering,  Beyschlag's  notion 
appears  to  be  that  these  forces  are  occult  and  unknown  to  natural 
science.  But  if  so,  what  right  has  one  to  postulate  them  ?  Where 
is  the  evidence  that  there  are  such  forces  ?  The  assumption  that 
they  exist  is,  moreover,  not  only  purely  imaginary,  but  entirely 
gratuitous  and  useless,  unless  it  is  assumed  that  God  cannot  act 
except  through  natural  forces.  These  slumbering  forces  are 
evidently  conceived  to  be  natural  forces.  But  we  now  meet  with  a 
second  and  still  more  serious  objection  to  this  hypothesis,  namely, 
that  it  is  self-destructive.  For  if  God  cannot  act  on  the  world 
except  through  natural  forces,  then  he  cannot  act  by  way  of 
releasing  the  slumbering  forces  except  through  other  natural 
forces.  This  act  of  releasing,  then,  according  to  the  hypothesis, 
must  be  either  simply  a  regular  normal  action  of  natural  forces  — 
in  which  case  of  course  the  result  of  it  (the  release)  must  be 
normal  and  regular,  and  therefore  no  miracle  ;  or  else  the  act  of 
releasing  must  be  an  irregular,  abnormal  action  of  the  natural 
forces  —  in  which  case  the  cause  of  the  irregularity  must  be 
looked  for  in  an  im^mediate  direct  exercise  of  divine  power.  But 
if  God  may  act  directly  (that  is,  without  the  use  of  a  natural  force) 
in  releasing  the  slumbering  force,  why  not  just  as  well  act  directly 
in  producing  a  miraculous  effect  without  the  use  of  the  slumber- 
ing force  ?  There  is  no  escape,  after  all,  from  the  hypothesis  of 
a  direct  divine  intervention,  unless  (what  no  one  would  dream  of 
doing)  we  resort  to  the  absurd  supposition  of  an  infinite  series  in 
the  business  of  releasing  slumbering  forces.  There  is,  in  short, 
no  middle  ground  between  the  theory  that  there  are  no  miracles 
in  the  proper  sense,  and  the  theory  that  God  acts  directly,  in  the 
exercise  of  supernatural  power,  for  the  production  of  miraculous 
effects. 

The  practical  application  of  this  hypothesis  is,  in  case  of  the 
more  striking  miracles,  the  explaining  away  of  the  miraculous 
element  altogether.  Beyschlag's  elucidation  of  the  miracle  of  the 
loaves  is  an  instructive  illustration  of  this  remark.  He  can  do 
no  better  than  to  dress  up  Paulus's  explanation  {Lehen  Jesu,  vol.  i. 
pp.  349  sqq.).     He  differs  from  Paulus  in  admitting  that  the 


BEYSCHLAG  ON  MIEACLES.  431 

narrative,  as  it  stands,  implies  that  the  narrators  regarded  the 
loaves  as  miraculously  multiplied.  But  the  substance  of  the 
explanation  is  the  same.  It  makes  the  miracle  to  be  a  miracle 
of  faith  on  Jesus'  part,  the  outward  act  consisting  in  nothing  else 
than  in  his  inducing  those  who  had  secretly  brought  provisions 
to  allow  their  supplies  to  be  distributed  for  the  general  benefit ! 
(vol.  ii.  p.  254  sqq.)  Yet  he  would  still  call  the  event  a  miracle. 
''  We  do  not  see,"  he  says,  "  why  the  glory  of  God  and  the  glory  of 
Christ  would  in  this  case  be  less  than  if  it  had  continually  sup- 
plied loaves  and  fishes  out  of  itself"  (vol.  i.  p.  311).  He  refers 
to  Weiss  as  substantially  agreeing  with  him.  The  latter  {Life 
of  Christ,  vol.  ii.  pp.  385  sq.)  does  favor  a  similar  explanation, 
though  he  does  not  conceive  the  food  as  concealed.  He  represents 
the  miracle  as  one  of  "divine  providence."  Jesus  exercised,  as 
it  were,  a  miracle  of  faith  in  being  assured  that  the  needed  supply 
would  come  somehow.  But  he  says  that  this  theory  is  a  hypothe- 
sis to  which  no  one  is  committed.  "  Simple  faith,"  he  adds,  "  is 
not  interdicted  from  keeping  to  the  idea  of  a  creative  miracle." 
In  Beyschlag's  case  this  attempt  to  explain  the  miracle  is  part  and 
parcel  of  a  systematic  explaining  away  of  the  supernatural  in  in- 
stances where  a  direct  exertion  of  supernatural  power  on  irrational 
nature  seems  to  be  affirmed.  Christ's  stilling  the  waves,  walking 
on  the  water,  turning  water  into  wine,  etc.  are  called  '-'unnatural," 
as  these  events  are  reported  to  us,  and  are  consequently  all  ex- 
plained away.  The  real  truth  he  assumes  to  be  that,  in  some 
cases,  as,  for  example,  the  walking  on  the  water,  the  disciples  were 
mistaken  in  regard  to  the  fact,  and  that  Jesus,  not  knowing  of 
their  error,  had  no  occasion  to  correct  it.  But  a  more  sober  criti- 
cism will  be  likely  to  find  these  explanations  more  "  unnatural " 
than  the  miracles  themselves  would  have  been.  Beyschlag  (vol. 
i.  p.  310)  says :  "  It  is  a  contra-natural  notion  that  the  baked 
loaves  and  the  roasted  fishes  should  have  grown  under  his  hands. 
That  is  not  the  manner  in  which  God  helps  or  creates.  When  he 
vouchsafes  to  an  August  Hermann  Francke  to  found  an  orphan- 
house  with  five  dollars,  he  does  it  by  causing  the  remainder  of  the 
money  to  be  contributed  to  the  man  who  in  courageous  faith  has 
engaged  in  the  enterprise.  Why  should  we  not  conceive  Jesus' 
act  of  faith  and  love  in  the  wilderness  as  crowned  with  success 
in  the  same  way  ?  "  The  obvious  answer  to  this  qiiestion  is : 
Because  the  narrative  gives  no  hint  of  any  such  explanation  of 
the  event.     The  narrative  distinctly  tells  us  that  there  were  only 


432  APPENDIX. 

five  loaves  and  two  fishes  with  which  to  supply  the  multitude. 
The  critics  imagine  that  in  the  crowd  there  is  enough,  and  more 
than  enough,  to  satisfy  the  whole  five  thousand.  The  narrative 
tells  us  that  Jesus  took  these  five  loaves  and  two  fishes  and  gave 
them  to  the  multitude.  The  critics  imagine  that  he  somehow 
learned  about  other  supplies,  and  got  hold  of  them  and  really  gave 
these  to  the  multitude.  The  narrative  tells  us  that  when  the 
people  saw  this  "  sign  "  they  called  Jesus  a  prophet  and  wanted 
even  to  make  him  a  king  (John  vi.  14,  15).  The  critics  tell  us 
that  there  was  no  "  sign  "  at  all,  and  that  the  transaction  could 
have  been  so  regarded  only  through  a  delusion.  But  even  if  this 
were  so,  still  the  apostles  must  have  known  where  the  supply 
really  came  from,  and  the  puzzle  is  to  explain  how  the  event  could 
have  been  called  a  miracle  by  the  Evangelists.  Beyschlag  seems 
to  trace  the  origin  of  the  notion  to  the  enthusiasm  of  the  people 
who  had  been  fed,  and  who  imagined  that  the  supply  had  been 
miraculously  furnished.  But  this  delusion  could  not  have  been 
transfused  into  the  minds  of  the  more  immediate  disciples ;  and 
it  is  still  unexplained  how  in  the  Fourth  Gospel  (whose  genuine- 
ness Beyschlag  defends)  the  occurrence  could  have  been  so  un- 
equivocally described  as  a  miracle.  Beyschlag  endeavors  to  find 
in  the  Gospels  themselves  positive  intimations  that  his  theory  is 
correct.  He  quotes  Mark  vi.  52,  where  it  is  said  that  the  dis- 
ciples "  understood  not  concerning  the  loaves,  but  their  heart 
was  hardened,"  as  evidence  that  they  did  not  originally  take 
the  occurrence  as  miraculous.  Mark  writes  this,  he  says,  from 
the  standpoint  of  one  who  did  regard  the  event  as  miraculous. 
But  then  the  question  arises,  How  did  the  disciples  ever  come 
to  regard  this  occurrence  as  miraculous,  if  it  did  not  make  this 
impression  at  the  outset  ?  Beyschlag  gives  as  the  reason  that 
they  had  witnessed  miracle  upon  miracle  wrought  by  Jesus,  so 
that  their  faith  in  his  miraculous  power  was  unbounded.  Very 
well ;  then  the  most  natural  thing  was  that  they  should  regard 
the  occurrence  as  miraculous  at  the  outset,  as  the  Evangelists  all 
evidently  imply.  To  say  that  Mark  in  one  breath  narrates  what 
he  conceives  to  have  been  a  palpable  miracle,  and  in  the  next 
affirms  that  the  disciples  did  not  understand  it  to  be  one,  is  to 
make  him  guilty  of  the  strangest  confusion.  Mark  makes  the 
statement  in  question  as  an  explanation  of  the  disciples'  surprise 
at  seeing  Jesus  walking  on  the  water.  That  is,  he  means  to 
intimate  that,  although  thev  had  just  witnessed  a  great  miracle, 


BEYSCHLAG  ON  MIRACLES.  433 

they  were  not  prepared  to  witness  another.  Inasmuch  as  Bey- 
schlag  regards  both  accounts  as  legendary,  it  requires  the  faith 
of  a  critic  to  detect  in  this  observation  of  the  Evangelist  the  one 
truthful  statement  which  unlocks  the  mystery  of  the  whole  af- 
fair, and  reveals  (what  there  is  not  the  faintest  hint  of)  that  there 
was  food  enough  "  concealed  "  by  the  multitude,  notwithstanding 
that  Mark  himself  (in  the  narrative  of  the  second  miraculous 
feeding)  makes  Jesus  say  expressly  (viii.  2)  of  the  multitude 
that  "  they  have  nothing  to  eat." 

All  this  straining  and  discrediting  of  the  narrative  in  order  to 
avoid  the  assumption  of  a  miracle  —  and  that  on  the  part  of  one 
who  strenuously  defends  the  reality  of  miracles  in  general !  It  is 
a  wonder,  however,  if  the  fear  of  believing  in  something  "  magi- 
cal" must  drive  one  to  some  method  of  explaining  the  miracle 
away,  that  our  author  should  not  have  adopted  an  explanation 
similar  to  the  one  by  which  he  solves  the  problem  of  the  miracle 
at  Cana.  The  hypothesis  that  by  a  sort  of  mesmeric  influence 
the  water  was  made  to  taste  like  wine  involves  only  two  difficulties, 
neither  of  which  appears  to  be  any  stumbling-block  to  Beyschlag, 
namely,  that  the  narrator  evidently  conceived  it  otherwise,  and 
that  Jesus  is  virtually  accused  of  practising  deception.  Other- 
wise everything  is  very  simple.  Now,  instead  of  such  large 
draughts  on  the  imagination  in  regard  to  the  supply  of  food,  why 
not  suppose  that  Jesus  exerted  his  mesmeric  power  here  with  re- 
gard to  food  as  in  the  other  case  he  did  with  regard  to  drink? 
Why  not  suppose  that  he  ordered  grass  to  be  plucked  and  passed 
around  to  the  multitude,  and  by  his  mesmeric  power  made  it  taste 
like  bread  and  fish  ?  Is  there  not  a  hint  of  this  in  the  express 
statement  made,  that  there  was  "much  grass"  in  the  placed! 


28 


434  APPENDIX. 


EXCURSUS    YIU 

RITSCHL    ON    MIRACLES. 

"O  ITSCHL'S  doctrine  of  miracles  is  further  expounded  in  the 
Jahrbiicher  fur  deutsche  Theologie,  1861,  where  he  propounds 
the  following  definition :  "  The  religious  conception  of  a  miracle 
is,  in  its  most  general  sense,  nothing  else  than  that  of  an  experi- 
ence of  God's  special  providence"  (p.  442).  Again  {Ibid.),  "In 
this  sense  to  declare  miracles  impossible  is  as  much  as  to  say 
that  positive  religion  is  an  illusion.  ...  In  this  sense  the  reli- 
gious man  is  continually  and  necessarily  experiencing  miracles, 
and  does  not  need  merely  to  believe  in  miracles  which  others 
have  seen."  Furthermore,  he  says  that  the  early  Christians  had 
"no  conception  of  natural  laws,"  and  that  therefore  "historical 
investigation  is  utterly  unable  to  make  out  from  the  narratives 
before  us  what  took  place  objectively ''  (p.  440).  And  in  Sybel's 
Historische  Zeitschrift  (1862,  p.  97)  he  says,  "  Most  certainly  natural 
events  which  contradict  natural  laws  are  for  us  scientifically  in- 
conceivable," and  adds  (p.  98),  "  Since  now  both  Jesus  and  Paul 
are  not  conscious  of  working  in  opposition  to  the  laws  of  nature, 
it  follows  that  confidence  in  the  truth  of  their  consciousness  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  principle  that,  because  a  contradiction  of 
the  laws  of  nature  is  inconceivable,  miracles  are  impossible.'^  All 
this  is  found  in  a  discussion  in  which,  in  opposition  to  Zeller  (who 
disbelieves  all  miracles),  he  is  undertaking  the  defense  of  the 
historic  credibility  of  the  evangelical  narratives.  He  says  that 
Jesus,  the  Evangelists,  and  Paul  are  credible  witnesses,  and  that, 
though  there  may  be  doubt  about  the  authenticity  of  some  parts 
of  the  history,  yet  there  is  no  sufficient  reason  for  denying  the 
stories  of  the  miracles  in  general.  But  such  a  defense  is  worse 
than  open  attack.  To  affirm  that  the  miracles  narrated  really 
occurred,  and  yet  to  affirm  that  we  do  not  know  what  "  took  place 
objectively,"  is  to  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing  in  the  same 
breath.  Everything  is  referred  to  a  purely  subjective  standard. 
A  miracle,  according  to  him,  is  anything  remarkable  in  so  far  as  it 
has  a  bearing  on  one's  religious  life.  He  speaks  indeed  of  extra- 
1  See  p.  143. 


RITSCHL   ON   MIRACLES.  435 

ordinary  events  ;  but  inasmuch  as  he  denies  that  these  events  in 
any  way  conflicted  with  natural  laws,  he  practically  denies  that 
real  miracles  occurred.  When  Zeller  retorts  {Ibid.,  p.  110),  "If 
they  [the  violations  of  natural  law]  are  unthinkable,  then  they 
are  also  impossible  ;  for  thiukableness  is  for  us  the  only  mark  of 
possibility,"  his  reply  is  conclusive.  For  Ritschl,  in  distinguish- 
ing miracles  from  violations  of  natural  law,  does  not  define  them 
as  events  wrought  by  special  operation  of  divine  power  independ- 
ently of  natural  law.  His  conception  of  them  is  apparently  as 
much  opposed  to  the  latter  as  to  the  former  conception.  In  short, 
an  event  is  a  miracle  to  him,  not  because  of  any  opposition  to,  or 
independence  of,  natural  law,  but  it  is  such  simply  by  virtue  of 
the  subjective  state  of  the  man  who  witnesses  or  experiences  it. 
It  is  manifest  that  this  is  a  radically  different  conception  of  the 
miraculous  from  the  ordinary  one.  It  is  only  one  instance  of  the 
characteristic  tendency  of  Ritschl  and  his  school  to  use  the  old 
terms  with  the  old  meaning  emptied  out.  Practically  this  school 
is,  so  far  as  miracles  are  concerned,  at  one  with  the  purely  natu- 
ralistic school.  And  when  Professor  Ladd  associates  Eitschl 
with  Nitzsch,  Muller,  and  Dorner,  as  a  defender  of  the  reality  of 
the  evangelical  miracles  (Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  pp.  3,  318),  he 
puts  Eitschl  into  company  with  which  he  is  far  from  belonging. 


436  APPENDIX. 

EXCURSUS  VIII.^ 

THE    BOOK    OF    JONAH. 


T 


HE  Book  of  Jonah  will  doubtless  long  continue  to  exercise 
the  ingenuity  and  perplex  the  faith  of  many  good  Chris- 
tians. Let  us  consider  some  of  the  ways  in  which  a  Christian 
may  evade  the  apparent  significance  of  Christ's  reference  to  the 
history. 

1.  One  may  suppose  Christ  to  have  been  mistaken  as  to  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  Old  Testament  records.  That  is,  he  may 
be  supposed  to  have  believed  the  story  to  be  true,  though  it  was 
not  true.  Christ's  veracity  is  saved  at  the  expense  of  his 
intelligence.  This  theory  is  the  least  admissible  of  all  those 
which  profess  to  be  consistent  Avith  faith  in  Christ.  Yet  it  is 
possible  for  one  to  have  a  very  exalted  view  of  Christ's  personal 
character,  to  acknowledge  him  as  a  divinely  commissioned  me- 
diator of  spiritual  light  and  salvation,  although  limited  in  his 
knowledge  of  matters  respecting  which  perfect  accuracy  requires 
an  acquaintance  with  scientific  and  critical  questions  such  as  he 
cannot  be  supposed  to  have  possessed.  If  Christ  could  declare 
himself  to  be  ignorant  of  the  day  of  his  own  second  coming 
(Mark  xiii.  32),  may  it  not  be  allowable  to  imagine  him  to  have 
been  also  ignorant  of  the  exact  truth  concerning  the  story  of 
Jonah?  Not  to  enter  in  detail  on  the  Christological  question 
thus  raised,  it  is  obvious  to  say  that  in  the  case  just  referred  to 
Christ  did  not  profess  to  know  the  thing  he  was  ignorant  of. 
He  knew  the  extent  of  his  own  ignorance,  and  was  careful  not 
to  commit  himself  to  any  assertion  beyond  the  limits  of  his  own 
knowledge.  In  the  case  of  Jonah,  on  the  contrary,  the  hypothesis 
under  consideration  requires  us  to  suppose  him  to  have  made  an 
assertion  on  a  point  beyond  the  limits  of  his  knowledge,  while  yet 
he  did  not  profess  any  ignorance  whatsoever.  The  declaration  in 
Mark  xiii.  32,  whatever  view  one  may  take  of  it,  is  remarkable 
as  the  only  one  in  which  Christ  directly  avows  his  ignorance. 
It  comes  in  connection  with  other  assertions  which  imply  a  very 
high  degree  of  knowledge.     Christ  puts  himself   here  not  only 

1  See  n.  264. 


THE   BOOK  OF  JONAH.  437 

above  all  other  men,  hut  above  the  angels,  and  makes  declavations 
concerning  the  future  which  nothing  but  supernatural  knowledge 
could  warrant.  The  confession  of  ignorance,  therefore,  strikes 
one  with  surprise  ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  in  various  ways 
commentators  have  endeavored  to  explain  away  the  apparent 
meaning  of  it.  These  explanations  may  be  unsatisfactory ;  but 
the  more  stress  one  lays  upon  Christ's  declaration  of  ignorance, 
the  more  necessary  is  it  to  accept  the  truth  of  what  he  implicitly 
and  explicitly  says  respecting  his  altogether  unique  knowledge. 
If  he  is  thus  trusted,  then  he  must  be  assumed  to  have  been  at 
least  conscious  of  the  limitations  of  his  knowledge.  And  we 
cannot  easily  conceive  such  a  being  to  have  undertaken  to  make 
declarations  concerning  matters  of  which  he  knew  himself  to  be 
ignorant.  If  he  did  not  know  whether  the  story  of  Jonah  was 
true  or  not,  it  is  derogatory  to  the  simplicity  and  sincerity  of  his 
character  to  suppose  him  to  have  intended  to  vouch  for  the 
truthfulness  of  the  story. 

2.  Again,  one  may  suppose  that  the  passage  (Matt.  xii.  40) 
in  which  Christ  is  said  to  have  referred  to  the  story  of  Jonah 
and  the  fish  is  not  genuine.  This  is  a  view  held  by  many. 
Stress  is  laid  on  the  fact  that  in  the  parallel  passage  (Luke  xi. 
29-32)  Christ  only  speaks  of  Jonah  as  preaching  to  the  Ninevites, 
and  makes  the  "  sign "  consist  only  in  that.  The  passage  iu 
Matthew's  Gospel  is  therefore  supposed  not  to  belong  to  the 
original  work,  but  to  have  crept  in  as  a  later  interpolation. 
Textual  criticism  has  shown  that  interpolations  did  sometimes 
take  place.  It  is  certainly  possible  that  the  verse  in  question  is 
an  unauthentic  addition  to  the  genuine  Gospel.  But  it  is  certain 
that  there  is  no  critical  authority  for  such  a  conjecture.  The 
passage  is  not  omitted  in  any  of  the  codices  of  Matthew's 
Gospel.  There  is  no  reason  for  questioning  the  genuineness 
and  authenticity  of  the  passage  except  such  as  would  be  equally 
valid  in  the  case  of  every  other  reference  made  by  Christ  to 
Old  Testament  miracles.^  The  process  of  mind  which  leads  to 
the  hypothesis  of  interpolation  is  this  :  Pirst,  one  doubts  the 
Old  Testament  story ;  next,  one  dislikes  to  see  Christ  apparently 
endorsing  it;  and  therefore,  finally,  one  searches  for  evidence 
that  he  in  fact  did  not  endorse  it.  If  in  the  search  for  evidence 
one  should   find   positive   external   and   internal   indications  of 

^  See  Meyer's  Commentary  in  loc. 


438  APPENDIX. 

spuriousness  in  the  passage,  such  as  have  weight  with  those 
who  find  no  intrinsic  objection  to  it,  then  the  case  would  be 
different.  But  as  the  case  is,  it  is  not  a  critical  investigation, 
but  a  critical  bias,  which  finds  the  evidence  of  interpolation. 

3.  Again,  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  passage  in  jVIatthew 
is  genuine,  but  that  the  story  of  Jonah  there  referred  to  is  not 
to  be  understood  as  authentic  history,  but  rather  as  a  mere  alle- 
gory or  parabolic  story.    This  theory  may  assume  different  forms. 

(a)  One  may  conjecture  that  the  story  of  Jonah  is  wholly 
fictitious,  and  was  understood  to  be  fictitious  both  by  Christ  and 
his  hearers.  In  that  case  the  reference  to  it  would  be  analogous 
to  that  which  we  often  make  to  characters  and  incidents  in  well- 
known  works  of  imagination.  But  the  objections  to  this  view 
are  insuperable.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  reason  for  sup- 
posing the  story  of  Jonah  to  have  been  regarded  by  Jesus' 
contemporaries  as  a  fable  or  allegory.  All  the  evidence  is  to 
the  opposite  effect.^  In  the  next  place,  it  is  inconceivable  that 
Christ  could  have  spoken  as  he  did  about  Jonah's  preaching  at 
Nineveh,  if  both  he  and  his  hearers  had  held  the  whole  story 
to  be  fictitious.  He  solemnly  declared  (Matt.  xii.  41 ;  Luke  xi. 
32)  that  the  men  of  Nineveh  had  repented  at  the  preaching  of 
Jonah,  and  would  rise  up  in  the  judgment  and  condemn  the 
Jews  who  had  rejected  the  gospel.  If  both  he  and  the  Jews 
addressed  held  the  Book  of  Jonah  to  be  a  fictitious  work  through- 
out, such  a  comparison  would  have  been  solemn  mockery. 
Fictitious  characters  will  certainly  never  rise  up  in  the  judgment ; 
and  the  appeal  to  the  Ninevites  could  have  excited  in  the  Jews 
no  other  emotion  than  that  of  ridicule,  if  they  regarded  the 
story  as  really  fictitious. 

(b)  One  may  conjecture  that  the  Book  of  Jonah  was  regarded 
both  by  Christ  and  his  hearers  to  be  in  part  historical  and  in 
part  fictitious.  In  this  case  the  reference  to  the  repentance  of 
the  Ninevites  may  be  considered  as  honestly  meant,  it  being 
supposed  that  Jonah  really  did  go  and  preach  to  the  Ninevites, 
but  that  the  story  of  the  fish,  and  other  parts  of  the  narrative, 
belong  to  the  poetic  drapery  of  the  book.  This  hypothesis  avoids 
the  second  objection  to  the  first  form  of  the  allegorical  expla- 

1  Tobit  xiv.  4,  8,  and  Josephus,  Jnt.  ix.  10,  2,  refer  to  the  story  as  historic. 
Davidson  (Introduction  to  the  Old  Testament,  vol.  iii.  p.  271),  while  he  denies  the 
authenticity  of  the  story,  yet  says,  "  It  was  the  current  belief  of  the  Jews,  however, 
that  the  events  narrated  respecting  Jonah  were  literally  true." 


THE   BOOK  OF  JONAH.  439 

nation,  but  it  is  still  exposed  to  the  other  one :  There  is  not  the 
slightest  evidence  that  the  Jews  held  any  part  of  the  Book  of 
Jonah  to  be  fictitious.  Besides,  this  hypothesis  is  exposed  to  an 
objection  that  does  not  lie  against  the  other,  namely,  that  it 
requires  us  to  suppose  Jesus  to  make  reference  to  two  incidents 
in  the  history  of  Jonah, —  to  both  in  the  same  way,  as  if  equally 
authentic,^  —  whereas  the  two  are  supposed  to  be  as  different  as 
fiction  and  fact.  Such  a  juxtaposition  is  possible,  but  exceed- 
ingly improbable.  Furthermore,  it  ill  comports  with  the  general 
style  of  Jesus'  address  to  suppose  him  to  call  anything  a  "  sign  " 
of  his  resurrection,  which  both  he  and  his  hearers  knew  to  be  a 
merely  fictitious  event. 

(c)  It  may  be  thought  that  Jesus  regarded  the  story  of  Jonah 
as  fictitious,  though  his  hearers  regarded  it  as  true.  In  this 
case  his  reference  to  the  story  must  be  taken  as  an  instance  of 
accommodation,  or  of  argumentum  ad  hominem.  So  Davidson,'^ 
who  says,  "  Where  he  does  not  assert  a  thing  on  his  own  inde- 
pendent authority,  but  merely  to  confound  or  confute  the  Jews 
of  his  day,  he  should  not  be  quoted  as  a  voucher  for  the  his- 
torical truth  of  facts  or  events."  That  in  some  cases  Jesus 
may  have  used  this  kind  of  argument  may  be  admitted,  though 
this  method  of  interpretation  can  be  only  very  sparingly  resorted 
to.  In  the  case  before  us  it  is  quite  unwarrantable.  The  allu- 
sion to  Jonah  was  not  first  made  by  Jesus'  hearers ;  his  reply, 
therefore,  was  not  a  retort  provoked  by  them.  He  himself  in- 
troduces the  subject,  and  asserts  "on  his  own  independent  au- 
thority" that  the  prophet  preached  at  Nineveh,  and   that  the 

1  Professor  Ladd  {Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scnpture,  vol.  i.  p.  67)  thinks  it  "perhaps 
worth  noticing,  that  the  part  of  the  narrative  of  Jonah  which  may  belong  to  the  his- 
toric basis  of  his  book  is  assumed  in  categorical  statement  (see  Luke  xi.  29-32),  while 
a  certain  part  which  plainly  [?]  belongs  to  the  allegorical  and  poetic  attachment  of  the 
book  is  given  by  Matthew  as  alluded  to  merely  in  a  figure  of  comparison."  But  surely 
this  is  a  subtlety  that  can  hardly  be  expected  to  carry  much  weight.  So  Christ  alludes 
to  the  brazen  serpent  (John  iii.  14)  and  to  the  antediluvians  (Matt.  xxiv.  37-39) 
merely  in  a  figure  of  comparison.  But  do  we  therefore  infer  that  he  regarded  either 
of  the  narratives  referred  to  as  fictitious  ?  In  a  categorical  statement  one  affirms  the 
truth  of  a  thing ;  in  a  comparison  one  assumes  the  truth  of  a  thing. 

2  Introduction,  etc.,  vol.  iii.  p.  270.  Davidson,  however,  is  disposed  to  admit  that 
some  elements  of  real  history  form  the  basis  of  the  book,  though  he  does  not  undertake 
to  say  what  they  are  (p.  279).  He  says  ( Ibid.)  that  "  Jonah  may  have  preached  to  the 
Ninevites,"  though  on  the  next  page  he  says,  "  We  cannot  believe  that  he  prophesied 
against  Nineveh ; "  and  on  pages  272  sq^.  he  argues  that  the  whole  story  of  Jonah's 
going  (o  Niueveh  is  very  improbable. 


440  APPENDIX. 

Ninevites  repented.  If  this  reference  to  the  story  of  Jonah 
does  not  imply  Christ's  belief  in  the  historical  character  of 
it,  then  the  same  can  be  said,  if  one  will,  of  every  reference 
which  he  makes  to  Old  Testament  history.  When  he  spoke  of 
the  Deluge  (Matt.  xxiv.  37,  38 ;  Luke  xvii.  26,  27)  ;  when  he  re- 
ferred to  Abraham  as  the  progenitor  of  the  Jewish  race  (Luke 
xiii.  16 ;  John  viii.  37)  ;  when  he  called  Moses  the  lawgiver  of 
the  Jews  (John  vii.  19),  and  replied  to  the  people  concerning 
Moses'  law  of  divorce  (Matt.  xix.  7,  8) ;  when  he  argued  con- 
cerning the  resurrection  on  the  ground  of  what  Moses  heard  out 
of  the  burning  bush  (Luke  xx.  37)  ;  when  he  quoted  the  conduct 
of  David  in  eating  the  shew-bread  (Matt.  xii.  3,  4) ;  when  he  re- 
ferred to  the  prophets  Isaiah  (Matt.  xiii.  14,  xv.  7)  and  Daniel 
(Matt.  xxiv.  15) ;  when  he  spoke  generally  of  the  prophets  (Matt. 
v.  12  ;  Luke  xviii.  31,  xxiv.  25 ;  John  vi.  45),  or  of  the  law  and  the 
prophets  (Matt.  v.  17,  vii.  12,  xxii.  40 ;  Luke  xvi.  16,  29),  —  in  all 
such  cases  one  may,  if  he  choose,  assume  that  he  was  only  using 
the  argumentum  ad  hominem,  not  meaning  to  imply  that  he  had 
any  belief  in  the  existence  of  Abraham,  Moses,  David,  or  the 
prophets,  or  in  the  written  history  of  God's  dealings  with  the 
Jewish  race  in  general. 

It  is  obvious  that  there  must  be  a  very  strict  limit  to  the  ap- 
plication of  this  hypothesis  of  accommodation.  If,  when  Jesus, 
without  direct  provocation,  introduces  a  reference  to  some  inci- 
dent of  Old  Testament  history,  speaks  of  it  as  if  it  were  a  fact, 
and  makes  a  practical  application  of  it,  we  may  yet  assume  that 
he  really  means  only  to  imply  that  his  hearers  thought,  though 
erroneously,  that  the  history  was  an  authentic  one,  why,  then 
the  door  is  open  for  unlimited  license.  If  this  principle  is  good 
for  Christ,  it  must  be  equally  good  for  his  disciples.  All  Paul's 
discourse  and  argumentation  about  the  Mosaic  law  and  Hebrew 
history  may  be  regarded  as  not  implying  that  he  believed  there 
was  anything  historically  true  in  what  he  referred  to ;  he  may 
have  been  only  using  the  argumentum  ad  hominem.  The  apos- 
tles may  be  supposed  to  have  received  esoteric  instruction  from 
Jesus  in  the  department  of  higher  criticism,  as  the  result  of  which 
they  came  to  hold  the  Old  Testament  to  be,  generally,  a  collec- 
tion of  myths  and  fables  ;  but  inasmuch  as  the  common  people 
held  the  history  in  great  reverence,  they  may  have  been  instructed 
to  speak  and  write  as  if  they  themselves  shared  the  popular  be- 
lief.    Since  the  object  was  to  introduce  a  better  religion  in  the 


THE  BOOK  OF  JONAH.  441 

place  of  the  Jewish  superstition,  it  might  have  been  thought 
easier  to  accomplish  the  object  by  treating  the  current  belief  as 
well  founded,  and  the  new  doctrine  as  a  fulfilment  of  the  old, 
than  by  attacking  the  old  religion  as  resting  on  a  false  founda- 
tion. By  adopting  such  a  view  of  the  attitude  taken  by  Christ 
and  his  disciples  towards  the  Hebrew  religion  and  history,  criti- 
cism gets  a  very  wide  field  of  operation.  Any  theory  of  the 
origin  and  meaning  of  the  several  Old  Testament  books  which 
the  "critical  feeling"  may  select  can  then  be  freely  promul- 
gated, and  all  that,  without  surrendering  faith  in  the  authority 
of  Jesus  Christ  and  his  apostles. 

But  this  would  evidently  be  going  too  far.  When  one  has 
come  to  look  upon  the  founders  of  Christianity  as  such  adepts  in 
simulation,  recommending  their  doctrine  as  being  a  new  and  im- 
proved edition  of  the  old,  when  in  reality  they  regarded  the  old 
as  a  fabulous  and  worthless  mass ;  in  other  words,  when  whole- 
sale deception  is  supposed  to  have  been  employed  in  order  to 
secure  the  adoption  of  the  new  religion,  one's  faith  in  the  immac- 
ulate truthfulness  of  this  new  religion  can  hardly  be  very  firm. 

The  foregoing  may  seem  to  be  a  caricature  of  the  principle  of 
interpretation  in  question.  Doubtless  no  one  ever  carried  it  to 
this  extreme ;  yet,  if  it  can  be  applied  to  such  a  case  as  Christ's 
reference  to  the  history  of  Jonah,  it  is  difficult  to  see  where  the 
limit  can  be  drawn.  For,  be  it  remembered,  the  prime  question 
in  this  connection  is  not  whether  the  narrative  alluded  to  is  in- 
trinsically improbable  or  not ;  it  is  rather  a  question  concerning 
the  manner  in  which  the  narrative  is  alluded  to,  and  the  purpose 
for  which  the  allusion  is  made.  If,  whenever  one  for  any  reason 
regards  an  incident  of  Old  Testament  history  as  legendary  or 
fictitious,  he  quietly  assumes  that  every  reference  to  it  in  the 
New  Testament  is  a  case  of  accommodation  to  popular  prejudice, 
there  is  manifestly  no  method  of  deciding  what  the  cases  of 
accommodation  are.  Each  man  will  have  his  own  standard  of 
application  for  the  convenient  hermeneutical  rule.  But  this 
would  be  making  Christ  and  the  New  Testament  writers  waxen 
figures  capable  of  being  moulded  according  to  the  caprice  of 
every  critic. 

What  criterion,  then,  is  to  be  adopted  in  determining  how  far 
the  language  of  Clirist  or  of  his  apostles  is  to  be  explained  as  an 
accommodation  to  prevalent  opinions  rather  than  as  an  expression 
of  their  own  ? 


442  APPENDIX. 

i.  The  presumption  is  against  every  alleged  instance  of  such 
accommodation.  The  burden  of  proof  rests  with  those  who  make 
the  allegation.  There  must  be  positive  evidence  adduced  that  in 
this,  case  the  general  rule  does  not  hold.  The  general  rule  is  that 
every  speaker  and  writer  must  be  presumed  to  mean  what  he 
seems  to  mean,  and  to  believe  what  he  seems  to  affirm.  It  is 
only  by  means  of  cogent  reasons  that  a  particular  case  can  be 
shown  to  be  an  exception  to  this  rule.  We  are  not  here  dealing 
with  ordinary  cases  of  rhetorical  figures.  In  most  instances  it 
lies  on  the  surface  whether  such  a  figure  is  used  or  not.  It  is 
not  often  difficult  to  see  when  a  speaker  or  writer  is  making  use 
of  irony,  or  paradox,  or  hyperbole,  or  metaphor,  or  metonymy. 
The  connection  generally  indicates  clearly  enough  whether  the 
language  is  to  be  understood  in  the  strictest  literalness.  The 
question  now  before  us  is  whether,  when  all  due  allowance  has 
been  made  for  tropes  of  this  sort,  the  language  used  expresses 
the  opinions  and  beliefs  of  the  speaker,  or  is  adopted  out  of  com- 
pliance with  the  sentiments  of  those  addressed.  This  is  not  one 
of  these  figures  of  speech,  whose  object  is  to  enliven  or  intensify 
an  obvious  meaning ;  it  is  using  language  without  meaning  what 
the  language  says.  Against  interpreting  language  in  this  way 
the  presumption  is  always  immensely  strong. 

ii.  It  is  not  an  instance  of  accommodation,  in  the  sense  here 
spoken  of,  when  words  and  phrases  are  retained  in  use,  after  the 
progress  of  knowledge  has  shown  that  the  original  use  of  them 
rested  on  a  mistake.  Thus,  when  we  talk  about  the  sun's  rising, 
or  the  dew's  falling,  or  about  a  lunatic  or  a  splenetic  person,  we 
do  not  mean  to  affirm  what  the  phraseology,  literally  interpreted, 
would  imply.  Though  a  "  lunatic "  originally  denoted  a  man 
struck  mad  by  the  moon,  we  may  still  use  the  word  in  the  general 
sense  of  "  madman,"  it  being  understood  that  the  etymological 
sense  of  the  word  has,  on  account  of  the  progress  of  scientific 
knowledge,  given  place  to  another.  So  long  as  this  change  of 
meaning  is  clearly  and  generally  understood,  there  is  no  "  accom- 
modation "  in  the  sense  of  the  word  now  under  consideration. 

iii.  It  is  a  sort  of  accommodation,  when,  in  cases  analogous  to 
the  above-mentioned,  the  original  error  which  gave  rise  to  a  cer- 
tain phraseology  still  generally  or  widely  prevails,  and  the  few 
who  have  attained  a  more  accurate  knowledge  still  use  the 
phraseology,  even  at  the  risk  of  appearing  to  share  the  popular 
error.     For  example,  an  astronomer  might  speak  of  "  fixed  stars," 


THE   BOOK  OF  JONAH.  443 

and  thus  seem  to  affirm  the  truth  of  a  common  notion  that  the 
stars  are  motionless,  though  he  really  believes  quite  otherwise. 
But  this  he  would  do  only  when  the  reference  to  the  stars  is 
incidental,  and  when  it  would  turn  him  aside  from  his  main 
point,  to  correct  the  vulgar  error.  Otherwise,  if  for  convenience' 
sake  he  still  used  the  current  phrase,  he  would  yet  take  pains  to 
explain  that  he  uses  it  in  a  different  sense  from  that  which 
implies  that  the  stars  are  motionless. 

It  may  be  an  instance  of  such  accommodation,  when  Christ 
spoke  of  demoniacs  as  if  he  agreed  with  the  common  opinion 
that  the  unfortunates  so  named  were  really  possessed  by  demons. 
The  mere  word  "  demoniac  "  might  be  used  as  we  now  use  "  luna- 
tic," to  denote  a  certain  well-known  disordered  state  of  a  person, 
without  committing  one's  self  to  any  opinion  as  to  the  cause  of 
the  state.  If  it  were  clear,  first,  that  he  merely  used  the  term  as 
a  current  and  convenient  one,  and,  next,  that  he  did  not  unne- 
cessarily confirm  the  popular  impression  by  the  manner  in  which 
he  spoke  of  the  persons  in  question,  it  might  be  argued  that  this 
was  a  case  in  which  there  was  no  need  of  his  undertaking  to  cor- 
rect an  error  of  the  prevalent  psychology.  There  are  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  this  view,  growing  out  of  the  fact  that,  as  his  lan- 
guage is  reported  to  us,  he  appears  to  endorse  the  popular  opinion 
by  the  use  of  expressions  which  he  would  hardly  have  used,  if  he 
had  not  shared  the  current  notion,  and  if  he  was  only  refraining 
from  a  direct  attempt  to  uproot  it.  If  he  went  out  of  his  way,  as 
it  were,  to  confirm  the  people  in  their  theory  of  the  cause  of  the 
so-called  demoniacal  possessions,  then  the  only  conclusion  con- 
sistent with  reverence  for  his  simplicity  and  veracity  is  to  sup- 
pose that  he  agreed  with  the  people  in  their  conception  of  the 
cause  of  the  demoniacal  phenomena. 

iv.  But  it  is  an  essentially  different  case  when  Jesus  makes 
reference  to  historical  events  and  institutions  for  purposes  of 
illustration  or  instruction.  Here  there  is  no  question  about  mere 
phraseology  which  may  have  originated  in  a  mistaken  notion  of 
physical  or  spiritual  causation.  It  is  rather  a  question  of  his- 
torical fact.  Any  voluntary,  unprovoked  reference  to  such  facts, 
or  supposed  facts,  on  Jesus'  part  must  have  been  understood  as 
implying  his  own  belief  in  their  genuineness,  unless  he  in  some 
way  guarded  or  qualified  his  remarks.  "When  he  was  accused  of 
casting  out  demons  through  Beelzebub  (Matt.  xii.  24),  his  rejDly 
might  not  improperly  be  taken  as  a  case  of  argumentum  ad  home- 


44J:  APPENDIX. 

7iem.  The  accusation  was  made  by  his  enemies;  and  he  takes 
them  on  their  own  ground :  "  i/"  I  by  Beelzebub  cast  out  demons, 
by  whom  do  your  sons  cast  them  out  ?  "  (verse  27) .  This  passage 
by  itself  might  leave  us  in  doubt  whether  he  believed  in  the 
existence  of  Beelzebub  or  not.  But  certainly  we  could  not  infer 
from  it  that  he  did  not  believe  in  such  a  being.  We  must  go  to 
other  passages  for  fuller  light.  But  when  Jesus,  without  being 
especially  challenged,  himself  introduced  references  to  incidents 
in  Hebrew  history,  he  must  be  presumed  to  have  referred  to  them 
as  historic  facts.  The  case  is  not  like  that  of  speakers  or  writers 
who  illustrate  their  remarks  by  reference  to  characters  or  inci- 
dents in  classical  mythology  or  in  well-known  works  of  fiction. 
In  such  cases  both  the  speaker  and  the  hearer  understand  that 
the  things  referred  to  are  fictitious.  In  referring  to  Hebrew  his- 
tory, on  the  contrary,  Jesus  appealed  to  what  was  understood  to 
be  real  history,  and  no  mythology  or  fiction. 

It  may,  however,  be  argued  that  by  rhetorical  license  Christ 
might  have  used  such  a  story  as  that  of  Jonah  by  way  of  illus- 
tration, even  though  he  himself  regarded  it  as  allegorical.  The 
possibility  of  this  may  perhaps  be  conceded.  But  against  assum- 
ing it  to  be  a  fact  must  be  insisted  (1)  that,  if  he  did  regard 
the  book  as  allegorical,  it  would  hardly  be  consistent  with  his 
straightforward  truthfulness  to  refer  to  it  as  if  he  thought  it  to 
be  real  history,  when  he  knew  that  he  would  be  understood  to  en- 
dorse it  as  such;  (2)  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  did  regard 
it  as  allegorical ;  and  (3)  that  there  is  no  proof  that  the  author  of 
the  book  meant  it  as  allegorical.  There  is,  therefore,  an  im- 
mense presumption  in  favor  of  regarding  Christ  as  implicitly 
endorsing  the  truthfulness  of  the  book. 

Still,  it  is  urged  by  some  that  there  are  clear  indications  in  the 
Book  of  Jonah  itself  that  it  was  not  meant  to  be  taken  as  au- 
thentic history,  but  rather  as  an  allegory  or  parabolic  fiction. 
"A  critical  examination  of  the  Book  of  Jonah,"  it  is  said,^ 
"  seems  to  show  that  it  is  a  composition  designed  by  its  author 
as  allegorical  and  didactic  upon  a  certain  basis  of  historic  facts." 
And  this  being  so,  it  is  asked,  "  Shall  it  be  claimed  that  Jesus 
could  not  quote  from  an  allegorical  book,  provided  it  be  proved  by 
criticism  that  such  a  book  exists 7"^  No,  we  answer,  "pro- 
vided it  be  proved."     What,  then,  are  the  proofs  which  criticism 

1  Ladd,  Doctrine  of  Sacred  Scripture,  vol.  i.  p.  67. 

2  IbiJ.,  p.  68. 


THE   BOOK  OF  JONAH.  445 

brings,  that  the  book  was  not  intended  to  be  understood  as  au- 
thentic history  ?  They  are  such  as  these  :  The  strange  character 
and  conduct  of  Jonah  himself,  in  trying  to  flee  from  Jehovah, 
and  in  repining  at  the  non-fulfilment  of  his  prophecy;  the  im- 
probability of  a  solitary  Hebrew  prophet  making  the  long  and 
toilsome  journey  to  Kineveh ;  the  extraordinary  effects  attributed 
to  his  preaching;  the  lack  of  details  in  the  account  of  Nineveh 
and  its  king ;  the  story  of  the  miraculous  preservation  through 
the  fish.^  The  argument,  in  short,  is  that  the  story  is  intrinsi- 
cally improbable,  that  it  is  therefore  not  real  history,  and  was 
not  intended  to  be  understood  as  history. 

Now  the  first  reflection  which  this  argument  suggests  is  that 
the  author  of  the  book  seems  to  have  made  a  bad  failure,  if  his 
intention  was  to  be  understood  as  writing  allegory.  To  be  sure, 
Davidson  tells  us,"^  "  The  story  speaks  for  itself ;  and  he  who  will 
not  see  the  fabulous  in  its  character  and  form  may  remain  igno- 
rant." Yet  the  fact  is  that  the  world  generally  has  failed  to  see 
what  is  here  declared  to  be  so  patent.  Davidson  admits  *  that 
the  Jews  believed  the  events  narrated  respecting  Jonah  to  be  lit- 
erally true.  It  certainly  is  unfortunate  that  the  author  of  the 
book  succeeded  so  poorly  in  making  his  intention  clear. 

A  second  reflection  suggested  by  the  argument  is  that  the  same 
considerations  which  are  urged  to  prove  the  book  to  be  unhis- 
torical  bear  also  against  the  assumption  that  its  object  is  didac- 
tic. Yet  these  two  propositions  are  usually  conjoined.  But  a 
fictitious  narrative,  strictly  speaking,  teaches  nothing  at  all.  The 
most  impressive  teaching  is  the  narrative  of  instructive  facts.* 
Fiction  may  indeed  be  designed  to  convey  a  moral  lesson,  but  it 
can  do  so  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  true  to  nature,  that  is,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  supposed  to  be  like  that  which  really  does  happen.  A  nar- 
rative may  be  judged  to  be  fictitious  because  of  the  inherent  im- 
probability of  the  events  narrated,  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of 
the  stories  of  Jules  Verne.  But  in  proportion  to  the  extrava- 
gance and  incredibility  of  the  narrative  it  must  necessarily  fail 
to  instruct.     This  self-contradiction  of  the  critics  in  their  judg- 

1  These  are  the  points  urged  by  Davidson,  Introduction,  etc.,  pp.  272  sqq.  The 
argument  for  an  allegorical  interpretation  of  the  book  is  presented  in  greater  detail  and 
with  much  force  by  Dr.  C.  H.  H.  Wright,  Exegetical  Studies,  pp.  34  sqq. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  280. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  271. 

*  Cf.  F.  Watsou,  The  Law  and  the  Prophets  (Hulsean  Lectures  for  1882),  p.  52. 


446  APPENDIX. 

ment  of  the  Book  of  Jonah  is  very  obvious.  The  book  is  conjec- 
tured, for  example,  to  have  been  composed  in  order  to  justify  God 
for  not  having  fulfilled  the  prophecies  against  the  heathen,^  or  to 
have  been  written  after  the  time  of  Ezra,  as  a  protest  against 
the  "  particularism "  of  the  priestly  party.^  Now,  even  if  this 
were  admitted  to  be  true  (though  there  is  not  a  particle  of  evidence 
of  it),  still  the  question  arises.  How  did  the  writer  expect  to  ac- 
complish his  object  ?  If  his  contemporaries  cherished  narrow 
conceptions  concerning  God's  feelings  and  purposes  towards  the 
heathen,  how  did  he  expect  to  correct  such  conceptions  by  o.  fic- 
titious story  about  the  prophet  Jonah's  preaching  to  the  Nine- 
vites  ?  His  narrow-minded  contemporaries  might  well  have  re- 
torted :  "  If  you  can  furnish  no  better  proof  of  your  proposition 
than  a  confessedly  false  story,  then  you  could  not  more  effect- 
ually proclaim  the  weakness  of  your  doctrine."  And  if  the 
writer,  in  order  to  prove  his  pious  doctrine,  not  only  invented 
his  facts,  but  invented  especially  extravagant  and  incredible 
facts,  a  bad  case  would  have  been  made  only  so  much  the  worse. 
Xo ;  an  erroneous  conception  of  the  character  of  God  could  have 
been  corrected  by  such  a  story  only  in  case  the  story  had  been 
supposed  to  he  true.^  This  is  a  proposition  whose  correctness  is 
especially  obvious  with  reference  to  attempts  to  alter  mirrent 
notions.  A  fictitious  work  may  be  able  to  illustrate  and  enforce 
moral  notions  already  prevalent ;  but  it  would  be  absurd  to  en- 

1  Hitzig,  Die  zwolf  kleinen  Propheten,  p.  161. 

2  Kuenen,  Hellgion  of  Israel,  vol.  ii.  p.  242 ;  Davidson,  /.  c,  p.  277.  Numberless 
other  more  or  less  fantastic  interpretations  have  been  propounded,  which  may  be  found 
in  Maurer's  Commentarius.  Cf.  Delitzsch,  Etwas  iiber  das  Buck  Jona,  in  Rudclbach 
und  Guericke's  Zeitschrift  fiir  die  gesammte  Lutherische  Theologie,  1840. 

8  Professor  Briggs,  however  {Biblical  Study,  pp.  238,  239),  speaking  of  the  books 
of  Esther  and  Jonah,  says,  "  The  model  of  patriotic  devotion,  the  lesson  of  the  univer- 
sality of  divine  providence  and  grace,  would  be  still  as  forcible,  and  the  gain  would  be 
at  least  equal  to  the  loss,  if  they  were  to  be  regarded  as  inspired  ideals  rather  than  in- 
spired  statements  of  the  real."  No  doubt  fictitious  narratives  may  powerfully  excite  the 
moral  and  religious  feelings,  when  those  feelings  already  exist.  But  a  disbelieved  or 
doubted  truth  cannot  be  made  an  undoubted  truth  by  means  of  fiction.  If,  for  example, 
Caesar  Borgia  is  wrongly  held  to  have  been  a  moral  monster,  the  error  may  be  corrected, 
and  the  public  opinion  altered,  by  a  historical  investigation  o^  facts.  But  an  avowed 
fiction,  which  should  portray  him  as  a  model  of  virtue,  would  leave  his  reputation  just 
where  it  is.  But  even  with  reference  to  motives  and  emotions  and  convictions  already 
existent,  the  proposition  of  Professor  Briggs  cannot  be  maintained.  "Would  v.  fictitious 
Paul,  or  Huss,  or  Wilberforce  make  the  same  impression  on  the  world  as  the  real 
man?  . 


THE   BOOK   OF  JONAH.  447 

deavor  to  reform  the  moral  or  religious  sentiments  of  a  people  by 
a  fiction  confessed  to  be  fiction.  If,  for  example,  the  Book  of 
Deuteronomy  was  composed  in  the  reign  of  Josiah,  and  if  its 
object  was  to  secure  the  enforcement  of  certain  new  political  and 
ceremonial  regulations,  and  if,  further,  the  legislative  book  was 
fictitiously  ascribed  to  Moses,  the  object  of  this  fictitious  ascrip- 
tion must  have  been  defeated,  if  it  had  been  understood  to  be 
fictitious.  The  people  might  have  stood  in  awe  of  the  real  Moses 
whose  law  was  reported  to  have  been  brought  to  light;  but  if 
they  had  been  told  that  the  law  did  not  really  emanate  from 
Moses,  but  only  from  somebody  who  thought  it  would  have  been 
well  if  Moses  had  promulgated  it,  and  who  therefore  called  it  the 
law  of  Moses,  it  is  manifest  that  such  a  trick  would  have  met 
with  well-merited  ridicule  ;  it  would  be  like  nothing  else  so  much 
as  Bottom  the  weaver's  careful  explanation  that,  in  acting  the 
part  of  a  lion,  he  was  really  not  a  lion  at  all.  The  theory  of 
Kuenen,  Wellhausen,  and  their  adherents,  that  religious  reforms 
■were  brought  about  by  the  introduction  of  supposititious  books, 
is  transparently  foolish,  unless  it  is  meant  that  by  means  of  these 
books  the  people  were  successfully  deceived.  And  the  same  must 
be  said  respecting  the  Book  of  Jonah.  If  its  author  had  such  a 
didactic  purpose  as  is  above  spoken  of,  he  must  have  meant  to 
be  understood  as  writing  a  true  history ;  else  he  would  have 
defeated  his  own  purpose. 

The  theory  of  a  didactic  purpose,  and  the  theory  that  the  book 
is  a  pure  and  acknowledged  fiction,  are,  therefore,  destructive  of 
each  other.  We  must  adopt  one  of  the  three  views :  either 
that  the  author  had  a  moral  aim  and  accomplished  it  by  an  in- 
tentional deception ;  or  that  he  had  no  moral  aim,  but  was  amus- 
ing himself  by  a  flight  of  his  fancy ;  or,  finally,  that  he  had  a 
moral  aim  which  he  accomplished  by  telling  a  narrative  which  is 
substantially  true. 

Substantially  true,  we  say.  For  it  may  well  be  that  a  construc- 
tive fancy  worked  up  the  facts  into  the  form  which  tliey  have. 
As  in  the  prologue  of  the  Book  of  Job,  the  incidents  are  woven 
together  in  a  poetic  way ;  there  is  a  crowding  together  of  remark- 
able things  such  as  in  real  life  seems  improbable.  There  is 
plausibility  in  the  hypothesis  that  the  author  used  a  certain  art 
in  dressing  up  the  story  of  the  prophet's  experiences.  But,  after 
all,  the  intrinsically  most  improbable  thing  in  the  book  is  just 
that  which  Christ  most  directly  attests,  namely,  the  mission  of  a 


448  APPENDIX. 

Hebrew  prophet  to  a  great  heathen  city.  It  is  contrary  to  all 
analogy;  yet  it  is  the  one  leading  thought  of  the  book.  The 
book  opens  with  Jehovah's  command  to  Jonah  to  go  to  Nineveh ; 
it  is  made  up  of  incidents  connected  with  the  prophet's  attempt 
to  evade  the  command,  and  with  his  final  execution  of  it ;  it  ends 
with  Jehovah's  lesson  to  the  repining  prophet  founded  on  his 
treatment  of  the  repentant  city.  It  is,  therefore,  consistent  when 
critics  like  Hitzig^  pronounce  this  feature  of  the  book  purely 
fictitious.  The  miraculous  incidents  in  the  history  are  not  with- 
out parallel  in  other  parts  of  the  Old  Testament;  the  really 
strange  and  seemingly  improbable  thing  is  this  sending  of  a  lone 
man  to  an  immense  foreign  city  with  a  threatening  message. 

When,  therefore,  less  radical  critics  admit  that  Jonah's  preach- 
ing in  Nineveh  and  the  effects  of  his  preaching  "  may  belong  to 
the  historic  basis  of  his  book,"  ^  the  chief  intrinsic  improbability 
of  the  narrative  is  conceded  not  to  be  insuperable.  Why,  then, 
should  we  question  the  authenticity  of  the  details  ?  So  strange 
a  mission,  it  might  be  expected,  would  have  strange  accompani- 
ments. Yet,  strictly  speaking,  there  is  only  one  outright  miracle 
reported,  namely,  that  concerning  the  fish.  If  this  miracle  gives 
offense,  it  must  be  either  because  any  miracle  is  offensive,  or  else 
because  there  is  something  'peculiarly  offensive  in  this  miracle. 
But  as  Prof.  E,.  A.  Redford  ^  well  remarks,  "  If  Jonah  was  to  be 
preserved  alive,  when  cast  out  of  the  vessel  into  a  raging  sea, 
what  more  fitting  form  of  the  miracle  can  we  imagine  than  that 
he  should  be  cast  out  by  a  great  fish  on  the  neighboring  shore  ?  " 
At  all  events,  if  the  story  of  the  fish,  as  a  fiction,  could  serve  any 
useful  purpose,  then,  as  a  fact,  it  must  have  served  that  purpose 
still  better.  Undoubtedly  the  author  did  design  to  convey  cer- 
tain lessons  by  the  story  of  Jonah.  It  teaches  that  God's  pater- 
nal government  is  not  confined  to  the  Jews,  but  extends  to  the 
Gentiles  as  well ;  that  it  is  futile  to  try  to  escape  from  the  divine 
authority  ;  that  God  can  deliver  one  from  the  extremest  peril ; 
that  he  can  use  even  unwilling  instruments  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  his  great  ends  ;  that  the  granting  of  mercy  to  the  peni- 
tent is  better  than  to  gratify  the  pride  of  reputation.  These 
truths  are  taught ;  for  they  lie  in  the  things  that  are  written. 
They  are  not  taught  in  the  form  of  didactic  propositions ;  but  they 

1  Die  zwolf  kleinen  Prophet  en,  p.  158. 

^  Ladd,  Sacred  Scripture,  p.  67. 

3  Studies  in  the  Book  of  Jonah,  p.  24.     An  excellent  monograph. 


THE   BOOK   OF  JONAH.  449 

are  implied  in  the  story,  especially  if  the  storij  is  true.  It  is  a 
singular  notion  of  some  men,  that  if  a  book  appears  to  contain  a 
moral,  it  must  needs  be  fictitious.  This  notion  is  carried  so  far 
that  the  same  narrative,  when  regarded  as  a  fiction,  is  pronounced 
more  instructive  than  when  regarded  as  a  true  history.  Thus 
Kuenen  remarks,  concerning  the  Book  of  Jonah,  "  The  whole 
of  this  writing  —  which,  interpreted  historically,  so  justly  gives 
offense  —  breathes  a  spirit  of  benevolence  and  universal  humanity 
which  is  very  attractive."  ^  That  is,  if  God  had  really  by  his 
providence  brought  about  such  occurrences  as  are  narrated  in  the 
book,  it  would  have  been  justly  offensive ;  but  if  the  occurrences 
are  only  imagined  to  have  taken  place,  they  convey  a  most  at- 
tractive lesson  !  In  the  name  of  common  sense  and  right  reason 
we  must  protest  against  this  absurd  and  preposterous  conception 
of  things.  If  Biblical  history  is  to  be  accounted  authentic  just 
in  proportion  as  it  conveys  no  determinable  lesson,^  then  there  is 
not  only  an  end  of  the  doctrine  that  God  has  revealed  himself  in 
and  through  history,  but  there  is  an  end  of  all  solid  foundation 
of  religious  truth  and  Biblical  science.  We  are  introduced  into 
a  world  in  which  worth  and  truth  have  no  relation  to  each  other, 
in  which  fiction  is  more  instructive  than  fact,  and  imagination 
more  to  be  trusted  than  experience.  No  wonder  that,  with  such 
a  principle  for  a  guide,  the  critics  find  the  Bible  abounding  in 
Tendenzschr'iften,  —  writings  whose  aim  is  to  establish  a  theory 
of  theology  or  of  history  rather  than  to  set  forth  the  truth.  No 
wonder  that,  with  such  a  keen  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the 
imagination  in  the  production  of  didactic  fiction,  they  should 
make  diligent  use  of  their  own  imagination  in  assigning  author- 
ship, dates,  and  fictitiousness  to  the  books  of  the  Bible. 

In  the  third  place,  we  remark  concerning  the  allegorical  inter- 
pretation of  the  Book  of  Jonah,  that  it  is  opposed  to  the  healthy 
tendencies  of  Biblical  exegesis.  The  drift  among  scholars  of  all 
classes  is  decidedly  against  the  theory  of  allegory  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  Bible.     Even  the  one  book  (Song  of  Solomon)  ^ 

^  Beligion  of  Israel,  vol.  ii.  p.  244. 

2  A  view  naively  expressed  by  Hitzig  {Geschichte  des  Volkes  Israel,  vol.  i.  p.  47), 
when,  concerning  the  incident  narrated  in  Gen.  xxxv.  22,  he  observes  that  it  is  to  be 
regarded  as  "an  actual  event,  because  not  adapted  to  have  reference  to  the  nation  as  a 
whole,  nor  to  involve  any  other  far-reaching  significance  "  ! 

3  The  allegorical  interpretation  of  this  book  has  much  more  to  say  for  itself  than 
that  of  the  Book  of  Jonah.  (1)  It  is  poetry,  making  no  pretense  to  being  history. 
(2)  There  are  suggestions  of  such  an  interpretation  in  the  frequent  representations  of 

29 


450  APPENDIX. 

which  has  longest  resisted  this  tendency  is  now,  even  by  many,  if 
not  by  most,  orthodox  interpreters,  regarded  as  not  having  been 
composed  as  an  allegory  conveying  an  occult  meaning  concern- 
ing the  Divine  love,  or  the  relation  between  the  Messiah  and  his 
Church.  It  is  remarkable  that  orthodox  men  should  nowadays 
be  inclined  to  resort  to  this  method  of  interpretation  in  the 
case  of  the  Book  of  Jonah,  which  has  usually  been  accepted 
as  a  statement  of  historic  fact.  Now  the  theory  of-  allegory  is 
never  plausible  unless  thei-e  is  some  positive  evidence,  internal 
or  external,  that  the  author  of  the  work  in  question  designed  it 
to  be  understood  as  an  allegory.  In  the  case  of  the  Book  of 
Jonah  all  the  positive  evidence  we  have  points  to  its  being  in- 
tended and  understood  as  history.  The  mention  of  a  prophet 
Jonah  the  son  of  Amittai  in  2  Kings  xiv,  25,  the  allusions  in  To- 
bit  and  Josephus  to  Jonah's  going  to  Nineveh,  the  general  belief  of 
the  Jews  that  the  story  was  an  account  of  facts,  and  Jesus'  refer- 
ence to  the  repentance  of  the  Ninevites,  are  the  chief  items  of 
external  evidence ;  and  they  all  point  to  the  historical  character 
of  the  book.  And  as  to  internal  evidence,  if  the  one  or  two  mi- 
raculous incidents  in  it  are  to  be  regarded  as  indicating  its  allegor- 
ical character,  then  by  parity  of  reasoning  nearly  every  historical 
book  of  the  Bible  must  come  into  the  same  category.  If,  further, 
the  moral  and  spiritual  suggestions  of  the  story  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  evidence  that  it  is  allegorical,  then  for  a  like  reason  all 
of  the  Bible  history  which  is  morally  instructive  is  to  be  esteemed 
not  really  history,  but  only  religious  instruction  in  parabolic  form. 
So  long  as  no  more  cogent  reasons  than  these  can  be  given  for  the 
notion  that  the  book  was  meant  as  allegorical,  it  is  a  misnomer  to 
speak  of  the  notion  as  the  result  of  "  criticism,"  unless  by  this 
term  is  meant  subjective  fancy  or  unfounded  conjecture. 

The  case  then  is  this :  The  Book  of  Jonah  purports  to  be  a 
veritable  history.  It  was,  according  to  all  the  evidence  before  us, 
so  regarded  by  the  Jews  of  the  time  of  Christ.  There  is  no  proof 
that  it  was  originally  designed,  or  has  generally  been  understood, 
to  be  anything  else.  Jesus  confessedly  refers  to  the  central 
feature  of  it  (Jonah's  mission  to  Nineveh)  as  a  historical  fact. 
In  immediate  connection  with  this  reference  he  refers  also  to  the 
account  of  the  miraculous  preservation  of  the  prophet.  There  is 
not  the  slightest  internal  evidence  for  thinking  that  he  regarded 

God  as  being  the  husband  of  his  chosen  people.  (3)  The  allegorical  interpretation 
has  been  the  prevalent  one  amongst  both  Jewish  and  Christian  scholars. 


THE  BOOK   OF  JONAH.  451 

this  as  less  a  fact  than  the  other.  The  question,  then,  recurs 
Does  Christ's  reference  to  the  story  of  Jonah  imply  that  he 
regarded  it  as  historical  ?  And  the  answer  can  no  longer  be 
doubtful.  If  there  were  evidence  (as  there  is  not)  that  the  story 
was  designed  by  the  author  to  be  understood,  and  generally  was 
understood,  as  an  allegory ;  or  even  if  there  were  evidence  (as 
there  is  not)  that  Christ  regarded  the  story  as  allegorical,  while 
his  hearers  did  not,  then  it  might  be  admitted  that  his  reference 
to  it  is  no  authentication  of  the  miraculous  event.  But  in  default 
of  this  evidence  the  conclusion  is  unavoidable  that  he  spoke  of 
the  event  as  a  fact.  He,  no  doubt,  "spoke  in  perfect  freedom 
from  the  ties  of  mere  criticism."  ^  This  may  mean,  however,  not 
only  that  he  refrained  in  popular  discourse  from  uttering  his 
critical  judgment  respecting  the  allegorical  character  of  the  Book 
of  Jonah,  but  that  he  was  quite  indifferent  to  the  opinions  which 
after  eighteen  centuries  certain  critics  would  propound  concerning 
it.  If  it  is  true  that  "the  commentator  may  not  help  out  his 
dulness  by  the  support  of  Christ's  infallible  authority,"  "^  it  is  no 
less  true  that  the  critic  may  not  help  out  his  acuteness  by  the 
support  of  Christ's  imaginary  authority. 

^  Ladd,  Sacred  Scrij)ture,  p.  68.  2  Jijid. 


TOPICAL   INDEX. 


Page 

Absolute  and  Relative,  the 415  sq,i. 

Absoluteness  of  God  and  personality 54,  412  s([q. 

Acceleration  theory  of  miracles 104  *(?• 

Accommodation  in  revelation 345  sq.,  439  sqq. 

Adam  and  Eve,  the  story  of 265 

Agnostic  view  of  miracles 131  sqq. 

Agnosticism  and  theism 415,  426  sqq. 

Allegorical  interpretations 266  sqq.,  438  sqq.,  449  sq. 

Anthropomorphism 53,  397  sqq. 

Apocrypha,  the 290 

Apostolic  authority 308  sqq.,  325 

inspiration 305  sqq.,  321 

Arnold,  Matthew,  on  miracles 157  sqq. 

Atheism  and  morality 39  sqq. 

general  consequences  of 30  sqq. 

not  a  mere  negation 30 

Authority  of  the  Bible 318  sqq. 

Authorship  of  Old  Testament  Books,  Christ's  testimony  on 274 

Berkeley  on  the  cognition  of  other  persons 391  sq. 

Jolin  Fiske  on 402 

Beyschlag  on  miracles 105  s^-.  429  sqq. 

Bible,  authority  of 318  sqq.,  329  sqq. 

infallibiUty  of 319,  342,  347 

and  the  "  Word  of  God  "...     : 367 

Bruce,  Prof.  A.  B.,  on  evidential  value  of  miracles 186  .'7. 

Brutes  and  men,  difference  between 17 

Canon,  the  Biblical 336,  363  sqq. 

Causation,  Berkeley  on 404 

Fiske  on 402  sq.,  412  sq. 

Hume  on 98  sq.,  412 

Christ,  authority  of 59  s^.,  93  sy?.,  141  s^?.,  210  s^.,  333 

as  a  leader 94  s^r. 

his  relation  to  miracles 157,  160,  179  sqq.,  186,  221 

his  moral  perfection 134,  142,  153  sq.,  182,  216 

his  miraculous  power I'^O  sqq. 

his  attitude  towards  the  Old  Testament  .     .     .231  sqq.,  263  sq.,  436  sqq. 


454  TOPICAL   INDEX. 

Page 
Christ,  his  resurrection 196  sqq. 

his  uuiqueuess 140  sq.,  168,  183,  210  sq. 

various  views  of  character  of 156 

Christian  experience  and  the  Bible 327,  337 

Christianity,  alleged  Aryan  origin  of 229  sqq. 

as  a  moral  power 192  sqq. 

skeptical  view  of  origin  of 168  sqq. 

presunipf ion  in  favor  of 360 

a  revelation 324,  352 

Church  and  the  Canon,  the 363  sqq. 

Cognition,  individual,  precedes  instruction 10  sqq. 

of  mind 10  sq.,  391 

Common  sense,  the  Christian 337  sqq. 

Conscience,  the  aboriginal 75  sqq. 

and  theism 39 

evolutionary  theory  of 40  55. 

Consciousness,  the  Christian 317,  319 

the  individual  and  the  common 389  sqq. 

Maudsley  on  the  validity  of 389  sqq. 

and  the  divine  personality 419 

Cosmic  Philosophy,  the 397  sqq. 

Cosmological  argument,  the 53 

Creation,  story  of  the 265  sqq.,  272  sqq. 

Credulity  of  critics 208 

Criticism,  Biblical,  right  of 330,  355 

of  miracle  stories 220  sq. 

affected  by  prepossessions 155  sqq.,  360  sqq. 

the  higher 374  sqq. 

limitations  of 363  sqq.,  370  sqq. 

Darwinianism 73 

Deism,  weakness  of . 62 

Demoniacs 443 

Dependence,  feeling  of 22,  27 

Design,  instinctive  demand  for 49,  56  s^. 

Deuteronomy,  critical  views  of 375  sqq.,  447 

Discrepancies  in  the  Bible 331,  339  sqq. 

Double  sense  of  Scripture 241 

Duty,  sense  of 39  *5f. 

Ecclesiastes,  authorship  of 374  sq. 

Education,  importance  of,  in  formation  of  opinion       .     .     .     .    5,  39,  358  sq. 

Empiricism 402  ^5. 

Ephesians,  Epistle  to  the,  and  the  liigher  criticism 372  sq. 

Error,  significance  of  the  fact  of 12,  34,  410 

Essential  and  non-essential  in  the  Bible 337  sqq. 

Evidences  of  Christianity  now  and  at  first 164  sqq. 

Evil,  moral,  Mr.  Royce  on 35 

Evolution,  eternal  series  of 48  57. 


TOPICAL   INDEX.  455 

Page 

Evolution  pliilosopliy,  the 399  sqq. 

Experience,  Christian,  and  the  Bible 327  sq. 

evidential  force  of 191  sqq. 

Fairbairn,  A.  M.  on  the  primeval  revelation 65  sqq. 

Fiction  in  the  Bible 374  597.,  438  597 

Fiske,  Joliu,  on  the  Absolute  and  personality 412  sqq 

his  philosophy  considered 397  «77 

Force,  the  agnostic  Deity 419  sqq 

Fraud,  as  an  agency  in  producing  the  Bible 370  sqq.,  441,  447 

Free  will  and  atheism Z\  sq. 

Freedom  of  thought 359 


Genius,  religious 134  .?(7, 

Gloatz  on  miracles 115  sqq 

God,  notion  of,  not  an  intuition 7,  26  55, 

innate  tendencies  to  believe  in  a 26,  49  5^5^ 

theories  of  origin  of  belief  in  a 21  sqq. 

personality  of 397,  412  sqq. 

Gospels,  the,  vs.  the  other  New  Testament  books 333  sqq 

Greek  philosophy  and  Christian  dogma 230 


Haeckel  on  nature 42 

Harmonizing  function  of  the  Christian  judgment 339  sq. 

Herrmann  on  Ciirist  and  revelation 144  sqq. 

History,  Old  Testament,  how  far  endorsed  by  the  New  Testament      .  265  sqq. 
Hume  on  miracles 98  5^. 


Idealism  vs.  materialism 391  ^9. 

Ignorance,  human,  as  proof  of  divine  existence 34 

Illusions  in  cognition 4,  12 

Individual,  as  related  to  common,  beliefs 16 

Infallibility  of  the  Bible 319,  342  .tqq. 

Infant  cognition 8,  17 

Infinite,  the,  and  God's  personality' 418 

metaphysical  puzzle  concerning  the 418 

Inspiration  and  revelation 280,  287  aqq. 

definition  of 283  sqq. 

mechanical  theory  of 284  sqq.,  309 

of  the  Biblical  writers 287 

of  Paul 312,  368  sq. 

proof  of  Biblical 293  sqq. 

of  words 287 

Intelligence,  origin  of 3(5 

Interpretation  of  the  Bible 328,  337  sqq.,  343 

Intuitive  truths 7>  14 


456  TOPICAL  INDEX. 

Page 

Jesus,  see  Christ. 

John,  Gospel  of,  authorship  of 207,  384 

his  testimony  ou  Clirist's  resurrection 207 

the  Baptist 158  sq.,  187  sq. 

Jonah,  Book  of 436  sqq. 

Judaism  and  Christianity 229  sqq. 

Jugglery  and  miracle-working 176 

Kaftan  on  origin  of  theism 22  s^. 

Knowledge,  a  product  of  individual  and  general  cognition 16 

reaUty  of 12,  356,  406  sqq. 

in  general  communicated 4  sqq. 

Kuenen  on  Deuteronomy 378 

Ladd,  Prof.  G.  T.,  on  inspiration 291  sqq. 

on  miracles 106  593.,  114,  179 

Language,  importance  of,  in  cognition 5,  11,  18,  394 

primeval ^^sqq.^Tlsq. 

Laws  of  nature  and  miracles 106,  111  sqq.,  218,  429  sqq. 

Leland  on  primeval  revelation 423  sq. 

Lessing  on  the  pursuit  of  truth 356  sq. 

Luther's  prayer  for  Melanchthon's  life 121 

Materialism  and  morality 41-47 

and  idealism 391  sq. 

and  immortality ^'i  sq. 

Mathematical  truths 8 

Matter,  belief  in  the  existence  of 12,  426 

Maudsley  on  the  validity  of  consciousness 389  sqq. 

Messianic  notions  of  the  Jews 161,184 

prophecies 234  sqq.,  256  sqq. 

Miracle  of  the  loaves 108  .^7.,  212  i*?.,  429  577. 

of  the  leper 211 

of  water  made  wine 104  sqq.,  185 

Miracles,  absolute  and  relative 114  sqq. 

acceleration  theory  of 104 

agnostic  view  of         132  sqq.,  426 

Arnold,  M.,  on 157  sqq. 

Beyschlag  on 429  sqq. 

criticism  of  narratives  of 219  sqq. 

criteria  of 224 

definition  of 97  sqq.,  146  sq. 

evidential  value  of 124  sqq.,  225  sq. 

faith  in,  relation  of,  to  Christian  faith 173  sqq. 

considered  as  obstacles  to  faith 167 

of  healing 214*77. 

Jesus  as  a  worker  of 157,  160,  179  sqq.,  186 

Jewish  conception  of 102  sq. 

relation  of,  to  natural  law  100,  106,  111  sqq.,  114  S77.,  147  sq.,  218,  429  sq. 


TOPICAL  INDEX.  457 

Page 

Miracles,  mesmeric  theory  of 105,  433 

Moses'  injunction  concerning 177 

narratives  of,  and  criticism 155  sqq.,  219  sqq. 

of  the  O.  T.,  how  far  authenticated  by  the  N.  T.       .      259  sqq.,  436  sqq. 

preconceptions  concerning,  effect  of 362 

proof  of 19G  sqq.,  209  sqq. 

proved  by  the  doctrine 179  sqq.,  188  sq. 

effects  of  questioning  the 169  sqq. 

Ritschl  on 145  sq.,  434  sq. 

true,  how  distinguished  from  false 175  sqq. 

Moral  argument  for  the  divine  existence 50 

law  as  immutable,  sense  of 40  s*?. 

order  of  the  universe ^■6 

sense 39  sqq. 

Morality,  atheistic 32,  42,  193 

and  Christianity 192  sj. 

and  theism 37  sqq. 

in  the  Deity 38  sq.,  398  sqq. 

of  the  Old  Testament 345  sqq. 

Moses  as  a  legislator *'i7 

and  the  Pentateuch 274 

Mystical  Christianity 226 

Nature,  laws  of 102,  111  sqq. 

Necessitarianism "^^ 

New  Testament,  authority  of 325 

Old  Testament  and  the  New 232  sqq. 

miracles  of  the 259  sqq. 

New  Testament  interpretation  of 335 

prophecies  of  Christ 234  sqq. 

Ontological  argument 53,  413 

Pantheism 47 

Pantheistic  tendencies  of  rationalism 62,  133 

Paradise,  Biblical  story  of 267  sqq. 

Paul  and  the  other  apostles 334 

his  apostolic  authority 289,  310 

on  the  resurrection  of  Christ 199  sqq. 

his  attitude  towards  the  Old  Testament 232 

Tiibingeu  theory  and 372 

Pentateuch,  authorship  of 274,  373  sqq. 

Perception  of  the  outward  world 12 

Perfection  of  the  Bible 347  sqq. 

Personality,  cognition  of  other  men's 10  sqq.,  390  sqq. 

of  God 397  sqq.,  412  sqq. 

Peter,  his  testimony  on  Christ's  resurrection 208 


458  TOPICAL   INDEX. 

Page 

Pfleiderer  on  the  primeval  revelation 79  sqq. 

Pfleiderer  on  revelation  in  general 133  sgq. 

Prayer,  answers  to 121  sg. 

relation  of,  to  theism 23 

Prepossessions  in  criticism 355  sqq. 

Primeval  man,  uniqueness  of  bis  condition 70  sqq. 

Prophecy  concerning  the  Jews 250 

evidential  use  of 243  sqq. 

minuteness  iu,  not  desirable 251  sqq. 

oriental  features  of 247 

sbaped  by  conceptions  of  the  time 249,  254  sq. 

Prophets,  their  general  office 245  sq. 

Providences,  special 120  sqq. 

Pseudonymy  in  the  Scriptures 374  sqq. 

Psychicalness  of  God 398  sqq. 

Rabbinical  interpretations  in  the  New  Testament 335 

Rabinowitz,  Joseph,  reference  to 350 

RationaHsm,  former  and  present 132  sq. 

Reason,  the  absolute 414 

a  collective  possession 18 

Relative  and  the  Absolute,  the 415  sqq. 

Relativity  of  knowledge li,  4:05  sqq.,  4:1Q  sq. 

Rehgion  and  morality 51 

natural  and  revealed 136 

theories  of  origin  of 21  sqq.,  419 

transmitted 2  sq.,  138 

Religious  impulse,  the 138 

opinions,  formation  of 358 

Resurrection  of  Christ,  fact  of 19&  sqq. 

M.  Arnold  on 163 

Herrmann  on 148 

Revelation,  alleged  impossibility  of 79 

natural  expectation  of 59,  62 

the  Christian,  general  features  of 87  sqq. 

marks  of 96,  132  sqq. 

antecedent  probability  of 19 

primeval 65  sqq.,  423  sqq. 

the  record  of 279  sqq. 

transmission  of 89  sq. 

Revelations,  multiplicity  of  alleged 64 

Ritschl  on  miracles 145  sq.,  434  sq. 

on  Christ's  character 142  sq. 

Satan  as  miracle-worker 177 

in  Paradise 269  sq. 

Senses,  testimony  of 4,  1 2 

Sibylline  Oracles  quoted 252 

Sin,  relation  of,  to  revelation 91  s^. 


TOPICAL   INDEX.  459 

Page 

Siulessness  of  Christ 153  sqq.,  183 

Skepticism  of  the  present  time 1 

Smith,  W.  R.  on  "  legal  fiction  " S77  sqq. 

Solomon's  Song 4-i9 

Spencer,  Herbert,  on  personality  of  God 397  sqq.,  412  sqq. 

philosophy  of 400  sqq. 

Stuart,  Moses,  on  typical  interpretation 235  sr/q. 

Supernatural,  the,  in  revelation 96 

in  the  New  Testament 161 

Taylor,  W.  M.,  on  evidential  value  of  miracles  .....    174  sqq.,  189  sq. 

Teleological  argument,  the 4:9  sq. 

Testimonium  Spiritu  Sancti 320 

Thaumaturgy  and  miracle-working 157  sq. 

Theism,  theories  of  origin  of 21,  69  sqq.,  419 

presumption  in  favor  of 29 

Theistic  beUef,  grounds  of 20  sqq. 

origin  of 1  sqq.,  424 

sense 22 

Tradition  as  a  source  of  theism 2  sq^. 

as  transmitting  Christianity 332 

Traditions,  Jewisli,  in  the  New  Testament 275  sqq. 

Trees  of  Paradise 270  sq. 

Trench  on  miracles 127,  177,  222 

Truth,  absolute 35 

absolute  and  relative 405-411 

Lessing  on  the  pursuit  of 356 

Tiibingeu  theory,  the 370  sqq. 

Typical  character  of  Old  Testament  prophecy 234  sqq. 

prophecies  not  evidential 243 

Uniqueness  of  Christ 140  sqq.,  168,  183,  210  sq. 

Unknown  Reality,  the 402 

Visions,  the  Biblical 200  sqq. 

Watson  on  the  primeval  revelation 425 

Westminster  Confession  referred  to 342 

"  Word  of  God  "  rs.  "Bible" 367 

Words,  in  what  sense  inspired 287 


INDEX    OF    AUTHOES    EEFEKRED    TO    IN    THIS 
VOLUME. 


Page 

Abbot,  Ezra 207 

Abbott,  E.  A.     .     .     .  129,  202,  212 

Alford 205 

Argyll,  Duke  of      .     .  25,  71,  77,  SG 

Arnold,  Matthew     47,  105,  129,  136, 

141,  157  sqq. 

Arnold,  Thomas      .     ,     .       127,  179 

Atbanusius 150 

Athenagoras 286 

Atkinson,  H.  G 38 

Augustine 112 

Baier 285 

Bannerman 301 

Barnes,  A 220 

Bascom,  J.     .....     .      53  s^. 

Baur,  F.  C 217,371 

Beck,  J.  T 298 

Bender,  W 22,  130,  188 

Berkeley 391  S17. 

Beyschlag      ....      105  sq.,  429 

Biedermann 130 

Birks,  T.  R 100 

Bissell,  E.  C 360,  381 

Boardmau,  G.  N 316 

Bowne,  B.  P 13,  30,  401 

Brace,  C  L 192 

Braid 214 

Bredenkamp,  C  J 382 

Briggs,  C.  A.    .     67,  234,  245,  374, 

446 
Bruce,  A.  B.     .     90,  112,  186   sq., 

222 

Buchanan,  J 403 

Biichner 397 

Burgon 238,  286,  335 

Burnouf,  Emile  .     66,  69,  86,  229  sq. 


Pagk 
Bushnell,  H.  .  .  98,  113,  129,  182 
Butler,  Bishop 316 

Caird,  J 25,  35 

Cairns,  J 98 

Calderwood,  H 3,  8 

Calovius 285 

Calvin 299 

Carpenter 214 

Chalmers 122 

Christheb      ....  128,  208,  260 

Chrysostom 299 

Clarke,  J.  F Ill,  126 

Clemens,  Alexaudriuus     .     .     .     229 

CUfibrd,  W.  K 193 

Cocker,  B.  F 423 

Coleridge,  S.  T 127,  179 

Conder,  E.  R 2,  54 

Couybeare 299 

Coquerel,  A.  J 130 

Cousin 385 

Cowper 221 

Cremer 299,  313 

Curteis,  G.  H 112,  131 

Czolbe 38 

Darwin 21 

Davidson,  S.      .     .  438,  439,  445  sq. 

Davison,  J 245 

Delitzsch    234,  242,  270  sq.,  381,  446 

DeWette 299 

Diman,  J.  L 2,  55 

Dorner,  A 112 

Dorner,  I.  A.    33,  39,  114,  124,  127, 
182,  223,  229,  318,  352,  412 

Drummond,  J 162 

DuBois-Reymond 72 

Dwiuell,  I.'  E 377 


462 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS. 


Page 

Ellicott 299  sq. 

Elmslie,  W.  G 273 

Ewald 212,245 

Tairbaira,  A.  M 65  sqq. 

Fairbairu,  P.     .    234,  239,  245,  256, 
299 

Eeuerbach,  L 21,  53 

Fichte,  J.  G 46 

Eisher,  G.  P.    33,  127,  128, 155,  160, 

200,  204 

Fiske,  J.  .   21,  43,  397  sqq.,  412  sqq. 

Flint,  R 2,  397,  423 

Eliigel,  0 115 

Frank 318 

Gaussen 285 

Given,  J.  J 331 

Gloatz 115  sqq. 

Goltz,  Vou  der Ill 

Gould,  E.  P 323 

Gray,  Asa 56 

Green,  T.  H.      .....     .       42 

Green,  W.  H 379,  381 

Greg,  W.  R.    83,  129,  141,  201,  206 

Haeckel 42 

Haley,  J.  W 331 

Hamilton,  Sir  Win.     .     .      357,  415 

Harnack,  A 230 

Harris,  S.  .    13,  39,  45,  54,  109,  414 

Harrison,  E 422 

Haweis,  H.  R 105 

Hedge,  E.  H 130 

Herrmann,  W 144  sqq. 

Hilgenfeld,  A 162,  302 

Hirzel,  J 164 

Hitzig  .     .     .    245,  258,  446,  448  sq. 

Hollaz 285 

Holtzmann 210,  299 

Hooker,  R 286 

Hopkins,  M 190 

Horst,  G.  C 244 

Hume 21,  98 

Huther 299 

Jackson,  W 55 

Janet,  P 55 


Page 

Josephus 438 

Justin  Martyr 229,286 

Kaftan,  J 22  sq. 

Kahnis      . 315,  324 

Keim    .     .     .  130,  199,  202  sqq.,  212 

Kleinert 245 

Konig,  E.  E 381 

Kostlin,  J 107,  126 

Kuenen  245, 251, 373,  378  sq.,  446, 449 
Kiiper 245 

Ladd,  G.  T.    106  sqq.,  114,  179,  220, 

234,245,  258,277,  290. s^?.,  298, 

313,  367,   435,  439,   444,   448, 

451 

Lange,  E.  A 21 

Lange,  J.  P 105,  214 

Lecky 192 

Lee,  W 281,  293,  313 

Leland 424 

Lessing     .     .      88,  90,  131,  205,  356 

Lewes,  G.  H 403 

Ligbtfoot,  J.  B 126 

Lipsius,  R.  A.  .     .  129  sq.,  132,  142 

Lotze,  H 36,  47,  51 

Lowtli 369 

Lubbock 21,  25,  73 

Lucretius 21 

LutLardt 62 

McCosh 17 

Mair,  A 127,  280 

Mansel 54,  415 

Marsh,  Bisliop 235 

Martineau,  H 38 

Martineau,  J 43,  298 

Matheson,  G 30 

Maudsley 389  sqq. 

Maurer 446 

Maurice,  F.D 127,  179 

Meyer 223,  437 

Mill,  J.  S 37,  87,  98 

Molescliott 397 

Morison,  J.  C 193 

Moslieim 298 

Mozley      .     .     .     100,  171,  186,  347 
Mulford,  E 8 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS. 


4G3 


Miiller,  Julius 115 

Miiller,  Max 6G,  86 

Murphy,  J.  J 4,  396,  403 

Neauder 105 

Newman,  F.  W 82,  154 

Ncwmau,  J.  II.  .      98,  125,  128,  217 
Nitzsch 253 

Oebler,  G.  F 245 

Ochler,  V.  F 258 

Olsbausen 104 

Orelli 245 

Origen 235,298 

Paley 174 

Park,  E.  A 97 

Parker,  Theodore    .     .     .     82  s^.,  88 

Patton,  F.  L 318 

Paulus 212,  430 

Peabody,  A.  P Ill 

Pecaut,  F 130,  244 

Perowue    .     .     .     234,  376,  379,  382 

Plieiderer,  0.      .    79,  81,  85,  129  sq., 

133  sq  ,  141,  232,  371,  373 

Philippi 287 

Philo 266 

"  Physicus  " 55 

Porter,  N 39 

Potter,  A 114 

Powell,  Baden    ....      128,  130 
Pressense 25,  220 

Quarry 266  57. 

Quenstedt 285 

Redford,  R.  A 448 

Reuan  ....     .86,  128,160,  219 

lienouf 86 

Riehm,  E 234,  245,  379 

Eitschl,  A.     .     22,  102,  130, 142  .?./., 
145,  150,  168,  434 

Ritter,  H 385 

Rogers,  H 83,164 

Rohr    .........     136 

Rothe,  R.      .     28,100  S7.,  107,  110, 

299,  302  sq.,  315 

Rougemout .     314 


Rousseau  . 
Row,  C.  A. 


103,  155, 


Royce,  J. . 
Riickert  . 
Rudelbach 


Page 

.     .     .     129 

182,  197,  287, 

313 

34  sq.,  94,  317 

...     164 

...     286 


Savage,  M.J 21,97 

Schaff,  P 1S2 

Schelling 77 

Sclienkel  .......  157,  202 

Schleiermacher   .     .  22,  111,  131,  197 

Scholteu 211  sq. 

Schottgen 276 

Schultz,  H 245,  252 

Schwegler 372 

Seeley,  J.  R 130,  167 

Seelve,  J.  H 124 

Smith,  R.  P 245,  381 

Smith,  R.  T 6 

Smith,  W.  R.     .     .     .      245,  377  sq. 

Smyth,  N 27,  347 

Speucer,  H.       21,  27,  33,  39,  44,  48, 
54,  397-401,  412-422,  427  sq. 

Spiess,  E 229 

Spiller,  P 427 

Stephen,  Sir  J 359,  375 

SterUng,  J 128 

Storrs,  R.  S 192 

Stoughton,  J 179 

Strack,  H.  A 381 

Strauss      159,  170,  197  sq.,  204,  212 

Stuart,  M 235-237,  239 

"  Supernatural  Religion  "    1,  99,  426 

Taylor,  W.  M.    98,  102, 174  sqq.,  189 

Teichmiiller 23,  147 

Temple,  Bishop 112,  215 

Tertullian 229 

Thayer,  J.  H.     .     155,  224,  277,  300 
Tholuck     .     128,  234,  246,  247,  251 

Thomas  Aquinas 114 

Thomassen,  J.  H 48 

Tindal,  M 88 

Toy,C.  H 382 

Trench,  R.  C    126  sq.,  177, 179,  222 

Tuke 214 

Twining,  K 196 


464 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS. 


Page 

Tylor,  E.  B 21 

Tyudall 400 

Uhlhorn 192 

UUmaun 182 

Ulrici 24,  33 

Urwick,  W 258 

Vogt,  C 397 

Vos,  G 381 

Wace,  H 298 

Waringtou,  G.  .      98,  109,  125,  287, 
300,  367,  377 


Page 

Watson,  r 275,  381,  445 

Watson,  R 425 

Weiss,  B 302,  431 

Weisse,  C.  H.    .     .  100,  168,  213  sq. 
Weizsacker   ....    202,  213,  217 

Wellhausen 373,  381 

Westcott 104,  365 

Whiston,  W 238 

Wiesinger 299 

Wright,  C.  H.  H 445 

Wright,  G.  F.     .    .    .  277,  313,  347 

Zeller 85,  434 


BIBLICAL    INDEX. 


Page 

Page 

Page 

Gen.  i.-iii   .  267, 

272,  273 

1  Kings  xxii 

13.     .     254 

Isa.  xliii.  22-24  . 

.     380 

i.  3      .     .     .    . 

.     272 

2  Kings  i.  9-12    .     .     260  | 

xliv.  1,  21    .     . 

.     257 

i.  27     .     .    . 

266,  272 

xiii.  21    . 

...     260 

xlix.  1-6      .     . 

.    257 

ii.  9     .     .     . 

267,  271 

xiv.  25    . 

...     450 

1.  10    .     .     .     . 

.    257 

ii.  24  .     .     .     . 

.     266 

xxii.   .     . 

...     379 

Ii.  17-liii.  12     . 

.     246 

iii 

.     265 

xxii.  8     . 

...    377 

Iii.  13-liii.  12 

257,  258 

iii.  15 ...     . 

.    256 

xxii.  11,  13.     .     .     3781 

liii 

257,  258 

iii.  22.     .  267, 

268,  271 

2  Cliron.  xxv 

i.  22     .     290 

Ixvi.  19   .     . 

.    255 

iii.  24 ...     . 

.    267 

Job  i.  1  .     . 

...     344 

Ixvi.  20-23  . 

.     249 

vi.  9    .    .     .     . 

.    344 

Ps.  ii      .    . 

.     .236,242 

Jer.  iii.  1-18    . 

.    246 

ix.  20      .     .     . 

.    277 

ii.  7     .    . 

.     .     .     236 

iii.  16 .     .     . 

.    249 

XXV.  27  .     .     . 

.    344 

xvi.     .     . 

236-2.S8,  275 

iii.  18  .     .     . 

.    251 

XXXV.  22      .     . 

xlix.  10  .     .     . 

449 

xviii.  . 

.     .     .     242 

vii.  25,  26    .     . 

.    247 

'.    256 

xix.  7      . 

...    344 

ix.  16 .     .     . 

.     250 

Exod.  xxxiv.  6    . 

.    260 

xxii.    .     . 

...     236 

XV.  4  .     .     . 

.    250 

Lev.  i.  1-5      . 

.    380 

xxii.  1     . 

...     241 

xxiii.  5    .    . 

.    249 

iii.  2    .     .     .     . 
iv.  4,  12  .     . 

.    380 

xxiv.  . 

.     .     .     242 

xxiv.  9    .     .     . 

.     250 

.    380 

xl.       .     . 

...     238 

xxv.  4-7 

.    247 

vi.  11       .     .     . 

.     380 

xlv.     .     . 

.     .     .     236 

xxix.  18  .    .     . 

.     250 

xi  44      '.     . 

.     346 

Ixvii.  .     . 

...     242 

xxix.  19 .     . 

.     247 

xix.  2      .     .     . 

.    346 

Ixviii. 

.     .     .    242 

XXX.  9    .     . 

.     249 

xix.  18    .     .     . 

.     346 

Ixix.    .     . 

.     .     .    236 

xxxi.  10-14 

.     251 

Num.  xxii.  28 
xxiv.  17  .     . 

.    260 
.    256 

Ixix.  5     . 

...     236 

xxxi.  15   .     . 

238,  250 

Ixix.  21  . 

.     .     .    236 

xxxi.  31-34 

.    249 

Deut.  iv.  27    . 

.    250 

Ixix.  21-2e 

...    345 

xxxiii.  15,  17 

.    249 

vi.  5   .     .     . 

.    346 

Ixxii.  .     . 

.     .     .    242 

xxxiii.  18-22 

.    249 

xii.  8  .    .    . 
xii.  21,  29    . 

.     380 

Ixxvi.      . 

.     .     .    242 

XXXV.  15      . 

.    247 

.     380 

Ixxviii.  2 

.     .     .    238 

xlvi.  27  .     . 

.    251 

xiii.  1-5  .    . 

177  sq. 

Ixxxiii.    . 

.    .     .    242 

Ezek.  ii.  3-5   . 

.    247 

xiii.  12    .    . 

.    380 

xcv.  7,  8 

...     275 

V.  10  .     .     . 

.    250 

xvi.  2      .     . 

.     380 

cvii.  4-9  . 

...    212 

xi.  16. 

.    250 

xviii.  15,  18 

.    257 

ex.      236, 

242,  275,  302 

xi.  17  . 

. 

.    251 

xviii.  22  .     . 
xix.  1      .     . 

.    245 

.     380 

ex  4 

.     .    257 

xii.  15 

.    250 

Isa.  ii.  2-4  . 

...     249 

XX.  23 

.     .    250 

XXV.  4     .     . 

.    237 

viii.  16-ix 

7    .    .    246 

xxvii.  13,  19 

.    .    255 

xxviii.  25     . 

,    250 

ix.  1-7     . 

242,  248,  257 

xxxiv.  23,  24 

.     .    249 

XXX.  11-14  . 

.     238 

ix.  7   .     . 

...     249 

xxxvi.  16-36 

.     .     246 

xxxii.  2  .     . 

.     .    277 

X.  24-xi.  16      .     .    246 

Dan.  iii.  27      . 

.     .      98 

Josh.  X.  11.     . 

.     .     261 

xi.  1-9    . 

...     257 

viii.  21     .     . 

.     .    255 

Judg.  iv.  4  sqq. 

.     .    247 

xi.  10-16 

...    251 

ix.  6    . 

.     .    247 

vi.  7-10  .     . 

.     .     247 

xi.  14.     . 

.     .     .    249 

ix.  26 . 

.     .    257 

2  Sam.  vii.  2  sqq 

.    247 

xiv.  1-3  . 

...     251 

X.  20  . 

,     .    255 

xii.  1-15.     . 

.     .    247 

xxvii.  12, 

13    .     .    251 

xi.  2  . 

.     .     255 

xxiv.  11-14 

.     .     247 

xxxiv.  11- 

-16    .     .    248 

Hos.  iii.  5 

.     .    249 

1  Kings  xi.  29-3 

5    .     253 

xl.-lxvi.  . 

255,  257,  380 

vi.  2   . 

.    .    203 

xiii.  2      .     . 

.     .     251 

xii.  8-14 

.     .257,258 

ix.  17  . 

.     .    250 

xvii.  7  sqq.  . 
xviii.  1 

.     .    212 

xiii.  1-7  . 

...    257 

xi.  1   . 

238,  250 

.     .    277 

xiii.  19    . 

.     .     .     257 

xi.  11  . 

.     .    251 

xviii.  17  .     . 

.     .     254 

xliii.  10  . 

...    257 

Joel  ii.  15- 

32". 

.    .     246 

30 


466 


BIBLICAL   INDEX. 


Page 

Joel  ii.  28-32  . 

242,  2!47 

iii.  1-8    .     . 

.     251 

iii.  6    .     .     .     . 

.     255 

Amos  ix.  7-15    . 

.     246 

ix.  8,  9    .    .     . 

.     250 

ix.  11 .    .    .    . 

.     249 

ix.  14, 15     .    . 

.     251 

Obad.  17-21    .     . 

.     251 

Jonah  iv.  2      .     . 

.     2G0 

Micah  iii.  l-iv.  5 

.     246 

iii.  8   .     .     .     . 

.     247 

iv.  10      .     .'     . 

.     251 

V.  1-5     ..     . 

242,  257 

V.  2-10    .     .     . 

248,  251 

V.  5    ...     . 

.     249 

Zeph.  ii.  14     .     . 

.     248 

iii.  8-20.     .     . 

.     251 

Zech.  iii.  8      .    . 

.    257 

vi.  13  .     .     . 

.     257 

vii.  12      .     . 

.     247 

ix.  9,  10      242, 

248,  257 

ix.  13 .     .     . 

.     255 

X.  10  .     .     . 

.     251 

xii.  10     .     . 

.     257 

xiii.  7 .     .     . 

.    257 

xiii.  8,  9.    . 

.     250 

xiv.  16-21   . 

.     249 

Mai.  iv.  4    .     . 

.    377 

Matt.  i.  18  .     . 

.     223 

ii.  15  .     .  238, 

239,  250 

ii.  17,  18      . 

238,  250 

iv.  4,  7,  10  . 

.     801 

iv.  17.     .     . 

.    210 

v.  12  .     .     . 

.     440 

V.  17     .     .     . 

240,  440 

V.  18  .     .     . 

.    302 

V.  21-48       . 

.     210 

v.  38-46.     . 

.     345 

V.  42  .    .     . 

.     338 

vi.  15.     .    . 

.     .     185 

vii.  12     .    . 

.     440 

vii.  21-27    . 

.     .     210 

vii.  29     .     . 

.     177 

viii.  28-33   . 

.     .     223 

viil.  33    .     . 

.     .     220 

ix.  2-6    .     . 

211,  212 

ix.  5   .     .    . 

.     .     181 

ix.6   .     .     . 

.157,186 

x.  1     .     .    . 

.  181,  308 

X.  19,20.     . 

.     .     305 

X.  34-39.     . 

.     .    210 

xi.  2-5    .     . 

.     .     157 

xi.  5   .     .     . 

.216,219 

xi.  11.     .     . 

.     .     159 

xi.  28.     .     . 

.     .    210 

xi.  46-48      . 

.     .     185 

xii.  3,  4  .    . 

.274,440 

xii.  24     .    . 

.     .    443 

xii.  27     .    . 

.     .    444 

xii.  39     .     . 

.     .     157 

xii.  40  239,24 

1,261,437 

Page  i 

Page 

Matt.  xii.  41 

...     438 

Mark  xii.  36   .     . 

.    302 

xiii.  14    . 

...     440 

xii.  40     .     .     . 

.     437 

xiii.  35     . 

...    238 

xiii.  11    .     .     . 

.     305 

XV.  7 

...     440 

xiii.  32    .     .     . 

.    436 

XV.  32-39 

...     213 

xiv.  49    .     .     . 

240,  300 

xvi.  4      . 

...     157 

xvi.  8      .     .     . 

.    205 

xvi.  5-12 

...    213 

xvi.  9-20     .     . 

.     204 

xvii.  3     . 

.     .     .     201 

Luke  i.  3    .     .     . 

.    284 

xvii.  24-2 

7.     .     .    222 

i.  11    .     .     .    . 

.     201 

xviii.  18  . 

...    308 

i.  32    .     .     .     . 

.    239 

xix.  4      . 

...     272 

i.  54-56   .     .     . 

.    223 

xix.  4-6  . 

...     266 

iv.  22.     .     .     . 

.     177 

xix.  7,  8  . 

...    440 

iv.  25,26     .     . 

261,277 

xix.  8.     . 

...     344 

iv.  27      .     .     . 

.     261 

xxi.  4,  5  . 

...    248 

V.  1-11    .     .     . 

.     222 

xxi.  13     . 

.     .     .     301 

V.  I8S77.     .     . 

.     212 

xxi.  18-2( 

)   ...     223 

V.  23,  24      .     . 

.     181 

xxi.  42    . 

.     .  300,  303 

V.  24  .     .     .     . 

157,  186 

xxii.  29  . 

.     .300,302 

vi.  5-10  .     .     . 

.     181 

xxii.  40  . 

...     440 

vi.  17.     .     .     . 

.    206 

xxii.  41-4 

6       .     .    335 

vii.  18-22    .     . 

.     157 

xxii.  43  . 

...    302 

vii.  48     .     .    . 

.     211 

xxii.  43-4 

5       .    .     275 

viii.  46    .     .    . 

.     181 

xxiv.  15. 

...     440 

ix.  1,2    .     . 

.     181 

xxiv.  37- 

39      .    439  so. 

X.  13  .     .     .     . 

1.57,  221 

xxiv.  38. 

...     277 

X.  38-42.    .     . 

.    206 

xxiv.  39. 

.     .     .     261 

X.  40  .     .     . 

.     184 

XXV.  31-4 

6.     .     .     211 

xi.  20      .    157, 

180,  216 

xxvi.  54- 

56      .240,303 

xi.  29      .     .     . 

.     157 

xxvii.  52, 

53    .     .     223 

xi.  29-32     .     . 

437,  439 

xxviii.  10 

.     .     .     204 

xi.  32.     .    . 

.    438 

xxviii.  U 

.     .308,309 

xii.  11,  12    . 

.     305 

xxviii.  20 

305,  308,  309 

xiii.  16    .     . 

.     440 

Mark  i.  21 

~qq.     .     .     217 

xiii.  .32    .     . 

.     157 

i.  40-45 

.     .     211 

xvi.  16    .     . 

.    440 

i.  44    . 

...     274 

xvi.  17     .     . 

.     802 

ii.  3  sqq. 

...    212 

xvi.  29     .  274, 

803,  440 

ii.  9,  10 

...     216 

xvi.  31    .     . 

157,  803 

ii.  10  . 

.     .  157,  186 

xvii.  10  .     . 

.     142 

iii.  15 

...     181 

xvii.  26,  27  . 

.     440 

iii.  20-30 

...     157 

xvii.  27  .     . 

261,  277 

iv.  38 

...     184 

xviii.  80  .     . 

.     210 

V.  30  . 

...     181 

xviii.  31      . 

301,  440 

vi.  7    . 

...     181 

XX.  28     .     . 

.     274 

vi.  34 . 

.     .     .     212 

XX.  37      .     . 

201,  440 

vi.  62 . 

.     .     .    432 

XX.  87,  S8    . 

.     835 

vii.  10 

...    274 

XX.  41-44    . 

.     275 

vii.  13 

...     367 

xxi.  14,  15  . 

.     305 

vili.  1-9 

.     ...    213 

xxi.  22    .     . 

240,  301 

viii.  2. 

...    433 

xxii.  87  .     . 

.     258 

viii.  12 

...     157 

xxiv.  21  .     . 

.     .     185 

viii.  14-2 

1    ...     213 

xxiv.  25  .     . 

.     .     440 

viii.  32 

...     184 

xxiv.  27      240 

300,  303 

ix.  13. 

.     .  159,  241 

xxiv.  .32  .     . 

.     .     300 

X.  5    . 

...    274 

xxiv.  44     240 

274,  301 

X.  6     . 

.    ...     272 

xxiv.  45.     . 

.  300,  835 

X.  6-9 

.     ...    266 

xxiv.  47-49 

.     .     308 

xii.  19 

.     ...     274 

xxiv.  49     204 

205,  305 

xii.  24 

.     ...     302 

John  i.  41  .     . 

.     .     185 

xii.  26 

.     .      261,274 

i.  45,  49  .     . 

. 185,  231 

xii.  85-3 

?     ...     275 

ii.  7-10    .     . 

. 104-107 

BIBLICAL  INDEX. 


467 


Page 

John  ii.  9  .  . 

.  107 

ii.  11  .  .  . 

.  185 

ii.  ly  .  ,  . 

.  1«1 

ii  -22  .  .  . 

.  301 

iii.  2  .  .  . 

.  .  216 

iii.  14.  .  23'J, 

261,  439 

iii.  16.  .  . 

.  .  369 

iv.  25,  26  . 

.  .  231 

iv.  34.  .  . 

.  182 

iv.  48.  .  . 

.  .  157 

V.  5  sq,,.    .   . 

.  .  212 

V.  36  .  .  . 

.  .  182 

V.  38  .  .  . 

.  303 

V.  39  231,  240, 

300,  302 

V.  40  .  .  . 

.  .  303 

V.  45-47  231 

274,  303 

vi.  14,  15  . 

,  432 

vi.  15.  .  . 

.  185 

vi.  30  sqq.     . 

.  157 

vi.  31,  45  . 

.  301 

vi.  31,  32,  49 

.  261 

vi.  35   .  . 

.  211 

vi.  38 .  .  . 

.  182 

vi.  45.  .  . 

301,  440 

vi.  47-58   . 

.  211 

vi.  66.  .  . 

.  183 

vii.  19  .  . 

274,  440 

vii.  23  .  . 

.  274 

vii.  31   .  . 

.  184 

vii.  39  .  . 

.  313 

viii.  12  .  . 

.  210 

viii.29,  46  . 

182,  210 

viii.  87  .  . 

.  440 

X.  18  .  .  . 

.  181 

X.  25  .  .  . 

.  1.57 

X.  32  .  .  . 

.  221 

X.  34-36.  . 

.  335 

X.  35  .  .  . 

300,  303 

X.  38  .  .  . 

.  157 

X.  41  .  .  . 

.  159 

xi.  26 .  .  . 

.  237 

xi.  40-42  . 

.  181 

xi.  42 .  .  . 

.  157 

xi.  46-48  . 

.  185 

xii.  13  .  . 

.  231 

xii.  14,  15  . 

.  248 

xii.  41  .  .  . 

.  231 

xiii.  6   .  . 

.  184 

xiii.  18  .  . 

.  231 

xiv.  11  .  . 

.  157 

xiv.  16-18  .  . 

.  305 

xiv.  26  .  .  . 

305,  308 

XV.  16  .  . 

.  211 

XV.  26,  27  .  . 

.  305 

xvi.  12-15  .  . 

.  305 

xvi.  24  .  .  . 

.  211 

xvii.20  .  .  . 

.  306 

xvii.  21  .  .  . 

.  192 

xvii.  22  .  .  . 

.  308 

xix.  24  .  .  . 

.  231 

23 


John  xix.  28 

XX.  9 

XX.  21 

XX.  22, 

XX.  31 

xxi.  16-17 
Acts  i.  4 

i.  8      . 

i.  13   . 

i.  16   . 

ii.  1-4 

ii.  3    . 

ii.  4    . 

ii.  14-21 

ii  22  . 

ii.  24  . 

ii.  24-36 

iii.  1-8 

iii.  15 

iii.  16 

iii.  24 

iii.  26 

iv.  8    . 

iv.  10 

iv.  13 

iv.  31 

iv.  35 

V.  30  . 

vi.  1-4 

vi.  5  . 

vi.  7    . 

vi.  8   . 

vi.  10 

vii.  2  . 

vii.  2,  3 

vii.  26 

vii.  30     , 

vii.  36 

vii.  53 

vii.  55 

viii.  5-7 

viii.  13 

viii.  17 

viii.  29 

viii.  32 

viii.  39 

ix.  7   . 

ix.  26,  27 

ix.  33,  34 

ix.  36-40 

X.  9-16 

X.  10  . 

X.  38  . 

X.  40-43 

X.  44  . 

xi.  1    . 

xi.  24 

xii.  24 

xiii.  2-4 

xiii.  9 


Page  1 

236,  240,  345 

.   231 

,301 

308 

.  .  305 

.308 

.  .186 

,  231 

308 

204 

308 

311 

.   240,  300  ] 

306 

201 

3U5 

247,  306 

,309 

186,  216 

219 

181 

186,  237 

,275 

181 

.   181 

lbi6 

181 

240 

181 

30(5 

186 

309 

.   305 

367 

309 

181 

309 

.   306 

310 

367 

310 

310 

201 

261 

201 

.   201 

261 

261 

276 

.   306 

310 

310 

310 

306 

.   306 

310 

301 

310 

202 

.   203 

311 

181 

.  .  . 

181 

201 

284 

221 

186 

306 

367 

311 

367 

305 

306 

Acts  xiii.  17 
xiii.  30  . 
xiii.  33  . 
xiii.  34-37 

xiv.  8-10 
xiv.  14  , 
XV.  1-29 
XV.  8  .  . 
XV.  16  . 
XV.  28  . 
xvi.  6,  7 
xvi.  9 
xvii.  2  . 
xvii.  3 
xvii.  11  . 
xvii.  31  . 
xviii.  9  . 
xviii.  11  . 
xviii.  24  . 
xix.  6 
xix.  20  . 
XX.  24  . 
xxii.  9  . 
xxii.  17  . 
xxiii.  3  . 
xxvi.  16  . 
Rofn.  i.  1  . 
i.  2,  3  . 
i.  4  .  . 
i.  17  .  . 
i.  19,  20  . 
ii.  14,  15 
iii.  2  .  . 
iii.  4  .  . 
iii.  5  .  . 
iii.  25 
iv.  1-18  . 
iv.  3  .  . 
iv.  6  .  . 
iv.  19-21 
iv.  23  . 
v.  5  .  . 
V.  12-21  . 
V.  14  .  . 
vi.  19  .  . 
viii.  .  . 
viii.  1-5  . 
viii.  9 
viii.  9-14 
viii.  17  . 
ix.  4,  5  . 
ix.  6  .  . 
X.  6  .  . 
X.  6-9  . 
X.  15.  . 
X.  19  .  . 
xi.  9  .  . 
xi.  13  . 
xi.  17-24 


237, 


186 


Page 
261 
181 
236 

241. 
275 
181 
311 
309 


305 
306 
201 
300 
240 
300 
186 
199 
367 
300- 
306 
367 
309 
202 
284 
314 
310 
306 
232 
211 
301 
231 
231 
2.32 
301 
312 
211 
232 
301 
275 
261 
301 
307 
265 
241 
312 
429 
307 
289 
.307 
.308 
232 


275 


232, 


301 
275 
275 
309 
373 


468 


BIBLICAL   INDEX. 


Rom.  xii.  4,  5 
XV.  4  . 
XV.  10 

1  Cor.  i.  1 
i.  16   . 
i.  17    . 
ii.  6    . 
ii.  6-13 
ii.  10-16 
iii.  1-3 
iii.  10-12 
iii.  16 
V.  7     . 
vi.  2    . 
vi.  19 . 
vii. 
vii.  6  . 
vii.  10 
vii.  12 
vii.  25 
ix.  1   . 
ix.  9,  10 
X.  1-4 
X.4    , 
X.  11   . 
xi.8,  9 
xii.  3-13 
xii.  4  . 
xii.  27 
xii.  28 
xiii.  10 
xiii.  12 
xiv.  36 
xiv.  37 
XV.  1   . 
XV.  1-11 
XV.  3,  4 
XV.  8  . 
XV.  8-10 
XV.  15 
XV.  22 
XV.  35 
XV.  45 

2  Cor.  i.  5, 
i.  24  . 
iii.  6  . 


m. 


7  . 
iii.  7-11 
iii.  15. 
iv.  2  . 
iv.  5  . 
iv.  6  . 
iv.  7  . 
v.  21  . 
X.  8-11 
X.  10  . 
xi.  3  . 
xi.  6  . 
xi.  17 
xi.  23 


202, 


Page 

,  .  211 
300,  301 

.  301) 

.  305 

.  284 

.  309 

.  307 

.  310 

.  305 

.  307 

.  309 

.  307 

.  239 

.  308 

.  307 

.  313 

.  312 

.  312 

.  312 

.  312 

305,  309 

237,  301 

.  232 

.  276 

.  301 
265,  266 

.  307 

289,  309 

.  211 

.  309 

.  307 

.  368 

.  367 

.  305 

.  309 

.  199 

.  232 

.  202 

.  305 

.  181 

.  265 

.  203 

265,  301 

.  308 

.  325 

.  303 

.  261 

.  232 

.  275 

.  367 

.  325 

.  272 

.  368 
182,211 

.  305 

.  289 

.  265 

305,  309 

.  312 

.  312 


2  Cor.  xii.  1 

xii.  1-4  . 

xii.  9,  12 

xii.  11,  12 

xiii.  2,  3  . 

xiii.  10  . 
Gal.  i.  1   . 

i.  6-9  .  . 

i.  8,  9  .  . 

i.  8,  9,  11, 

i.  8,  11  . 

i.  9-12  . 

i.  10  .  . 

i.  15,  16  . 

i.  18  .  . 

ii.  2  .  . 

ii.  5  .  . 

ii.  6  .  . 

ii.  6-9  . 

ii.  11-14 

ii.  14  .  . 

iii.  2  .  . 

iii.  3  .  . 

iii.  7  .  . 

iii.  8  .  . 

iii.  14  sqq. 

iii.  15   . 

iii.  19   . 

iii.  24   . 

iv.  5-7  . 

iv.  22-25 

V.  16  .  . 

vi.  1  .  . 
Eph.  i.  1  . 

i.  13  .  . 

i.  15  .  . 

ii.  20  .  . 

iii.  1  .  . 

iii.  1-7  . 

iii.  2-8  . 

iii.  13-19 


305, 


IV.  8  .  . 
iv.  11.  , 
iv.  13  . 
iv.  17 .  , 
iv.  25 

iv.  30 

V.  18  .  . 
V.  30  .  . 
vi.  20-22 

Phil.  iii.  10 

iii.  12  . 

iii.  15  , 
Col.  i.  1   . 

i.  24  .  , 

i.  28  .  . 

ii.  16  .  . 

ii.  19  .  . 
1  Thess.  ii.  13 


Page 

.  199 

284,  313 

.  305 


.  289 

309,  310 

.  325 

.  310 


.  305 
.  3:^5 
305,  310 
203,  335 
313,  314 
.  314 
.  309 
.  305 
.  313 
.  314 
.  307 
.  307 
.  232 
.  301 
.  232 
.  312 
.  276 
.  232 


305 


239 
307 
307 
373 
307 
373 
309 
373 
305 
373 
373 
373 
300 
309 
307 
373 
372 
307 
307 
211 
373 


307 
307 
305 


.    307 

.     240 

.     211 

305,  367 


1  Thess.  iv.  1,  2 
iv.  8   .     . 

iv.  15.    . 

2  Thess.  ii.  13 
ii.  13-15  . 
ii.  15  .     . 

1  Tim.  i.  1 . 
ii.  5  .  . 
ii.  13,  14 

2  Tim.  ii.  9 
iii.  8  .  . 
iii.  15. 16    29 


iv.  13.  . 
Titus  i.  1-3 

ii.  6     .    . 

iii.  5  .  . 
Heb.  i.  1     . 


ii.  2 
ii.  12 

iii.  7 


iv.  7  . 
iv.  12 
iv.  15 
V.  6     . 


vn.  .  . 
vii.  26  . 
viii.  5 
viii.  7 
X.  1  .  , 
X.  5,  15  . 
xi.  7  .  . 
xi.  8  .  . 
xi.  11  . 
xi.  17-19 
xi.  28  . 
xi.  29  . 
xi.  30  . 
xi.  33-38 
xii.  18-21 
James  i.  25 
ii.  21  .  . 
v.  17  .     . 

1  Pet.  i.  2  . 
i.  3  .  . 
i.  10,  11  . 
i.  10-12  . 
i.  19  .  . 
i.  21  .  . 
i.  23  .  . 
ii.  6  .  . 
ii.  9  .  . 
ii.  22  .  . 
iii.  20  . 
iii.  21  . 
iv.  14      . 

2  Pet.  i.  4  . 


Page 
.  305 
.  307 
.  305 
.  307 
.  305 
.  306 
.  305 
.  211 

265,  266 
.  367 
.  275 

298,  322, 

344 

.  369 


367 
307 


.  276 

.  300 

.  300 

.  300 

.  275 

.  367 

.  182 

.  300 
239,  241 

.  182 

.  240 

.  344 

.  240 

.  300 

.  261 

.  261 

.  261 

.  261 

.  261 

.  261 

.  261 

.  276 

.  261 

.  379 


.  261 
261,  277 


186,  208 
.  301 
.  305 
.  182 
.  208 


301 
308 
182 
261 
208 
307 


BIBLICAL  INDEX. 


469 


2  Pet.  i.  21 

ii.  16  .  . 

iii.  2  .  . 

iii.  5  .  . 

iii.  15,  16 
1  Jolin  i.  l-o 

i.  3   .  . 

1.  8   .  . 

ii.  20  .  . 

Page 
301 
261 
305 
367 
305 
305 
332 
341 
289 

1  John  iii.  1,2 
iii.  5  .  .  . 
iii.  y  .  .  . 
iii.  24   .  . 

Jude,  9  .  .  . 

14,  15   .  . 

Rev.  i.  1-3   . 

i.  5   ... 

i.  6   ... 

Page 

308 
182 
342 
307 
276 
276 
305 
207 
308 


■  Page 

Rev.  i.  9   .  . 

.  367 

i.  18  .  .  . 

.  207 

ii.  7  .  .  . 

.  267 

ii.  8  ... 

.  207 

XX.  2  .  .  . 

.  269 

XX.  4  .  .  . 

.  367 

xxi.  2   .  . 

.  267 

xxii.  2  .  . 

.  267 

xxii.  6,  7 

.  305 

iBm 


